[16-11-2004 ‘Armenia-Azerbaijan’]
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AREAS OF COOPERATION BETWEEN THE COUNTRIES OF THE REGION AS A FACTOR
FOR REDUCING THE CONFRONTATION LEVELS IN SOUTH CAUCASUS
Source : Yerevan Press Club (Armenia)
Author: Boris Navasardian
If we attempt to speak about the complicated processes of integration
into international structures and on the problems of peaceful
resolution in South Caucasus, it is reasonable to try and understand
what the resources at our disposal to solve these issues are. It is
also important to try and estimate the dynamics of these resources
after the latest stage of the ethnic conflicts in the region and the
independence of the South Caucasus countries. This presentation is an
attempt to consider the issue primarily in the context of Karabagh
conflict and the relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan as the most
complicated problem in the region, however, many regularities present
here are also characteristic for other conflicts in South Caucasus.
DYNAMICS OF RECONCILIATION RESOURCES
The whole period in question (since 1988 up to present) can be
subdivided into four periods: a) Soviet, b) period of was and conflict
internationalization, c) post-war period till the Key-West meeting, d)
the post-Key-West period. The Soviet period. One of its main features
is the orientation to the central government, the aspiration to find a
solution by the bodies of USSR central administration. Thus, all
aspects were discussed only with the direct participation of Moscow
and there has been little direct dialogue aimed at
reconciliation. There has been no interaction even at the level of the
Communist Parties of the two republics. However, the
national-democratic movements and human rights activists made some
attempts to find common ground. The media of Armenia and Azerbaijan
were strongly controlled and mostly had to follow the Moscow
policy. However, there were some spans of weaker pressure, when the
media were seized by nationalistic euphoria and they were largely
contributing to the interethnic hostility. The interpersonal contacts,
so active during the pre-conflict period, diminished drastically.
The period of war and internationalization of the conflict. The
military and diplomatic channel went out into
foreground. International organizations started to join into the
conflict resolution process. At the initial stage the Armenian party
displayed much interest in the internationalization of the problem,
believing that its arguments are stronger. However, it soon became
clear that while the intervention of international structures is
inevitable, it was naïve to expect them to come up with an
unequivocal recipe for the resolution. The civil society (primarily,
the non-governmental organizations and human rights activisms) made
the interaction more active. Their activities were focused on the
problems of prisoners of war and hostages, but soon some elements of
popular diplomacy on a very narrow ground started to emerge. The media
thought it their duty to provide the information support to the
military actions of their party. The interpersonal contacts remained
quite weak.
The period after the war and before the Key-West. This time span can
be considered to be the most intensive one in terms of the use of
various reconciliation resources. It is in 1994-2001 that the OSCE
Minsk Group proposed three plans for conflict resolution, and while
each of them was turned down by one of the parties, including the
Mountainous Karabagh which acted as a quite independent factor, the
set of resolution components in the three models was quite complete
and diverse. It looked as though the reasons they are rejected are
simply the way the components are combined, and should another
principle be used, positive result can be achieved. Active mediating
role at various stages was played by all three co-chairmen of the
Minsk Group – Russia, France and the USA. At the same time no
recurrence of the idea to solve the problems in the `Center’ occurred,
since Moscow was decreasingly considered as the main mediator and on
various levels bilateral (more seldom – trilateral, including Karabagh
or regional formats, with the involvement of the whole South
Caucasus. This occurred also between the presidents, the parliaments,
also between some ministries and agencies. Against this background the
role of the purely diplomatic channel stopped being exclusive,
instead, the contacts on a non-governmental level got immediately more
active. Joint projects started to be implemented by the whole array of
NGOs’ activities. Media started to display significant interest to
the events in the rival country, various forms of information
exchange. Much attention was paid to the contacts between young
people, improvement of interpersonal relations started. Even in the
economic sphere, where the cooperation initially was excluded by the
Azerbaijani party, certain progress was manifest: some spontaneous
border trade started and joint researches of the economic perspectives
of the region were conducted.
