Holy Smoke: What were the Crusades really about?

HOLY SMOKE
by JOAN ACOCELLA

The New Yorker
Dec 6 2004

What were the Crusades really about?

In its original meaning, a crusade was a Christian holy war, and in
that sense it was a contradiction in terms. Christ’s whole teaching
was to love thy neighbor, not kill him. But, like everyone else,
the early Christians had enemies, whom they needed to fight on
occasion. So the Church fathers went to work on the doctrine, and
by the eleventh century it was agreed that in certain circumstances
God might not only condone war but demand it. Of course, there had
to be an important cause. The Church claimed that it had such a
cause: Jerusalem had fallen into the hands of infidels. Actually,
that had happened more than four hundred years earlier, and in the
ensuing period Christians were generally treated far better in the
holy city than non-Christians were in Europe. But there was another
call to arms: Alexius I Comnenus, the emperor of Byzantium—that is,
of Catholic Europe’s Eastern brother—had asked the Pope for help
against Muslim forces threatening his borders. Again, however, this
was something less than an emergency. Byzantium and Islam did fight,
but no more frequently than most neighboring powers of the time.

According to many modern historians, what triggered the Crusades was
not an external cause but an internal one: a campaign, beginning with
Pope Gregory VII, in the late eleventh century, to reform the Church.
This was a two-pronged effort. One goal was to stamp out immorality:
get the priests to stop marrying, stop selling ecclesiastical offices,
live by their vows. A second, and probably more important, objective
was to strengthen the Papacy. In religion as in politics, Europeans
of that period had little respect for centralized authority. The
Pope’s sovereignty was disputed not just by secular rulers but
within the Church. When Urban II, Gregory’s successor, was elected,
in 1088, it took him six years to get a rival, German candidate out
of the Lateran Palace. (He finally had to bribe him.) This is not
to speak of the fact that the Pope had no control over the Eastern
churches, the dioceses of the Balkan peninsula, Asia Minor, Syria,
and Palestine. Most of these territories were under the jurisdiction
of the Byzantine Empire and hence of the Greek Orthodox Church,
which, to Rome’s abiding fury, had broken with the Western Church
in 1054. The Vatican wanted to get mightier and holier, and Urban II
took on the job.

In 1095, he went on a tour of France, and one afternoon in Clermont he
gave a sermon calling on Christians to journey to the East and reclaim
the Holy Land. “A race absolutely alien to God,” he said, was defiling
Christian altars, raping Christian women, tying Christian men to posts
and using them for archery practice. None of this was true, but it had
the desired effect. First, as the postcolonial theorists would say, it
“otherized” the Muslims. Second, it gave the European nobles a cause
that could distract them from warring with their neighbors—a more
or less daily occupation of knights in that period—and unite them,
for a holy purpose. In the months that followed, at convocations
across Europe, between sixty thousand and a hundred thousand people
came forward and knelt to “take the Cross.”

Thus was launched the crusading movement, whose high tide lasted
for two centuries. As time went on, a “crusade” no longer meant
just a march against the Muslim infidel. Any perceived enemy of
the Church—the Wends, in Germany (pagans); the Cathars, in southern
France (heretics)—could be the target of a crusade. But the Crusades
against Islam were the model, and the two most interesting were
the first (1095-99) and the fourth (1202-04). The First Crusade is
important because, apart from being first, it was successful, at
least in the Church’s terms: the men recruited by Urban did capture
Jerusalem, together with other rich territories in the East, and
in consequence—because those lands had to be defended—they made
the later Crusades to the East necessary. The Fourth Crusade is
famous for the opposite reason. In Christian terms, it was the least
successful—indeed, a scandal. The Crusaders never got to Jerusalem;
instead, they attacked Christian cities, notably Constantinople, the
capital of the Byzantine Empire, which they effectively destroyed.
They thus shifted the center of Christian civilization from East to
West, and permanently altered the history of the world. These two
expeditions are the subject of a pair of recent books, “The First
Crusade: A New History” (Oxford; $35), by Thomas Asbridge, and “The
Fourth Crusade and the Sack of Constantinople” (Viking; $25.95),
by Jonathan Phillips. Both authors are young lecturers in medieval
history at the University of London, both have written previous books
on the Crusades, and they think alike.

To the nineteenth century, the Crusades, like most things medieval,
were exotic, heroic, and spiritually fine. In Walter Scott’s “The
Talisman,” in Verdi’s “I Lombardi,” brave knights, their standards
whipping in the wind, ride off to save Christendom from godless people
with scimitars. The popularity of the subject was tied to the movements
for national unity that dominated the period. On the surface of “I
Lombardi,” medieval Lombards are fighting the Saracens; beneath the
surface, nineteenth-century Lombards are fighting the Austrians,
and Verdi is rooting for them. The theme survived well into the
twentieth century. Lloyd George, when he published the speeches he
gave during the First World War, called the book “The Great Crusade”;
Eisenhower’s memoir of the Second World War was entitled “Crusade in
Europe.” Whenever a war needed to be viewed as a sacred enterprise,
the word came up. Shortly after September 11, 2001, George W. Bush
used it to describe his war on terrorism.

Unlike his predecessors, however, President Bush was quickly warned
off that term, which had negative associations for Muslims and,
by this time, for others as well. Between Ike’s war and Bush’s, the
notion of ideological warfare fell into bad odor with intellectuals.
The most important influence here, aside from the Cold War, was
the great English medievalist Steven Runciman, whose three-volume
“History of the Crusades” was published between 1951 and 1954 and
achieved wide popularity. Far from regarding the crusading movement
as a noble endeavor, Runciman described it as “a vast fiasco,”
whose main result was simply to create an undying enmity between
Islamic and Christian peoples. Faith may have inspired the Crusaders,
but not for long, Runciman said: “High ideals were besmirched by
cruelty and greed, enterprise and endurance by a blind and narrow
self-righteousness; and the Holy War itself was nothing more than a
long act of intolerance in the name of God.” That sentence is now fifty
years old, but the opinion is still widely held. John Julius Norwich,
in his 1995 “Byzantium: The Decline and Fall,” calls the crusading
movement “one of the blackest chapters in the history of Christendom”
and says that the Fourth Crusade, at least, was basically about loot.

The trend is reversing again, however. Many of today’s young
historians in Britain and America are tired of the economic—and
therefore iconoclastic—analyses that were so popular with their
professors and, perhaps not unaffected by the spectacle of people
in the Middle East blowing themselves up for Allah, are returning
to the study of ideology as the wheel of history. That, in any case,
is what one gathers from recent writings on the Crusades. As Jonathan
Riley-Smith, another expert on the movement, sees it, the disasters
of twentieth-century history so poisoned ideological warfare in the
minds of historians that they could not imagine its being waged even
by people who lived eight centuries earlier. They had to believe
that the Crusaders were after property, pillage. They could not
understand, though the evidence was there, “how intellectually
respectable the Christian theory of positive violence was” to the
medieval mind. Positive violence—what is that? Just what it says:
the idea that killing is virtuous. According to Riley-Smith, a number
of historians now accept this belief as key to the Crusades.

Asbridge and Phillips are of that party. Both are writing for the
general public, and in their view there are two facts about the
Middle Ages that nonspecialist readers must get into their heads. The
first is that violence was a normal fact of medieval life. Seizing
your brother-in-law’s castle, cutting off his nose—these were
unremarkable activities. The second is the pervasive religiosity of
the period—above all, the fear of damnation, especially on the part
of the knights. They were usually the ones committing the violence.
Yet every sermon they heard told them that killing was an abomination
to God; every church portal they gazed up at showed grinning devils
hauling the violent down to Hell. So they were caught in a vise:
the thing they were trained to do was also a thing that was going to
cause them to burn for all eternity. They tried to stave this off.
They went on pilgrimages; they made donations to monasteries. (The
rise of the monastic orders in the Middle Ages owes much to knightly
guilt.) Still, they knew they were living in a state of sin.

Then Urban, in preaching the First Crusade, offered them a solution.
He called upon them to kill, and told them that on this occasion it
was not a sin—indeed, that it would win them remission of past sins.
By the Fourth Crusade, participants were guaranteed absolution of
all confessed transgressions—in other words, a ticket straight to
paradise. The arrangement that Urban offered to the men of the First
Crusade is less clear, but they were promised “eternal rewards.” So
it was two in one: the knights could go on slaughtering people and
get to Heaven thereby. That was “positive violence,” and, according
to Asbridge and Phillips, it was the motor of the Crusades.

