Czech Parliamentarians Visit Nagorno Karabakh

CZECH PARLIAMENTARIANS VISIT NAGORNO KARABAKH

Tuesday,June 04

President of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic Bako Sahakian received
today a group of parliamentarians from the Czech Republic.

The press service of NKR president reported that issues concerning
relations between Nagorno Karabakh and the Czech Republic were
discussed at the meeting, with special attention being paid to the
establishment of links between the parliaments of the two countries.

Bako Sahakian said the NKR is interested in establishing and developing
relations with the Czech Republic, adding that both countries would
benefit from it.

TODAY, 15:41

From: A. Papazian

http://www.aysor.am/en/news/2013/06/04/bako-sahakyan/

ARF Calls For Nairit Rubber Plant Ad-Hoc Investigative Committee

ARF CALLS FOR NAIRIT RUBBER PLANT AD-HOC INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE

14:08, June 4, 2013

The ARF faction in parliament today introduced a motion calling for the
creation of ad-hoc committee that would look into the operations, loan
obligations and privatization of the Nairit Rubber Plant in Yerevan.

The plant has been plagued with a number of work-related issues and
alleged financial misappropriations in the recent past.

From: A. Papazian

http://hetq.am/eng/news/27054/arf-calls-for-nairit-rubber-plant-ad-hoc-investigative-committee.html

Armenia Invited To Join The UN Peacekeeping Mission In Lebanon

ARMENIA INVITED TO JOIN THE UN PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN LEBANON

15:20 04.06.2013
Armenia, Lebanon, peacekeeping, UN

Italy, as commander of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL), has officially applied to Armenia with a proposal to include
an Armenian detachment in the peacekeeping mission. It suggests the
Armenian troops to ensure the security of the mission headquarters.

Negotiations on sending Armenian peacekeepers to Lebanon are currently
underway. Discussions with the UN and the Italian Defense Ministry
focus on the composition of detachment, the place of deployment,
logistical and technical support and other issues.

A specialized working group of the Ministry of Defense will leave for
Rome next week to continue the negotiations. This will be followed
by the visit of the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces. Two
Armenian peacekeeping platoons are likely to be deployed in Lebanon
by the end of the current year.

One Officer of RA Armed Forces has been involved in the UN observation
mission in Lebanon since 2012.

Armenia has received another proposal to join the UN peacekeeping
mission in Mali. The negotiations focus on sending Armenian military
observers.

From: A. Papazian

http://www.armradio.am/en/2013/06/04/armenia-invited-to-join-the-un-peacekeeping-mission-in-lebanon/

Armenia’s Foreign Trade Turnover Rose To $1,748.3mln In January-Apri

ARMENIA’S FOREIGN TRADE TURNOVER ROSE TO $1,748.3MLN IN JANUARY-APRIL

YEREVAN, June 4. /ARKA/. Armenia’s foreign trade turnover rose by
2.8% to over $1,748.3 million in January-April compared with the same
period of the year before, ArmStat reports.

Exports totalled $454.7 million (16.1% increase) and imports were
$1,293.6 million (1.1% reduction) in the period, bringing the trade
red ink to $838.9 million.

According to preliminary information, trade red ink in FOB prices
amounted to $639.7 million in January-April.

Statistics say the key export items were mining ($127.5mln, 13.9%
increase against January-April 2012), non-precious metals ($113.3mln,
5.9% increase), ready food products ($91.1mln, 38.4% increase),
precious and semi-precious stones, precious metals and articles
(about $62.1mln, 21.8% increase), and etc.

ArmStat says the main import items were mining ($302.7mln, 3.2%
reduction), machinery, equipment and tools (about $147.8mln, 9.3%
reduction), ready foodstuffs ($117.3mln, 10.4% increase), chemical
industry and related ($106.7mln, 6.2% increase), and etc.

($1=417.17drams). -0-

From: A. Papazian

Talks Underway Over Engaging Armenian Troops In Peacekeeping Mission

TALKS UNDERWAY OVER ENGAGING ARMENIAN TROOPS IN PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN LEBANON

14:00 ~U 04.06.13

Italy, the Commander country at United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL), has officially applied to Armenia for engaging Armenian
troops in the mission to ensure the safety of the headquarters of
the mission, Armenia’s Defense Ministry press service reports.

