16:44, 28 September, 2021
YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 28, ARMENPRESS. President of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev says he wouldn’t mind holding an OSCE-mediated meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan.
In an interview to FRANCE24, Aliyev said that if the OSCE Minsk Group of mediators (France, the US and Russia) set up a meeting with Armenian PM Nikol Pashinyan, he would have no objections.
17:26, 28 September, 2021
YEREVAN, 28 SEPTEMBER, ARMENPRESS. The Central Bank of Armenia informs “Armenpress” that today, 28 September, USD exchange rate up by 1.32 drams to 482.61 drams. EUR exchange rate up by 0.62 drams to 563.54 drams. Russian Ruble exchange rate up by 0.01 drams to 6.64 drams. GBP exchange rate down by 0.84 drams to 658.33 drams.
The Central Bank has set the following prices for precious metals.
Gold price up by 206.02 drams to 27235.71 drams. Silver price down by 0.67 drams to 349.97 drams. Platinum price up by 304.90 drams to 15299.04 drams.
Joyce Karam
Former Republican senator Jeff Flake, the nominee to become the next US ambassador to Turkey, has officially recognised the mass atrocities perpetrated against Armenians by the Ottoman Empire as genocide, reversing his earlier positions on the issue.
Mr Flake answered with a resounding “yes” when the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bob Menendez, asked if he has changed his stance and is ready to “join this body and the administration in reaffirming the Armenian genocide".
While representing Arizona in both the House and Senate, Mr Flake voted against congressional bills making a genocide declaration in 2005, 2007, 2010 and 2014.
President Joe Biden in April became the first sitting US president to officially recognise the 1915 killings of hundreds of thousands of Armenians by Ottoman forces as genocide.
Mr Flake also addressed the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, describing Turkey’s role as destabilising.
“If confirmed, I will encourage Turkey to support efforts to find a sustainable long-term solution to the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan and encourage peaceful and diplomatic resolutions to disagreements in the Eastern Mediterranean,” he said.
The nominee described Turkey as an “indispensable ally” for the US, but one that is presenting Washington with complex challenges.
“Our relationship also faces profound challenges. Despite the United States’ tireless efforts to address Turkey’s security needs, Turkey still chose to purchase and test fire the Russian S-400 [missile defence] system,” Mr Flake said.
The former Republican senator stressed that absent of Turkey disposing the Russian system, current sanctions and penalties under US law will remain and could escalate.
“I will also warn Turkey that any future purchase of Russian weapons risks triggering further Caatsa sanctions in addition to those already imposed,” he said, referring to the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act.
Congress passed the measure in 2017 to sanction any country engaging in significant transactions with Russia. Turkey installed the $2.5 billion Russian system in July 2019 and began testing it last October.
On Sunday, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan threatened to buy more Russian defence systems in defiance of the US and the Nato alliance it is part of.
The US has also expelled Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet consortium.
“I see no arms sales going to Turkey unless there is a dramatic change around the S-400s,” Mr Menendez said.
Asked what his strategy would be to advance democratic values and human rights in Turkey, Mr Flake promised a candid approach.
“I will continue to practice speaking truth to power, speaking out and being frank as our current ambassador has done and the State Department and the president do,” he said.
If confirmed, Mr Flake would succeed career foreign service officer David Satterfield in the position.
Armenian music legend Hayko has died of Covid-19 at the age of 48.
In 2007, Hayko became Armenia’s second-ever Eurovision entrant when he sang “Anytime You Need”, finishing in eighth place. The dramatic ballad conveyed his devotion to his beloved, whose tears he said he would always wipe away.
With his passing, the opening lyrics now have a haunting quality: “Why, baby, tell me why does someone always say goodbye?”
The Top 10 finish was but one of many achievements in his storied career, which also included being named Best Singer at the Armenian National Music Awards in 2003 and 2006.
Hayko maintained a close relationship to the world of Eurovision, serving as a judge on the 2017 national selection show Depi Evratesil.
There have been more than 260,000 confirmed cases of Covid-19 in Armenia since the start of the pandemic. More than 5,000 people have lost their lives, while more than 240,000 have recovered.