Period after the Key West meeting. The meeting of President Heydar
Aliev and Robert Kocharian on this Caribbean Island and its
consequences have changed the situation significantly. The
`crushability’ of the stances of the Presidents under the pressure of
constructive proposals was probably wrongly interpreted. The phrase
of the American diplomat Kerry Cavanaugh that the Presidents were
ready for reconciliation and they only had to convince their public of
the acceptability of the agreements achieved. The reality proved to be
different: Aliyev and Kocharian only pretended that they were ready
for the resolution, but in reality they disagreed with the model,
defined in Paris and Key West, or did not feel secure enough to
implement it. To dismiss the burden of responsibility for the refusal,
they did start to work with the public. But this work was not the one
they were expected to do, it was just the contrary – to the work aimed
at making their stances stronger and say the countries were unready
for compromise. In Armenia statements of uncompromising nature were
made by all Parliament factions, and in Azerbaijan a document
appeared, which was conventionally called `The Charter of Four’
eventually signed by about 600 leaders of non-governmental
organizations and reputable members of society. The `Charter’,
actually put an end to the `popular’ or `civil’ diplomacy, since the
people who initiated the Dialogue with Armenian signed below the
principles, unacceptable for their peers. Thus, the basis on which the
dialogue was taking place was destroyed and arguments were provided to
the leaders of the country, enabling them to go back on the `Paris’ or
`Key West’ principles.
The situation started to rapidly return to the realities of the early
days of the conflict, when the controversies were much more numerous
than the space for compromise, and the smell of war was strong in the
air. The contacts in all the spheres were reduced. The meetings of
presidents and other high-ranked officials had become pure
rituals. The parliamentary contacts were disrupted after an incident
of little significance during the regional meeting of the MP in
Sophia, in summer 2004, held under the auspices of UK `Links’ NGO.
Several provocative actions, similar to the one that occurred in
September 2001 Baku against the human rights activist from Karabagh,
Karen Ohanjanian, reduced intensity of contacts between NGOs. The
mutual visits of journalists and other professional, civil groups that
were the strongest instrument for the restoration of mutual confidence
became completely impossible.
As the numerous researches showed, the experts of the two countries
stressed that the interaction of Armenia and Azerbaijan, of all the
international structures, was particularly promising under the
auspices of NATO, due to its extreme effectiveness in practical
matters. However, in 2004 it was under `the roof’ of NATO that several
incidents occurred raising the mutual hostility towards a height,
unprecedented since after the war. These were the assassination of an
Armenian officer by an Azerbaijani one in Budapest, an attempt of the
members of Organization of Karabagh Liberation to attack the Armenian
participant of the NATO meeting in Baku, and finally, the
scandal-making refusal of Azerbaijan to accept the Armenian officers,
resulting in the cancellation of the NATO exercise.
The sociological researches conducted by Yerevan Press Club and its
partners in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Mountainous Karabagh showed that
at least in three spheres the public of conflicting parties advocates
cooperation, even if the conflict is still unresolved. These are: 1)
the search of people lost in action, greaves, joint work on the lists
of supposed hostages and prisoners of war; 2) regional projects on
environment protection; 3) efforts aimed at the reduction of a level
of mutual hostility in the media publications. The interaction in
these spheres is favored both by people from the street, the experts
and the decision-makers. However, despite all of this, the joint
search of people missing in action is practically frozen, the
environmental subjects became another sphere where confrontation
increases and the media during the past three-four years keep
contributing to xenophobia development.
At the same time there has been no new escalation of hostility in
interpersonal relations of Armenians and Azerbaijanis and the interest
towards joint study of economic perspectives of the region. But
against the background of regress in all other spheres this gives
little comfort.