Currently, negotiations are underway over the place of deployment
of the Armenian troops, technical and other issues. A group from
Armenian Defense Ministry will leave for Rome to participate in the
negotiations, after which Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces
will depart for Italy.

During this year 2 Armenian peacekeeping platoons will be sent
to Lebanon

From: A. Papazian

http://www.tert.am/en/news/2013/06/04/peacekeepers/

Comparative Advantages of Nabucco-West Offset By Lack of Financing

Comparative Advantages of Nabucco-West Offset By Lack of Financing

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 102
May 30, 2013 03:41 PM
By: Vladimir Socor

(Source: civilnet.am)

The Nabucco Committee’s meeting (see accompanying article) on May 21
in Bucharest has provided perhaps the final opportunity for
comprehensively assessing the Nabucco-West project’s comparative
advantages as a route for Azerbaijani gas to Europe. Prior even to the
Committee meeting, the Nabucco participant governments had appealed in
a joint letter to the European Union to show more visible signs of
support for this project (see EDM, April 26). The May 21 Committee
meeting entered the end game of the final pipeline selection decision
in Baku.

Although still unfunded by international financial institutions, the
Nabucco-West pipeline project holds significant comparative advantages
from the perspective of the European Commission and of Caspian gas
producing states. This project:

– Offers the shortest route to lucrative European gas markets for
Caspian gas. Nabucco participant countries should enable Caspian gas
producers to earn higher netback prices, thanks to the shorter
distance from the production site to market, compared with rival
Trans-Adriatic Pipeline’s (TAP) more remotely located markets in Italy
and Switzerland.

– Targets those markets where supply diversification is a pressing
requirement, yet liquefied natural gas (LNG) will not be available to
compete against pipeline-delivered gas. Such is the case with the
Nabucco participant countries. Meanwhile, Italy’s plans to increase
LNG imports are likely to depress the price of pipeline gas in that
already saturated market.

– Interconnects Central and Southeast European countries’ gas
networks and integrates their gas markets. In effect, Nabucco-West is
designed to function as a backbone-interconnector of the countries
along that route. The Nabucco countries, moreover, are linked with
their neighbors through bilateral connections: Austria-Slovenia,
Hungary-Croatia (recently completed), Hungary-Slovakia (soon to be
built), Romania-Ukraine, Bulgaria-Serbia and Bulgaria-Macedonia, thus
multiplying the market options for Caspian gas
(, accessed May 29).

– Capitalizes on gas storage sites available along the Nabucco-West
route, with capacities ranging from 0.5 billion cubic meter (bcm) in
Bulgaria and 2.7 bcm in Romania, to 6.1 bcm in Hungary and 7.1 bcm in
Austria (, accessed May 29). For its part,
rival TAP intermittently proposes to build a `strategic’ storage site
in the peripherally located Albania.

The TAP project holds a different set of comparative advantages. Its
shareholders’ (led by Norway’s Statoil) superior financial resources,
compared with those of Nabucco, can prove decisive. Within the Shah
Deniz consortium, certain West European shareholders claim that the
Nabucco consortium has proposed a far lower purchase price for gas,
compared with that proposed by the TAP consortium in the initial
bidding at the end of March. Further bidding rounds are possible, and
the Shah Deniz producers have until late June to announce their
decision.

Shah Deniz producers such as BP prefer TAP mainly because of this
pipeline’s limited capacity at 10 bcm per year, correspondingly
limiting the investment into the pipeline. BP is narrowly interested
in exporting its share from the 10 bcm per year of Shah Deniz Phase
Two of production, with a commensurate pipeline solution. BP is
aligned with TAP’s lead company, Statoil, in this respect. A pipeline
capacity with strategic impact would, however, involve a larger
diameter and/or additional parallel strings, necessitating higher
investments.

Nabucco-West’s capacity is designed to be scaled up from 10 bcm to as
much as 30 bcm per year, in step with anticipated gas production
growth from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan. For its part, Azerbaijan
plans to build the Trans-Anatolia Pipeline (TANAP) in Turkey with an
ultimate capacity of at least 30 bcm, potentially up to 50 bcm per
year. Baku also proposes expanding the capacity of the transit
pipeline in Georgia (connecting Azerbaijan with Turkey) at least to
equal TANAP’s capacity. These pipeline plans are vital to Azerbaijan’s
future as a gas-exporting country from projects beyond Shah Deniz, as
well as a transit country for gas from Turkmenistan. In this
perspective, Azerbaijan’s interests would seem to be aligned with the
Nabucco-West project.