Our thoughts are with Hayko’s friends, family and fans as they grieve their loss and celebrate his musical legacy.
09/29/2021 United States (International Christian Concern) – In the early morning hours of September 23, a masked assailant armed with a bat destroyed the stained-glass windows at St. Peter Armenian Apostolic Church in the greater Los Angeles area, according to a report from CBS Los Angeles. The attack came just days before the anniversary of Azerbaijan’s invasion of Nagorno-Karabakh (Armenian: Artsakh) last year, which was supported by Turkey. Many fear that the ensuing war from last year and the taking of territory by Azerbaijan from Armenia has emboldened anti-Armenian hate crimes around the world.
This attack also falls into a pattern of increased attacks against the Armenian community in the United States. Last year, St. Gregory Armenian Apostolic Church in San Francisco was set ablaze when an unknown assailant lit two Molotov cocktails in the office of the church’s priest. Additionally, the nearby KZV Armenian School was defaced with anti-Armenian graffiti and shot at in a drive-by shooting in two separate occasions, also occurring in the second half of 2020 around the time of the invasion.
International Christian Concern (ICC) released a report shortly after the war depicting the religious freedom violations committed by Azerbaijan and Turkish-paid Syrian mercenaries entitled, Anatomy of Genocide: Karabakh’s Forty-Four Day War. During the war, not only did these militants commit war crimes against ethnic Armenian Christians, but they also underwent a campaign to erase the history of Christianity from the land through the destruction of churches and Christian symbols, a campaign that continues to this day.
ICC also sent two staff members to Artsakh earlier this year to meet with survivors of the war and investigate the reality on the ground in order to deliver humanitarian aid to families in need. Their findings, compiled into a report entitled, Nagorno-Karabakh, A Humanitarian Perspective, showed the devastation that Turkey and Azerbaijan undertook during the war to truly strike at the heart of Armenian culture and Christianity.
As long as Turkey and Azerbaijan continue to commit atrocities against Armenian Christians in Artsakh, it is reasonable to expect that radicals around the world will feel empowered to commit crimes against Armenians, such as the ones seen in California.
Following the recent conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan / Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, PACE has set out a series of recommendations to both countries to address the humanitarian consequences in the short and long term, and move towards a process of peace and reconciliation.
Approving a resolution and recommendation on the basis of a report by Paul Gavan (Ireland, UEL), who visited both countries, the Assembly said it was “concerned about the many allegations of crimes, war crimes and other wrongful acts,” during the six-week war, listing the most serious. It called on both countries to “fully investigate the allegations and bring to justice anyone, including at command level, found to be responsible” and to co-operate fully with the European Court of Human Rights on the complaints lodged against them. “Unless there is accountability and some form of truth and reconciliation, these allegations will poison relations between the two countries for generations, and the consequences of the conflict will linger,” the parliamentarians pointed out.
While welcoming the recent release by Azerbaijan of 15 Armenians on 12 June 2021 and a further release of 15 persons on 3 July 2021, bringing the total of those repatriated to above 100, the Assembly also called on the Azerbaijani authorities to release all remaining captives and return them to Armenia without further delay.
Ayear ago on September 27, as part of Turkey’s imperialist Strategic Depth Doctrine, which aims to build a neo-Ottoman Empire, Azerbaijan with Turkish aid, attacked the indigenous Armenian people of Nagorno Karabakh using cluster bombs, phosphorous munitions, drone warfare, and mercenaries. In 44 days, the onslaught and ensuing war killed more than 5,000 people, including approximately 150 civilians, at least 13 of whom were children. In the end, Azerbaijan seized the region known to Armenians as Artsakh, displacing approximately 130,000 Indigenous people whose ancestry traces to the region for thousands of years.
A new report by the Human Rights Defender of the Republic of Armenia suggests egregious human rights violations, including crimes against humanity committed by Azerbaijan, such as physical and psychological torture of POWs and civilian captives. Electroshocked and beaten with metal chains, gun butts and batons, Armenian captives were forced to disclose sensitive information and make false confession, the report said. Among sustained permanent injuries, one man has been rendered blind. The report also noted video and photos of beheaded Armenians during the ceasefire period, which is a war crime whether or not the beheading was the cause of their deaths. As of this writing, approximately 45 Armenians remain in Azerbaijani detention while others are still missing, according to the report.
