ALEXANDER RAHR: “RUSSIA MOVES TOWARD A PRAGMATIC COOPERATION WITH AZERBAIJAN”
Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
Aug 14 2013
14 August 2013 – 3:35pm
Interviewed by Orkhan Sattarov, head of the European office of VK
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Azerbaijan has caused a lot
of judgements about the new trends of Russian policy in the Caucasus,
which will be continued in specific agreements signed in Baku. The
two neighbouring and friendly countries reaffirmed their policy of
strategic partnership, providing for compulsory coordination of the
interests of each other, including those on external sites.
Independent expert and scientific director of the German-Russian
Forum Alexander Rahr told VK about the contours of the new Russian
policy in the region.
– Alexander Glebovich, how would you rate the prospects of
Azerbaijani-Russian energy cooperation in the context of the energy
security of Europe? In particular, in the media there are rumours about
the possibility of acquiring shares in the TAP and TANAP projects by
“Rosneft”…
– First of all, I think “Rosneft” is very difficult to stop. This is
a company that is growing rapidly in Russia, it is now strategically
aimed at gaining its share, not just a niche, but its large share in
the large gas business. Not only in Russia, but also outside Russia,
so it is logical that such a company which has, incidentally, the
closest strategic forms of cooperation with Exxon, with BP, will
now seek to obtain for itself the strategic direction of actions in
the gas sector. The support from the government for “Rosneft”, in
my opinion, is very large, and in the coming years the company will
determine the direction vector of the entire Russian energy policy.
It seems to me that if “Rosneft” will really unite with SOCAR
(State Oil Company of Azerbaijan – VK) in one direction or another,
in the construction of pipes or, perhaps, as a share of pumping gas –
I do not rule out that “Rosneft” itself is interested in starting gas
production in the northern part of the Caspian Sea – it will lead to
a truly large-scale strategic cooperation.
Russia has always tried to cooperate in such a way. However, something
has changed. In previous years, we can say in the last 20 years,
Russia tried to prevent the break-up of its transport monopoly.
“Gazprom” tried to deny it and not to let the post-Soviet states float
freely, that is, not to give them the opportunity to build or engage in
alternative transit and transportation routes bypassing Russia. But
in this great game Russia could not support its policies. And it
had to accept the fact that both Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, which
previously could be somehow constrained in this respect, too, had
their pipes to China, and now there is a very serious competition
to Russia. Azerbaijan is also beginning to be serious competitor
for Russia, of course, and especially for the “South Stream” in the
European markets. And so I think this is the proper development.
If not “Gazprom” with its own plans, so “Rosneft” will search some
common ground with its rivals and try to get into this business. I
think if that happens, we will have less geopolitics and more economic
cooperation, more economic benefits. Russia will no longer have to
think geopolitically, to let or not to let someone, to prohibit someone
to build a bypass pipe and collaborate with someone there. And here,
in principle, Russia is engaged in a project that already exists and
is being implemented without it in order to provide capital and earn
money. I think it’s a smart move, if it takes place.
– What expectations do you link with the visit of Vladimir Putin
to Azerbaijan, given that some time ago many experts were talking
about a pause and even a certain cooling in relations between the
two countries?
– I would not say that Russia’s relations with Azerbaijan were heavily
damaged. There is one problem. I think it does not lie in the gas
field. Azerbaijan has its own ally – the strong regional power of
Turkey, it has his own ties with Israel and the United States –
Russian diplomats, I think, understand this quite well. A problem
that has always existed somewhere is the alliance between Russia and
Armenia. But I, on the other hand, do not think that in these allied
relations, in military alliance relations with Armenia, Russia will
automatically act against the interests of Azerbaijan. I have not
noticed it.
