Georgian “alibi” in Europe. Why did Pashinyan remind that Tbilisi-EU is frozen?

When the Prime Minister of Armenia speaks about the country’s European aspirations from the podium of the European Parliament, why does he point to the frozen relations between Georgia and the EU as the main obstacle? Is this a simple diplomatic gesture, an agreement to advance Georgian lobbying, or a calculated “alibi” to justify possible delays on the way to European integration and soften Europe’s skepticism?

VERELQin a conversation with a political analyst Hakob Badalyan decodes Nikol Pashinyan the footnotes of the speech, discussing the deep interconnectedness of the complex Armenian-Georgian logistical nodes, regional interests, and domestic political and pre-election agendas.

Hakob Badalyan is in the photo, the photo is from 168.am

VERELQ: What do you attribute to RA Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s speech in the European Parliament, where he, as if speaking on behalf of Georgia, clearly emphasized that the biggest obstacle to Armenia’s integration into the European Union is the frozen relations between Georgia and the EU? Why did he speak about it in such an open text for the first time? 

Hakob Badalyan. Considering that just a few days before the speech, he was on a working visit to Georgia, we can assume that this statement was pre-agreed, because otherwise it would at least sound strange. Even if agreed upon, the statement is somewhat strange. Armenia-EU relations are primarily about the acceptance and enforcement of standards, and in the foreseeable future, or at least at this stage, they do not imply a question of a physical road. It is extraordinary in itself to arrange Armenia-Europe relations with a third country, in this case Georgia, as a physical route. Therefore, I also tend to think that it was a pre-agreed move with Georgia.

I think that Georgia, in turn, contributing to Armenia-Azerbaijan communication (which is very important for Nikol Pashinyan from the point of view of pre-election campaign), expects that in return, Pashinyan will carry out a kind of Georgian lobbying in Europe. On the other hand, in my opinion, there is another context for Pashinyan here. He perfectly understands and imagines that Armenia’s great drive towards European integration and EU membership is not in demand in Europe itself.

From this point of view, the mention of the Georgian factor is a unique alibi for Nikol Pashinyan. He realizes that there is no great political prospect for the settlement of Georgia-EU relations for now. Therefore, this circumstance is a suitable excuse for him to explain the delay of some steps in the relations with the European Union in the future or to face the possible demands and doubts arising from the EU. The Georgian topic becomes a very good alibi in this respect.

VERELQ: In other words, the message is that we want to integrate with Europe, but there are problems and physical obstacles in our way, so don’t ask us more than we are able to give.

Hakob Badalyan. I think the relations with the European Union have the following logic. It is simply not in Europe’s interest to assume too much responsibility towards Armenia.

VERELQ: Of course, it is logical.

Hakob Badalyan. Based on this, the European Union will always try to question Nikol Pashinyan’s steps and will express this skepticism in different formats (both in plain text and in contexts). In response to this, Pashinyan, in turn, needs a counter-argument and a playing card. In my deep conviction, Europe-Georgia relations are used as such a card and an alibi, and raising the issue had this very purpose.

VERELQ: As you already mentioned, before that Nikol Pashinyan was in Tbilisi. We all know that in Armenian-Georgian relations there are cargo transportation and other logistical problems. Did his gesture towards Georgia also aim to contribute to the settlement of these issues? And according to you, as a result of the visit, were those logistical complications alleviated or resolved at least to some extent?

Hakob Badalyan. It is difficult for me to say clearly, because people who are directly related to these problems should talk about it, evaluating the presence or absence of solutions. In this regard, I do not have exhaustive information, but there is no doubt that they have become the subject of discussion. Especially in the conditions of the military tension created around Iran, when it is objectively expected that Iranian logistics will have problems, the importance of the northern routes for Armenia increases dramatically.

As I mentioned, the Azerbaijan component is particularly important for Nikol Pashinyan in the context of pre-election campaigning. For example, we see that Georgia announces the establishment of a symbolic price for the transit of Azerbaijani gasoline. It is noteworthy that no such privilege is established for fuel imported from Russia or other places. This suggests that the gasoline coming from Azerbaijan is one of the essential components of Pashinyan’s “peace propaganda”. From this point of view, all issues are interrelated. Georgia, for its part, is undoubtedly trying to use the current dynamics of Armenia-EU relations, expecting that Yerevan will try to protect and represent Georgian interests on that platform.

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