TAP’s proposed capacity of 10 bcm per year and its market destinations
are non-strategic. They also seem barely relevant to supply security
through diversification in the destination countries. TAP’s main
market, Italy, is highly diversified already, with Gazprom’s market
share currently at 27 percent () and set to
diminish thanks to Italy’s LNG imports. Switzerland, another TAP
market (to be reached presumably via Italian pipelines), uses little
natural gas in its overall energy mix, and it purchases that gas
already via Germany from E.On Ruhrgas (a TAP minority shareholder).

TAP would drop off a small portion of the gas in Greece, en route to
Italy; and it proposes to create natural gas markets from scratch in
Albania, Kosovo, and Montenegro. These three states, meanwhile, do not
use natural gas and are not connected to any pipeline grid. It has yet
to be explained how could any of those destinations be more lucrative
than the Nabucco countries for Caspian gas.

Nabucco’s design capacity, scalable ultimately to 30 bcm per year,
could accommodate Azerbaijani gas from projects other than Shah Deniz
after 2020, combined with gas from Turkmenistan, which can come on
stream earlier, and which the European Commission regards as pivotal
to the Southern Corridor to Europe.

Nevertheless, EU political support for Nabucco-West seems to be
diminishing, and the European Commission has not been able to mobilize
financing for this project in these times of austerity. As Elshad
Nassirov, vice-president of Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company, ruefully
noted to the Southern Corridor forum just held in Baku, Europeans and
Americans could easily have financed the Nabucco project a few years
ago, at a cost equivalent to that of a few weeks of military
operations in Iraq for example (Trend, May 29).

Lacking EU-backed public financing, the Nabucco consortium now
suggests `working with’ the EU and the TAP participant countries Italy
and Greece toward a `win-win,’ `comprehensive’ or `inclusive’ outcome
of this rivalry (Nabucco Committee Declaration,
, accessed May 29). What this would entail is
not publicly specified yet. It might perhaps envisage some commitment
to sharing gas volumes from the Caspian basin between these two
pipeline projects at some point in time.

The Obama administration endorses `both options’ in principle, as does
the EU with its `project-neutrality’ between Nabucco-West and TAP. But
Brussels and Washington know that the Shah Deniz producers’ consortium
will select only one of the two routes in the coming weeks. The final
selection decision might be presented as sequencing the two pipeline
projects in a certain order. In that case, the project passed over in
June would not officially be eliminated outright, but postponed for
some years, awaiting the further growth of gas production in the
Caspian basin. In that case, Nabucco-West could only remain on the
drawing boards in expectation of gas from Turkmenistan and the
EU-backed trans-Caspian pipeline materializing.

[tt_news]=40958&tx_ttnews[backPid]=27&cHash=6385e071106b353dfe49b9a9fff3fc0a

From: A. Papazian

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews
www.nabucco-pipeline.com
www.gie.eu.com/maps/gse_stor
www.nabucco-pipeline.com
www.nabucco-pipeline.com

NCWA Continues its Pursuit of Western Armenians’ Interests

NCWA Continues its Pursuit of Western Armenians’ Interests

By Jirair Tutunjian – Editor keghart.com, May 22, 2013

At its national council meeting in Yerevan, on April 26, the National
Congress of Western Armenians (NCWA) asserted that for the abrogation
of the consequences of the Genocide of Armenians, it is necessary not
only to give political and legal assessment to the crime, but also to
restore historical justice – primarily by restoring the interrupted
millennial presence of the Western Armenians in their homeland.

Acknowledging that in the past decade Turkey has promoted democratic
values and the establishment of national consensus among all its
citizens, the NCWA said it considers inevitable and necessary the
implementation of appropriate steps to address the Armenian issue in
the context of the processes of construction and establishment of
democratic and liberal Turkey.

The organization also called on civil society in Turkey, the carriers
of liberal and democratic values, progressive thinkers, public figures
and organizations, conscientious and responsible citizens to
participate with the NCWA in the restoration of all the rights of
Western Armenians who lost their homeland in 1915 and scattered around
the world, as well as of recognition and compensation of their moral,
material and territorial losses.

