FORMER SOVIET STATES MAKE CHOICE IN VILNIUS
Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
Dec 2 2013
2 December 2013 – 12:25pm
By Victoria Panfilova, an NG commentator, exclusively for Vestnik
Kavkaza
Offers from Brussels and Moscow to the ex-Soviet republics to choose
between the European and Customs Unions has put them between a rock
and a hard place. The choice of one of the unions aggravates relations
with the other. The EU seems more loyal, giving time and chances to
members of the Eastern Partnership to think, study all the pros and
cons and make a choice. If they fail at the Vilnius summit, they can
try again in the future. Russia is harsher: either the Customs Union
or be aggrieved for your own choice.
They seem to forget that the Eastern Partnership was initiated by
Poland and Sweden, with the US standing behind them, not the EU. The
European Union had enough problems with Greece and its suddenly
shattering hopes around Ireland. Irreversible problems could be
seen in the traditionally problematic states of southern countries
of the continent. Washington’s will to see the EU strong does not
always seem honest. Although its desire, even though discreet, to
weaken influence of Russia is always honest. This is why Russian
uncompromising approach in the said issue and flexibility of the EU
appear quite understandable.
Six members of the Eastern Partnership can be geographically split
into western (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova) and southern (South Caucasus
states). The Vilnius summit outlined a more cloudy fate for the
‘western triplets’ than the ‘eastern.’ Predicting the outcome of the
Ukrainian crisis is complicated. Some Ukrainian political analysts
believe that even schism of the Ukrainian state is possible. So this
problem provokes more concerns about integrity of Ukraine than its
foreign political goals.
The situation with Belarus is also unclear. There are periods when
Brussels forgets about the Belarusian president, ‘the last dictator
in Europe,” and his manner of rule and starts liberalizing relations
with Minsk. But the exceptional firmness of Alexander Lukashenko in
relations with allies hinders the process. Lukashenko ends up faithful
to Moscow in his attempts to make the best dividends from Russia and
the West, although he understands that it would be hard to withstand
pressure from the West without the help of Russia. Belarus and Ukraine
signed nothing in Vilnius but the EU has not slammed the door for them,
though Belarus is a member of the Customs Union.
Moldova initialed the association agreement to implement the free trade
and visa-free regime for long periods. The Document needs ratifying by
the parliament of Moldova, most members of which are communists with
their own vision of the future. New parliamentary polls are coming. The
Communist Party may achieve the constitutional majority again in 2014.
The ‘southern triplet’ is a lot more predictable. Azerbaijan took
quite a passive position in the Eastern Partnership from the very
start. The self-sufficient state can talk with the EU as an equal actor
and set priorities of cooperation, with account of Europe’s need for
hydrocarbons. Simplification of the visa regime was the priority for
the Vilnius summit. Brussels agreed and Baku probably needed nothing
else. The Karabakh problem is evidently limiting opportunities for
political maneuvers of Azerbaijan and closer cooperation with the
EU, considering that the Customs Union and other Russian integration
projects are of little interest to the republic, could cause certain
annoyance in Moscow. This is of no interest to Baku.
The scenario of Armenia was easy to figure out. The association
agreement, individual for every member of the Eastern Partnership,
offered Armenia a free trade zone, simplification of the visa
regime in exchange for reforms of administration and legislature to
harmonize them with European standards. The political and military
aspect were totally excluded, giving hopes that Moscow will not be
challenged by choice of a strategic Trans-Caucasus partner. It was
clear that in the situation Armenia was in, deprived of chances to
make a political maneuver because of the Karabakh problem and in
great economic dependence, it had no choice.
Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan said at a recent visit to Moscow
that Armenia wanted to join the Customs Union. Such sudden u-turn
triggered minor grievances and disappointment of the pro-Western
part of the society. But the recent polls of Gallup ‘legitimized’
the president’s choice. About 70% of the population speak for the
Customs Union. In Vilnius, worried about the predictable u-turn of
Armenia, Europe was trying to both ‘save its face’ and the partner
by signing a blurred memorandum and making declarations about plans
to develop relations. Relations will probably progress but Armenia,
as presupposed, stays in the geopolitical zone of Russian influence.
Arrival of Russian President Vladimir Putin to Yerevan on November
2 will only put a logical end at this stage of the story.
Georgia, as expected, initialed the agreement, continuing to drift
in the European direction. The visual dividends Georgia achieved are
cheaper EU visas, though Georgians cannot receive them fast.
Rapprochement continues. Obviously, some pressure from Moscow will
grow. How will it all turn out at a pinch? This may result in a new
trade embargo or complications in former Georgian autonomies Abkhazia
and South Ossetia. Access to the breakaway republics will be even
harder, construction of border barriers will continue deeper on the
Georgian territory. But it seems that Georgia is unimaginably far
from joining the EU, unless a political decision will be made for it,
the way it was made for Bulgaria, despite its inability to meet the
criteria. No security guarantees can be given to Georgia. This makes
its foreign political vector irreversible.
From: A. Papazian
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/48178.html