EUROPE AND CONFLICTS
The popular references to the public as the main obstacle for the
establishment of dialogue in various spheres have little ground. It is
true, the public at large in both Azerbaijan and Armenia is not very
inclined to make compromises, but it is in no way (and this has been
confirmed by numerous surveys) opposes the development of contacts on
various levels, seeing them to be a guarantee for confidence building
and rapprochement (which is actually the base for compromise). No
significant influence is made on the radicalization of the stances of
the parties by the public opinion, independent institutes. Moreover,
there is a trend of monopolization of all the processes related to the
conflict by the administration, moreover, a narrow group within it,
the exclusion of all alternative components, capable of initiating
development uncontrolled by the authorities. To this effect the
authorities are usefully manipulating the media, some civil society
institutes that due to their financial and political dependence, being
little developed are easily becoming an object and subsequently the
subject of manipulations. The pseudo-patriotic ideals, established in
this manner, are further reproduced by the whole social and political
field, there appears a creating competition as to who is more
uncompromising, the perpetual mobile is launched, the whole knots of
which are interdependent and work to strengthen the hostility.
In Azerbaijan the idea that the rigid stance will allow to gain most
results is instilled. So all the attempts to start a dialogue
proceeding from compromise are suppressed. The authorities in Armenia
see no reason in any contacts, but for official ones, so, while not
exactly suppresing, they are simply neglecting the possibilities of
`the second way’. This yields a serious controversy of transitions and
values of Europe, into which the region is seemingly trying to
integrate, and our South Caucasian attitude to conflict resolutions.
The `European recipe’ of conflict resolution, formed after World War
II calls for accentuation of common interests, the strengthening of
their influence on the relations of the conflicting parties (by
consistent, often very small steps), reduction of the impact of
dividing factors and their gradual deactualization.
The `South Caucasian recipe’ did not change during the past one
hundred years and is confined to the opposition of the idea of
compromise as such, accent on the controversies, the resolution of
which is seen to be the pure advancement of one’s own position.
The first option actually results in overcoming the conflict by an
open and unconventional dialogue of the parties involved, and the
second one eventually results in power solutions (a war or other forms
of inducement). At the same time the `South Caucasus recipe’ proposes
the only serious alternative to the military solution to be the
involvement of the international community, some `center’, that is, as
noted above, signifies a certain return to the Soviet period. The only
difference here is that Moscow concedes its place to other `centers’ –
Vienna, Strasbourg, Brussels, New York or something else. And
similarly to the situation with Moscow, the strengthening of the role
of the `center’ results not in the relief of tension, but in its
escalation. Thus, the report on Karabagh Conflict, produced by the
current Secretary General of CE Terry Davis convinced Baku that its
uncompromising position yields results and it is the one to be
followed. In Yerevan similar documents cause the accusations of the
`center’ of partiality and again the radicalization of positions.
The purely mediating role of the new `centers’ is negative under the
lack of will displayed by the parties to have constructive
dialogue. An example of this is the futility of the Minsk Group
efforts. Thus the only resolution method is imposing the constructed
model to the parties or, as it is commonly called `inducement to
peace’. The shortcoming of this method is that it usually results in
dissatisfaction of one of the parties, similarly to the war solution,
and very often – to dissatisfaction of both. In other words, the
probability of conflict regeneration remains high.
For this very reason the preferrability of the `European recipe’ is
apparent, but it calls for a process, reverse to the one existing in
Karabagh issue today: maximal expansion, and not narrowing, of
cooperation areas. Should this condition be met, the intermediary
mission of OSCE Minsk Group can turn out to be productive, and in this
regard the integration of the region to Europe should be considered
not only as a political and economic process, but also in terms of
adoption of values, traditions and experience. Also, the value and
traditions of overcoming the confrontation after World War II.