Delegates from Armenia, Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Lebanon, France, and
Canada attended the one-day conference at the Noravank Foundation, one
of the leading think-tanks of Armenia. The gathering was presided over
by its leaders – Souren Seraydarian from France and Garen Mikaelyan and
Gen. Norad Ter-Grigoryants from Russia.

`The meeting was successful because we were able to make progress and
crystalize our words as to where we are going,’ said the NCWA
President Seraydarian. `Through the council meeting, we formed a
consensus that we should work with Turkish individuals and
organizations that have recognized the Genocide of Armenians.’

Seraydarian added that for far too long April 24 has become a day of
death (`Merelots’)… a time of mourning. `While we recognize and honor
our dead, we should move to April 25 and revive Armenian rights. The
Ottoman government made us stateless. This is recognized
internationally as an illegal act. We also lost our individual,
property, collective, cultural heritage. We were naturally influenced
by the countries where we had to settle after the Genocide. Thus we
became Argentinian-, Syrian-, French-Armenians. As a result, we don’t
have the same Armenian culture. We lost our miasnagatsoutune.’ DIKRAN.
WHAT’S THE ENGLISH WORD?

Seraydarian said that the NCWA hadn’t approached the land issue yet,
although it is the organization’s final goal. `Addressing the land
issue is a step-by-step process. The strategy and tactic for the
achievement of that goal should be different. Right now we are
establishing what we want and how we can get there… in other words,
legally what steps are required,’ said the NCWA president.

Once the NCWA has finalized its goals and strategy, it will discuss
that battle plan with other Armenian organization.

`The centenary of the Genocide is not an end in itself. It’s the beginning.’

The council also decided to launch a pilot project in Armenia whereby
members would pay $1 per month as membership contribution. If
successful, the project will expand to our countries.

As an adjunct event to the national council conference, the NCWA
hosted two Turkish journalists – Erdal Dogan and Sait Chetinoglu. Dogan
is also a human rights lawyer, while Chetinoglu is a well-known
Marxist journalist. They said that although in visiting Armenia they
were perhaps taking their lives into their hands, they were proud to
be in Yerevan. Both insisted visiting the Dzidzernagapert Genocide
Memorial and Museum.

Chetinoglu has recently compiled a list of Armenian towns and cities
in Western Armenia which have vanished. He said that he hoped to
translate his research in an English-language book.

Dogan, who has acted as a human rights lawyer for the past 15 years,
has exposed the killing of missionaries in Malatya and has seen the
perpetrators punished by the courts. `The same mentality of 1915
continues in Turkey,’ warned the lawyer. `They same attitude prevails
across the country. It’s not just the Deep State. Even so-called
democratic left-wing is a secret ally of those who maintain the Young
Turk attitude,’ he said. `Kemal Ataturk and his friends merely changed
their masks to create conditions best suited for their infernal work.
You can see that policy in the Dersim Massacres of 1936. Many who were
killed then were Armenian survivors of the Genocide.’

The young lawyer warned press conference attendees that the Deep State
and their allies control the Turkish government, organize denialist
seminars across the country and intimidate anyone who doesn’t agree
with them. `They have the ability to change the state agenda. They
have infiltrated the judiciary, the universities. The Turkish media
and even the British media do not cover their activities. This secret
group of 100,000 people includes senior military officers, judges,
diplomats, journalists…and even non-Turks. Their core ideology is the
denial of 1915,’ said Dogan.

The lawyer also warned Armenians not to trust Turks who describe 1915
as `tragedy’. He said it’s a tip that they deny the Genocide. He said
he believed it’s very important to present the Armenian Question to
the international public and to Turks. `Human rights and justice are
the basis of the Armenian Question,’ said Dogan.

Journalist Chetinoglu said that Kemalist party’s finances were based
on confiscated Armenian properties and businesses. `In 1919 it was
estimated that Armenian property confiscated by Turkey was worth $50
billion…Today’s Kemalists and Islamists are not much different from
the Marxist point of view. Today’s Turkish generations are the
grandchildren of the confiscators.’