Electroshocked and beaten with metal chains, gun butts and batons, Armenian captives were forced to disclose sensitive information and make false confession.
Azerbaijan has also continued what some experts call the worst cultural genocide of the 21st century to date. Already, in what has been interpreted as an attempt to erase traces of the region’s indigenous Armenian people, Azerbaijan has destroyed at least 89 medieval churches, 5,840 uniquely Armenian khatchkars (intricately carved cross stones), and 22,000 historical tombstones in a region known as Nakhichevan. Despite UNESCO’s 2000 urgent order to preserve the remaining monuments, Azerbaijan took sledgehammers to much of what had remained, including Armenia’s largest medieval cemetery that featured 10,000 cross-stones. As part of the latest conflict and ceasefire agreement, Azerbaijan has now taken Artsakh’s land and with it, centuries of cultural heritage.
Mass killing, torture, falsification of history, and destruction of antiquities, has long been practiced by Azerbaijan’s strategic war-partner, Turkey, which over the past century, has successfully eradicated Armenians, Assyrians, and Greeks from their historic homelands and erased much of their existence there. Destroying ancient culture and art continues today in Turkish occupied Cyprus.
These types of acts—inflicting cruelties, such as torture on other humans and erasing their cultural heritage and existence—usually occur in tandem with mass dissemination of dehumanization, blame and fabricated histories, ancestry, ownership, and belonging, according to political communication studies. In their thirst for more power and land, malignant leaders design these parallel “frame wars” to provoke hate and rage in their own populations, then use those emotions to enlist, motivate, and unleash the wrath of soldiers and civilians onto the targeted people to justify lethality and plunder valuable property.
In this case of Nagorno-Karabakh, or Artsakh, Azerbaijan is no exception, according to our examination of its state media agency AZERTAC (also Azertag) from the period of 27 September 2020 until July 30, 2021. Like so many extremist leaders before, Azerbaijan’s leadership is using its media to aid in ethnically cleansing people from their indigenous lands, inflicting physical and psychological torture, erasing them from the region entirety, and erasing traces of history itself. Rife with dehumanization and demonization of Armenians on par with the Rwandan Genocide, the Holocaust and the nationalist media in the former Yugoslavia, the Azerbaijan government media portrayed Armenians as animals, savages, barbarians, fascists, criminals, vandals, wild beasts, or Neo-Nazis in more than half of the 60 articles examined. “We have defeated the savages . . . saved the region from savages and fascists,” said Azerbaijan’s President Aliyev in one August AZERTAC report. In another, the city of Fuzuli, he said, “was in the hands of wild beasts, in the hands of predators.”,
Embedded within a “good-versus-evil” framing in which “our side” are the “good” and “they” are the evil who are destroying something sacred, the Azerbaijani state media agency falsely accused Armenians of a range of crimes and international violations while branding itself a “civil nation.” Despite DNA evidence of Armenians’ 7800-year presence in Artsakh, for example, Azerbaijan’s state media falsely accused Armenians of illegal occupation and of fabricating its ancient identity. Armenians “exploited our lands,” said president Aliyev in the state media agency. “There has never been Armenian land here, and there never will be. This is the land of Azerbaijan. We, the Azerbaijanis, the owners of these lands, have returned.”
Similarly, while Azerbaijan has been destroying Armenian cultural heritage sites in an attempt to erase a people, its media has instead accused Armenians of ethnic and cultural erasure, calling it “evidence of Armenian savagery.” In its post-ceasefire efforts to rewrite the history of Artsakh, Azerbaijan’s state media agency falsely claimed that Armenian antiquity, such as the ancient khachkars, were created in a modern workshop and subsequently buried to lay claim for the region. Their monuments, it has labelled, not as Armenian, but “Caucasian Albanian.”
