C.I.S. Struggles for Cohesion
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR)
06 June 2005
Report Drafted by Molly Corso
At one point, political observers feared that the Commonwealth of
Independent States (C.I.S.) was Moscow’s way of preserving the Soviet
Union. However, growing tensions within the alliance during the past two
years prove Russia’s leverage over the former Soviet republics is
fragile at best. Perhaps the clearest example of Moscow’s waning
influence is the tangible rift between C.I.S. leaders after the tide of
revolutions sweep through member states. Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova
are seeing fewer benefits from the alliance and are finding prospects
outside of Moscow’s sphere of influence more attractive.
On June 3, the leaders of the C.I.S. countries met in Tbilisi for the
latest summit meeting. Although the Georgian government hosted the
event, there is little doubt that the country’s role in the alliance is
now all but symbolic.
A Turbulent History
It took a civil war and the Abkhaz conflict to convince Georgia in 1993
to join the C.I.S. The alliance itself was created in 1991 by Russia,
Ukraine, and Belarus. Originally, the stated purpose of the C.I.S. was
to help the former Soviet republics cope with the breakup of the Soviet
Empire. While Georgia flatly refused to sign up at its creation,
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze finally agreed to join nearly two
years later in a bid to save the country from civil war and guarantee
Russia’s help in resolving the crisis in Abkhazia.
The confederation was intended to ease the transition for former Soviet
republics, or to create something akin to the European Union with one
currency and free trade, as well as military support. However, Georgia’s
guiding motivation to join the alliance was centered on its conflicts
with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not an ideological common language with
Moscow.
The basis for Georgia’s role in the C.I.S. was the guarantee that Russia
would help mediate the unsettled conflicts. Its involvement in the
organization led to the current C.I.S. peacekeeping troops, all Russian,
stationed 12 kilometers on either side of the disputed borders. But
after more than ten years of negligible progress with either conflicts,
Georgian politicians and opposition alike are forecasting the end of the
alliance.
Georgia’s role in the C.I.S. since Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili came to power has been characterized more by a series of
scandals than by any level of cooperation. Relations were at an all time
low during the meeting in August 2004; a dispute concerning the
Russian-Abkhazian railroad project led presidents Saakashvili and Putin
to spend the meeting arguing about Russia’s interests in the disputed
republic rather than discussing the C.I.S.’ role in mediating the
conflict. With Georgian-Russian relations strained over the Russian
military base agreement in early May, it was no surprise that
Saakashvili refused even to attend the informal C.I.S. summit in Moscow
during the May 9 celebrations.
A Precarious Future
Despite the fact that the organization has stated new goals and
conducted regional meetings, there is little to show for the time and
energy put into the alliance. Originally branded a means for economic
cooperation, C.I.S. countries have failed even to create the long
anticipated free trade zone. By all reports, this zone was to begin in
2005. During the latest summit in Tbilisi, members of the organization
could not even agree to a 2012 deadline. Even more telling is the fact
that member states, on the whole, trade less with one another than they
do with Western powers like Germany and the United States.
The ongoing conflicts within the former Soviet Union are another glaring
example of the alliance’s failures. In 1994, member states signed a
“collective security treaty,” which was designed as a military alliance
intended to guarantee the peaceful end of regional conflicts, as well as
to provide a united front against the growing concern of Western
military involvement in the former Soviet Union. However, five years
after its conception, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Uzbekistan refused to
renew the treaty and left the military alliance, citing a complete lack
of progress dealing with conflicts, as well as growing dissatisfaction
with Moscow’s policies.
Tensions were obvious at the Tbilisi meeting as well, where the
priorities of member states were clearly at odds. Conflict resolution
aside, Georgia has also not received any clear economic benefit from the
C.I.S. Although Tbilisi removed visa restrictions for Russian nationals,
there is still a strict Russian visa regime in place against Georgia.
The summit meeting in Tbilisi on June 3 was promoted as a forum for
economic development; however, the president of the Russian delegation,
Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov, could not make any promises that
the Russian visa requirements would be lifted. During a press
conference, he merely mentioned that negotiations concerning the issue
are “not easy.”
While Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli expressed optimism that
the alliance can still be viable, other Georgian politicians are
questioning the future of the C.I.S. There was little Georgian
involvement in issues discussed at the summit; out of 34 treaties
presented, the Georgian leadership signed nine. That degree of
inactivity is in sharp contrast to the enthusiasm Georgia exhibits
toward N.A.T.O. A Georgian delegation met with N.A.T.O. representatives
in Brussels last month; while N.A.T.O. officials were more cautious,
Irakli Okruashvili, the Georgian defense minister, was confident
Georgia’s rapidly paced military reforms would lead to N.A.T.O.
membership in as little as three years.
Georgia is not the only C.I.S. member considering other, more
Western-oriented, alliances. After two years of velvet revolutions
throughout the former Soviet space, the C.I.S. is now struggling to
bring together radically different governments. Even Russian President
Vladimir Putin tried in March to downplay the importance of the
organization, saying it had been merely a means of ensuring a “civilized
divorce” for the former Soviet republics. However, after more than a
decade of summit meetings and unimplemented treaties, members are
increasingly looking toward N.A.T.O. and the E.U. as a means to achieve
their goal of integration with a post-communist world.
There is also a growing ideology gap between the governments of the
member states. With the leader of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, “the
last dictator in Europe,” at one end and pro-Western presidents like
Saakashvili on the other, the alliance is stretched to the breaking point.
Conclusion
While the C.I.S. purportedly represents 12 of the 15 former republics,
Russia has always been the deciding force behind the organization;
during its nearly 14 years of existence, the president of the C.I.S. has
always been either from Russia or Belarus. The relationship between
Georgia and the C.I.S. has always been a reflection of the larger
Russian-Georgian relationship. Now, since the Russian military bases are
beginning the withdrawal process, the Georgian leadership is noting the
tension within the C.I.S. but has expressed some mild hope for its
future. However, if relations with Russia sour further, the call for
Georgia to leave the C.I.S. will be louder and will carry more political
weight.
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent organization
that utilizes open source intelligence to provide conflict analysis
services in the context of international relations. PINR approaches a
subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral
judgments to the reader.
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