The Turkish journalist said that the Turkey is adept at manipulating
antagonists. `On Kurdish issues, Turkey approaches the Kurds as
`Muslim brothers’ while to the world it presents the image of a
democratic and secular governance,’ he said and told the story of an
Armenian (Arshag Baghdassarian) of Urfa, who had turkified his name to
recover property confiscated in 1915. `He died during the court case.
His son continued his father’s attempts to regain the family property.
The day the court ordered the return of the properties, the son was
killed in a hail of bullets.

Addressing the recent liberal mood of Turkey, Chatinoglu cited the
publication of a book about the Genocide. The book was allowed to be
published because the judge said there are so few Armenians in Turkey
that they can’t damage the country.

He said that Armenians should work through the European Union (EU) to
regain what belongs to them. `Turkey is linked to the EU and the UN
since it’s a signatory to judicial agreements. A collective return of
Armenians is possible,’ he said.

Echoing his colleague, Chetinoglu said Turkish plan for a homogenous
nation hasn’t changed. He cited the massacre of Dersim, the war
against the Kurds, the discrimination of Alevis, Armenians, and
Assyrians. `Turkey refuses to recognize the Alevi religion, closes
Alevi mosques, bans the teaching of Kurdish…the mindset of 1915
continues. Threats and 301 continue,’ he said.

When asked whether Armenian should trust the Gulenist movement, which
has thousands of schools around the world, Erdal said the Fatheullah
Gulen, the founder of the Gulenist organization is a disciple of Imam
Said Nursi, a participant in the Genocide. `Over the years, the
Gulenists have remained silent about the Genocide. Their silence
speaks volumes,’ said Erdal and chastised `Today’s Zaman’ (owned by
the Gulenist Foundation) for its frequent promotion of the Khojali
`genocide’ in Azerbaijan. `When it comes to the Genocide of Armenians,
`Today’s Zaman’ is no different from other major Turkish dailies which
deny what actually took place in 1915. Their attitude is this: `We
love you Armenians; don’t talk about the Genocide; certain bad things
happened in 1915. You committed the Khojali genocide,” he said.

The human rights lawyer also criticized Armenia for its lack of effort
re the plight of Syrian Armenians. `We are witnessing the decline of
Christians in the Middle East. The Syrian-Armenian community, the last
of the Cilician-Western Armenian culture, might disappear because of
the Syrian conflict,’ he said.

When Erdal was asked why he continued to live in Turkey when his life
is threatened and he is surrounded by enemies, the journalist said: `I
want to stay on the land. I want to make it a just society, raise my
children and remain steadfast in my beliefs.’

From: A. Papazian

http://www.keghart.com/NCWA_ArmeniansInterests

Facing Growing Iranian Threats, Azerbaijan Deepens Ties To Israel

Facing Growing Iranian Threats, Azerbaijan Deepens Ties To Israel

Wednesday, 15 May 2013

Published in Analytical Articles
by Robert M. Cutler (05/15/2013 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Iranian legislators in Teheran have drafted a bill calling for
revision of the 1828 Treaty of Turkmanchay, which divided the multiple
Azerbaijani khanates between the Russian and Persian Empires. While
this cannot be taken wholly seriously, it is a symbol of the
deterioration of bilateral relations. It comes against a background of
worsening rhetoric between Teheran and Baku, which have in the past
extended into subversive actions by Iran on the territory of
Azerbaijan. It is thus in the line of longstanding Iranian threats
against Azerbaijani sovereignty and the government of President Ilham
Aliyev.

BACKGROUND: The Safavid dynasty of Persia ruled the territory of
present-day Azerbaijan during the sixteenth century. In 1603 the
Ottoman Turks occupied the region, and the victories of Russian Tsar
Peter the Great in the early 1700s sealed the fall of Safavid
influence, breaking the territory up into independent and mutually
quarreling khanates. Following further Russo-Persian wars in the early
nineteenth century, the 1828 Treaty of Turkmanchay confirmed the
ceding of the northern khanates to Russia, splitting historical
Azerbaijan in two. Subsequently, Tsar Nicholas I created the necessary
condition for the situation now known as the Karabakh problem. With
the Treaty of Turkmanchay, he styled himself protector of the
Christians in the Persian Empire, and received them into his own
lands, settling many ethnic Armenians in what is now Nagorno-Karabakh.

