POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE NAGORNO-KARABAKH CONFLICT SETTLEMENT ROADMAP AT CURRENT STAGE
Mikhail Aghajanyan
Noyan Tapan
18.02.2011
The process of the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement has recently shown some
kind of stalling and absence of any significant dynamics of positive
development. Such a tendency has been boldly outlined after the
well-known meeting of three presidents in Sochi on January 25, 2010.
It became even more prominent after the meeting of three presidents
in Saint-Petersburg on June 17. 2010 and, at last, the meeting in
the same format in Astrakhan finally convinced even the most fervent
optimists of the fact that the stances of two conflicting parties did
not reproach. Besides, according to estimations of some persons who
are aware of the details of the discussions in triangular format,
there is even no dynamics to rapprochement between the stances of
the parties. After the meeting in Astrakhan, many expectations were
connected with the meeting at the OSCE summit in Astana on December
1-2.
Probably, the only novelty, which is to support the process of the
settlement in the respectable shape and to prolong the international
mediatory efforts, is the discussion of the issue of adoption of some
“roadmap” within the process of the settlement. For the first time the
later was actively discussed in 2009-2010 on both political and expert
levels. Thus, at the end of 2009 and at the beginning on 2010 it had
been often mentioned that Kazakhstan, the OSCE presiding country, is
ready to offer Armenia and Azerbaijan a draft of conflict settlement
document in the form of a “roadmap”. It was mentioned that “the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan Kanat Saudabayev announced
the creation of a “roadmap” directed to the settlement of the Karabakh
conflict. Prior to that he visited Azerbaijan and Armenia and made
sure that there are positive shifts in the stances of the parties” 1.
Back in October 2010, several days before the meeting of three
presidents in Astrakhan, the US envoy to the OSCE Ian Kelly, mentioning
the anxious situation on the cease-fire front line in the zone of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, stated that at current stage the most
important was that the parties keep talking to each other in order to
provide diplomatic process. As for the expectations of the American
diplomacy from the upcoming OSCE Summit in Astana, Kelly mentioned
about the possibility of a “roadmap” in the process of the Karabakh
settlement in the context of inviting the parties to agree at least
on a definite “roadmap” for the settlement of the conflict2.
Drafting and implementation of a “roadmap” for the settlement
of the old interstate conflicts is not an innovation3. One can
remember an attempt to breathe a new life into the settlement of
Israeli-Palestinian conflict just with the help of the adoption of a
“roadmap”. The “roadmap” of Israeli-Palestinian conflict settlement4,
which was approved on the highest international level, formulated
in a form of a written document, to which the leaders of Israel and
Palestinian administration set a seal, was not implemented and under
the current realities of the Israeli-Palestinian settlement a few or
none remembers about it. The “roadmap” of the Israeli-Palestinian
settlement was formulated as a step-by-step process with definite
stages when each subsequent stage logically ensues from the realization
of the previous one. The “roadmap” of the settlement of any process of
interstate conflict is a plan to obtain definite political goals and
this means that it is first of all a plan of political settlement,
which included, to varying degree, judicial and other aspects of
settlement, but in its essence and general trend it still remains a
political plan. Taking this into consideration, any “roadmap” should
be ready for swing in its effectiveness; as anything political in
modern world, here the effect is also most often twofold – either
actual breakthrough (which by the way, has never been observed in
international practice) or full stopping which can be seen in the most
of the cases. There is no middle way if the “roadmap” is meant for the
settlement of a complicated interstate conflict which takes place out
of the immediate European space, because conflicting parties are not
ready for the compromise in the sense as it is taken in the European
political thought. Most often the parties approach the situation from
the position of de-facto situation, i.e. “if I get something then it
is mine, and I will not give it to anyone “for the hell of it”. The
western meaning of compromise assumes that “for the hell of it”
(i.e. to give for nothing or for something which is absolutely not
commensurable with what you receive in return), and at the same time
they make reference to a highly developed culture of compromise. Of
course it is easy to achieve compromise in quite Europe as compared
with the South Caucasus which is in fact divided by confrontations.
The logical step-by-step constructions can hardly promote
implementation of the “roadmap” of the Israeli-Palestinian settlement
and the “roadmap” of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement, because
Israelis will never leave Eastern Jerusalem “just for the hell of
it”, and Armenians will never renounce their legitimate claims for
the compensation for the Genocide of the Armenians in Western Armenia.