In contrast, Armenian state media has largely refrained from resorting to dehumanizing stereotypes of the Azerbaijani people. It did, however, refer to the Azerbaijani government’s policies as “fascist.” After vandals attacked Kanach Zham in Shushi (St. John the Baptist church), for example, the Armenian media called the actions of the Azerbaijani government “against Armenian cultural heritage” the “continuation and the embodiment of the fascist policy in a disgusting and dangerous manner.” It went on to compare the destruction of historic churches akin to acts of terrorism, noting the Taliban’s destruction of the Buddha statues of Bamiyan.
While the international community has failed to stop the great violence inflicted on the people and culture of Artsakh/Nagorno Karabakh, there is still time to repair, redress, and restore the survivors and what remains of their cultural heritage, while preventing the utter destruction of their history. It is imperative to put those wheels of justice in motion immediately to stem the monumental losses, stop them from becoming permanent, and send a signal that human rights still matter.
Maria Armoudian and Olivia Guyodo
SUMMARY
Context
Almost a year has passed since the outbreak of the Nagorno Karabakh (NK) conflict in September 2020, which left over 90,000 people of NK displaced from their homes and relocated to Armenia. As of May 2021, the majority of these people have returned to NK1 , and those who remain (approximately 35,000 people2 ) are expected to stay for the longer term, due to the movement of their areas of origin (AoO) under Azerbaijani control and other factors (such as security concerns and socio-economic challenges) that increase their vulnerability.
Given the continued presence of refugee-like population3 , this assessment was conducted to support the development of early recovery programming and contribute to exit strategies after the completion of immediate emergency assistance, especially as the Inter-Agency Response Plan (IARP)4 is being updated for the duration till the end of 2021. Understanding such longer term humanitarian and early recovery needs5 of the remaining population could inform when and how the transition from cash, inkind and voucher-based humanitarian support should be implemented. To generate an in-depth understanding of the livelihood needs of this particularly vulnerable population within the context of a transitioning humanitarian response, this Economic Resilience Assessment (ERA) was implemented in the framework of the “Multisectoral Emergency Assistance to Vulnerable Conflict-Affected Population” project funded by ECHO, and the field activities were conducted in close collaboration with the Unified Social Service (USS) of the Republic of Armenia Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
Methodology
The assessment employed a mixed methods approach combining 1) a desk review6 of the existing information on the socio-economic environment in which the refugee-like population must integrate themselves in the case of long-term displacement, and 2) Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) to assess the demand side of the job market and ascertain perceived barriers to employment in Armenia. The primary data collection component of the assessment thus followed a qualitative methodology using a semistructured data collection tool. Primary data collection was implemented through a total of 21 FGDs conducted across three population groups of interest: 1) refugee-like population remaining in Armenia, 2) host communities7 , and 3) social workers from municipalities and regional employment centres. To identify FGD participants, a mix of purposive and snowball sampling strategies were followed. The geographic areas covered by this assessment included 5 marzes overall, including the capital Yerevan .Given the qualitative nature of this assessment, the findings should be considered as indicative only, and not representative of the general refugee-like population or the host communities.
Key findings
➢ Main sources of income: While the refugee-like population were found to be mostly relying on the state-provided assistance9 , host community members reported to be primarily relying on the salaries of the working family members, pensions or other state allowances and benefits. Other sources of income reported by the refugee-like population were temporary or seasonal jobs (such as construction, harvest, etc.), daily paid jobs, agricultural/farming activities, or labor migration10 . In the case of employees of state and community institutions (including schools) in NK, they also continued to receive salaries fully or partially (terminated as of the end of 2021). In some cases, host community members were also found to be relying on farming or other agricultural activities (reported by the participants in marzes, and primarily in rural communities). ➢ Housing and living conditions: Based on demographic information provided by FGD participants, refugee-like population were more likely to be staying in rented apartments, while host community members were more likely living in their own house/apartment. It can be assumed that refugee-like population bears the additional burden of house rental costs. Consistently, most of the FGD participants among the refugee-like population highlighted not having their own house/shelter as a major challenge with the following main issues related to that: high rental costs even for apartments lacking basic conditions, lack of clarity on the future, and lack of stability disallowing making long-term livelihood choices when having to move from one place to another. ➢ Major livelihood challenges: FGD participants from both population groups indicated having hard time covering basic livelihood needs and trying to find a balance between such needs as utility payments, food and clothes, healthcare, and education costs. For both population groups utilities were reportedly their primary expenses. While in rural areas participants could rely on alternative means, e.g. firewood or manure for heating, or their own agricultural products or crop production for nutrition, this was not possible for urban residents.