The legislative bill in the Iranian Majlis is in line with over a
decade of provocations against Baku and challenges against Azerbaijani
sovereignty. Perhaps the best known of these took place in the summer
of 2001, when Iran deployed military force in the Caspian Sea and
threatened to use it against a BP-led mission intended to explore the
Alov hydrocarbon deposit in the Azerbaijani sector. This mission
included an Azerbaijani vessel, and the Iranian threat forced a
cessation of work that continues to this day. The Iranian name for the
deposit is Alborz, which perhaps by no coincidence is also the name of
the country’s first deepwater semi-submersible drilling rig, launched
four years ago in the Caspian Sea.

More recently, in 2007 fifteen Iranians and Azerbaijanis were
convicted of spying on state oil facilities and conspiring to
overthrow the government in Baku. In 2008, a plot by Hezbollah
operatives to blow up the Israeli Embassy in Baku with Iranian
assistance was exposed and thwarted. In late 2011 the Azerbaijani
journalist Rafig Tagi, who had since 2005 been the subject of a
death-penalty fatwa from Grand Ayatollah Fazel Lankarani, was murdered
in a knife attack in Baku days after publishing an article that
criticized Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad for discrediting
Islam. And in early 2012, Azerbaijani police exposed and arrested
members of yet another terrorist cell created by the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards together with the Lebanese Hezbollah.

IMPLICATIONS: The southern nineteenth-century khanates not absorbed
into the Russian Empire are referred to as Iranian Azerbaijan, or
sometimes by northern irredentists as `Southern Azerbaijan.’ They now
constitute four contemporary northwestern Iranian provinces that
include over 10 percent of the country’s population, which is itself
variously estimated to count between one-quarter and one-third ethnic
Azerbaijanis. Perhaps in reply to the Majlis initiative seeking
revision of the Treaty of Turkmenchay, Azerbaijan’s foreign minister,
Elmar Mammadyarov, paid the first-ever high-profile visit by any of
Baku’s cabinet ministers to Israel in late April. There are historic
and cultural links that undergird the informal upgrading of bilateral
diplomatic relations. Sephardic Jews have reputedly lived in the
mountains of Azerbaijan since close to 600 BC, and the region was a
relatively safe refuge for Ashkenazi Jews fleeing Russia from the
German invasion during the Second World War. Such a trip was in any
case overdue in view of the depth and breadth of bilateral relations
for such a long time.

Experts estimate that Azerbaijan supplies at least one-third, perhaps
as much as two-fifths of Israel’s oil (roughly 20 million barrels),
and trade turnover between the two has reached US$ 4 billion per year.
Azerbaijan is reported to have purchased US$ 1.6 billion in arms from
Israel in 2012, and Israeli firms are cooperating with the relevant
Azerbaijani ministries in advising on the Azerbaijani manufacture of
military weapons. Apart from that, Azerbaijan has for a long time been
a main link of the Northern Distribution Network, which supplies
equipment to NATO forces in Afghanistan, and Iran has accused it of
preparing to allow Israel to conduct military operations against
Teheran. Hard evidence to support this accusation has been lacking,
but it is important to note that Azerbaijan’s present-day ties with
Israel are not merely an artifact of state interests. They reflect the
historical experience of Azerbaijan, where the nation-building
antecedents even in the nineteenth century were tied to
anti-clericalism. So it should also not be a surprise that the
spectrum of Azerbaijani revolutionary parties in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries replicated the political variety seen in
Europe and were influenced by European ideologies.

Tehran’s threats against Baku are driven not only by Azerbaijan’s
foreign policy orientation but also by its status as a post-Soviet
state with a majority Shi’ite population but secular Muslim identity.
As such, it gives the lie to the Iranian regime’s theocratic doctrines
and eschatological pretensions. Iran pretends to give formal
diplomatic support for Azerbaijani sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh,
but its sponsorship of actions against Azerbaijani sovereignty as
mentioned above reveals its real preferences. Indeed, Iran has greatly
deepened and broadened its relations with Armenia in the last six
years, opening a crucial gas pipeline to Armenia that has been an
energy lifeline, constructing two hydroelectric plants on their common
border, and building highway and railroad links. By contrast,
relations between Iran and Azerbaijan are already rather poor, and
there is little that Teheran can do to prevent Baku from deepening its
relations with Jerusalem. Because there are so many current problems
and so much mutual distrust, relations between Azerbaijan and Iran are
unlikely to normalize even after the upcoming presidential elections
in Iran, regardless of which faction of the Teheran elite is able to
claim victory.

