Russia can accept the existence of new roads, but it is difficult to remain indifferent.

November: 17, 2026

Recently, the former foreign minister of Iran, adviser on international affairs to the country’s supreme leader, Ali Akbar Velayati of Iran «Ettelaat» harshly criticized Nikol Pashinyan’s foreign policy in the periodical. In particular, in the article entitled “Open and honest with Mr. Prime Minister”, Velayati claimed that the current authorities of Armenia are deepening the country’s dependence on Western countries, in particular, the USA, France and Great Britain.

He separately referred to the TRIPP project, considering it an initiative against Iran’s national interests.

“I openly told the Armenian ambassador that if Trump and his allies try to cross that red line of Iran, we will break their legs,” he wrote.

The authorities of Armenia, for their part, assure that there were questions on the Iranian side, the answers to which were given, and as RA Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan said on one occasion, Iran, in its impression, is satisfied with the answers.

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Are Tehran’s concerns about TRIPP really allayed or are they fully preserved, especially when the issue is not just the possible presence of American armed forces, but the formation of a permanent infrastructure of influence in the immediate vicinity of Iran’s borders?

On these and other issues 168.amhas talked “Henaket” Analytical Center expert Shiraz Khachatryan with։

– Of course yes. I think Tehran not only maintains its concerns, but also expresses them more openly and harshly against the background of recent developments. In the case of Iran, the problem was never limited exclusively to the possible presence of Western powers. The deep essence of the problem is that Iran does not want to see the formation of such strategic infrastructures in its immediate neighborhood, which can later turn into a permanent tool of foreign influence and change the regional power balance.

For Iran, which has been in conflict with the US for decades, all of this naturally has security and geopolitical significance. Tehran has always considered the South Caucasus as its immediate national security zone. I do not want to make a long historical excursion or give many examples.

I think that the statements made by Velayeti, the adviser on international affairs of the supreme leader of Iran, in recent days are quite telling in themselves. His harsh criticism of Pashinyan’s policy and TRIPP shows how the influential circles of the Iranian political elite perceive this process.

Yes, it is possible for Tehran to change its tactics, soften its diplomatic rhetoric, even cooperate with various power centers, but it is unlikely to come to terms with the strengthening of such an external presence in the immediate vicinity of its northern borders, which could limit its strategic maneuverability.

– Russia benefit or the damage which one is TRIP–from, does Russia have any interests: economic, geopolitical?

– You see, TRIPP is both an economic opportunity and a geopolitical challenge for Russia. On the one hand, Moscow is interested in unblocking regional communications, as new transport routes can bring economic benefits to Russia as well.

On the other hand, it is very clear that there is a much deeper problem here. The question for Russia is who will manage the main levers of management, security and economic exploitation of regional communications after the opening of that road. For decades, Russia has also maintained its influence in the South Caucasus through its control over communications and infrastructure.

Now, when the initiative of the process passes to Washington, Moscow faces the problem of reshaping its influence.

Let’s also not forget that the railway network of Armenia is under the management of the Russian “South Caucasian Railway” on the basis of concession management until 2038. Therefore, the formation of a new communication system is also related to Russia’s specific economic interests. For me, Moscow’s dual approach is particularly remarkable, Russia cannot be fundamentally opposed to the opening of regional communications, but at the same time does not want to be excluded from the formation of their management and security mechanisms.

In other words, Russia can accept the existence of new roads, but it is unlikely to remain indifferent to the question of who will gain strategic influence through these roads.

– The current RA authorities say that TRIPP is a business project and not a territory, although there is talk of extraordinary demarcation. Shouldn’t such projects have a fixed geographical or territorial record in the document: what areas, from where, of what size? 

– It is difficult to imagine that the communication of such strategic significance passing through the territory of Armenia has a purely economic purpose, when obvious geopolitical interests collide around it. But the most worrying thing for me is something else. We still do not have a clear idea of ​​what specific territories, what borders and what jurisdictions we are talking about, where are the maps, territorial specifications, complete agreements?

