Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Jan 15 2012
Former diplomat Ä°skit: Tehran may be planning to divide Iraq
15 January 2012 / YONCA POYRAZ DOÄ?AN, Ä°STANBUL
Tehran may have plans to divide Iran in order to increase its
influence in the region following the Arab Spring, which has made the
region unstable and unpredictable, a former diplomat has told Monday
Talk, adding that Turkey better be cautious in this time of transition
in its neighborhood.
`As pressures increase on Iran, Tehran tries many tactics. For
example, it threatens to respond to Western sanctions by closing the
Strait of Hormuz. Tehran may also be planning to divide Iraq,’ said
retired Ambassador Temel Ä°skit, evaluating Turkey’s foreign policy
challenges in 2012.
`Iraq’s division would support Iran’s claim to be the regional power.
We cannot think of an Iraq independent of Iran. Iran has a great
influence on Shiites,’ he also said.
Ankara and Tehran have recently had meetings in the face of the United
States’ latest sanctions on Iran targeting Tehran’s ability to sell
crude oil. The European Union and Japan are also drawing up sanctions
on Iran.
On that and more, Ä°skit addressed the most challenging foreign policy
questions of this year, answering our questions.
What do you expect to happen in the Middle East and North Africa in
2012, especially with regard to Turkey as the country in this region
where hot developments have been taking place?
I don’t have a crystal ball. But we can look at the present picture
and discuss what Turkey can do in that environment. There are great
instabilities in the countries of the region. The closest ones to
Turkey are in Iraq and Syria. Contrary to the rest of the region,
northern Iraq has become a place of stability. Even though Turkey
still does not call that region `Iraqi Kurdistan,’ the Kurdish
administration has become an entity, a semi-state that Turkey
cooperates with.
But the rest of Iraq is in turmoil.
The presence of American troops in Iraq was helping to keep a balance
between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq, but with the departure of the
American troops, the balance has gone. Shiite Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki’s attempt to arrest one of the country’s top Sunni
politicians, Vice President Tariq al-Hashemi, accusing him of running
a hit squad targeting government officials, ignited the long-lasting
Shiite-Sunni division. [Hashemi denies the allegations. He is staying
as a guest of Iraqi Kurdish President Jalal Talabani, out of reach of
security forces under Baghdad’s control.] We don’t know how this issue
is going to evolve. Turkey supports Iraq’s unity, but its influence is
quite limited with regard to developments in Iraq. Turkey does not
have influence when it comes to Shiites, and Maliki has not refrained
from confronting Turkey. He is supported by Iran. For Sunnis, the
benefits of siding with Turkey are not clear since this might
strengthen the divisive forces in Iraq.
There are comments suggesting a possible Turkish-Kurdish-Sunni axis.
There are, but what is it going to lead to? Such a grouping would be
against Maliki, the Shiites, Iran, Syria and Hezbollah. Turkey
wouldn’t be able to afford being in that position; it would be harmful
for Turkey to take such a biased stance. Turkey should be able to
protect its objectivity as much as it can. Yes, there is a possibility
that Iraq will be divided, and the United States would probably not
have the power to interfere since US troops have left the country.
`Moscow might provide refuge to Assad’
How does Iran play a role in that picture?
As pressures increase on Iran, Tehran tries many tactics. For example,
it threatens to respond to Western sanctions by closing the Strait of
Hormuz [a transit route for a fifth of the world’s oil]. Tehran may
also be planning to divide Iraq. Iraq’s division would support Iran’s
claim to be the regional power. We cannot think of an Iraq independent
of Iran. Iran has a great influence on Shiites.
What would you say about Iran’s relations with Syria?
Iran does not have as direct of an influence on Syria as on Iraq, but
Iran and Syria are traditional allies. Tehran would not like to see
[Syrian President] Bashar al-Assad fall. Moscow has more influence
over Syria than Tehran. Russia has maintained support for the
increasingly isolated Assad, whose nation has been one of Moscow’s
closest strategic partners in the Middle East and a big purchaser of
its weapons. Russian warships recently docked at a Russian naval
maintenance and supply facility in the Syrian port of Tartus to
display support for the Assad government.
There were news reports that Assad may soon call Russia home.
