Why Armenia’s EU Membership Could Be Smoother Than Most Prospective Members –

Eurasia Review

Nov 3, 2026

By Julian McBride

Key Takeaways:

• After Russia’s inaction in the 2020–23 Karabakh conflicts, Pashinyan froze CSTO participation in 2024 and began diversifying defense imports toward India and France while deepening U.S. ties.
• In 2024–25 Armenia advanced EU accession legislation, prompting Russian import bans and hostile rhetoric.
• The absence of active territorial disputes and ongoing reforms are cited as advantages over other candidates, though elections and residual Russian influence remain risks.

Armenia, after decades of Russian influence, has made strides in democratic reforms and branching out to alternative partners in trade, technology, and defense. Over the past several years, Armenia’s ruling government, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, has expressed interest in future European Union membership.

Yerevan’s potential accension will face hurdles; as it has been under Moscow’s influence for decades, reforming full democratic control remains paramount to the country’s future. Amid the diversification process, Armenia continues to transform into a solidified Western partner with key agreements with the U.S. and stronger ties with Europe.

Initial Russian-Economic Bloc and Breakdown in Relations

Against the backdrop of the dissolution of the USSR, Armenia gained its independence from the Soviet Union, albeit in a weakened and precarious state. Armenia’s democratic institutions were initially flawed, with a lack of structural safeguards, which would be seen up until the Velvet Revolution.

Immediately after independence, Armenia would fight a major war with Azerbaijan over the Karabakh region, which also desired autonomy and self-determination. The Karabakh region, historically with an Armenian majority and Armenian architecture, was transferred to the then Azerbaijani SSR by Josef Stalin, who wished to ignite ethnic tensions and quell nationalism within the USSR.

The First Karabakh war ended in an Armenian military victory. Still, a Russian-mediated ceasefire left the dispute unresolved—particularly due to Azerbaijani refugees and the status of the breakaway state of Artsakh, which was supported but not annexed by Armenia. Moscow would be Yerevan’s closest ally at the time, allowing Armenia to join the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), but this allyship would be tested amid the Velvet Revolution.

During the Velvet Revolution, Armenians removed the pro-Russian bloc that was close to longtime autocrat Vladimir Putin, which the Kremlin took as a spiteful act akin to Euromaidan in Ukraine and the Georgian protests. When Azerbaijan initiated the Second Karabakh war in 2020, Russia did not respond to Armenia’s request for assistance, and the resulting armed conflict saw Baku recapture much of the region from the Armenian army and Artsakh militias.

Russia would gain a foothold in the South Caucasus in 2020 it previously had lost thirty years ago from the collapse of the USSR via a peacekeeping contingent in the Karabakh region as over 120,000 Armenians remained under threat. However, this peacekeeping mission would prove hollow and set the stage for a major split between Yerevan and Moscow.

Armenia’s Western Pivot and EU Aspirations

In mid-September 2022, Azerbaijan would initiate large-scale artillery fire against Armenia proper. Several hundred troops on both sides would be killed in less than three days, with the United States mediating a ceasefire.

Despite a CSTO member in Armenia being attacked in its non-disputed territory, no member of the alliance took action to defend Yerevan, Russia included. Due to the inaction, Armenia’s Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan openly criticized the CSTO and slowly started a process of disengaging Yerevan from the mutual defense organization.

In February 2024, Pashinyan froze Armenia’s participation in CSTO a year after Azerbaijan launched one more major military operation in Karabakh in 2023 that saw the expulsion of over 100,000 Armenians and cultural desecration of ancient Armenian artifacts. Pashinyan would later state intentions to eventually leave CSTO as Armenia would branch out its dependency away from Russia.

Armenia is diversifying its defense imports away from Russia, increasing procurements from countries such as India and France. Starting with the outgoing Biden administration, Armenia was also upgraded towards a strategic comprehensive partnership with the United States, which continued to expand during Yerevan’s Western pivot.

Armenia’s Potential EU Ascension

On September 9th, 2024, Nikol Pashinyan acknowledged that starting Yerevan’s process towards European Union (EU) accension was a key policy of his government. Several months later, on March 26th, 2025, the Armenian parliament put forth a legislature called the EU Integration Act for future membership aspirations.

For the past year, Yerevan’s government has been engaging in domestic and democratic reforms to make the looming EU accession process smoother.  For instance, Pashinyan’s government will expect opposition towards a Western pivot, as some of the opposing blocs maintain good ties with Russia, which could enact information and hybrid warfare against Armenia when its process begins.

Russia has already reacted to Armenia’s EU aspirations with ire by lobbying against Yerevan’s current Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) membership. In a form of sanctions and economic coercion, the Kremlin enacted bans on Armenian imports, with media figures and Duma members exacerbating rhetoric similar to that against Ukraine after Euromaidan. Despite the economic coercion, Armenia is unlikely to abandon EU aspirations, as over-reliance on Russia led to the country’s isolation from better-performing Western markets at a time when Yerevan needed outside support the most between 2020 and 2023.

Why Yerevan’s Prospects Could be Less Turbulent than Other Prospects

During Armenia’s preparations for EU accession, there are a handful of countries that are either in the process of negotiations or are in an indefinite standstill due to various reasons that involve other members of the European Union.Currently, Albania, Georgia, Moldova, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Bosnia and Herzegovina are in the candidacy phase. However, only a handful of these countries will likely receive future membership in the next several years.

Montenegro is likely the next member of the European Union, as Podgorica has checked off everything it needs for future membership. Georgia and Moldova are currently suffering from pro-Russian movements and political crises which are amplified by the Kremlin’s informational warfare strategy. Ukraine, currently engaged in Europe’s largest war faces upheavals due to the ongoing conflict with Russia’s invasion.

Albania and Serbia are both dealing with political turmoil stemming from corruption that brings frequent protests to both countries, and North Macedonia is only four years into negotiations. Both Turkey and Bosnia and Herzegovina are embroiled in delicate situations that could have wider implications.

Turkey currently has a five-decade military occupation over the northern regions of Cyprus, and Nicosia is an EU member. Alongside Greece, which is a mutual treaty ally of Nicosia, Ankara’s EU aspirations are likely to remain in purgatory until a full resolution of Cyprus’ frozen conflict is mended. 

Bosnia and Herzegovina faces a renewed separatist movement from one of its internal entities, the Republika Srpska (RS). The RS has stepped up lobbying efforts with U.S. officials in the Trump administration to lobby towards independence, which not only threatens Bosnia and Herzegovina’s EU accession, but also the Dayton Accords that could bring various factions back into ethnic armed conflicts that still scar the Balkans to this day.

Armenia currently has no open conflicts or disputes, particularly as Pashinyan offered territorial proposals of acknowledgement and land swaps to Azerbaijan. Yerevan is continuing to implement democratic reforms and is increasingly leaving Russian-led blocs, which means EU integration will be smoother. Still, Yerevan cannot remain complacent, as by the time the country is formally in negotiations, future elections will take place, and the pro-Western Civil Contract party could face future challenges to the EU aspirations. 

Overall, Armenia’s trajectory from an obscure country surrounded by enemies and heavy Russian influence is now brighter, with a freer market democracy that can branch out to various countries for technology, economic trade, and defense instead of solely relying on the Kremlin. European Union membership aspirations can help Yerevan not only grow but also bring needed investments to the South Caucasus.