In terms of food-related expenses, while there were no participants in the 21 FGDs who reported not being able to ensure food security for themselves and their HH members, nevertheless, difficulties ensuring proper dietary diversity (particularly for children) was mostly highlighted as a challenge, also given increased prices on food. In terms of expenditures, participants from both population groups reported to be cutting down clothes expenses.
It is possible that host communities, in a sense, find themselves in a more vulnerable situation, as unlike the people in a refugee-like situation who have been receiving extensive clothesrelated support (at least during the first months of their displacement), host community members do not receive much of clothes/clothing kits and have to rely on such assistance coming from relatives, neighbors, or in rare cases – NGOs or other organizations. In terms of healthcare, wherever facing challenges affording some expenses, participants in both population groups mostly reported saving on healthcare costs – skipping visiting doctors even if they had to, decreasing the regularity of visits in case of chronic illnesses, and taking other similar actions to cut down on the healthcare costs. In terms of education, FGD participants with school-aged children in the HH pointed out some challenges covering these costs – mainly expenses related to extracurricular tutoring, stationery and books, and tuition fees in the case of university or college students. ➢ Job-finding attempts: Given continued stay in Armenia and need for longer-term selfreliance, the refugee-like population was found to be more actively seeking jobs or income-generating activities than during the first months of displacement. While most of the participants among the refugee-like population, particularly men, reported having engaged in some short-term, non-formal, or seasonal jobs and daily-paid activities, a small proportion of participants in general (among both population groups) highlighted not having taken any action towards finding a job or an income-generating activity, not applying to any institution – either state or private. The main reasons reportedly were either lacking previous working experience and not expecting to succeed, or lacking knowledge on where who or how to apply or being unsure of their chances based on other people's experience. Most of the participants among both population groups were aware of the Employment Service (now integrated into the RA MoLSA Unified Social Service), were registered as the beneficiaries of the service, and relied on their assistance in job-finding attempts. Nevertheless, there were some challenges that they faced with the Employment service, namely long waiting time (even up to a couple of months) before they got any offers or job opportunities, and narrow range of potential job opportunities, mostly requiring low-skilled labour force with low salaries. ➢ Barriers to employment: Participants from both population groups identified many similar challenges relating to the situation in the labor market and the general job prospects. This was acknowledged also by the people in a refugee-like situation themselves as they substantively mentioned that the labour market was the same for everyone, and if there were no available jobs, it applied to everyone. There were a few barriers which were specific to the refugee-like population such as discrimination based on belonging to the refugeelike population, bureaucratic barriers, and lack of clarity on the future. Overall, major barriers identified by the FGD participants were: 1) lack of job opportunities, 2) low wages, 3) work environment and conditions, 4) lack of work experience, 5) lack of skills and education, 6) nepotism and unfair hiring, 7) discrimination based on belonging to the refugee-like population,
8) care responsibilities (mostly identified by female participants), 9) age (applied not only to the elderly participants but also middle-aged participants), 10) lack of clarity on the future as an obstacle for long-term planning, 11) barriers to launching agricultural activities, 12) bureaucratic barriers for the refugee-like population not being considered eligible for some employment and other support programmes, 13) health-related issues, 14) lack of working tools, 15) lack of awareness on support programmes and lack of knowledge on to who, where and how to apply.