It is likely that Moscow will provide Assad refuge, if that means the
figurehead is gone, but the Assad regime is well and alive. Look at
what happened in Egypt; Mubarak is gone but the military has the ropes
now. What will happen in Syria is of utmost importance for Turkey. The
first concern for Turkey is with regard to the flow of refugees from
Syria, if growing instability leads to a refugee crisis. Turkey better
continue to do what it is already doing: support dissidents of that
country. However, supporting armed opposition groups would be a
mistake; a military intervention would be unacceptable. Some Western
writers, especially a number of American commentators, tend to suggest
the idea that since a non-Muslim power’s intervention in Syria would
not be received well in the region, Turkey should do it because it has
a claim to regional power status against Iran. This idea carries with
it the air of provocation. Turkey’s recent overconfidence makes it
exposed to such calls with ulterior motives.
`Time to be cautious for Turkey in foreign policy’
Opponents of the Syrian regime have suggested creating a buffer zone
along the country’s borders that would protect civilians and enable
the army’s soldiers to defect. Do you think Turkey can take this
responsibility on?
For Turkey to do it, there needs to be a civil war in Syria leading to
a flow of refugees. Until that happens, Turkey cannot do it, because
if it does, this buffer zone will be a safe haven for Syria’s armed
opposition. But if thousands of refugees are fleeing Syria, then a
buffer zone could be established on the Syrian side of the border.
Even that would be risky because if Syrian armed forces try to attack
those refugees, Turkey would have to send its fighter jets to the
area. Back to Turkey’s overconfidence, those changes and the situation
of instability in the region are likely to teach Ankara its limits.
One incident that tested Ankara’s limits was with regard to its policy
toward Israel. Turkish foreign policy has unnecessarily been taken
hostage by the situation in Gaza. Another incident involved Iran.
Ankara’s previous policy toward Iran made Turkey a guarantor for
Tehran, though the situation changed recently as Ankara agreed to host
NATO’s early warning radar as part of a NATO missile defense system
which is capable of countering ballistic missile threats from Iran.
With so much instability in its neighborhood, it is time Turkey
becomes cautious in its foreign policy. It is better for Turkey to
observe the situation around it carefully. No one knows how the events
will evolve since there is currently a process of transition. And in a
transition, being cautious is the most important virtue.
Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu visited Tehran last week and
said Turkey was ready to host further talks with world powers and Iran
over its nuclear program. In addition, Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali
Larijani said after meeting with Turkish leaders in Ankara that Tehran
supports the idea. What is happening?
Those sanctions would make Iran even more cornered as its ability to
sell oil would be seriously harmed. Iran is already uneasy because its
main ally in the region, Assad, is in a bad situation, and now comes
more Western pressure. As I mentioned, to fight its isolation, Iran
would try to use its influence on the Shiites of Iraq. It is unlikely
that Iran will close the Strait of Hormuz as this will hurt Iran the
most. Under the circumstances, Iran has another card, the card of
negotiations. But Iran has to convince the West that it is sincere. It
is also highly unlikely that the United States and Israel will resort
to military measures against Iran since this would lead to a deepening
of the world economic crisis. Therefore, it is likely that
disagreements between Iran and the West will be long-lasting. In that
environment, it is good that Turkey has the ability to talk with Iran,
but that does not mean that Turkey does not have any problems with
Iran, which may pose a constant threat [once it obtains] nuclear arms.
Also Iran does not trust Turkey because of our Syria policy and
because we agreed to host the NATO radar. All in all, relations
between Turkey and Iran are not very bright, but both Ankara and
Tehran will avoid serious conflict with each other. In this vein, Iran
will not actively support the PKK [outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party].
`2012 to be another lost year with regard to Turkey-EU relations’What
is your evaluation of Turkish-French relations in light of the recent
developments with regard to the French parliament’s vote on a bill
that could penalize denial of the `Armenian genocide.’
It was another example of the emotional reactions of the prime
minister [Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an] with regard to some foreign policy
issues. He chose to attack personally French President Nicolas Sarkozy
— who we all know had purely political aims in bringing the issue of
the `Armenian genocide’ to the French Parliament as he faces elections
and is trying to capture the votes of ethnic Armenians living in
France. He also chose to make comparisons with French atrocities in
Algeria, which was negated by that country’s prime minister. He has
taken a clear nationalistic, not to say populist, attitude in this
affair. Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an could instead have attacked more
pertinently the restriction of freedom of speech in France which that
bill’s passage implies. In other instances Prime Minister ErdoÄ?an
reflects a religious bias in foreign policy issues. He has made some
remarkable statements, including that `Muslims do not commit
genocide.’ Another example is the issue of the Gaza blockade, where he
overreacted and took a clearly partial stance.
