America’s Role in the Caucasus Can Be Revised

Differences between Turkey and Azerbaijan on the issue of Iran are changing the regional arrangements

US and Israeli aggression against Iran to the landscape The differences and contradictions between Ankara and Baku are becoming more and more obvious to international observers. It’s coming «the moment of truth», whose preparation has been going on for a long time.

Since the early 1990s, the two Turkic-speaking countries have declared a close alliance, but relations between the two countries have periodically deteriorated. For example, in 1995, Azerbaijan accused some Turkish citizens, allegedly linked to Turkish forces, of supporting a failed coup against then-President Heydar Aliyev.

In 2008, tensions resurfaced «football diplomacy» in the background, which was aimed at the regulation of Armenian-Turkish relations, in the conditions of the status quo, which did not satisfy Baku in Nagorno-Karabakh. The contacts came up again when Erdogan emphasized Turkey’s role in Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 “44-Day War” in several speeches. In Baku, they quite categorically rejected the Turkish hypothesis about Ankara’s decisive role in the war. However, from the beginning of March 2026, the conflict developing from below is qualitatively more serious.

The Turkish side, in contrast to the Azerbaijani side, is doing everything to end the conflict as soon as possible. Thus, according to the Bloomberg agency, Ankara is putting pressure on the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf so that they publicly and officially refuse to participate in aggression against Iran. of course The tensions between Ankara and Baku reflect a deeper mismatch in the views of Turkish allies on regional threats and processes, especially with regard to Israel and Iran.։ Some Baku experts they thinkCurrent trends may weaken the close ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey, creating an opportunity for Russia to strengthen its influence in the South Caucasus.

To remind, after the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei on March 4, 2026, Aliyev visited the Iranian embassy in Baku to express his condolences. For a number of reasons, he seems to have sought to avoid participating in the conflict. But literally the next day, Iran allegedly carried out a drone attack on the capital of Azerbaijan’s Nakhichevan autonomy, injuring several people. In response, Aliyev made a speech in which he sharply accused Iran, which caused a strong negative reaction in the Turkish mass media. Deputies of the Milli Mejlis loyal to Aliyev accused media outlets linked to Erdogan’s entourage of organizing a media campaign against Aliyev’s administration.

Turkish media criticism has ranged from emphasizing Baku’s close ties with Israel to pointing to the entrenched authoritarian nature of the government in Azerbaijan, an issue long ignored by Turkish authorities. Iranian reaction has been mixed, partly due to the extreme situation, including the deaths of many of the country’s leaders, including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, in bombings and terrorist attacks. Officials, including Iran’s president, have denied any involvement in the incident, while some pro-government commentators have called the strike targeted at its northern neighbor. Iran’s warning.

In turn, both the government in Baku and opposition figures used the drone attack to rekindle irredentist rhetoric against Iran’s northern territories. An analysis of sources closely intertwined with the structures of the IRGC, as well as the materials of a number of authoritative news agencies, indicates that Iran officially denies its participation in a number of drone attacks, including on the facilities of the UAE and Bahrain. Moreover, the technical identity of drones of different origin creates ideal conditions for all kinds of manipulations. Because the US ATSs, which are actively involved in the aggression imposed on Iran, are visually almost indistinguishable from the Iranian “Martyrs”, which is purposefully used in information warfare.

It is important to note that both Israel and Turkey supported Azerbaijan in the last Karabakh war։ Although the Turkish participation was more direct and decisive. Erdogan stood by Aliyev’s side in the victory parade, and Turkish military advisers played a key role in Azerbaijan’s success. Baku’s deep and multifaceted ties to the Netanyahu government, largely hidden from public and pundit eyes, remain almost decisive in determining all of Baku’s international policies.

Bilateral contacts, which began in the early 1990s, are based on a long-standing strategic partnership, the key elements of which are such directions as energy, defense, and intelligence. Suffice it to say: Azerbaijan is one of Israel’s key energy suppliers, providing a significant portion of its oil imports, while the Jewish state plays a central role in modernizing the Azerbaijani military, particularly through drone technology and advanced weapons systems.

Azerbaijan’s geographical proximity to Iran also makes it strategically important for Israel in terms of intelligence and regional positioning. Along with major Western economic players such as BP, Israeli chains are among the most important international supporters of the Aliyev administration.

This support is particularly important given the authoritarian image and vulnerability of the Azerbaijani government on the world stage. The multilateral partnership that is being talked about explains why ties with Israel are not only tactical in nature, but form the structural basis of Azerbaijan’s foreign policy.

In the current situation, Turkish pro-government media outlets express dissatisfaction more often, expecting Baku to show the priority of relations with Turkey over relations with Israel. As a result, there is not only a short-term divergence, but also a deeper structural tension within the long-term balancing strategy. While Turkey provides regional security, Israel provides international influence and strategic maneuver. However, the current crisis proves that it is increasingly difficult for Baku to maintain that balance.

The deepening of disagreements between Ankara and Baku may affect the regional balances in the Caucasus. As the US seeks to reduce its involvement in the Ukraine conflict, Russia may gradually shift its focus to the region. Although the US remains an important global player, its direct role in the South Caucasus may be limited.

Previous crises, such as the 2008 war over South Ossetia and the 2020 Karabakh war, show that Washington has shown little desire to directly intervene in regional conflicts, preferring indirect influence through partners. In this context, the weakening of the role of Turkey is not necessarily compensated by the strengthening of the participation of the USA. Despite the White House’s growing interest in the region and the much-touted “Trump Road,” the relationship remains fragile and largely conditional. Although Washington is interested in strengthening its presence in Central Asia, its willingness to act decisively in the South Caucasus remains uncertain.

Until recently, Aliyev maintained relatively constructive relations with Russia and sometimes used them as a counterbalance to Turkey, for example through close personal ties with Putin. As before, Turkey was afraid of a possible rapprochement with Moscow, its Caspian ally։ However, the situation has changed significantly. Recently, Azerbaijan has adopted a much more critical position towards Russia, in the context of protracted military operations in Ukraine, which avoids the further escalation of the conflict with Baku. On March 27, Russia’s Putin took part in the opening ceremony of the Azerbaijani State Music-Drama Theater after its reconstruction in Derbent. In April, another meeting of the Russian-Azerbaijani intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation will take place in Baku. Ambassador of Azerbaijan in Moscow Rahman Mustafayev talks about the active process of normalization and intensive restoration of relations, positive dynamics in all spheres, which are meant to smooth out the complications and misunderstandings of recent times.

International relations develop in an unpredictable manner. We live in extremely turbulent times when strategic calculations are being reviewed and reorganized. In such an environment, even improbable scenarios deserve serious consideration. The current tension between Ankara and Baku, if it escalates, may therefore signal not just a temporary rift, but a deeper strategic shift that could change the balance of power in the South Caucasus.

YURI MAVASHEV

fondsk.ru

Translation by Zhanna Avetisyan

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