[16-11-2004 ‘Armenia-Turkey’]
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ARMENIA SAYS GENOCIDE POLICY UNCHANGED
Source : “Turkish Daily News” newspaper (Turkey)
Author:
Yerevan will not stop trying for the recognition by the international
community of the so-called Armenian genocide under Ottoman Empire
rule, a move that could open the door for improved ties with Turkey.
Armenian and Azeri media recently reported that dropping, by the
Armenian government, of a regular reference to the alleged genocide in
next year’s draft budget was a sign of a possible shift in Yerevan’s
genocide policy.
But an Armenian Foreign Ministry spokesman outrightly denied the
reports. “There is no change in our policy for the recognition of the
genocide on the international platform,” Anatolia news agency quoted
spokesman Hamlet Gasparyan as saying.
Recognition of the so-called genocide is not only a matter of Armenia
and Armenian Diaspora but also of the entire international community,
he added. “So, the matter of recognition cannot be limited to a
budget or financial document.”
Abandoning the genocide claims is high among the conditions put
forward by Turkey to normalize ties with land-locked Armenia. But
Yerevan should also end its occupation of the Azeri territory of
Nagorno-Karabakh and revise its constitution to take out provisions
that include territorial claims in Turkey, for better relations,
Turkish officials say.
In response to the media reports, Ankara earlier this week said that
it had not observed any indication that Armenia would abandon its
genocide policy.
Armenians claim that 1.5 million Armenians died as part of a genocide
campaign at the hands of the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the
last century. Turkey categorically denies the charges, saying that the
death toll is inflated and that the killings occurred when the Ottoman
Empire was trying to quell civil unrest during the World War I period.
[12-11-2004 ‘Armenia-Azerbaijan’]
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YEREVAN DISTRIBUTES LICENSES ON AZERBAIJAN
Source : “Echo” newspaper (Azerbaijan)
Author: N. Aliev, R. Orujev
The scandalous `Karabagh Telecom’ company got a license for operating
on the occupied territory of our country from the Ministry of
Communication of Armenia
Armenian government issued a license for provision of mobile
communication services in Armenia to the scandalous `Karabagh Telecom’
company, in the hope to impede Azerbaijan in `its strenuous activity’
for depriving the Karabagh separatists of any connection with the
outside world. That was the exact statement of Andranik Manukian,
Minister of Transport and Communication in his interview to Yerevan
newspaper `Aravot’. Moreover, he stated that official Yerevan granted
a license to `Karabagh Telecom’ company for activity on the occupied
territory of Azerbaijan proper.
According to Manukian, `Karabagh Telecom’ company invested 15 million
dollars to Karabagh, viewed as a zone of risk, and in accordance with
the license issued by us, assumes the obligation to invest additional
10 million dollars”. Doubtlessly, it gives a serious reason to
Azerbaijan for publicizing all of these data on international level.As
head of the press service of AR Ministry of Communication and
Information Technologies, Mushfik Amirov stated to `Echo’ yesterday,
it is not long ago that `Karabagh Telecom’ was accepted as member of
GSM Association. “However, we sent a relevant appeal to the
association, and the separatist structure was deprived of membership.
However, immediately after it `Karabagh Telecom’ sent a repeated
appeal for membership in GSM Association. On November 1, this appeal
was considered and rejected”.
By the way, after the information on official establishment of a
branch enterprise `Karabagh Telecom’ on the Armenian market, AR
Ministry of Communication and Information Technologies sent a new
appeal to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and
GSM. “Based on the fact that our first appeals got a positive response
of these international organizations, we have certain confidence that
ITU will oppose the presence of `Karabagh Telecom’ on the Armenian
mobile communications market’, M. Amirov stated.