For me, it is unacceptable when issues related to the territory of the state and strategic communications are presented to the public with political slogans, and the real agreements remain unclear. And if it is a business according to them, let them publish the full terms.

– By the way, the leadership of Armenia assures that weapons cannot pass through TRIP, can this harm Azerbaijan, when its border with Turkey is through Nakhichevan, and it also has access from Iran? that area. That is, Is the impact of the restrictions equal? ​​What are the risks for Armenia?

– This question of yours is a continuation of the previous one. I repeat, we still do not have a complete idea under what conditions and with what settings that communication will work. The authorities say that the transit of weapons and ammunition will be prohibited. But here a question arises. Besides, Azerbaijan has a connection with Turkey through Nakhichevan, it also has a border and communication with Iran. So, what strategic damage does Baku suffer from this ban, and why is it presented as a guarantee of Armenia’s security?

Meanwhile, the risks for Armenia are much wider. The problem is not only the possible transit of weapons, but the control of the road, cargo inspection, security mechanisms and possible incidents. My concern is that this road can turn into another bone of contention for regional competition, and Armenia will be the first bearer of the geopolitical and security consequences of that competition. Great powers and regional players may have their own interests, may compete and reshape the map of regional influence, but the geography of the clash of these interests will be our country.

– There is an opinion that the Ijevan road is more beneficial to Azerbaijan than the Meghri road. Is this comparable, how important is it for Azerbaijan? Moreover, who needs TRIPP more: Azerbaijan or Turkey? After all, Baku and Ankara do not hide that the “Zangezur Corridor” unites the Turkic world, and Baku also adds that Turkey is strengthening its position in the South Caucasus through the Organization of Turkic States.

– To be honest, I have not come across such an assessment until now. Until now, both Baku and Ankara have prioritized the communication through Meghri in the south of Armenia in their political demands. The problem here is not only the shortness of the road, but the strategic possibility of connecting the main territory of Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan and continuing this connection with Turkey.

I do not rule out that the direction of Ijevan can also be quite beneficial for Azerbaijan, especially from the point of view of providing direct communication with Turkey. But it is not necessary to equate these two routes. The Ijevan road can solve one transport problem, and the Meghri direction also has a separate geopolitical significance for Turkey and Azerbaijan.

As for who needs TRIPP more, Azerbaijan or Turkey, I think their interests should be distinguished. Azerbaijan needs it for a direct land connection with Nakhichevan and a communication alternative. For Turkey, however, the benefit is much wider, it is about strengthening the connection with Central Asia, expanding the Middle Corridor and deepening the economic and military-political ties between the Turkic world.

Ankara is consistently trying to turn transport, economic and political cooperation into a more unified system of regional influence. And I do not rule out that in the future, if the Armenian authorities cannot clearly define and protect our national and legal interests, Azerbaijan and Turkey will try to get maximum privileges to use any Armenian communications.

– Do the interests of the USA and Turkey in the South Caucasus fully coincide, and to what extent?

– No, they do not completely coincide, just that there is a significant commonality of their interests in the South Caucasus. The priority for the US is to strengthen its own strategic presence in the region, create new communication opportunities, and limit the influence of Russia and Iran. For Turkey, the question is broader. Ankara seeks to strengthen its position in the South Caucasus, to deepen the connection with Azerbaijan, and to form more direct economic and transport links with the Turkic world.

The US can cooperate with Turkey without sharing all of Ankara’s ambitions in the region. Turkey, being a member of NATO, has its own foreign policy agenda, and it does not always coincide with Washington’s calculations. It is not necessary to think that the common interests and contradictions of the US and Turkey are limited only to the issue of Armenia. Between them there are both overlapping interests and serious disagreements in almost all key areas of the region, from Azerbaijan and Armenia to Georgia, as well as in relations with Russia and Iran.

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Disclaimer: This article was contributed and translated into English by Liana Toganian. While we strive for quality, the views and accuracy of the content remain the responsibility of the contributor. Please verify all facts independently before reposting or citing.

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