TURKEY’S POLICY TOWARDS ARMENIA AND ENERGY SECURITY IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS
Armenia – Turkey rapprochement is important not only for alternative
regional energy solutions but also for the establishment of peace
and stability in the Caucasus. The United States, in the context
of President Obama’s policies emphasizing engagement rather than
confrontation, has encouraged Turkey to refrain from isolating
Armenia. The West is by now convinced that Azerbaijan cannot serve as
an alternative to Russia for natural gas supplies. One reason for this
is Azerbaijan’s small production volume. Another is the instability
of the transit route, highlighted again by the August 2008 “South
Ossetia War”.
* Hakob Chakryan is a Political Analyst for the Armenian daily,
Azg. He is also the resident expert for the Urban Foundation for
Sustainable Development.
Hakob Chakryan * 118 VOLUME 9 NUMBER 2 HAKOB CHAKRYAN ince 1991,
Turkish foreign policy towards Armenia has negated Armenian diplomatic
attempts to normalize relations with Turkey. The main obstacle is
Turkey placing pre-conditions for normalization (i.e.
that Armenia must refrain from Armenian Genocide recognition claims,
and recognize Nagorno-Karabakh as inalienable part of Azerbaijan),
which are incompatible with the basic principles of international
relations. Thus, bilateral attempts to normalize relations have
resulted in deadlock.
The need to resolve this deadlock gave international actors an
opportunity to intervene in the Armenian-Turkish normalization
process. However, the involvement of the United States, the European
Union, and Russia in this issue has spontaneously drawn Turkey and
Armenia deeper into the uncompromising contest between these larger
powers for influence in South Caucasus. As a result, Armenian and
Turkish sides eventually accepted a normalization process with which
neither side was completely comfortable.
1 The South Ossetia War of August 2008 changed the balance
of power in the South Caucasus and seriously affected the
aforementioned rivalry. On its face, this was a Russian-Georgian
confrontation. However, it needs to be better understood as Russia’s
response to the West’s assistance to Georgia, resulted with Russia’s
recognition of Abkhazian and South Ossetian independence.
The fallout of the conflict led to unprecedented growth of Russia’s
military and political influence in the South Caucasus. The U.S. policy
towards the South Caucasus is on the verge of failure by virtue of
Russia’s actions. Georgia is paralyzed and is no longer a reliable
partner for the U.S. The post-conflict situation rendered the energy
transit routes stretching through the territory of Georgia less
secure. The West is by now convinced that Azerbaijan cannot serve
as an alternative to Russia for natural gas supplies. One reason for
this is Azerbaijan’s small production volume.
Another is the instability of the transit route, highlighted again
by the August 2008 “South Ossetia war”. Compounding the problem
is Azerbaijan’s tendency to change allegiance during the course of
events. For example, it was pro-West during the presidency of Abulfaz
Elchibey, the pro Russia under Haydar Aliyev, then again pro West
under Ilham Aliyev, who, in the wake of the South Ossetia conflict
has immediately sought closer ties with Russia.
2 Such developments call into question the United States’ political
calculation to use Georgia as a transit corridor to international
markets for Azerbaijani oil and gas, as well as using it as a base
for controlling the strategically important Black Sea and 1 Armen
Manvelyan, “Competition of International Forces for the Caspian
Sea Basin Energy Resources and the South Caucasus in 1991-2007”,
Yerevan, 2010.
2 Hakob Chakryan, “The Task of the State Secretary was Counterbalancing
Russia’s Influence in South Caucasus,” 7 July 2010, http://
hishatakaran.livejournal.com/19015.html TURKISH POLICY QUARTERLY
119 TURKEY – ARMENIA RELATIONS Caspian Sea
basins. Thus, Russia, in its rivalry with the United States, has
gained the upper hand in gaining further influence in the South
Caucasus. In addition, the strategic significance of Armenia as an
ally has increased for both the U.S and Russia.
The imperative to regain its position in the South Caucasus has
led the U.S. to invigorate its efforts to have closer ties with
Armenia. An indication of this effort was the active involvement
of the U.S. in latest rounds of the Turkish Armenian normalization
process, which included talks on opening of the border between the
two countries. In this light, a number of developments indicating
a warming up of Armenian-Turkish relations were not surprising,
including the announcement by the Turkish Prime Minister Erdoðan on
the initiation of a “Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform”,
3 a plan which includes a visit of the President Abdullah Gul to
Yerevan; signing of Armenian-Turkish Protocols in Switzerland and a
return visit to Turkey by the Armenian President, Serge Sargsyan.
