THE VULNERABLE STATUS QUO IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
Vahan Dilanyan
Noyan Tapan
09.08.2010 | 12:30
Euro-Atlantic Quarterly
The Caucasus region has not yet recovered itself from the consequences
of the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, and another breeding
ground of an armed confrontation over Nagorno-Karabakh is arising
there. Today, the over 16 years’ protracted conflict of Karabakh is
the most significant obstacle to security in Caucasus.
The Obama administration saw the normalization of Turkish-Armenian
relations, and the opening of their border, as a critical step in
establishing trust in the region, which would much affect to the
Armenian-Azeri relationships. However, as National Intelligence
Director Dennis Blair stated, “Turkey-Armenia rapprochement has
affected the delicate relationship between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
and increases the risk of a renewed conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh”.
The Ceasefire signed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Armenia backed
Nagorno-Karabakh in 1994, has been frequently breaking in recent.
The reconnaissance group from Azerbaijan trespassed the territory of
Nagorno Karabagh during the night of June 18-19, 2010 in the northern
part of the Line of Contact between Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan.
In the result of the fighting Azerbaijan left a casualty and
ammunition, and the Armenian side suffered four casualties and four
wounded.
This was the fourth serious incident in the contact line between
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh taking the 2008 March and November,
and 2010 March similar serious confrontations.
With the oil-money Azerbaijan has upgraded its armed forces and
increased the military expenditures from $ 300 million in 2005 to
about $ 2 billion in 2009. The nowadays military budget of Azerbaijan
is more comparing with the Armenia’s state overall budget. If the
military balance is broken between conflicting sides, a “beneficial”
environment of a possible war naturally forms.
The western nations, the pipelines passing through Caucasus critical
for them, have never condemned the Azerbaijani military policy. It
should be noted the Martakert region of Nagorno-Karabakh is over a
50 km far from the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, and in the case of
a possible confrontation, this line could become vulnerable.
To exclude the military initiative in the case of the existing
realities, such as oil and gas security vital for the Azerbaijan,
Turkey and EU, as well as the fact that the aforementioned raise
of military expenses is a “necessary, but not sufficient” factor
to the renewal of hostilities, could be questioned, if taking into
consideration the coefficient of unpredictability of the Azerbaijan.
After agreeing over the principle of renunciation of use of force
(Meindorf declaration in November, 2008 and the Helsinki agreement
in December, 2008), Azerbaijan continued the breaking the frontier
line with Karabakh, one of which during the OSCE mission monitoring
in the conflict zone in February, 2009.
The Azerbaijan’s attack against Karabakh in June 18 was just some
hours after the meeting on Karabakh peace talks between Russian,
Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders in Sankt Petersburg.
Azeri bellicose statements against Karabakh have been activated in
recent, thus ruling out the appropriate response of Azeri people to
conflict solution.
In June 25, 2010 Defense Minister Safar Abiyev announced “the military
option has never been ruled out” in the Karabakhi case. In one of
his recent statements, Abiyev said, Azerbaijani “armed forces are
capable of terminate targets throughout Armenia in the result of
purchase and installation of new armament systems”.
The war experience has showed that the war rhetoric could become out
of hand if precautionary measures are not taken.
The Armenia is considered as the main threat facing the National
Security of Azerbaijan in the approved of June 8, 2010 Military
doctrine of Azerbaijan. The Milli Mejlis MP Zahid Oruj described the
doctrine as “liberating the occupied Azerbaijani territories”.
The situation is becoming more tensioned because of absence of a
peace agreement.
Early in March of this year Armenian President “appealed to Azerbaijan
to sign an agreement not to use force”, which could “instill trust in
the Armenian people of Karabakh and Armenia”. Baku welcomed this call,
but with a reservation, “the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the
Azerbaijani occupied territories”.
The mood of “not giving a door” for the conflict resolution is apt
to the settlement process. Though the parties publicly agreed the
peaceful solution of the conflict under the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs
mediation, but none of them displayed the needed political will to
settle the conflict.
The “Madrid principles” offered to the conflict sides by
mediator-states (US, France, Russia) in November, 2007 as basic
principles for the negotiations are not of the sides’ interests;
therefore they strain the relative instability between them. The
document seems to be a “model of inconsistency” as it repeats the
principal of Nations self-determination on one hand, while giving a
nod to the Azerbaijani proposal for autonomy on the other.
The updated of last year “Madrid principles” do not affect the public
opinion in Azerbaijan and in Armenia and Karabakh.
The joint statement issued by the Presidents of United States, France
and Russia on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in June 26 during the
G8 summit in Canada underlined the urgency on completing the work on
the offered Basic Principles.
However, with the absence of Public will to concessions, even the
compromise via the political will would increase the possibility of
an armed confrontation.
Vahan Dilanyan currently teaches International Relations at European
Regional Educational Academy in Yerevan, and since 2006 chairing the
Political Developments Research Center NGO, Yerevan. He is serving
as the Contributor at Euro-Atlantic Quarterly, Slovakia.
From: A. Papazian