CONCLUSIONS: Iran’s threats affect not just Azerbaijan but also
Turkey, since Turkey’s current prosperity is due in significant part
to its low-cost imports of natural gas from Azerbaijan for domestic
use, as well as its role as a transit country for Azerbaijani oil
(Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline) and, soon, gas (Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum
and Trans-Anatolian pipelines) to European and world markets. With its
investment in Turkey’s petrochemical sector, Azerbaijan is set to
become the largest foreign investor in the country before the end of
the present decade. Although Mammadyarov’s visit to Israel was not
`official’, he met with the president, prime minister, defense
minister and other senior officials in the country for intensive
discussions. At a news conference after the trip was over he concluded
that it was only `a matter of time’ before Azerbaijan opened an
embassy in Israel. Official Baku does not credit Teheran’s accusations
against Israel that it is seeking to throw a wrench into
Azerbaijani-Iranian relations. On the contrary, Azerbaijan is said to
have refrained from high-level visits to Israel in the past in order
not to antagonize Iran. Mammadyarov’s visit may therefore, in future
retrospect, be seen as a turning point.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Robert M Cutler is senior research fellow in the
Institute of European, Russian and Eurasian Studies, Carleton
University, Canada.

From: A. Papazian

http://www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/12730-facing-growing-iranian-ties-azerbaijan-deepens-ties-to-israel.html

Circassian Activists in Turkey Receive Boost from Erdogan

Circassian Activists in Turkey Receive Boost from Erdogan

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 10 Issue: 100
May 28, 2013 05:35 PM
By: Valery Dzutsev

Circassians commemorating the 149th anniversary of the end of the
Russo-Caucasian war, Nalchik, May 21

On May 21, Circassians worldwide marked the 149th anniversary of the
end of the Russo-Caucasian war. In the North Caucasus, the largest
republic with a Circassian population, Kabardino-Balkaria, held
multiple events marking the anniversary. Hundreds of young people
staged a procession in the republic’s capital, Nalchik, and an
estimated 3,000 people participated in a rally in the central part of
the city. The leadership of the republic was also present at the
rally, underlying the political importance of the event. The president
of the International Circassian Association, Khauti Sokhrokov, stated
at the rally that the Russian-Caucasian war changed the fate of the
Circassian people. `Only an impartial assessment of this war will give
[us] the right to look into each other’s eyes calmly and not leave
this problem to the next generations,’ Sokhrokov said
(). The procession of
Circassian youth in Nalchik featured quite frank slogans, such as `We
remember the 1763-1864 Circassian genocide’
().

Khauti Sokhrokov is closely connected to the government of
Kabardino-Balkaria and is ostensibly loyal to Moscow, but even with
this background his statements resemble those of independent
Circassian activists. Even officials in the republic cannot nowadays
simply ignore the issue of recognizing the Russian Empire’s `genocide’
of the Circassians in the 19th century. At the same time, the
authorities try to appropriate public discussion on the Circassians’
past travails. The rally in Nalchik was officially endorsed and likely
organized in part by the republican government. A few speakers called
on the Circassians not to dwell on past events, but work instead to
`develop Kabardino-Balkaria.’ The regional authorities in Krasnodar
region devised their own way of alleviating the Circassians’
grievances. On May 21, the Day of Memory and Grief marked by the
Circassians, authorities in Krasnodar planned to invite Circassian
activists to the sites where the Russian army celebrated its victory
over the Circassians in 1864, followed by an excursion to the 2014
Olympic sites in Sochi. In this way, the authorities in Krasnodar
would add an insult to injury ().
Many Circassians have been opposed to the Olympics in Sochi, calling
it the `land of genocide’ and demanding that Russia recognize the
tragic events, which happened there as `genocide’.