The “roadmap” of Israeli-Palestinian conflict has its logic. Thus,
the first step stipulated the stage of “ending of terror and violence,
normalization of the living conditions of the Palestinians, formation
of the Palestine institutions”, which had to be carried out just
within several weeks from the moment of the adoption of the “roadmap”.
The second stage of the “roadmap” implied definite measures which
“concentrate their efforts on the creation of an independent
Palestinian state within provisional borders and with the attributes
of sovereignty based on a new constitution and as an intermediate
stage on its way to a constant settlement”. And finally, the third
stage had to bring to “an agreement on the constant status and final
settlement of Israeli-Palestinian conflict”.
The main purpose of the Israeli-Palestinian “roadmap” was formulated as
obtaining final and comprehensive settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict till 2005. This purpose was sounded in the speech of the US
president G. Bush on June 24, 2002 and approved by the European Union,
Russia and UN in the statements made after the meeting of the ministers
of foreign affairs on July 16 and September 17, 2002. More than 5 years
has passed since “the time-frame of the final settlement”. According
to some initiated experts “the fact of mismatch of the plan of the
“roadmap” to the real situation was mentioned by the official Russian
diplomacy. “By the end of this year we had had to begin creation of
the Palestinian state. But in fact we are still just at the beginning
of the first stage of the “roadmap”.
The time-frame is unrealizable. Let’s not put a brave face on a
sorry business, – said Alexander Kalugin, the special envoy of the
RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Middle East settlement, on August
18, 2005, – Ever since Israeli-Palestinian relations has only become
strained and the time-frame of the “roadmap” has expired” 5.
There was a kind of logic in two well-known Armenian-Turkish protocols
where a definite sequence of stages within the specified time frame
of their realization was set. There are following references to
the time-frame of implementation of separate steps by the parties
in two Armenian-Turkish protocols signed in Zurich on October 10,
2009, and this can be considered as stages of the “roadmap” of
the normalization of the relations between two countries: – The
establishment of diplomatic relations between two countries on the
day when The Protocol on Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between
Armenia and Turkey comes into effect; – Opening of the borders within
two months after The Protocol on Development of the Relations between
Armenia and Turkey comes into effect; – Both Protocols come into
effect on the same day, i.e. on the first day of the first month which
follows the interchange of the ratification documents by the parties; –
The last part of The Protocol on Development of the Relations between
Armenia and Turkey includes the terms of formation and beginning of
work of the intergovernmental commissions and sub-commissions.
But everybody knows the difficulties the given logic faced; everybody
knows that the world leading powers sounded the support of the process
of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement and concrete realization of
the provisions of two protocols. The logic of the western political
thought, based on an axiom of compromise with regard to the conflict
settlement, was beaten by the logic of the direct participants of
the conflict. With regard to the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement the
logic of the only power which torpedoed the process, i.e. Turkey,
consisted in the fact that in return for its “concession” in the
form of opening of the border with Armenia, Ankara was ready to
accept only “commensurate” concession – renouncing of the process of
international recognition of the Armenian Genocide and withdrawal of
the Armenian forces from the Lowland Karabakh. What fate is in store
for the “roadmap” of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement if it
is formulated in a written form?
We can mention several positive, in our opinion, moments, in case
of practical implementation of such an initiative, i.e. elaboration
of the stage-by-stage lan of the Karabakh conflict settlement in the
form of “roadmap”. But we should also mention aspects which may have
negative effect on the process of the Karabakh conflict settlement.
Let us only specify that one of the main goals of possible “roadmap”
of the Karabakh conflict settlement, on which the external powers rely
for achieving progress, may consist in the fact that the “roadmap”
by itself may become a definite “compromise” between two traditionally
dominating discrepant approaches – Armenian and Azerbaijani approaches
to the conflict settlement, i.e., correspondingly, the “package” or
“stage-by-stage” settlement. At first sight the “roadmap” is obviously
“stage-by-stage” approach which gives preference to Baku. But it
is not so. Each stage of this “roadmap” is a “package” of steps,
the whole of set of definite actions. The combination of these two
approaches is a well-known aspiration of the external powers which
play mediatory role in the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict
settlement. Then why not to try to make this dream come true in the
form of “stage-by-stage and package” approach in this “roadmap”?