Asbridge, in his account of the First Crusade, reminds us of this
point continually. But it is just his bass line, not his theme. His
theme—unavoidable, in the history of that expedition—is disunity. The
First Crusade had no single commander. Basically, the army was made
up of four contingents: the northern French, the southern French,
the Germans and Lotharingians, and the southern-Italian Normans—all
of them, despite their varying origins, called “Franks” by early and
late historians of the Crusades. Each group had a different leader
and spoke a different language; some hated others, by reason of past
conflict. Add to this another contingent, the so-called People’s
Crusade, a rabble got up—independently of Urban, and probably to his
dismay—by a charismatic French monk, Peter the Hermit, and, in the
words of one chronicler, including as many “adulterers, murderers,
thieves, perjurers” as it did pious folk. All the divisions travelled
separately to the East. The People’s Crusade departed first, crossing
Europe on foot and, figuring that the rout of infidels might as
well begin at home, slaughtering a large portion of the Rhineland
Jews as they passed through that territory. They were the first to
reach Constantinople, where Emperor Alexius I took one look at them
and shipped them across the Bosporus, into Asia Minor. Probably to
the relief of their allies as well as their enemies, they were soon
wiped out, almost to a man, by the Turks.

Then the official Crusade reached Constantinople, and began its
dealings with Alexius, who must be counted as another competing leader
of the expedition. He regarded the Crusaders as his tool—Urban had told
him that they were coming to defend his territories—so, after loading
them down with gifts, he extracted promises from the leading knights
that they would turn over to him any captured territory that had once
been part of the Roman Empire, of which, in his view, Byzantium was
the continuation. The knights departed and shortly began betraying
their vows to Alexius, as he began violating his promise to send them
supplies and reinforcements. They captured the important Turkish city
of Nicaea (which they did turn over to Alexius). Then they began
the gruelling march across Asia Minor. When it was over, half the
Crusade’s men, and more than half of its horses, were dead. Whatever
their commitment to “positive violence,” the survivors seem to have
decided that if they were going to suffer this they should get some
material reward. At every subsequent engagement, there were ferocious
disputes over booty. The Crusaders spilled each other’s blood, shook
hands in the morning, and then took out their grievances on the towns
that lay in their path.

Chief among these was Antioch, a great trading city. In order to
conquer Jerusalem, the Franks had to take Antioch first, to cover their
backs, but the city was well supplied and had seemingly impregnable
walls. The siege of Antioch lasted more than seven months, during
which period many men deserted and many others died of hunger. By
the time it was over, the Crusaders were in no mood for mercy. They
killed almost everyone, including the resident Christians. And now
the quarrels over who would get what escalated. Jerusalem was three
days’ march down the road, but it took the Crusaders half a year to
set out on that journey, because two rival knights were fighting over
control of Antioch, and neither would leave the city in the other’s
hands. Finally, a large contingent left for Jerusalem. Outside the
city, they tarried for another month, building war machines and
arguing again over the division of the anticipated spoils. Then
they attacked. According to contemporary accounts, they left not
one Muslim alive. The city’s Jews took refuge in their temple; the
Franks barricaded the exits and set the building on fire. At the end
of the sack, Asbridge writes, the Crusaders “came, still covered in
their enemies’ blood, weighed down with booty, ‘rejoicing and weeping
with excessive gladness to worship at the Sepulchre of our Savior
Jesus.'” (He is quoting an eyewitness.) They had fulfilled their vow.

The story is not just brutal; it is thick with ironies. By the time
the Crusaders got to Jerusalem, the Seljuk Turks, their primary enemy,
had lost the city to the Egyptian Fatimids, who were in diplomatic
negotiations with the Crusaders. So the people from whom the Crusaders
took the city were not their foes but their hoped-for friends. Pope
Urban II never heard of the victory; he died two weeks after it
occurred. Most of the wealth that the soldiers had acquired was spent
on their return passage; many arrived home penniless. The Eastern
Christian sects—the Armenians and Copts and others whose freedom to
worship in the city was one of the Crusade’s foremost stated goals—were
expelled from Jerusalem. Nevertheless, the Franks had established the
Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, which, despite various losses (notably
the city of Jerusalem), did not fall for two hundred years.

Asbridge, in keeping with his aim to produce a popular history,
writes with maximum vividness. Some of this gets a little
hokey—there are cliff-hangers galore—but I am grateful that he
stooped to entertain us. Mad Hugh and Basil the Bulgar-Slayer were
fun to read about. Raymond of Toulouse, one of the leading knights,
was reputed to have had an eye plucked out in an earlier conflict,
and to have carried this shrivelled organ in his pocket afterward,
“as testament to his suffering.” Asbridge says that there’s no good
evidence for this story, but he includes it anyway. As long as we’re
on the gallows, he’ll give us some gallows humor. There is also
a note of comedy in the competition among the knights, with their
nasty little treacheries, and with the lesser soldiers running back
and forth between tents to figure out who’s on top—and therefore whom
they should ally themselves with—today.

Asbridge tries to put everything in concrete, practical terms. In
particular, he takes pains to explain the actual warfare, which
in those days had everything to do with walls. Walls—huge, thick
walls—were how a city protected itself, and they were what the
besiegers had to breach. The Franks had ingenious machines—the
petraria, the mangonella—for catapulting rocks over the battlements.
And, when the townspeople retaliated by pouring burning grease and
pitch down on the attackers, there were other machines—the vulpus,
the testudo—to protect them. Walls were also the stage of medieval
warfare’s psychological theatre. The Muslims hung the Christian dead
from the top of the walls and left them there, so that their friends
could watch them rot. In turn, the Christians, when they beheaded their
prisoners, did so in front of the walls, so that the enemy could get
a good look. Then they lobbed the heads over the battlements. In the
face of such tactics, Asbridge has to work hard to remind us of the
holy principles underlying the Crusade.

Asbridge’s problem is small, however, compared with that of Jonathan
Phillips, in his book on the Fourth Crusade. As appalling as the
First Crusade was, the fourth was far worse. The goal, again,
was to recapture Jerusalem, which had been seized by the Turks in
1187. This time, the leaders of the expedition decided that everyone
must go together, by sea. In 1201, a delegation was sent to Europe’s
mightiest seafaring power, Venice, which was ruled at that time by a
bold, crafty man, Doge Enrico Dandolo, who, though he was blind and
probably over ninety years old, was to become the chief policy-maker
of the Fourth Crusade. The delegates told Dandolo what they needed:
enough ships to transport thirty-three thousand five hundred soldiers
and their horses, enough men (it turned out to be thirty thousand,
the equivalent of half the adult population of Venice) to rig and
sail the ships, and enough food to get everyone through the journey.
This was a tall order, and the Doge asked a great price—eighty-five
thousand marks. (According to Phillips, that was twice the annual
income of the kings of France and England.) The Franks swallowed
hard and signed the contract, and the Venetians spent more than a
year preparing the fleet. Then, as agreed, the Crusaders mustered
at Venice, but instead of the thirty-three thousand five hundred
men who were expected—and absolutely needed, for the Doge’s price
was to be met by each of the men paying his own portion—only a third
of that number showed up. True to form, the European knights didn’t
like taking orders. Some preferred to sail, with their forces, from
Marseilles or Genoa. Of those who had come to Venice, the rich dug
into their pockets, but still they could come up with only a little
more than half of what they owed.

What could they do now? To turn back would be a betrayal of their vow,
and of their knightly honor. But what could the Doge do? He thought
about it, and he came up with an idea. On the Dalmatian coast there
was a city, Zara—a rich city, with excellent oak for shipbuilding—that
had recently thrown off Venetian control and gone over to the King
of Hungary. If the Crusade would agree to besiege Zara and restore
it to Venetian rule, the Doge would postpone (not forgive—he drove a
hard bargain) payment of the Franks’ debt. For the Franks, this was
a shocking proposal. Their mission was to make war on infidels. Zara
was a Christian city, and under the spiritual rule not of the Greek
Orthodox Church but of the Pope in Rome. Furthermore, the King
of Hungary had taken the Cross, which meant that his property was
under the protection of the Vatican and could not be legitimately
attacked by anyone. That was part of the deal offered by the Church
to any Crusader.

Nevertheless, the Franks accepted the Doge’s proposal. The Pope
soon got wind of their plans, and as they were camped outside Zara
they received a letter from him forbidding them to lay a hand on the
city and promising excommunication to anyone who did. At this point,
a bitter quarrel broke out among the knights, and a few defected,
with their men. (Indeed, as the fleet left Venice for Zara, the
putative leader of the Crusade, Boniface of Montferrat, found that he
had urgent business to attend to back home in Piedmont. He rejoined
the forces at Zara, but only after the city had been taken.) A core
group of influential knights decided to go ahead, and make it up
to the Pope later. They did not share the contents of the Pontiff’s
letter with the common soldiers; they just led them to the walls of
Zara and conquered the city in short order. The Pope then fired off
a new letter, excommunicating them all.