Russia has always sought to maintain good business relations with
Azerbaijan. And it seems to me that what happened over the last few
months and weeks, namely Azerbaijan’s rejection from building the
“Nabucco” pipeline mostly with Turkey and the decision to build TAP,
is the best of all, of course, not perfect, but the best option
for Russia. If the EU’s presence and then, maybe, Americans had been
dominant in the Caucasus through, say, such a large western pipeline as
“Nabucco”, Russia would be disturbed. Now Azerbaijan and Turkey are
in fact regional powers and countries which already depend on these
resources, and by geographical location, Turkey is a transit corridor
to Europe. Russia can accept the fact that they are building and will
control the flow of gas through alternative routes bypassing Russia
to Europe.
I think that Putin’s visit in this regard will be aimed at making an
agreement on the joint forms of work, and the inclusion of “Rosneft”
in this new consortium is the evidence of Russia’s intentions here
to disconnect from purely geo-political attitudes and move towards
a very pragmatic cooperation.
– You spoke about Armenian-Russian cooperation. In this context, the
question arises about the initialling by Armenia of the Association
Agreement with the EU and at the same time the prospect of Armenia’s
accession to the Customs Union. What do you think, are these two
perspectives compatible with each other, and what is your outlook on
future developments?
– I have talked about the fact that, as for the Caucasus and
Azerbaijan, Russia wants to reduce the proportion of geopolitics,
to return to a more pragmatic economic cooperation. You touched on
the issue of clear geopolitics. It seems to me that the associate
status, which is now proposed, by the way, to Ukraine, and Moldova,
and Armenia by the EU, also shows the geopolitical thinking of the
EU, which fears that Russia, which has become stronger in the last 12
years of Putin’s rule, ventured to restore something similar to the
Russian Empire. This was said by Mrs. Clinton and other politicians in
the West. This process causes the most concern in the entire security
policy in Europe. Therefore, the West will continue to offer associate
status, including to Armenia.
But there are some catches here. First, it seems to me that since
there are themes of geopolitics, they can be negotiated. Armenia and
Ukraine may agree to have associate status with the West and the East.
The association with the EU, for them, of course, is beneficial,
because through the European Union both Armenia and Ukraine will come
to the rule of law in Europe and the legal order. This is a defense
against corruption, more pure competition, strengthening the legal
system and, therefore, for these countries it is very profitable,
especially for the businesses in these countries, to protect their
activities, their accumulated capital, by strengthening the legal
system.
On the other hand, it is also a fact that the Armenian and Ukrainian
products in most cases are not competitive in the European markets,
and both countries need, of course, the Russian market. The CIS is
almost non-existent, but the Eurasian Union will exist. And there’s a
very big opportunity for these products, they’re more competitive. So
closing the way for their business, for example, Armenian business,
to the Russian market is also impossible. Because you need to find
a way to become associated both there and here.
I think that it is theoretically possible if both there and here,
that is, in the EU and in the Eurasian Union there will be very clear
and very strict rules of the WTO, it would be the rule of law, and the
norms in the Eurasian Union will be more and more like European ones.
This is a complex economic and legal work to be done, and this requires
political will. I think this is the perfect way to go. I think that,
in the end, we will go down this path. Therefore the output for
Armenia now is just to play smartly, soberly and pragmatically for
itself and to get this status in the East and the West.
But Armenia and Ukraine have some problems in obtaining the status of
the West. As we all know, in Ukraine there is Tymoshenko, who is in
prison. The West is dissatisfied with very fact that the head of the
opposition is in prison, and therefore to the Ukraine, there is more
distrust, and it is even unknown whether there will be an agreement.
In the case of Armenia, it seems to me that no associated status will
be signed unless Armenia agrees to open the border with Turkey or
in any case, goes to the liberalization of trade and the border with
Turkey. And as we know, Armenia has its own ideology here, its own very
serious matter, the issue of genocide, and the requirements of some
repentance on the part of Turkey that Turkey, of course, will not make.
These are still significant problems, significant barriers that
constantly impede this process and create a situation where we have
always been in one status quo, for two decades, with no significant
changes.
From: A. Papazian
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/interviews/politics/43869.html