As a reminder, our newspaper repeatedly reported that the competition
for the license on mobile communications in Armenia was won by the
branch enterprise `Karabagh Telecom’ – “K-Telecom”. This fact provoked
a surge of emotions in Armenia proper. For instance, leader of
`National Democratic Bloc’ Arshak Sadoyan declared that the process of
negotiations of Armenian government with the telephone monopolist
`ArmenTel’ company of Armenia on suspension of its monopoly in the
sphere of communication was only an imitation with an aim to introduce
`Karabagh Telecom’ company on the Armenian market. Sadoyan is
confident that already nine months ago the Armenian authorities
adopted a secrete decision for introducing `Karabagh Telecom’ company
on the Armenian communications market.He accused Armenian officials of
getting a bribe of 7 million dollars.
In his turn, Minister of Communication of Armenia, Manukian stated in
his interview to `Aravot’ that the package of investment proposals
given to `Karabagh Telecom’ foresees investments amounting to 50
million dollars for the development of mobile communications in
Armenia. “We attach particular importance to the establishment of this
type of communication in border regions of the country. At the same
time “Karabagh Telecom”, in contrast to `ArmenTel’, provides a higher
quality communication”. “I want to mention one more important fact
impacting the Commission’s decision. In Karabagh, viewed as a zone of
risk, `Karabagh Telecom’ company invested 15 million dollars and, in
compliance with the license granted, is to pay 10 million dollars
more. Besides, only for getting the license, the company will pay 7
million dollars to the Armenian state budget. “Karabagh Telecom”
ensures roaming communication of Karabagh with 88 countries, thus
contributing to the recognition of Artsakh in this sphere by the
leading countries of the world. It is a fact that communication
operators in USA, Britain, France, China and other developed countries
signed agreements with `Karabagh Telecom”. Why shouldn’t we have given
this company the opportunity to become a second operator in Armenia,
moreover with rather limited rights?” the Armenian Minister states.
– Does the word “Karabagh” in the company’s name prompt the public
that the real owners of this business are high-ranking officials of
Karabagh origin?
– It is malignant gossip. I hope that when owner of `Karabagh
Telecom’, Arab businessman Pierre-Michelle Fetusha comes to Armenia,
you will have the opportunity to speak with him. Then these absurd
doubts will disappear themselves…
By the way, as regards `absurd doubts’, the Armenian Minister was
obviously overexcited. It is enough to open the site of `Karabagh
Telecom’, which directly states that the owner of this structure is
not Pierre-Michelle – Arab businessman, but Ralph Yirikian, citizen of
Lebanon. It is this personality that with the persistence that might
be applied for a better purpose, has taken all efforts for developing
mobile communications on the occupied territories of Azerbaijan in
recent years.
In his turn, deputy of Milli Mejlis Mayis Safarli stated to `Echo’
that `the developments in Armenia are generally accorded with the
current strategy of the country to integrate the separatist regime of
Karabagh to the international community, i.e. the course for
recognizing this structure. For many years on end, the Armenian budget
has included a separate item on the expenses for Mountainous Karabagh,
which is also absolutely illegal on the international level”.
“The introduction of `Karabagh Telecom’ to Armenia testifies to the
intention of Yerevan, through development of communications on the
occupied territories, to help the separatists in their access to the
international arena. I hold that official Baku should not stay
indifferent to these moments. We have all the grounds for submitting
this issue to the discussion of UN Security Council and OSCE”, the
deputy thinks.
By the access of `Karabagh Telecom’ to its market, Armenia once more
obviously proves that the occupation of Azerbaijani territories is its
responsibility, as Safarli stated. In his opinion, this topic also
requires the position of our country’s Parliament. “At the coming
session of Milli Mejlis, I intend to insist on the inclusion of this
issue on Parliament agenda”.
—
Yerevan Press Club of Armenia, ‘Yeni Nesil’ Journalists’ Union of
Azerbaijan and Association of Diplomacy Correspondents of Turkey
present ‘Armenia-Azerbaijan-Turkey: Journalist Initiative-2002’
Project. As a part of the project web site has
been designed, featuring the most interesting publications from the
press of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey on issues of mutual
concern. The latest updates on the site are weekly delivered to the
subscribers.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
www.mediadialogue.org