News of their difficulty spread quickly to the courts of Europe,
and reached Alexius Angelos, the crown prince of Constantinople, who
at that time was living in exile in the West. Seven years earlier,
Alexius’s father, Isaac II, the rightful emperor of Byzantium, had
been deposed by his (Isaac’s) brother, now Alexius III, who threw him
into a dungeon and had his eyes gouged out. Prince Alexius had been
trying for years to induce some European power to help him reclaim
his inheritance. Now, like Dandolo, he saw in the Fourth Crusade’s
troubles an opportunity for himself, and he sent a delegation to
the Crusaders at Zara. Since the Crusade was pledged to the service
of God and justice, the delegates said, its duty, clearly, was to
make a detour to Constantinople and expel the usurper. If they did
so, furthermore, Prince Alexius would pay them two hundred thousand
silver marks, provision the entire army, provide ten thousand men to
go with them to Egypt (this was another of their planned side trips),
and, for as long as he lived, protect Frankish possessions in the
East. Finally, he would place the Greek Orthodox Church under the
rule of Rome. The last item was crucial, the very thing the Crusaders
needed. If they could return proud, schismatic Byzantium to Roman
control, this would quickly solve their problems with the Pope. Also,
the promised two hundred thousand marks would more than pay their
debt to Dandolo. The Doge, who was with them, favored the plan for
other reasons as well. Byzantium had threatened Venetian trade routes;
if it had a ruler who owed his throne to Venice, this would be good
for business. So the offer was accepted. Alexius, who now arrived in
person, was taken on board, and the Crusaders, with stops at various
Byzantine ports to demand the people’s allegiance and make off with
their food supplies, proceeded to Constantinople.

Byzantium at that time was the greatest civilization in Christendom.
In 395, the Roman Empire had been divided in two. The Western
half—that is, Europe—soon fell to the barbarians, while the Eastern
half survived, as the inheritor of the empire and the repository of
its culture. Constantinople, its capital, was ten times larger than any
city in Western Europe. Situated on the Bosporus, smack in the middle
of the trade route between the West and the Orient, it was also far
richer than any European city. It had palaces of gold and marble; its
basilica, Hagia Sophia, dwarfed any European cathedral and, together
with the city’s other churches, housed priceless relics—the Virgin
Mary’s robe, the Crown of Thorns, two heads of John the Baptist. The
city was sophisticated, cosmopolitan, with luxurious habits. Its
ladies, watched over by twenty thousand eunuchs, wore silks and
jewels and white wigs. The Constantinopolitans—or Greeks, as they
were known—regarded the Europeans as grunting tribesmen. The Franks,
in turn, viewed the Greeks as pantywaists, and probably enjoyed
the thought of having to rescue them. Arriving in June of 1203,
they attacked quickly and in one day put Alexius III to flight.
Isaac was brought up from his dungeon and restored to power.

Then a delegation from the Crusade went to Isaac, enthroned among
his nobles, and informed him of the bargain that his son had made
to achieve this result. (Apparently, the agreement included Prince
Alexius’s being made co-emperor, Alexius IV, for that happened soon
afterward.) The court was not happy, nor, after twenty years of
political unrest, was it in a position to meet the terms. But it had
no choice. Oppressive taxes were levied on the people; the silver lamps
of Hagia Sophia were taken down and melted into coin. As this went on,
the Constantinopolitans came to hate the Franks, and, as the payments
started to come late, and then stopped coming at all, the Franks hated
them back. Finally, the Franks threatened war. In response, a flotilla
of “fire ships”—flaming vessels—was sent out one night from the port
of Constantinople to destroy the Venetian ships. (It failed.) Soon
afterward, Isaac and Alexius IV were deposed by a Constantinopolitan
nobleman determined to get rid of the Franks. Isaac died of grief,
probably with some assistance; Alexius was murdered. With the latter
gone, the Franks knew that they would never be paid, and they decided
to take the city instead. They did so in two days.

Even amid the other horrid events of the Crusades, the sack of
Constantinople is notorious. Not only did the Crusaders rape and
massacre; they made a party of it. They hatted out their horses in the
white wigs of the Constantinopolitan ladies. A prostitute straddled the
Patriarch’s throne in Hagia Sophia and sang songs. The Franks gathered
up booty wholesale; what they couldn’t carry, they destroyed. The
Venetians, who had better taste—and who, in keeping with their
still unpaid debt, were allowed two-thirds of the spoils—quietly
crated up the city’s finest treasures. As a result, St. Mark’s
basilica, in Venice, houses one of the world’s foremost collections
of Byzantine art, including the four golden horses that once stood
in Constantinople’s hippodrome and were now installed over St. Mark’s
main portal. As for the territories, Dandolo shrewdly took what he knew
Venice could defend: Crete, Corfu, the ports in the Peloponnese. The
huge power of the Venetian republic during the Renaissance owed
much to those acquisitions. The Franks took the interior, which they
then spent years fighting over with outraged locals and, as usual,
with each other. Baldwin of Flanders, one of the Crusade’s leaders,
was made emperor of Byzantium. He was captured and killed by the King
of Bulgaria within a year. Nor did the Frankish rule of Byzantium
last long. The Greeks retook Constantinople a half-century later, in
1261; in 1453, the city, or what was left of it, fell to the Turks,
who occupy it still. So a great, ancient civilization was destroyed,
in the name of God.

Phillips, even more than Asbridge, is determined to put this story over
to the general public. He is not just vivid; he basically storyboards
the Crusade, beginning with an elaborate flash-forward to the rugged
Baldwin being crowned in Hagia Sophia. (Baldwin changes his woollen
hose for stockings of red samite. He receives in his calloused hands
a ruby the size of an apple. He thinks of his wife, a denizen of
“cold, marshy” Flanders, whom he must now summon to be the empress of
Byzantium.) And that’s just the prologue. These scenes are exciting,
but Phillips’s most substantial achievement is his analysis of the
Realpolitik of the Fourth Crusade, his effort to show these knights
not as greedy cynics, which is what Steven Runciman called them, but as
men impelled by many conflicting motives, among which, like Asbridge,
he places religion very high. At some points, he has trouble with this
argument. For example, in the matter of the knights’ worries about
Zara, he writes that damnation was “the greatest possible concern to
all medieval people.” Clearly not, however, for the knights ignored
the Pope’s threat of excommunication—that is, damnation—and attacked
Zara anyway. It gets a little confusing. Nevertheless, that is often
what people’s decisions are like when their backs are to the wall,
and one has to admire Phillips for trying to juggle so many causes.

We are left with one question about these two books. The insistence
on the Crusaders’ sense of religious duty, as opposed to bloodlust
and greed, comes across as a justification. However much the authors
may historicize it, it starts to sound virtuous. Does this mean that
Asbridge and Phillips think the Crusades were O.K.? Not according to
many of their statements, particularly about the sack of Jerusalem
and of Constantinople. But before those events, as the Franks are
lobbing the stones and mounting the battlements, our chroniclers
are full of admiration for them. Asbridge praises the “inspired
and audacious” tactics of the leaders of the First Crusade, their
“military genius”; Phillips roots for the men of the Fourth Crusade
as, with their boats swaying beneath them and with scores of Greek
bowmen firing at them, they climb their ladders and jump out onto the
walls of Constantinople. Later, the authors bemoan the slaughter,
but what did they think the audacious tactics were for? There is a
curious amorality here. It may be endemic to military history. (What
an exciting battle! Oops, what a lot of dead people!) Still, it
is strange.

And it is even stranger in relation to current events. Asbridge never
mentions the war in Iraq. Phillips gives Al Qaeda a few sentences in
his introduction. But these two books are aimed at the common reader,
and the authors know very well that their customers will be thinking
about what is now happening in the Middle East. (Or Asbridge knows
it. In the American edition of his book, a new subtitle has been
added: “The Roots of Conflict Between Christianity and Islam.”) And
if I have noticed certain resemblances between the Crusades and the
war in Iraq—the exaggeration of the threat, to get the war going;
the enormous financial cost to the attacking country; the mixture
of idealistic and commercial motives; the surprise of finding that
the liberated may not thank you, indeed, may attack you—Asbridge and
Phillips have surely also noted the parallels. They are silent on the
subject, but in the resulting void, and with the constant emphasis
on the religious motive, there is a strong suggestion, intentional
or not, that we should consider whether today, too, there might be
such a thing as positive violence.

–Boundary_(ID_1aRc2iiafMd9RioEMx/Qkw)–

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

BAKU: Armenia engaged in archeological excavations in occupied lands

Armenia engaged in archeological excavations in occupied lands

Assa-Irada, Azerbaijan
Dec 6 2004

Armenians continue looting natural resources, as well as destroying
and claiming cultural and historical monuments in the occupied lands
of Azerbaijan.

The Institute of Archeology and Ethnography of the Armenian Academy of
Sciences, in collaboration with the Yerevan Institute of Architecture,
carried out archeological excavations in Kalbahar District this August,
the Armenian “Azg” (Nation) newspaper reports.

Hamlet Petrosian, an employee of the Institute of Archeology and
Ethnography, has said a picture of a military horseman engraved on
a stone dating back to 13th –14th centuries and other items were
discovered during the excavations.

The operations were funded by the “Yerkir” organization and the
Harutyunians, a family of Armenian descent living in New Jersey, US.
Armenia have been trying for many years to claim the historical
Azerbaijani monuments in Upper Garabagh, Azerbaijan’s region currently
under the Armenian occupation, and to prove that Armenians have lived
in the region for centuries.*

–Boundary_(ID_aOh5r5p74b1uBh0UupDk8w)–

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Iran: A tumultuous time captured in Isfahan’s portrait photography

The Daily Star, Lebanon
Dec 6 2004

Iran: A tumultuous time captured in Isfahan’s portrait photography
Hundreds of images and thorough research produce a unique documentary
of a nation in transition, 1920-1950

By Kaelen Wilson-Goldie
Daily Star staff

BEIRUT: In one picture, a young woman strikes a playful pose in a
photographer’s studio. With lustrous black hair and a coy smile, she
wears a man’s suit jacket over a full-skirted white dress. She has one
hand plunged rakishly into her pocket and one hip extended suggestively
toward the camera. Exaggerating the feminine and masculine attributes
of body language, her stance is that of a dancer and gangster at once.

