ANTI-WESTERN ISLAMISM BECAME POSSIBLE ONLY AFTER END OF COMMUNISM
by Paul Goble
Eurasia Review
Sept 9 2010
Islamist radicalism could “declare itself as a real alternative to
‘pro-Western regimes of the Islamic world and to globalization as a
whole only after the collapse of the communist idea” as embodied in
the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc, according to a Mohylev-based
commentator.
In an article that takes issue with Araks Pashayan’s
2006 essay “Post-Islamism: The Inevitable Evolution”
(), Dmitry
Puzyrev of Mohylev makes an argument that is already attracting the
attention of other scholars and commentators on the Russian Internet
().
Pashayan, an Armenian Iranist, argued that with the end of the Cold
War, it became fashionable to speak of post-this and post-that, and
she suggested that it would be useful to talk about “post-Islamism,”
in order to “designate the end of [one] period of Islamism and the
beginning of a new one.”
But in his new article, Puzyrev says that Pashayan’s argument led many
to conclude that Islamist terrorism would wane just as other “post”
realities have. In fact, he says, events, including the September 11th
attacks on the United States, show that her views in that regard were
overly optimistic.
Long before 2001, he continues, Moscow “had called for the unification
of efforts of all countries of the international community for
the struggle with international (trans-national) terrorism, but
unfortunately, until that moment, [its] appeal was not heard.” And
now the world faces more rather than less Islamist terrorism.
Puzyrev says that in his view, “Islamic radicalism” is “an ideology
which contains a radical interpretation of Muslim doctrine in
the third of the absolutization of the early Islamic way of life
and the social-political practice based on it and directed at the
establishment of a world governed by shariat and using extremist and
terrorist methods” to gain that end.
In this regard, the Mohylev-based commentator continues, “Islamic
radicalism” and “Islamism” are synonyms because both present themselves
“as an alternative to the contemporary regimes of the Islamic world,”
an appeal, he argues that is “in no way exhausted” at the present time.
During the Cold War, there was little room for this distinctive kind
of radicalism. And “only with the collapse of the communist idea
could Islamist radicalism speak of itself as a real alternative to
‘pro-Western regimes’ of the Islamic world and also to globalism as
a whole” and moreover offer “a special path of development operating
on traditional Muslim values.”
According to Puzyrev, the growth of such “radical Islamist movements”
was further promoted by “a whole range of inter-connected and mutually
reinforcing causes, including historical ones like the opposition of
Islam and Christianity, social-economic ones including unemployment,
poverty and foreign debt, and demographic ones like rapid population
growth.
In addition, he says, there were political factors at work including
“the inability of the ruling regimes to resolve essential problems of
societal development” and psychological ones including “the absence
of firm internal barriers against the use of force methods and means”
for political goals.
And he suggests these factors work with another one to drive Islamist
groups in an ever more radical direction. As some of them achieve their
goals in part and gain some measure of power, they tend “gradually
to distance themselves for the use of force for the resolution of
problems,” a shift that leads others to turn against them for the
same ideological reasons.
Moreover, Puzyrev argues, the suggestion of some that the spread of
democratic forms into the Muslim world will undermine the radicals is
almost certainly wrong, at least in the short term. Numerous examples
show, he says, that “the pro-Western regimes of the Muslim world,
mired as they are in corruption,” are neither popular nor effective.
As a result, “under such conditions, among the faithful spontaneously
arise movements calling for the return to the roots of faith and for
the cleansing of Islam from innovations” – in short, for exactly the
kind of movement usually labeled fundamentalist and willing to engage
in violence.
But there are two other reasons, Puzyrev argues, that make the
prospects for a move beyond radicalism among Muslims problematic
anytime soon. On the one hand, the leaders of the Islamist groups have
shown themselves willing to modify, at least for public consumption,
some of their “utopian” ideas, particularly concerning women, in
order to win support.
And on the other, Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries continue
to provide massive funding to those who engage in such radical
activities. It may be that these countries are trying to direct
this movement away from themselves, but it is likely that they will
ultimately be its targets and victims as well.
Paul Goble
Paul Goble is a longtime specialist on ethnic and religious questions
in Eurasia. Most recently, he was director of research and publications
at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Earlier, he served as vice
dean for the social sciences and humanities at Audentes University
in Tallinn and a senior research associate at the EuroCollege of the
University of Tartu in Estonia. He has served in various capacities
in the U.S. State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and the
International Broadcasting Bureau as well as at the Voice of America
and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty and at the Carnegie Endowment
for International Peace. Mr. Goble maintains the Window on Eurasia
blog and can be contacted directly at [email protected] .
From: A. Papazian
http://www.eurasiareview.com/201009097951/anti-western-islamism-became-possible-only-after-end-of-communism.html
www.noravank.am/rus/issues/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=3143
www.pravaya.ru/look/19823