It could determine whether the country turns west, or back to Moscow
OPINION:
Armenia’s June 7 election will determine whether the country continues its cautious westward shift or drifts back into Moscow’s orbit.
The election is a test of whether Western political and economic partnerships can compete with Russia’s long-standing influence on its own doorstep.
Over the past several years, Yerevan’s government has strengthened ties with the U.S. and Europe while pursuing normalization with neighboring Turkey and Azerbaijan. It recognizes that Armenia’s security dependence on Russia failed to deliver stability. Moscow’s unwillingness to prevent Azerbaijan’s 2023 takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh was a decisive blow.
Yet Armenia’s geopolitical reorientation remains fragile. The central figure is Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who has been attempting a balancing act since coming to power after the 2018 Velvet Revolution. His political standing is not secure. Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 war with Azerbaijan and the 2023 displacement of about 100,000 Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh dominate domestic politics; they are a profound national trauma.
Mr. Pashinyan committed Armenia to a controversial but pragmatic path toward a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Yet despite the finalization of a treaty text earlier this year, implementation remains uncertain. Azerbaijan demands constitutional changes in Armenia before signing.
Critics accuse Mr. Pashinyan of conceding too much, while supporters say normalization offers Armenia its best chance to escape decades of economic isolation. It’s fertile ground for political challengers.
The fragmented opposition is largely rooted in the political networks that governed Armenia before 2018. Most prominent is the Armenia Alliance, led by former President Robert Kocharyan. It’s the largest opposition bloc in parliament, and it advocates closer alignment with Russia.
Other opposition figures associated with former President Serzh Sargsyan and business networks that once dominated Armenian politics also seek a restored security partnership with Moscow.
A defeat for Mr. Pashinyan would not necessarily begin a sweeping ideological shift in Armenian society. Rather, it would signal a convergence of grievances: frustration over Nagorno-Karabakh, economic anxieties and the enduring influence of political and business networks tied to the previous political order.
A Pashinyan loss would create opportunities for external interference. Russia retains considerable leverage through economic ties, media influence and politics, and it possesses a well-established playbook for shaping political environments in neighboring states.
Under Vladimir Putin, the Kremlin has repeatedly used disinformation, covert financing and digital manipulation to weaken pro-Western governments across Eastern Europe.
Recent elections in Moldova and Romania offer clear examples. Moldovan authorities say Russian-linked networks spent hundreds of millions of dollars on vote-buying and propaganda during the country’s recent election cycles. In Romania, the Constitutional Court annulled the country’s 2024 presidential election after intelligence services warned that coordinated digital influence operations had distorted the outcome.
In Armenia, similar tactics could prove effective. Narratives portraying Mr. Pashinyan as having “surrendered” Nagorno-Karabakh could be amplified across media and social platforms. Claims that Western partners offer rhetoric but few meaningful security guarantees could resonate.
The objective would not necessarily be to install a loyal proxy government but rather to generate enough political fragmentation and uncertainty to derail the reorientation away from Moscow.
That reorientation expanded significantly in recent years. European Union investments are expected to reach roughly $2.87 billion under its Global Gateway initiative, along with a $310 million Resilience and Growth Plan to accelerate economic reforms and infrastructure development.
The EU has also deployed a civilian monitoring mission along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan, an unprecedented European presence in the country’s security landscape.
Washington also has begun exploring deeper economic and strategic cooperation with Yerevan. President Trump’s Trade and Regional Infrastructure Partnership Program — a U.S.-supported framework aimed at expanding Armenia’s connectivity, energy integration and access to global markets — is key.
Last year, the U.S. and Armenia signed a Strategic Partnership Commission Charter, formalizing cooperation in economic development, democratic governance and security. Over the past three decades, the U.S. has invested more than $3 billion in Armenia to support economic reform and institutional development.
Armenia will hold its election while global geopolitics are shifting in ways not seen since the end of the Cold War. The assumption that smaller states could operate largely outside great power rivalry has eroded. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and rising geopolitical tensions across Eurasia have underscored the return of hard geopolitical competition.
So Armenia is a test case: Can democratic alignment and economic partnership compete with the coercive tools authoritarian powers deploy?
A regression risks restoring a political and economic system shaped by oligarchic patronage networks and Moscow-linked influence.
In an era when the geopolitical choices of small states increasingly shape the balance of power, Armenia’s voters are about to make a decision that could echo far beyond the Caucasus.
• Nerses Kopalyan is an associate professor-in-residence of political science at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2026/mar/16/armenias-upcoming-election-pivotal-us/
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