In another, three men face the camera with hands clasped respectfully
behind their backs. Two are formally dressed and standing a few
steps back. The other, in the foreground, is bare-chested and built
like a truck. The triangular set-up is rigged to show off one man’s
athletic prowess, as the depth of field makes the flanking men seem
tiny in comparison.

In yet another, a wedding portrait captures a blissful bride and groom
with hands held delicately in the center of the frame. The standing
groom smiles down on his sitting bride, who directs her peaceful
gaze off camera. The photograph seems to be a study in matrimonial
convention until you realize that both subjects are women. An early
example of women dressed in drag, the groom’s voluminous tuxedo
jacket camouflages her breasts, her hair is swept up under a hat,
and a fake moustache adorns her upper lip.

These are portrait photographs from Isfahan, three among the hundreds
that have been published in a new book by Iranian artist, academic
and activist Parisa Damandan. “Portrait Photographs from Isfahan:
Faces in Transition, 1920-1950” focuses on a tight but tumultuous time
frame, when Iran was undergoing rapid social, political and economic
transformation. Damandan, who was born in Isfahan and remembers her
own early experiments with having her picture taken by a professional
photographer, returned to her hometown to find evidence of the
old studios and commercial practices that once flourished in the
ancient city.

The book resulting from her research reveals as much about how
photographers worked in the first half of the 20th century as it does
about how people in those times saw themselves, how they constructed
their identities before the camera and, in turn, how the identity of
a nation took shape, fell apart and reformed against a backdrop of
industrialization, modernity, political change and looming revolution
and upheaval.

“My age and the generation I belong to [is] a link between this
period and now,” explains Damandan, taking a break from her work to
answer questions by e-mail about her book. “There is evidence that
is still alive – existing, forgotten and endangered archives. I have
studied the history of photography before this period, and [I have]
followed the traces back to the appearance of photography in Iran,
and soon after in Isfahan.

“The main part of my collection of photographs dates back to 1920
to 1950. It is an important period, as the country is changing from
traditional to modern and industrial, and there are also a lot of
changes in the faces and in portrait photography itself.”

The period is also important, she adds, because “portrait photography
became popular in this period in Iran, almost a century after the
1850s when it became popular in Europe.”

Damandan studied photography at the University of Tehran in the late
80’s and early 90’s. She mounted a few exhibitions of her own work in
Iran, the U.K. and the Netherlands, but soon devoted all her time to
more academic research on photo-portraiture. The legwork for “Portrait
Photographs from Isfahan” began with her undergraduate thesis. And
over the past 10 years, Damandan has not only written a great deal on
the subject, she has also assembled traveling exhibitions and amassed
an impressive personal collection of archival images.

“Portrait Photographs from Isfahan” introduces readers to the lives
of such photographers as Minas Patkerhanian Mackertich (an Armenian
who learned how to take pictures in India before settling in Isfahan)
and his son Vahan (who took Damandan’s baby pictures in the late
60’s). Damandan traces the development of Isfahan’s portrait studios,
following the well-worn story of photography’s evolution overall (from
an expensive practice reserved for the elite to a more affordable
commodity accessible to the middle classes) and in light of the
particular modifications made to that narrative in Iran.

To this, Damandan adds the story of a city, a country and a people.
The book is full of surprises – cross-dressing women, Isfahan’s
community of Russian prostitutes and the flood of Polish refugees
who took up temporary residence in Iran during World War II. And it
captures telling evidence of changing times – women casting off and
taking up the veil, the significance of gymnasiums as a social space
in men’s lives, family configurations, gender roles at social events
and the growth of industry (textile factories, workers on strike) that
is evident both on the landscape and in the photographs themselves.

In addition to Damandan’s narrative, “Portrait Photographs from
Isfahan” includes essays by Iranian writer Reza Sheikh (who looks at
the relationship between portraiture and democracy) and Dutch writer
Josephine van Bennekom (who explores the differences between and
encounters among Iranian and European portraiture). These texts are
embedded with ideas that warrant further research. Yet the pictures
lend themselves to endless interpretation, raising a number of pressing
issues about the collection and study of historical photography.

“I have gathered more than 50,000 photographs,” says Damandan. “I am
keeping them in my personal archive at home, not in a good situation.
Most of them are glass-plate negatives and are very fragile and need
to be preserved in particular conditions of temperature and moisture.”

Searching for images like these is often an act of salvaging prints
and negatives from age, time, ruin and decay. But once they are
found, how can they be preserved? And who should take charge of such
efforts? The photographs Damandan has unearthed reveal a great deal
about Iran’s past, but to what extent do such archives constitute
cultural patrimony? Are they a part of a nation’s heritage? And if so,
who has the right or responsibility to protect them?

“There is no special organization yet in Iran to be responsible for
such archives,” explains Damandan. “And we don’t have a photographic
museum.”

What’s more, the book itself – as a portable representation of
Damandan’s collection – is unavailable in Iran: “Unfortunately,
the book couldn’t be published in Iran because of the portraits of
unveiled women,” she says. “It won’t be distributed in Iran, so the
book really can’t be seen here.” Damandan is hoping to place the book
in a few libraries, so that students will have access to it and in
hopes that it will provoke further research.

The fact that her work can’t be shown in Iran hasn’t diminished
Damandan’s efforts.

“Wherever I travel in Iran, I am usually curious to find the origins of
portrait photography,” she says. “I have spent some time in Kurdistan
for this reason, and I am busy with a project in Bam, again making
my research.”

Seventy-two hours after a massive earthquake struck the southeastern
city in December 2003, Damandan arrived on the scene to help. For
the past 10 years she has been involved with a Dutch organization,
AIDA (Association International de Defense des Artistes), which
she describes as a second home. When she got to Bam, she realized
she wasn’t the best person to help rescue workers pry bodies from
fallen buildings. But she was qualified to save the city’s copious
photo archives. (She met a woman whose two sons had been killed in
the quake, one had been married the day before, and his mother was
hoping to find his wedding pictures among the rubble.) So she secured
support from AIDA to fund a rescue mission of a different sort.

“The first time I went,” says Damandan, “I started to dig out photo
studios which were ruined in the disaster. I dug out six archives
and have made several trips until now. Later, I will work on these
archives, clean them and make a new archive … I am focusing on
making a memorial photo wall in Bam,” she adds, and next year, she
will begin working on another book. It promises to be more somber
than “Portrait Photographs from Isfahan” but it will no doubt prove
as valuable – and as fascinating – an archive.

Parisa Damandan’s “Portrait Photographs from Isfahan” is published
by Saqi Books and the Prince Claus Fund for Culture and Development.

Preventing disasters from space

PREVENTING DISASTERS FROM SPACE

RIA Novosti, Russia
Dec 6 2004

MOSCOW (Space Research Institute expert Yury Zaitsev for RIA Novosti)
– In the last few years, natural disasters have become more frequent
and caused more damage. Undesirable and dangerous processes are
triggered by the environmental damage caused by technological
progress. Natural disasters and accidents like earthquakes, volcanic
eruptions, forest fires and pipeline accidents can be predicted and,
in some cases, even prevented. Data from space is essential to solve
these problems. After the tragic December 1988 earthquake in Armenia,
Soviet experts proposed developing an early-warning system consisting
of space and ground equipment. At the time, the necessary equipment
for the space part of the system was planned to be placed on the Mir
space station and eventually be transferred to unmanned satellites.
The spacecraft were to have been put into orbit by converted ballistic
missiles. However, the Soviet Union collapsed and the program, like
many others, was terminated. Nonetheless, the long-duration Mir,
Salyut-6 and Salyut-7 missions helped amass experience in this field.

In short, the space stations served as a testing site for developing
remote-sensing systems. Such experiments are now being conducted on
Russia’s segment of International Space Station (ISS) as part of the
Uragan (Hurricane) program. The goal of the program is to develop
specific aspects of a disaster warning system. The program is focused
on digital photos of the earth and monitoring all natural disasters
and accidents.

The photographs taken from the ISS at an altitude of 380km cover
an area of 10x15km, with a resolution of 5m and 20x30km, with a 10m
resolution. Panoramic photos of the earth are also taken, however as
the photographed area increases, the resolution decreases.

High resolution photographs are the most popular. Therefore magnifying
optical systems are often used for these observations to ensure a
three-meter resolution of the terrestrial surface. The restrictions
of the station’s orbital inclination to the equatorial plane limit
the area the high-quality photographs can be taken to between the
latitudes of 56 degrees north to 56 degrees south. This creates large
blank spots in the research because the Arctic and Antarctic regions,
which significantly influence the climate, are unable to be seen.

