TURKEY’S CRISES OVER ISRAEL AND IRAN
International Crisis Group
Sept 8 2010
Damage to Turkey’s relations with Israel and suspicions in Western
capitals about its relationship with Iran have dealt setbacks to
Ankara’s “zero-problem” foreign policy. At the same time, there have
been many misconceptions about Turkey’s new engagement in the Middle
East, which aims to build regional peace and prosperity. From a Turkish
perspective, Israel and Iran issues have separate dynamics and involve
more collaboration and shared goals with Western partners than is
usually acknowledged. Ankara’s share of the blame for the falling
out with Western friends and Israel has been exaggerated, but there
are problems in the government’s formulation and presentation of its
foreign policy. These include short-sightedness, heated rhetoric,
over-reach and distraction from Turkey’s core conflict-resolution
challenges in its immediate neighbourhood, including a Cyprus
settlement, normalisation with Armenia, resolution of new Kurdish
tensions and commitment to EU convergence.
Turkey-Israel relations are at a nadir after Israeli commandos
killed eight Turks and a U.S. citizen of Turkish descent on 31
May 2010, as they seized a ship that Ankara had discouraged from
sailing but said it ultimately could not stop from trying to break
the blockade on Gaza. The U.S. and EU member states should back UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon’s four-person, UN-led panel of enquiry
into the tragic incident. Israel should work to normalise its important
relationship with Turkey, including, if its soldiers are found to have
used excessive force or committed crimes, by prosecuting suspects,
and finding ways to give Turkey satisfaction in the matter. For its
part, Turkey should use the current enquiries to satisfy Israeli
and international opinion about the Turkish activists’ intentions
and play its part to improve relations with Israel by moving away
from maximalist demands and confrontational rhetoric. Previously
good ties gave Turkey a unique status as a potentially effective
mediator in the Middle East, including in Arab-Israeli peace talks,
but frayed relations with Israel and the U.S. need to be set right
if this potential is to be realised.
Turkey is also being criticised for its attempts to mediate with Iran
over its nuclear program, especially after voting against additional
sanctions on 9 June at the UN Security Council. But Turkey’s “no”
was not to reining in any Iranian nuclear military ambitions. Ankara
argues that it (and Brazil) believed it had U.S. encouragement to
negotiate the swap of a substantial amount of Iran’s low-enriched
uranium stockpile, as set out in the 17 May Tehran Agreement. It voted
as it did in the Security Council, it says, to protect its negotiating
leverage and to retain the Tehran Agreement as a possible way forward.
The U.S. and EU states should put aside simplistic cliches about
Turkey “turning East”, “joining an Islamist bloc” or “turning its
back on the West”. Turkey’s new foreign engagement has been first and
foremost economic, with Christian and Muslim countries in Eurasia,
the Balkans, Africa and the Middle East alike. The bulk of its trade
and investment, its social, popular and educational connections,
and the source of its intellectual and economic innovation all remain
inextricably linked to EU states and the U.S.
Turkey also shares most of its Western partners’ goals in the
Middle East, such as no nuclear weapons proliferation in the region,
including Iran; a just solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
that respects the full rights of both parties; and the elimination
of al-Qaeda. It should find more ways to speak out for these common
objectives. At the same time, its Western partners should recognise
that due to geography and history, Turkey will reasonably pursue them
at times with its own tactics and methodology.
Ankara can achieve more through a good working relationship with the
EU and the U.S. than if it tries to forge ahead alone. The government
and public opinion should avoid presuming, as they sometimes seem
tempted, that the U.S. needs Turkey more than it needs Israel,
or that personal relations with President Obama will substitute
for policy substance. Even though Turkey is clearly becoming a
stronger international player, cooperation with Washington and EU
convergence are keys to its regional prominence and have contributed
to its economic growth, boom in trade with neighbours and improved
respect for human rights, as well as Istanbul’s growing reputation
as a glamorous regional hub. Turkish leaders should also tone down
populist or militant rhetoric, since it undermines allies’ trust,
and resume more quiet dialogue with Israel to regain its unique
ability to speak with confidence to all parties in its region.
Turkey has changed greatly over the past two decades, becoming
richer and more self-confident, no longer dependent on Washington or
Brussels alone. While Ankara should not exaggerate its own importance
or capacities, its Western partners should recognise its genuine
significance in its region and beyond and spend more time talking to
it quietly, constructively and at high-levels. To this end, Washington
and Ankara in particular might usefully consider establishing new
mechanisms for regular dialogue and better coordination on the full
range of their shared foreign policy interests, including in the
Middle East. Moreover, while Turkey remains committed to its EU path,
France and Germany must keep its membership perspectives credible,
if all are to take maximum advantage of their shared Middle East goals.
These commonalities remain a strong basis for cooperating to increase
stability and diminish conflicts in the region.
From: A. Papazian
http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/turkey-cyprus/turkey/208-turkeys-crises-over-israel-and-iran.aspx