Circassian claims received an unexpected boost from Turkey during the
149th anniversary of the war’s end. Selahattin Demirta?, the chairman
of the Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party in Turkey, spoke in favor of
Turkey recognizing the Circassian genocide, which gave an important
international boost to Circassian claims. `Turkey traditionally does
not welcome topics related to genocide and pogroms,’ Demirta? said.
`This morning, Circassian associations held protest actions in front
of the Russian Embassy. In our turn, we intend to propose that
parliament recognize the Circassian genocide and promote publicity for
this issue in the international political arena’
(). Moreover, on May 18, the
Circassian diaspora in Istanbul unveiled a monument dedicated to the
genocide and exile of the Circassians. The organizers of the event
invited Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdo?an to attend, and
even though the prime minister did not find time to visit the site, he
sent a sympathetic letter stating: `I reckon that such events possess
special importance for both, receiving international acclaim and
strengthening our unity and brotherhood that is held together by
honoring the memory of those who died in exile’
().

The `genocide’ issue is especially sensitive for Turkey, because of
Armenians’ claims that Turkey should recognize the atrocities
committed in 1915 as `genocide’ by the Ottoman Empire. The Russian
Federation officially recognized the Armenian `genocide’ in 1995
(), so if Turkey were to
recognize the Circassian `genocide’ by the Russian Empire in 19th
century, it would be only a belated tit-for-tat move. Georgia is thus
far the only country in the world to have officially recognized the
Circassian `genocide’: it did so in 2011. Turkey may want to avoid
negative repercussions, as it has relatively warm relations with
Russia. At the same time, Turkey is certainly trying to establish
itself as a regional power that has its own views on the countries
that border it. This means that Ankara will have to make some
decisions that strengthen its identity and show its leadership role.
Therefore, the issue of recognizing the Circassian `genocide’ appears
to be growing as part of the widening public debate inside Turkey.

Russian-Turkish relations soured over the past several years in
connection to the opposing views of the crisis in Syria. The civil war
in Syria is also related to the Circassian question, since thousands
of ethnic Circassians reside in this war-torn country and some of them
have fled to Turkey. Turkey has the largest Circassian diaspora in the
world, numbering up to 5 million people, so the Turkish authorities
are understandably attentive to what the Circassians say about the
situation in the North Caucasus. The upcoming Winter Olympics in Sochi
raises the stakes of the Circassian question. The significance of any
political decision regarding recognition of the Circassian genocide
would be magnified because of the world’s attention to the region.

Both the Circassians in the North Caucasus who are loyal to Moscow and
independent Circassian activists expect Russian authorities to somehow
act upon the Circassian question and stop avoiding it, particularly as
the 2014 Olympics in Sochi make it virtually unavoidable. Moscow’s
inaction on the issue, it seems, no longer satisfies anyone among the
Circassians. And with growing awareness in Turkey, it seems that the
issue is not losing momentum, but forcing Moscow further and further
into a state of genocide denial.

[tt_news]=40935&tx_ttnews[backPid]=685&no_cache=1

From: A. Papazian

http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/224505/
http://kavpolit.com/21-maya-den-pamyati-i-skorbi-cherkesov-traurnoe-shestvie-v-nalchike-31-foto/
http://aheku.org/page-id-3557.html
http://aheku.org/page-id-3560.html
http://aheku.org/page-id-3559.html
http://ria.ru/spravka/20100305/212370444.html
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews

PACE standing committee statement on NK conflict

States News Service
May 31, 2013 Friday

PACE STANDING COMMITTEE STATEMENT ON THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT

STRASBOURG, France

The following information was released by the Parliamentary Assembly
of the Council of Europe (PACE):

On the occasion of its meeting in Yerevan on 31 May 2013, the Standing
Committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
(PACE) made the following statement:

The search for a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is
a commitment taken by Armenia and by Azerbaijan upon their accession
to the Council of Europe. In this context, we express our full support
to the negotiations within the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, on
the basis of the Madrid principles which establish a framework for
resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
The Assembly urges Armenia and Azerbaijan to seize the opportunity
offered by their respective chairmanships of the Committee of
Ministers of the Council of Europe, to promote reconciliation between
these two member states and their populations, as well as to intensify
the search, in the framework of the OSCE Minsk Group, for a solution
to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This should be reflected in the
respective priorities of these two chairmanships.

Our Assembly is ready to do everything it can, through parliamentary
diplomacy, to facilitate dialogue and establish a climate of trust
between parliamentarians from both member States.

From: A. Papazian