All experiments conducted on the Russian segment of the ISS must be
coordinated with the United States and receive safety certificates.
For example, a large amount of time has been spent trying to convince
the Americans that taking photographs from the ISS’s windows was
safe. It was necessary to provide evidence that the crew members
would not damage their eyes from solar radiation or from fragments
of the window that might break off if a micro-meteorite hit it. These
concerns were groundless because all observations are conducted when
the window faces the earth.

Indeed, photographs transmitted to earth in real time are the most
valuable in predicting disasters. The United States’ communications
channels were initially used for this purpose, relaying all data
via the TDRS geostationary satellite. The photographs that required
immediate analysis were sent to earth without any problems. However,
after September 11 when cosmonauts photographed the tragedy, this no
longer became possible because NASA established a special department
comprising scientists who analyze all photographs taken by cosmonauts
before they are sent on American communications channels. This
censorship was not included in any agreements. Consequently, that
communications channel basically stopped providing real time data.
Russian tracking stations receive some photos when the ISS passes
over them, however, most of the photographs are flown back on Soyuz
spacecraft every six months).

There is another problem. After the space shuttle Columbia disaster,
a full crew is not on the ISS, which has prevented research projects
from being done. Work on the Uragan program is mostly done voluntarily
on the weekends or during free time.

What has been accomplished over the last several years? The first ISS
mission did work on the Uragan program that mostly included taking
pictures of hydrocarbon deposit in Kazakhstan on the northeastern
coast of the Caspian Sea. Technologically imperfect oil production,
oil spills and removal of subterranean waters, in the area led to
the formation of 1-2km in diameter oil and water lakes. Some of the
lakes were surrounded by mounds of earth to prevent subsequent spills.
However, the photographs from space show that the some of the dams
have already been breached and oil is leaking into the sea. An
environmental disaster is quickly approaching and it will affect
not only the Kazakh, but also the Russian parts of the Caspian Sea
before politicians agree to demarcate the body of water. The Aral
Sea is also being monitored from the ISS. Observations show that
the sea will disappear in the near future because the Amudarya and
Syrdarya rivers are being drained. As the Aral Sea dries up, a new
problem has been created: salt clouds from the bed have reached as
far as Tashkent, Bukhara and Samarkand. Photographs from the ISS
have documented this. The clouds are now moving in the direction
of the South Urals and the Volga region. Aside from damaging crops,
these salt clouds are also unhealthy.

The catastrophic floods that have been photographed in the North
Caucasus, Central and Eastern Europe, China, India and Pakistan are
evidence that disregard for nature and basic safety precautions can
cause the greatest damage. Photographs from space provided important
information about a avalanche that occurred in Karmadon gorge,
North Ossetia, two years ago. Analysis of these photographs shows
that a similar disaster could happen on the Pamir mountain range’s
Medvezhy (Bear) snowfield. Densely populated areas could be flooded
if an avalanche flows into a nearby lake which would then cause the
Pyandzh River to overflow.

Detailed photographs from the Russian ISS segment can also be used
to monitor and help with the construction of roads, pipelines and
tunnels. The Moscow authorities and Ukraine have agreed to build a
multi-purpose bridge and underwater pipeline to supply water from
the Kuban River to the Crimea. Photographs from the ISS will make it
possible to analyze the environmental implications of construction
project and conduct an objective safety inspection.

Overall, Russian methodologies enable space crews to monitor
many natural processes and accidents. International co-production
arrangements and the creation of an international disaster prediction
system that would benefit humanity are feasible. The creation of
such a system is particularly important because natural disasters and
accidents that occur far away from each other are often more connected
that than previously thought. An international space monitoring system
will enable the optimal decision to be made for both regional and
global problems.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Intensification of combating international terrorism discussed at CI

Intensification of combating international terrorism discussed at CIS IPA

Kazinform, Kazakhstan
Dec 6 2004

Astana. December 6. KAZINFORM. 24th plenary session of the CIS
Interparliamentary assembly (IPA) ended December 4 in adoption of a
set of model draft laws in sphere of cultural cooperation, observation
of human rights and liberties, Kazinform reports.

The agenda comprised 13 points, including strengthening of the role
of parliaments of CIS IPA member states in fighting international
terrorism.

During the held bilateral meetings of Chairman of the Senate of
the Parliament of Kazakhstan Nurtai Abykayev with Chairman of the
Federation Council of the Russian Federal Assembly Sergey Mironov,
Chairman of State Duma of Federal Assembly Boris Gryzlov, Chairman of
Armenian Federal Assembly Artur Bagdasaryan, Chairman of the House
of Representatives of the National Assembly of Belarus Vladimir
Konoplyov the sides discussed situation and prospects of bilateral
interparliamentary relations and also issues of the constructive
dialogue on the level of international parliamentary organizations.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Turchia, non aprire all’invasione silenziosa

