GEORGIA . . . ON RUSSIA’S MIND
By Ariel Cohen
Washington Times, DC
Oct 19 2006
Amid great power fretting over North Korea’s nuclear test and
continuing Iranian truculence against the West, Russia escalated its
confrontation with the neighboring Georgia. The arrest of five Russian
alleged intelligence officers two weeks ago was a pretext for Moscow
to further escalate an already difficult relationship with Tbilisi,
now affecting the 1 million Georgian Diaspora in Russia.
Ethnic Georgians, including children, were loaded on cargo planes
and expelled from Russia, citing their illegal immigration status.
Prominent Georgian intellectuals, who are Russian citizens, are being
harassed by the tax police. Georgian businesses in Moscow are singled
out by law enforcement authorities. The handling of the crisis is
threatening Russia’s international standing as a responsible and
constructive great power.
Georgia may have overplayed its hand by arresting the military
intelligence officers, whom it accused of sabotage, and not just
expelling them quietly — an acceptable modus operandi in such cases.
In response, Moscow recalled its ambassador from Tbilisi, evacuated
diplomats and their families and halted issuing visas to Georgian
citizens. The Russian military forces stationed in Georgia have gone
on high alert. Russia cut air and railroad links, and blocked money
transfers from Georgians working in Russia, denying an important
source of income for many Georgian families.
Since Mikheil Saakashvili came to power in the Rose Revolution of
2003, anti-Russian statements by Georgian leaders, a relentless
push to evacuate Russian military bases (to which Russia has agreed
previously), an attempt to join NATO, and opposition to Russian
membership in the World Trade Organization, have caused the Putin
administration to embargo the two key imports from Georgia. These
are Borjomi mineral water and wine, much beloved in Russia.
It did not end there. In September, South Ossetian separatists, who
receive Russian military support, have fired on Georgian helicopter
carrying the defense minister. This was a provocation, which, if
successful, could have led to conflagration of hostilities in the
small secessionist territory that belongs to Georgia. However, Russia
made little secret of its desire to start a war in the Caucasus that
would lead to a regime change in Tbilisi.
There are regional and global reasons why Moscow is escalating the
crisis over Georgia: c? To begin with, this is not the first time
Russia is trying to stop NATO enlargement into the formerly Soviet
territory. In 1999, Russia fulminated against the Baltic States’ NATO
membership. But at that time, Russia was extricating itself from the
1998 economic crisis while a power struggle was afoot in Moscow to
succeed President Boris Yeltsin. As energy prices were much lower
in 1999, Western European countries supported the Baltic States’
NATO bid despite Russian protests. However, today, Western Europe is
increasingly energy-dependent on the Gazprom and so is taking Russian
foreign-policy positions much more seriously.
c? Second, the Kremlin is now buoyed by $250 billion in petrodollar
reserves. These funds buy a lot of hardware for the Trans-Caucasus
Military District and for pro-Russian separatists in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia.
c? Third, Russia is uneasy over the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main export
pipeline, which takes Azeri oil to the Mediterranean markets, and
crosses Georgia but bypasses Russia. The Absheron-Erzurum gas pipeline
will be coming online, bringing Azeri gas to Turkey and Europe. Gazprom
is concerned that this gas pipeline may eventually allow export of
Turkmenistan and Kazakhstani gas to Europe, circumventing Russia’s
pipeline network.
If Georgia comes under the Russian sway, neighboring Azerbaijan
and Armenia will feel the full weight of Russian presence. Leading
foreign policy experts in Moscow believe Azerbaijan has not allocated
enough oil patches to Russian companies and facilitated oil exports
via Turkey instead of Russia, which may explain why Russia is leaning
on Georgia so much.
The Armenian opposition openly demands a more pro-Western and less
pro-Russian policy, noting close ties with Moscow did not improve
Armenia’s abysmal living standard and did not allow it to receive
international recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence.
A pro-Russian Georgia in the Collective Security Treaty Organization
of the Commonwealth of Independent States would permit Russia and
Iran to dominate Azerbaijan and Armenia, severely limiting the U.S.
policy options there. Furthermore, such a development would put to
rest U.S. ambitions in Central Asia and may cut off strategically
important Kazakhstan from Western energy markets.
Russia has warned repeatedly it will retaliate severely in case
Kosovo is granted independence against the will of Serbia, a
historic ally. Mr. Putin has called for imposition of the Kosovo
criteria on separatist enclaves in the former Soviet Union, including
Transnistria, which is a part of Moldova, Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Nagorno-Karabakh. Russia would enforce a referendum in these
territories, and would recognize their independence, opening the door
to their eventual incorporation in the Russian Federation. Moreover,
such an approach would create dangerous precedents vis-a-vis the
Crimea, where a majority of the population is pro-Russian; for
Russian-speaking Eastern Ukraine; and even for predominantly Slavic
Northern Kazakhstan.
Violations and alternations of the existing borders of the former
Soviet Union may generate severe tensions in Europe and open the
Pandora’s box of territorial claims and ethnically based border
challenges there and elsewhere, for example in Iraq and Kurdistan.
The United States today is preoccupied with major crises, such as
Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea. Russia is a key player in all
these. Its true and real cooperation would be welcome, although so far
it is not sufficient. It is vital for the future of the U.S.-Russian
relations and for global security that Moscow behaves responsibly and
constructively. Quickly defusing the Georgian crisis via diplomacy
is a good place to start. Washington should encourage the European
powers, the European Union and Turkey to become more engaged in
diffusing the Georgian-Russian confrontation. It should also advise
Georgia not to escalate rhetoric and performance vis-a-vis Russia
unnecessarily. After all, a peaceful and prosperous Caucasus is in
the Russian, Georgian and American interests.
Ariel Cohen is senior research fellow in Russian and Eurasian studies
and international energy security at the Heritage Foundation.