The positive effect of the “roadmap” may also manifest itself in the
continuation of consultations and negotiations round the Karabakh
settlement and this will preserve the current status quo in the
region, will not allow this shaky stability turn into hostilities in
the zone of conflict. The “roadmap” will become a kind of compromise
between the main mediators represented by Russia, USA and France,
as the trilateral format of meetings initiated by Russia makes many
believe that the Minsk group is a kind of burden for Moscow and
it wants to get rid of it. The “roadmap” will not allow the Minsk
group fading from the scene but, at the same time, it will even
more sideline the institution of the Minsk group. Because signing
of any document between parties can become reality only by active
diplomatic work of Moscow. For the later the way from the November
2008 Meindorf declaration to the October 2010 Joint Statement is a
way of a certain “diplomatic regress” as in November 2008 something
was signed, two years later only statement was made. In a situation
like that Moscow needs to sign any document and it is desirable that
it will be a significant document on the Karabakh conflict settlement.
Then, the positive aspects of the “roadmap” are that it allows
predicting further steps by two of the three conflicting parties,
a kind of schedule of events, definite actions, which have to be
implemented by a specific date. If this does not happen it would be
easy to find out who does not stick to his liabilities stipulated in
the “roadmap”.
The “roadmap of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement” may also
have a positive effect on stability in the region in general. From this
point of view, if we compare it with the “roadmap” of Armenian-Turkish
normalization, we can state that the only positive effect of the
unfinished process of the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement is a greater
degree of distinctness in the relations between Ankara and Yerevan,
and such distinctness between regional rivals means greater degree of
stability. It also implies that the external actors will follow the
deviations to the negative sides and try to suppress those deviations
because they are more interested in the stability in the region. So
the “roadmap” puts the process within some frames, even if it is not
brought to the logical end. Thus, since the adoption of the “roadmap”
in 2003, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has not gone beyond definite
borders of the disputed territories (e.g. to Syria, though there
were some “encounters” on the Lebanese territory); Armenian-Turkish
relations have not been deteriorated after the conclusion of the
“Zurich protocols” but they obtained more distinct character. So
one can hope that the availability of the “roadmap” in the Karabakh
conflict settlement will become another element which will promote
stability and will become a relative guarantee of not spreading a
conflict beyond its current frame and areal.
The negative factors are as follows: 1. If the “roadmap” of the
Karabakh conflict settlement is drafted now, two well-known statements
of the presidents of Russia, US and France will be extrapolated (June
10, 2009 and June 26, 2010) to it. Such a basis for the “roadmap” of
the Karabakh conflict settlement, in our opinion, will be of negative
character and will bring it to the dead end at the very first stage.
The “roadmap” of the Karabakh conflict settlement cannot begin with
the provision which reads “returning of the occupied territories
round Nagorno-Karabakh”6. The first stage should be the conclusion by
all the three conflicting parties of the agreement on the non-use of
force at any stage of the Karabakh conflict settlement. The “roadmap”
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict settlement was mostly brought
to the dead end by the fact that the external actors had overstated
expectations connected with the withdrawal of the Israeli forces
behind the so-called “green line”. Many experts mentioned that
“many failures of the international diplomacy on the road to settle
Israeli-Palestinian conflict are caused by the fact that the withdrawal
of the Israeli forces behind the “green line”7 is considered as an
immutable precondition necessary for the settlement. To set hopes on
the withdrawal of the Israeli forces behind the borders which existed
before 1967 as the main mean to achieve peace is as hopeless as to
support the demagogic conversations of the US State Department about
the correctness of the “roadmap” 8.