La Padania, Italia
domenica 5 dicembre 2004

Con l’immigrazione confluiscono in Europa integralismo, terrorismo e
criminalità

Turchia, non aprire all’invasione silenziosa

È in atto una politica di penetrazione del continente europeo

Il Comitato Pro Nativa Europa di Ferrara ha inviato ai vertici
dell’Unione Europea un Memorandum in cui sono illustrati i motivi che
rendono inaccettabile l’adesione della Turchia all’Ue. Riportiamo di
seguito la terza puntata del fascicolo.
CONQUISTA ISLAMICA IN AZIONE: INVASIONE MIGRATORIA E POLITICA DEL
VENTRE
L’immigrazione islamica non è un evento legato soltanto alla
congiuntura europea, ma una scelta politica di penetrazione in Europa
perseguita con un preciso disegno dall’insieme islamico
(Organizzazione della Conferenza Islamica), che l’ha programmata
nella conferenza di Lahore del 1974. La leva demografica è ritenuta
la modalità vincente dell’Islam per sommergere gli europei, i quali,
al contrario, per il ridotto tasso di natalità tendono a ridursi.
Cosicché Ernst Nolte ha acutamente considerato che all’Islam «una
conquista di tipo non bellico deve apparire possibile, anzi
probabile».
L’immigrazione, pertanto, è divenuta una questione complessa, da cui
dipende il permanere od il soffocamento della civiltà europea. Da un
lato l’economia europea ha bisogno di importare mano d’opera,
purtroppo non ben regolata dagli Stati e dalla stessa Unione.
Dall’altro lato si attua una precisa volontà politica dell’insieme
islamico, nel quale confluiscono tanto il fondamentalismo quanto il
terrorismo, di conquistare l’Europa con l’immigrazione.
Sicché le correnti immigratorie islamiche avvengono sotto regia, più
o meno occulta, della Turchia, che ne ha accompagnato e ne accompagna
tuttora l’afflusso clandestino in partenza dai porti islamici turchi
ed africani. Già l’8 gennaio 1998, quindi a fenomeno migratorio
intenso già da diversi anni, in una seduta in Roma dei capi delle
polizie dei Paesi più interessati agli sbarchi di clandestini,
l’accordo era unanime nell’ammettere che tale flusso era diretto da
organizzazioni aventi la loro base in Turchia.
Il punto discriminante per definire l’atteggiamento dell’Europa
sull’Islam è quello di stabilire se tale movimento politico-religioso
sia totalitario oppure no. Qui non c’è spazio per disamine
dottrinali. La via più rapida è storicizzare l’esperienza di oltre
tredici secoli di regimi islamici, per capire che essi si traducono
in assolutismi politici, da cui non vi è ritorno allo stato laico
democratico ed alla libertà sia religiosa sia politica.
Coloro che ritengono di imporre all’Islam con la forza laicità e
democrazia, così come intesi in Occidente, prospettano una soluzione
impossibile. L’Islam non condivide e non intende condividere il
potere con alcuna forza politica diversa dall’Islam. Per l’Unione
Europea è urgente e grave decisione politica prendere provvedimenti
rapidi e radicali, fin che ne ha la possibilità.
L’Europa, che è scampata di recente a due totalitarismi, quello
nazi-fascista e quello comunista, ha davanti a sé il problema di
salvaguardarsi da un totalitarismo più difficile da contenere e da
combattere per le sue ambiguità contenutistiche di tipo religioso.
Gli immigrati, su posizioni religiose diverse dall’Islam, pur
conservando la loro fede si integrano nelle società degli Stati
Europei, che hanno dato loro accoglienza. Gli islamici non si
integrano, costituiscono in ogni Stato comunità separate a se stanti.
I modelli di integrazione seguiti nei diversi Stati europei sono
falliti. Una schiera di sociologi e politologi invece di mettere in
luce l’irriducibilità volitiva ed ideologica islamica, ne fanno
addebito agli Stati europei passando a chiedere nel nome della
libertà religiosa, ignorata e calpestata dagli islamici, di piegare
alla loro immodificabile ortoprassi strumenti giuridici e princìpi
etici. Peraltro, l’impossibile integrazione islamica in Europa è
altresì la riprova di quanto sia fallace l’ideologia americana di
esportare la democrazia all’interno dei regimi islamici.
I musulmani in Europa, sunniti e sciiti, hanno un solo obiettivo
politico, sentito fanaticamente come un dovere religioso: divenire
maggioranza. Sono di dominio pubblico le esternazioni islamiche, che
essi conquisteranno l’Europa con il ventre delle loro donne. Nelle
moschee si invitano le donne islamiche a partorire ciascuna almeno
cinque figli. La mentalità inculcata agli islamici è di essere
fratelli soltanto fra di loro, e di considerare il non islamico non
solo un infedele ma un nemico.
Dunque, l’immigrazione islamica è un’invasione, e come tale è
predicata dagli islamici che la sublimano come una nuova egira, dopo
quella operata da Maometto, il quale si trasferì con un gruppo di
suoi seguaci dalla Mecca a Yathrib (oggi Medina), finendo per
assoggettare tutti al suo potere, cacciando ed uccidendo quanti si
opponevano.
Ma l’Europa, che sta sottovalutando la sfida totalitaria dell’Islam,
sarà in grado di reagire? In questo momento i politici Europei sono
nella medesima condizione mentale dei politici di Bisanzio, i quali
disputavano sul sesso degli angeli, mentre l’Islam si affacciava come
sempre da nemico alla soglia della loro capitale. Quando Bisanzio
avvertì il pericolo era troppo tardi, ragion per cui restò
conquistata e distrutta. I politici europei, allorché discutono sul
come esportare la democrazia nei regimi islamici e sul come integrare
i musulmani in Europa, non percepiscono la realtà distruttiva
incombente, ma vivono di astrazioni cullandosi in sogni e perdendosi
in utopie.
Il Consiglio e la Commissione dell’Unione Europea non hanno colto il
senso della proposta, da più parti avanzata e riformulata da Giacomo
Biffi a Bologna, di distinguere nell’immigrazione tra non islamici
integrabili ed islamici inintegrabili. È, infatti, una concezione
politicamente suicida l’accoglimento di una minoranza islamica
aggressiva e totalitaria, che ha nel suo programma e nei suoi intenti
il non rispetto della maggioranza, e che si organizza ed agisce per
combatterla e sottometterla. In definitiva. non si tratta in generale
di chiudere le Porte all’immigrazione. ma soltanto in generale di
bloccare l’immigrazione islamica invasiva.
BELLIGERANZA SIA IDEOLOGICA SIA ARMATA
Il Consiglio e la Commissione dell’Unione Europea devono prendere
atto che fra le religioni orientali approdate in Europa, solo l’Islam
costituisce un gravissimo problema di ordine pubblico permanente.
E lo sta sempre più divenendo, ormai alla soglia di una guerra non
dichiarata. L’Islam si presenta come una religione, quando è
piuttosto un movimento ideologico politico-religioso, cioè una forza
politica che ha assunto come contenuto ideologico la fede religiosa.
Religione e politica (quindi potere, stato e così via) sono
inscindibili. In questa sua natura di movimento politico, che
considera il sentimento religioso la quintessenza della politica, va
rinvenuta la spiegazione della sua differenza dalle altre religioni
orientali.
Questo carattere è così profondo nell’Islam che ne fa un movimento
rivoluzionario e nel contempo un movimento sovversivo permanente nel
conculcare ogni forma di cultura politica e religiosa, ogni sistema
di civiltà diversa dalla identità, che in partenza dal Corano, ha
sviluppato. (…).
Per i europei che considerano il nazi-fascismo come un modello di
totalitarismo classico, che sono arrivati tardi a comprendere la
natura totalitaria del comunismo, cogliere un totalitarismo atipico
rispetto ai totalitarismi europei come quello islamico potrà essere
un risultato sofferto, augurabilmente non troppo lontano nel tempo. È
opportuno, dunque, che il Consiglio e la Commissione dell’Unione
Europea affrontino la questione della natura totalitaria dell’Islam,
prima ancora che diventi impossibile una strategia di difesa
all’interno della stessa Europa. La prima autodifesa è tanto politica
quanto giuridica e dovrebbe trovare nella Costituzione europea una
norma di divieto per ogni movimento di ispirazione ideologica
totalitaria e di istigazione alla conquista esclusiva del potere.
Il punto dirimente, sia sulla natura totalitaria dell’Islam come
ideologia politico-religiosa sia sul suo obiettivo politico-religioso
di islamizzare l’Europa per detenerne il potere assoluto, è dato
dalla realtà in atto di forza belligerante, che ha dichiarato guerra
all’Europa, anche se il Consiglio e la Commissione dell’Unione
Europea fingono di non vedere. E’ sufficiente constatare le forme di
ostilità in atto dell’islam in Europa. La prima forma assunta
dall’immigrazione islamica è quella ideologica di lotta ai simboli
cristiani.
L’Islam ha innescato una spirale di insofferenza verso le tradizioni
ed i simboli della Fede cristiana nella loro manifestazione pubblica.
Se ne chiede l’eliminazione, l’epurazione, la scomparsa. Il
cristianesimo è parte attiva della cultura europea, e come ogni
cultura rinviene una proiezione visibile nei simboli, poiché il
simbolo in ogni cultura è ciò che unisce.
Ovviamente i musulmani, nel clima di rispetto che l’accoglienza
occidentale offre loro, non hanno alcuna giustificazione per
un’azione continua di avversione alle tradizioni cristiane. La loro
intolleranza per i crocifissi, per i presepi, per i canti natalizi ed
altro di segno cristiano nelle scuole, in luoghi di lavoro od in
altri ambiti pubblici è presentata come una “lotta per raggiungere la
pari dignità sociale garantita a tutti i cittadini italiani dalla
Costituzione” (Dichiarazione dell’Unione Musulmani d’Italia del
dicembre 2001). Così in Italia. Analogamente in altri Stati Europei.
A fronte delle pretese contro i cristiani avanzate in Europa, nessuna
dichiarazione di condanna della condizione giuridica riservata ai
cristiani nei regimi islamici sottoposti a pesanti restrizioni nella
loro libertà religiosa, costretti al pagamento di un’imposta e non
parificati nei diritti politici e civili ai cittadini musulmani.
Ma nemmeno i Governi europei, ancor meno l’Unione Europea, si sono
posti il problema di esigere la reciprocità dai rispettivi Stati
islamici, i quali sono assai solerti a sostenere finanziariamente e
diplomaticamente le comunità musulmane sia nel proselitismo sia nel
mantenimento di posizioni discoste dal contesto europeo.
Quale il senso di questa guerra ai simboli cristiani? Perché sulla
strada della conquista politica dell’Europa (la sua islamizzazione)
l’ostacolo maggiore sono i cristiani, non i democratici agnostici e
increduli incapaci di cogliere con l’ascesa dell’Islam la fine dello
Stato laico e della democrazia politica, nonché illusi di influenzare
l’Islam e di riformarlo secondo le loro concezioni secolariste.