Do you think Turkish-French relations could be negatively affected in
the long term? And do you think there will be significant changes in
both countries’ relations if Sarkozy does not win the election? There
is news that Sarkozy is narrowing the lead of his Socialist rival,
François Hollande, ahead of this year’s presidential elections.
I don’t think there will be much change in relations whether Sarkozy
or Hollande win. This year Europe will be more embroiled in its
financial problems. And before Greek Cyprus’ EU presidential term ends
and even before elections are held in Greek Cyprus in 2013, there will
be no progress in Turkey-EU relations. This is not only because of
France’s stance against Turkey’s inclusion in the EU but also
Germany’s stance, as well as the general financial crisis in Europe.
We are likely to see an introverted Europe in 2012.
Ankara keeps saying that it favors a united Cyprus before next July,
when the Greek Cypriot administration takes over the rotating helm of
the EU. Are Turkey’s relations going to be cut with the EU during the
Greek Cypriot presidency?
It is possible that Turkey will not have any contacts with the term
president but continue our current relations with other EU
institutions. We have close contacts and cooperation with many
European Union institutions, and especially with the European
Commission. On the other hand, as long as the political climate is the
same between Turkey and the EU and as long as Turkey refuses to open
its ports and airports to traffic from Greek Cyprus, we should not
expect the opening of new chapters in Turkey’s accession negotiations
with the EU. Paradoxically, both sides seem content with the status
quo.
—————————————————————-
`Cyprus problem will be extended’
Do you expect any developments with regard to the long-lasting Cyprus problem?
There will be no crisis; ties will not be cut off between the Turkish
and the Greek Cypriot leaders. But the time period to find a solution
to the Cyprus problem will be prolonged. There is one sensitive issue:
The Turkish side has said that unless the Cyprus problem is resolved
by the time Greek Cypriots take over the EU term presidency, the
two-state solution to the problem will be implemented. This is a big
statement, almost an ultimatum. We will see if Turkey is going to
pursue that approach.
If Turkey pursues a two-state solution, is it going to leave the gas
reserves to the Greek Cypriots off the island of Cyprus in the south?
This is a question that needs an answer. Does Turkey have a right to
tell the Turkish Cypriots to renounce their claims to the gas? Those
gas sources also belong to the Turkish Cypriots. Unless Turkey takes
bold steps, the Cyprus problem will linger on.
Bold steps?
Turkey could, for example, open Turkish air and sea ports to Greek
Cypriot traffic. I believe Turkey may take some initiatives to solve
the problem. Otherwise we will have to go back to square one.
—————————————————————-
`Obama likely to win in presidential election’
There are presidential elections in November in the United States. Do
you think President Barack Obama is likely to stay president?
Republican candidates are no match for Obama, especially when it comes
to foreign policy. And Ankara’s relations with Obama are quite good.
We have a spring time with Washington, especially after Ankara agreed
to host NATO’s early warning radar component as part of a NATO missile
defense system. Maintaining good relations with the United States will
be beneficial for Turkey as Ankara will not be able to afford to run
counter to both Europe and the United States at the same time.
—————————————————————-
PROFILE
Retired Ambassador Temel Ä°skit
He joined the Foreign Ministry in 1963. During his 40-year diplomatic
career, he served at various Turkish foreign missions and held
different posts at the Foreign Ministry, including that of director
general for EU affairs and deputy undersecretary for economic affairs.
He was also Turkey’s first director general of free trade zones. As
ambassador, he served as Turkey’s permanent representative to the
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and as
ambassador to the Czech Republic and to Belgium. After serving as
Turkey’s permanent representative to the Western European Union in
Brussels from 1999 to 2002, he retired due to the age limit. After
retiring, Ambassador İskit lectured for five years at Sabancı
University and Bilgi University. He is presently a columnist at the
Taraf daily. He has also written a book on diplomacy.
From: A. Papazian
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-268632-former-diplomat-iskit-tehran-may-be-planning-to-divide-iraq.html