There can be no retreat of the NKR to the borders of 1988, as there
were no such borders, because today’s NKR was de-facto territorially
formed within the borders of historical Artsakh, meanwhile some of its
territories are still occupied by the Azerbaijani Republic. There can
be no withdrawal of the Armenian forces from the territory of Lowland
Karabakh until a real format of the process of negotiations between
two parties, which are responsible for any hypothetical withdrawal of
their forces from some territories, is formed. Those parties can be
the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and Azerbaijani Republic and they have
to become the main actors while implementing definite provisions of
the possible “roadmap”,
Thus, at current stage, there are no real grounds for the settlement
and no real party composition of the “Karabakh roadmap”, 2. The
“roadmap” is always an imperative demand for the parties to stick to
their commitments mentioned in the concluded agreements. Definitely the
only party which has been violating the requirements is Azerbaijan and
this is proved by a sequence of armistices concluded during the war in
1991-1994, as well as a number of agreements with the participation
of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic following it (the classical example
is the Agreement about the Enforcement of the Cease-Fire Regime which
was officially signed under the auspices of the OSCE on February 4,
1995 by all the three conflicting parties).
There can be no efficient or any positive return from any “roadmap”
if the party, which initially considers itself “injured party”,
reserves the right to reconsider its commitments. In this connection
the full name of the Israeli-Palestinian “roadmap” dated May
2003 is demonstrative: “Roadmap” to a permanent settlement of
Palestinian-Israeli conflict in accordance with the principle of
coexistence of two states based on the evaluation of the implementation
of the obligations by the parties. We believe that the assessment of
the “implementation of the provisions of the roadmap” by Azerbaijan
will always be unsatisfactory because there is no style of respectable
attitude towards the opponents necessary for the constructive dialogue
in Baku. “Karabakh roadmap” is unrealizable against the background
of the chauvinism towards everything Armenian and claims on “Western
Azerbaijan”. 3. For the positive implementation of the “roadmap” there
is no such an accepted in the international practice institution as
the personal envoy whose intermediary services are accepted by all
the parties to the conflict. The institution of co-chairmen of the
Minsk group cannot be considered as the similar to the institution
of the personal envoy of the head of the state. People are necessary
who would work on the elaboration, coordination and implementation
of the “roadmap” 24-hours a day, and, what is most important, they
would have a mandate for such a work from the heads of states which
are the external mediators. After the events round South Ossetia in
August 2008 an issue of creation of the position of the special envoy
of the US president on Karabakh settlement was discussed behind the
scene by Western experts. Later on, they spoke that it would be more
reasonable if there was a special envoy of the US State Secretary in
the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement.
It is remarkable that today such conversations in the Russian expert
circles have become more often.
Thus, Russian experts, mentioning absence of any real progress in
the process of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement after the
meetings of the presidents of Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan, said
after the meeting in Astrakhan that “the promises of Medvedev that
by the moment of holding the OSCE Summit in Kazakhstan on December
1-2 Yerevan and Baku would get a new coordinated variant of general
principles of the settlement of the conflict inspires no optimism. Even
more, in case of elaboration of such principles they would not go
beyond the norms formulated by Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan in
the joint declaration signed in Moscow on November 2, 2008. Thu,
they will again speak about obscure commitments which do not promote
real initiation of the peace talks”. Russian experts believe that the
main reason for it is that Kremlin has not “enough diplomatic tools
to solve this issue”. All the contacts with the conflicting parties
are mainly built through the president. The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs provides technical support to the head of the state. At
the same time Russia has no such position as the special envoy of
the Russian president on Nagorno-Karabakh issue. Traditionally in
the international practice, the special representative gets to the
heart of the matter and reconciles differences between conflicting
parties. He is also responsible for the everyday work and contacts
with the counteragents. This is the only way not only to achieve a
true understanding of the matter but also to gradually pave the way for
the process of negotiations. Russia has nothing like that. Nominally,
the role of the special envoy is taken by the representative of Moscow
in the Minsk group. But this is mostly ceremonial post which has no
full powers, just like the OSCE by itself” 9.
4. And finally, probably the most important restraint for the positive
implementation of the “roadmap” of Karabakh conflict settlement
is the absence of the intentions of main external powers to settle
anything in the Nagorno-Karabakh process. The fact that the process
of settlement is necessary does not cause any contradictions. But
this does not mean that the external powers tend to obtain any result.
There is already a result and that result has caused relatively
efficient sustention of the status-quo in the zone of the conflict
for the recent 16 years. Enough is as good as a feast and the external
powers realize that current situation is better than the uncertainty
which follows the first step in the hastily drafted “roadmap” of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement.
Noravank
From: A. Papazian