Questa lotta ideologica ai simboli cristiani è guerra di religione,
ed è guerra al cristianesimo in preparazione allo scontro con la
civiltà europea nell’insieme di tutte le sue componenti.
L’integrazione islamica in Europa è un’utopia: chi sta dentro l’Islam
è un fratello, chi sta fuori dall’Islam è un nemico. La seconda forma
assunta dall’emigrazione islamica è quella violenta di lotta armata,
di azioni terroristiche preparatorie della jihad-guerra santa.
I musulmani non sono soddisfatti della libertà di cui godono in
Europa, potendo conservare la propria fede, le proprie tradizioni, la
propria cultura. Essi puntano ad ottenere, come comunità separata,
l’autogoverno religioso-politico attraverso il concilio delle
moschee. Per una precisa scelta ideologica: «Ritroveremo la libertà
soltanto se dichiareremo incompatibili la civiltà dell’Islam e la
civiltà dell’ovest. È giunta l’ora per noi di trovare alternative
alle vacche sacre del capitalismo, del socialismo e della democrazia»
(Kalim Siddiqui, direttore del Muslim Institute for Research and
Planning – Londra, luglio 1989). In ogni parte d’Europa è già
iniziato un braccio di ferro, più o meno conflittuale, nell’esigere
spazi amministrativi e giuridici specifici per l’Islam. Il loro
obiettivo, oltre a cimiteri, macellerie e scuole proprie, è di
conseguire l’applicabilità per le loro comunità del diritto islamico,
iniziando dal diritto di famiglia con tutte le sue norme sul
matrimonio, sul divorzio, sull’eredità, e, quindi l’accesso alla
poligamia ed a procedure assai sbrigative sempre in materia di
matrimonio e di divorzio.
Queste rivendicazioni giuridiche, in partenza ostili all’integrazione
nella società europea e mirate alla formazione di enclave politiche
all’interno degli Stati, avvengono nello sfondo di azioni
terroristiche sempre più frequenti. Gli atti di disturbo a forte
ripercussione psicologica – come l’uccisione di turisti europei in
visita a luoghi arabi, come i sequestri di civili europei in missioni
umanitarie o di lavoro, come il maxi attacco terroristico a Madrid
dell’11 marzo 2004, come i riflessi in Europa delle incursioni
megaterroristiche su suolo russo – puntano in tempi accuratamente
intervallati a sfibrare politici ed intellettuali.
L’Islam è prossimo all’ultima fase della sua strategia di conquista:
quella, cioè, di considerare l’Europa ormai come territorio di
guerra, i cui tempi sono incalcolabili, con tregue intermittenti
secondo un’abile strategia, ma da cui si propone di uscirne
vincitore.
L’Europa, ha scritto il giornalista musulmano Magdi Allam in premessa
ad una sua indagine al jihad in atto in Italia, è «diventata non
soltanto territorio di jihad, di predicazione della guerra santa, ma
anche di formazione e addirittura di esportazione dei “shahid” i
martiri dell’Islam» (giugno, 2003), dove il termine “shahid” indica i
Kamikaze, che si immolano in azioni terroristiche largamente
distruttive e seminatrici di panico.
Il primo obiettivo di questa “guerra santa” è di incutere paura nei
popoli europei, così da indurre disorientamenti e smarrimenti, su cui
tentare di inserirsi per graduali condizionamenti della vita politica
in Europa. Una realtà è certa e consolidata: l’Islam è diventato un
problema permanente di ordine pubblico. L’Europa, al presente,
considera soltanto il versante terroristico dell’Islam quale problema
di polizia. Non si sente ancora oggetto della “guerra santa”
islamica, poiché il jihad è attualmente attivo prevalentemente con
intimidazioni ed azioni di disturbo. Tra non molto inevitabilmente
l’Islam porrà seri problemi di sicurezza militare.
Il quadro è largamente inquietante: un’emigrazione invasiva,
sollecitata a congiungere la prolificità ai flussi migratori sempre
continui, onde sopravanzare numericamente i nativi europei, ed
accompagnata da una crescente guerra ideologica e terroristica. Quale
provvedimento di salvaguardia pensa di adottare l’Unione Europea?
L’ingresso della Turchia!Una Turchia, che dietro un’apparente
condiscendenza, è irremovibile nel ruolo assegnatole dall’insieme
islamico di essere determinante nella conquista dell’Europa: «Nessuno
cerchi di esercitare pressioni sulla Turchia con il pretesto
dell’Unione Europea» (Primo Ministro Tayy Erdogan – Settembre 2004);
«Nessuna condizione speciale per la Turchia è possibile» (Abdullah
Gull, vice premier e ministro degli esteri – Ottobre 2004 ). Bertolt
Brecht ammoniva: «Quando si marcia contro il nemico, è bene essere
sicuri che il nemico non marci alla nostra testa». Chi sta per
tradire la Patria Europea? Chi si oppone all’ingresso della Turchia o
chi si piega nuovo gauleiter al diktat americano?
LA TURCHIA, STATO PRESCELTO PER IL COLPO DI GRAZIA ALLA CIVILTÀ
EUROPEA
Gli Stati europei non possono condividere le istituzioni comunitarie
con uno Stato islamico, quale è la Turchia. La Turchia è uno Stato a
regime islamico, cioè una comunità politica ordinata soltanto per i
musulmani, restando dei tollerati tutti gli altri. La dhimmitudine,
cioè i provvedimenti restrittivi per i non islamici, è ancora vigente
in Turchia. L’ortoprassi islamica prevale sulle norme di adeguamento
all’ acquis comunitario, in quanto un insieme di forme di controllo
sociale e di procedure interne amministrative convergono nel
mantenere lo status quo. Del resto, nel gioco legislativo simulatorio
del l’ acquis comunitario, l’attuale governo presieduto da Erdogan
respinge ogni profondo cambiamento dell’ordinamento islamico, con
l’avallo dei militari. È significativa al riguardo la dichiarazione
resa dal Capo dello Stato turco, Ahmet Necdet Sezer, nel discorso
inaugurale della Conferenza O.C.I. – Organizzazione della Conferenza
Islamica – svoltasi ad Istanbul nel giugno 2004, affermando che le
riforme da introdurre «non devono snaturare le tradizioni del mondo
islamico».
Lo Stato turco si mantiene, altresì, rigorosamente sulla linea
islamica di attribuire l’esercizio dei diritti politici soltanto agli
islamici. I capi dello Stato ed i capi del Governo non possono che
essere islamici. È una sfida alla credulità ritenere che a guidare le
istituzioni possa essere un ebreo, od un cristiano od un ateo
professo. Però, entrando nella Unione Europea, in nome della
democrazia, la Turchia pretenderà al vertice dell’Unione
l’inserimento di un esponente islamico, senza concedere altre
alternative. La Turchia, inoltre, è uno stato basato su un’ideologia
razzista. La Turchia associa all’assolutismo politico-religioso
islamico un nazionalismo di segno etnico: il turchismo. Questo lato
perverso è stato chiaramente enunciato come un requisito costitutivo
dello Stato dal primo successore di Ataturk, il presidente Ismet
Inon: «solo la nazione turca è legittimata a rivendicare diritti
etnici e nazionali in questo paese. Nessun’altra componente ha alcun
diritto di questo tipo». Questo nazionalismo etnico ha provocato
rapporti ostili verso i kurdi e, unendo il pregiudizio etnico
all’identità islamica, la radicale emarginazione dei non musulmani.
Con Erdogan l’influenza islamica sull’educazione nazionale è
crescente. (…). Ma l’Unione Europea non può ignorare le credenziali
che la Turchia deve presentare per l’ingresso in Europa. Si escludono
i riferimenti al defunto Impero Ottomano, per attenersi
esclusivamente ai comportamenti dell’attuale Turchia anatolica dal
suo sorgere ad oggi. Ecco un breve sommario di questi meriti storici:
a) – Il genocidio armeno. Sotto l’influenza dell’ideale panturco il
movimento dei “Giovani Turchi” , costituito prevalentemente da
militari, avendo di fatto il controllo del Paese, ha dato avvio alla
“soluzione finale” del problema armeno con implacabili operazioni di
sterminio dal 1915 al 1916. Gli armeni occupavano parte dell’Anatolia
orientale, che era però il loro territorio natio da oltre due
millenni e mezzo. Resta un caso clamoroso di radicale pulizia etnica.
Il territorio fu completamente svuotato, tra massacri ed esodi
forzati, della popolazione armena. Si calcola sul milione e mezzo il
numero dei morti durante le stragi, mentre quelli scampati in parte
si raccolsero attorno alla capitale Erevan proclamando la “Repubblica
Armena” ed in parte si dispersero in molteplici paesi del mondo. Le
vittime furono presumibilmente di più, poiché sotto l’imperante
ideologia nazionalista, i Turchi eliminarono contemporaneamente
minoranze cristiane formate da cattolici, da caldei, da siriaci
ortodossi, da nestoriani, da protestanti. (…).
b) – La cacciata dei cristiani greco-ortodossi. Kemal Ataturk, armato
dalla Russia bolscevica, uscì vincitore dallo scontro con l’esercito
greco nella guerra combattuta nel biennio 1921-1922. Entro la fine
del 1922 circa un milione e mezzo di greci, tra fuggitivi e
scacciati, avevano lasciato la Turchia. Ma non mancò il bagno di
sangue alla turca. Quando l’esercito turco raggiunse Smirne incendiò
i quartieri, escluso quello musulmano, procedendo a massacrare i
cristiani. La brutalità turca adottava, ancora una volta, lo
sterminio come mezzo per risolvere definitivamente il problema delle
minoranze cristiane. (…)
c) – Pulizia etnica e terra bruciata a Cipro Nord. La Turchia non ha
alcuna giustificazione né di ordine politico né di ordine militare
quando nel 1974 le sue truppe, equipaggiate di armamenti americani,
occupando in pochi giorni il 37% dell’isola di Cipro, hanno dato il
via ad una operazione di pulizia etnica a spese della popolazione
greca: 180.000 greco-ciprioti espulsi, 112.000 greco-ciprioti
desaparecidos. La cieca violenza dell’esercito turco ha colpito pure
i ciprioti di religione islamica contrari all’occupazione: 50-60 mila
sono emigrati in Europa e 500 circa risultano desaparecidos. (…)
d) – Le stragi Kurde. La questione Kurda è sorta con la fondazione
nel 1923 della Repubblica Turca. Mustafà Kemal Ataturk ottenne
l’abrogazione del Trattato di Sèvres (10 agosto 1920), che aveva
riconosciuta l’autonomia locale ai Kurdi. Esso fu sostituito dal
Trattato di Losanna (24 luglio 1923), che includeva qualche articolo
riguardante in generale il rispetto delle minoranze senza nominarne
alcuna. Così fu facile a Kemal Ataturk dare il via a provvedimenti
repressivi. Nel 1924 un decreto ufficiale bandì tutte le scuole, le
pubblicazioni e le organizzazioni Kurde. Successivamente una legge
del 1934 approvò un programma di assimilazione dei Kurdi spostandoli
in area a prevalente etnia turca, affiancato da un piano per
turcizzare le zone kurde. A completamento i governi turchi hanno
tenuto bloccato lo sviluppo economico e sociale, così da provocare
più facilmente l’abbandono kurdo delle loro terre per migrare
altrove.