These barriers are presented in more detail in the relevant section. ➢ Modalities of assistance: Participants from both population groups reported that with relevant support programs and modalities of assistance they would have better chances in their job-seeking attempts. Although there were FGD participants who were unsure how exactly the Government, international or local organizations, or community institutions could assist in their search for a job or the process of engaging in income-generating activities, most of the participants pointed out various aspects where they needed support. Some of the most highlighted areas for support were: 1) filling the gap in education and skills, 2) job placement,
3) financial support to cover education, training costs or as initial support to launch incomegenerating activities, 4) support in agricultural activities (acquisition of livestock, land for cultivation, setting up small farming activities, etc.), 5) housing and shelter support to build stability and lay a foundation for long-term planning, 6) provision of working tools to engage in income-generating activities.
➢ Challenges faced by the Employment and Social service providers: The Employment Service was found to have initiated two specific programs to provide employment support to the refugee-like population, namely 1) three-month programme to gain work experience, 2) temporary employment by involvement in paid community works. One of the added values of this assessment was the incorporation of inputs from Employment and Social service providers contributing to building a more comprehensive understanding of the livelihood and economic challenges of the refugee-like population and host communities, and more solid findings for the relevant international humanitarian and development actors to rely on for early recovery planning. Being the primary state institution to which vulnerable groups of the population apply for support in tackling their livelihood challenges and solving their employability issues, these institutions were themselves facing challenges impacting efficiency and quality of their services, particularly: 1) lack of material resources,
2) lack of inter-agency collaboration, 3) lack of proper mechanisms for better efficiency and evidence-based decision-making, 4) a capacity gap in terms of skills and knowledge, and, finally,
5) lack of human resources.
Conclusion
Overall, findings from this ERA indicate that basic housing and livelihood challenges (connected to the ability to pay rental or utility costs, ensure food security, cover basic education and healthcare costs) faced by the refugee-like population also impact their capacity for longer-term planning and attempts of ensuring self-reliance through jobs or income-generating activities. These challenges were particularly expected to aggravate with the termination of the state-provided monthly allowances from August 2021. Given the need for self-reliance throughout their continued stay in Armenia, many people in the refugee-like situation reported on various job-finding attempts, mostly highlighting short-term, seasonal, or daily paid job opportunities available to them. Additionally, there were several employment support programs designed specifically for the refugee-like population, however the latter expressed some concerns about their efficiency, as well as additional barriers to decent employment in Armenia. The findings further indicate lack of significant gaps in terms of employment barriers faced by the refugee-like population and host communities, and only a few of the reported barriers were specific to the refugee-like population such as discrimination based on belonging to the refugee-like population, bureaucratic barriers, and lack of clarity on the future.
It can be concluded that there is a growing need for well-planned development and support programs targeting engagement of the refugee-like population in economic activities as a sustainable solution to strengthening their capacity for self-reliance. While these findings could be useful to inform the humanitarian and development actors in Armenia on the key livelihood needs and employment barriers among the refugee-like population and host communities, they also highlight persisting limitations and knowledge gaps, which could be further explored in future assessments, such as concerning the capacity of the Employment and Social services to address the needs of these vulnerable population groups.
UNHCR’s Protection Monitoring (PM) exercise is conducted on an ongoing basis to analyse trends in the protection environment and risks facing individuals in a refugee-like situation from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding districts. It uses standard questionnaire to gain information on their protection situation, needs, and coping mechanisms.
Starting from July 2021, UNHCR implements protection monitoring in partnership with the Armenian Red Cross Society (ARCS). In addition,
UNHCR Protection Unit conducts systematic protection missions to locations with high concentration of people in a refugee-like situation from Nagorno- Karabakh to meet with various stakeholders, displaced families and to complement the quantitative analysis from the household interviews.
Highlights
The number of interviewed households residing in collective accommodation (Collective Shelters or Transitional Centers1) dropped from four percent (4%) during the previous reporting period to two percent (2%) for the reporting period of July-August.
The intention to return amongst people in a refugee-like situation interviewed during the reporting period dropped from 19% to 6% (compared to May-June 2021).
Among concerns related to return: security risks (34%), no access to the area of origin/former habitual residence (29%), lack of access to livelihood (17%) and damaged property (11%), lack of access to basic services (2%), presence of mines (1%) were reported.
During the latest Protection Monitoring exercise, 364 households were identified as the most vulnerable and were referred to relevant partners who provided them with the required assistance.