These developments certainly were influenced by the new situation
being forged in the region whose main motives were the following:
* The U.S. President Obama’s policies aimed at mitigating military
tensions in the Middle East; * The U.S.’s encouragement, as part of
its policy of engagement with the Muslim world, of Turkey to actively
work to establish peace and stability in the region; * The failure of
Turkey’s policy towards Armenia which has been pur sued since 1991; *
The incompatibility of Turkey’s new role with its policy of isolating
Armenia from regional initiatives and energy projects.
The impetus for Armenian-Turkish reconciliation reached beyond the
frame of bilateral relations between the two countries. It touched
upon American, European, and Russian rivalry in the South Caucasus and
affected their respective regional policies; and it also dealt with
the issues of energy security, efficiency of energy and transportation
projects. All of these factors led to “reconciliation” becoming an
issue of great regional significance.
As part of this wider process, it would appear that Georgia would be
compelled to reconsider its positions towards Armenia, Azerbaijan,
and Turkey; and Turkey, whether desired or not, would reconsider
its priorities regarding its relations with Azerbaijan. Obviously,
if Turkey gives more importance to its relations with Armenia, then
Azerbaijan’s ability to threaten Armenia -with the unconditional
support of Turkey- would be greatly constrained.
3 Hakob Chakryan, Press Conference in Yerevan, PanArmenian.net,
19 August 2009.
120 VOLUME 9 NUMBER 2 Perhaps, regional significance of
Armenian-Turkish “reconciliation” contributed to the interest shown
in this process by the U.S. and EU, as well as Russia for no other
reason than not willing to be left out. It seemed that Ankara did
take into consideration international interests deriving from the
regional significance of “reconciliation” of the two countries,
which were the main catalysts of this process.
Therefore, it would demonstrate commitment to the Protocols
on establishing diplomatic and other bilateral relations with
Armenia. However, the pre-conditions set forth by Turkey related
to Nagorno-Karabakh and Genocide issues were more stringent than
expected. Thus, Armenian-Turkish reconciliation process reverted to
its base line.
The implication of this reversion is one of increased tension
in the South Caucasus, which already contained ample grounds for
conflict. Any aggravation of tensions in the South Caucasus should
bother not only Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia, but also international
actors which have made large-scale investments in energy projects;
particularly the pipelines Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan, Baku-Erzurum, and
Baku-Supra, all of which run near the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh
or the Armenian-populated Javagheti region of Georgia and generate
tension in Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey.
At first glance, it seems that Armenia has been left out of regional
energy projects.
But in fact, it has resources which could make it an important
player. As a transit country, Armenia is a worthy alternative to
Georgia. In addition, Armenia is implementing several joint projects
with the Islamic Republic of Iran, such as a hydro-power station
which is being constructed on the Aras River, and the Iranian-
Armenian oil pipeline.
4 By implementing these projects, Armenia will receive additional
electricity, as well as oil below international prices. Also, it
will become a transit country connecting Persian Gulf harbors with
the Black Sea through its highway and railway systems.
Thus, even though it has been left out of the energy projects
conceived by Turkey and the West, it has not been left completely on
the sidelines.
Moreover, for Armenia, Iran is preferable to Turkey as a partner
for energy projects because Iran is a major producer of oil and gas,
unlike the latter which is only a transit country. In the absence of
normalized relations with Turkey, Armenia is left with no alternative
but to cling to Russia and wait for the improvement of U.S. – Iran
relations.
HAKOB CHAKRYAN The imperative to regain its position in the South
Caucasus has led the U.S.
to invigorate its efforts to have closer ties with Armenia.
4 Fikret Ertan,” Ýran-Ermenistan iliþkileri
gittikce geliþiyor”[Iran-Armenia relations
are improving], Samanyolu Haber, 18 July 2010,
From: A. Papazian
http://www.turkishpolicy.com/dosyalar/files/117-120.pdf
http://www.samanyoluhaber.com/y_435331_fikret-ertan-iran-ermenistan-iliskileri-gittikce-gelisiyor.html
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