–Boundary_(ID_VXZy9pgyd0qhMELL2WFoXg)–

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Oskanian & Mamedyarov again discuss Karabakh

OSKANIAN AND MAMEDYAROV AGAIN DISCUSS KARABAGH

ArmenPress
Dec 6 2004

SOFIA, DECEMBER 6, ARMENPRESS: Armenian foreign affairs minister
Vartan Oskanian, who left for Bulgaria’s capital Sofia on December 5 to
participate in the 12th OSCE Ministerial Council on 6 and 7 December,
had a meeting with his Azerbaijani counterpart Elmar Mamedyarov during
a working dinner with the OSCE Minsk group cochairmen the same evening.

Armenian foreign affairs ministry said both minister discussed the
current pace of the Nagorno Karabagh conflict resolution and exchanged
ideas on resolution prospects.

Minister Oskanian is scheduled to take floor on December 7. From Sofia
he will fly to Brussels where he will attend a regular ministerial
meeting of NATO’s Euro Atlantic Partnership Council on December 9.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Russian satellite shifts orbit

ANALYSIS: RUSSIAN SATELLITE SHIFTS ORBIT
by Ian Mather Diplomatic Correspondent

Scotland on Sunday
December 5, 2004, Sunday

UKRAINE’S Supreme Court has a reputation for fierce independence
unusual in a former Soviet republic and last week it demonstrated it
with a vengeance.

In a humiliating rebuff to outgoing President Leonid Kuchma and his
pro-Moscow protege, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych, it threw out
the presidential election result in which Yanukovych had been declared
the narrow winner.

The court’s decision, which cannot be appealed against, is a stunning
victory for the Western-oriented opposition leader Viktor Yushchenko
and his backers, and is massively significant since it clears the way
for a Yushchenko victory which could take Ukraine out of the Russian
sphere of influence and closer to membership of the European Union
and Nato.

The decision gives Yushchenko exactly what he wanted: a straightforward
re-run of the last round, between the two highest-scoring candidates
from the first round.

Kuchma, who is at the end of a 10-year stint as president, had
dismissed the idea of a re-run as a “farce”, instead seeking a
completely new election. This would have opened up the field to
fresh candidates, allowing Kuchma to ditch Yanukovych in favour of
a different pro-Moscow candidate thought to be less unpopular.

There are other signs that the tide has turned against Ukraine’s
pro-Moscow establishment. The country’s parliament has begun flexing
its muscles, adopting a more aggressive role against Kuchma for
the first time. In an emergency session it voted to invalidate the
election.

Later, when Kuchma sought to circumvent the opposition by pushing
through a political reform that would have transferred significant
powers from the president to parliament, boosting the prime minister’s
role, the parliament rejected it.

The Supreme Court’s decision is also a serious setback for Russian
President Vladimir Putin, who had mounted a personal campaign to
try to assure the election of Yanukovych. He paid two high-profile
visits to Ukraine during the election campaign and later caused anger
in Europe and the US by congratulating Yanukovych on winning before
the official outcome was announced.

The prospect of a Yushchenko presidency has raised old Russian fears
of ‘encirclement’ if Ukraine, a large and strategically important
nation, were to move out of Moscow’s orbit, and line up with the West,
particularly the United States.

But it is a triumph for Washington, which announced it would refuse
to accept the last election result and hinted at sanctions against
Ukraine if the result were not reversed.

It is also an unexpected success for the EU, which argues that it has
an external security role in what it calls the “common neighbourhood” –
which includes Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, and the Caucasus republics
of Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.

Moscow fiercely rejects such a role for the EU, arguing that Ukraine
and other former Soviet republics belong to what it calls its
“near abroad”.

“The Russians still perceive it as their sphere of influence and would
prefer not to have anyone from the EU,” said Wojciech Saryusz-Wolski,
an analyst at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Holy Land Christmas: Jerusalem & Bethlehem seek visitors

HOLY LAND CHRISTMAS: Jerusalem and Bethlehem seek visitors
By LAURIE COPANS, Associated Press Writer

The Associated Press
December 6, 2004, Monday, BC cycle

JERUSALEM — For the first Christmas season in five years, Israel
and the Palestinians are cooperating to boost tourism to encourage
Christian pilgrims to visit the Holy Land during the holiday.

The Israeli and Palestinian tourism ministers announced in a meeting
last month – their first since fighting broke out in 2000 – that
they intended to guarantee easy access for visitors traveling between
Jerusalem and nearby Bethlehem, simplifying security checks.

Christmas celebrations in the land Jesus walked once attracted tens
of thousands of tourists. But in the last few years, violence has
kept pilgrims away.

Tourism has recently begun to rise again due to a marketing push and
a renewed effort to maintain relative calm after Palestinian leader
Yasser Arafat’s death on Nov. 11.

“We are telling everyone that they can come more freely to the Holy
Land,” Palestinian Tourism Minister Mitri Abu Aitah said in the
meeting with his Israeli counterpart, Gideon Ezra.

Ezra said he expected the new procedures to help. “I think this meeting
between us will lead to a lot of people to come visit the Holy Land,”
he said.

If you make the trip this season, here are some recommendations.

One of my favorite things to do in Jerusalem – where I have lived
for 10 years – is to walk the ramparts of the Old City, where you
can view the minarets and steeples from every angle. You may even see
a relative of the peregrine falcon, the lesser kestrel, who prefers
the stone holy places when it nests in the area from February to July.

After visiting the Church of the Holy Sepulcher, built in the fourth
century by Emporer Constantine to mark the traditional site of Jesus’
crucifixion and burial, enter the small door to the left as you come
out the main entrance.

Climb the stairs through three tiny Ethiopian chapels to the roof.
Passing through the archway, you can enter the Coptic Patriarchate.
Find the stairs leading down into a dark cistern whose acoustics are
wonderful for singing your favorite Bible hymn.

For a spectacular view in every direction, climb the tower at the
Lutheran Church a few steps away from the Holy Sepulcher.

One of the most difficult challenges for tourists in Jerusalem is
finding out when it’s possible to visit the walled Al Aqsa Mosque
compound (known to Jews as the Temple Mount). The compound, home to the
Dome of the Rock mosque, is closed twice daily, during prayers, but it
is worth the effort to get inside and view the rock from which Muslims
believe the prophet Muhammad ascended to heaven on his white stallion.

To the left of the plaza of the Western Wall, a retaining wall of
the Second Jewish Temple and the holiest site for Jews, you will see
the entrance to an archaeological tunnel. Here you can see stones,
cisterns and a Hasmonean water channel used 2,000 years ago.

The Old City’s Arab market shops are a must. You can buy vests
decorated with traditional Palestinian embroidery, hand-painted
Armenian pottery and fresh sesame and pistachio brittle. Haggling
is an art you must master quickly. In most cases it’s best to offer
half the price you are first quoted and work your way up to about
two-thirds of what the seller asks. Try not to show you really want
the item or the shop owners won’t budge much.

Traveling from Jerusalem just a few miles away to the West Bank town
of Bethlehem can seem somewhat daunting since tourists must pass
through an Israeli military checkpoint.

But don’t mind the M-16 guns held by the Israeli soldiers. This area
has not seen clashes in more than a year and they are unlikely here
since both Israelis and Palestinians are eager to facilitate the
travel of pilgrims.

Manger Square is not the quaint, calm scene depicted in the Christmas
carol “O Little Town of Bethlehem.” Although it has been transformed
in recent years, it is often still full of tour buses.

The stone Church of the Nativity is dank and cold, but filled with
fragrant incense and a wonderful sight when full of worshippers at
the midnight Mass on Christmas Eve. Bring warm clothes if you come
for the holiday season; temperatures around Christmas in Bethlehem
average in the 40s.

If you’re lucky, it might even snow.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ANM admits its role in opposition’s activities

ANM admits its role in opposition’s activities

Yerkir/arm
3 Dec 04

Every time when there were talks that the opposition was often
using the advice of the Armenian National Movement (ANM) and thus —
willingly or unwillingly — was implementing that party’s objectives,
both the opposition and the ANM were voicing their objections.

The opposition was looking insulted because its intellectual potential
was underestimated, and the ANM was accusing everybody of seeing it
behind the opposition’s moves.

A few days ago, the ANM disclosed itself: the leaders of the party
admitted that they had given advice — and not only — to the
opposition.

What were the results of such advice in the case of the events of
this spring, or what could the results be, is another story. It is,
however, noteworthy to speak about an accent that this party uses in
its propaganda tactics: ANM claims it is the only alternative to the
present regime.

The formula is this: the current opposition (the Ardarutiun, Gegamian
and the others) is incapable of removing the regime as it has neither
the resolve nor the intellectual potential; the ANM in contrast,
is able to do it. This formula, however, is for the “consumers”
outside Armenia.

This explains the recent activeness of the ANM’s comments on
the former president and things that the latter has said or has
not. Most probably, such activeness will be followed by the campaign
of “reliable information” that the current president will be replaced
with the former one.