ANTELIAS: HH Aram I receives the ARF Bureau

PRESS RELEASE
Catholicosate of Cilicia
Communication and Information Department
Contact: V.Rev.Fr.Krikor Chiftjian, Communications Director
Tel: (04) 410001, 410003
Fax: (04) 419724
E- mail: [email protected]
Web:

PO Box 70 317
Antelias-Lebanon

HIS HOLINESS ARAM I RECEIVES THE BUREAU
OF THE ARMENIAN REVOLUTIONARY FEDERATION TASHNAKTSUTIUN

On Tuesday 24 November 2009, the members of the Bureau of the Tashnak Party
with its leader Hrant Markarian visited His Holiness Aram I in His office.
Their visit followed that of the Social Democrat Hunchakian Party. Their
conversations centered on the Armenia-Turkey protocol and strategies to
strengthen Armenia-Diaspora relations, as well as adopt new approaches in
pursuing the just cause of the Armenian people regarding the Genocide.

##
The Armenian Catholicosate of Cilicia is one of the two Catholicosates of
the Armenian Orthodox Church. For detailed information about the history and
the mission of the Cilician Catholicosate, you may refer to the web page of
the Catholicosate, The Cilician
Catholicosate, the administrative center of the church is located in
Antelias, Lebanon.

http://www.ArmenianOrthodoxChurch.org/
http://www.ArmenianOrthodoxChurch.org

Folkmordet1915.se: New site dedicated to the 1915 Genocide

PRESS RELEASE
November 27, 2009
Stockholm, Sweden

Armenica.org
[email protected]
www.armenic a.org

Union of Armenian Associations in Sweden
[email protected]

Armenic a.org, in cooperation with the Union of Armenian Associations in
Sweden, launches a new information site in Swedish,
, dedicated to the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman
Turkey.

The main purpose of the site is to enhance the Swedish knowledge about the
1915 Genocide and serve as a reference point for information, recognitions
and the existing research about the genocide. The lack of such resource
allows speculations and misleading information to the Swedish public as
well as the authorities, attempting to deny the reality of the genocide.
By presenting hard facts with concrete sources, document, images and other
educational information, Folkmordet1915.se will demonstrate the width of
the existing consensus regarding the reality of the 1915 Genocide in
Ottoman Turkey.

http://www.folkmordet1915.se
www.armeniska.se

F18News: Turkey – Religious freedom survey, November 2009

FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway

The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one’s belief or religion
The right to join together and express one’s belief

========================================== =======

Friday 27 November 2009
TURKEY: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM SURVEY, NOVEMBER 2009

Ahead of the UN Human Rights Council May 2010 Universal Periodic Review of
Turkey, Forum 18 News Service has found that the country continues to see
serious violations of international human rights standards on freedom of
religion or belief. A long-standing crucially important issue, with many
implications, is that Turkey has not legally recognised religious
communities in their own right as independent communities with full legal
status – such as the right to own places of worship and the legal
protection religious communities normally have in states under the rule of
law. Additionally, the most dangerous threat to individuals exercising
freedom of religion or belief has been a series of violent attacks and
murders on those perceived as threats; in recent years the victims have
been Christians. Turkish citizens have argued to Forum 18 that the
protection of the right of all to freedom of religion or belief, as laid
down in the international human rights standards which Turkey is party to,
should be the standard used by the authorities in all affected fields. They
also argue that the authorities act against the intolerance fuelling
violent attacks and murders.

TURKEY: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM SURVEY, NOVEMBER 2009

By Otmar Oehring, Head of the Human Rights Office of Missio
<;, and
Güzide Ceyhan

Ahead of the UN Human Rights Council May 2010 Universal Periodic Review of
Turkey, Forum 18 News Service has found that the country continues to see
serious violations of international human rights standards on freedom of
religion or belief. The single most important and the most long-standing
issue is the fact that – despite undertaking to do so in the 1923 Lausanne
Treaty – Turkey has not legally recognised non-Muslim religious communities
in their own right as independent communities with full legal status – such
as the right to own places of worship and the legal protection religious
communities normally have in states under the rule of law. This problem
faces all religious communities in Turkey, including those which were not
present in 1923. Even the majority Sunni Islamic community is not
recognised in this way, instead being under the control of the Diyanet, or
Presidency of Religious Affairs, which reports directly to the Prime
Minister. Additionally, the most dangerous threat to individuals exercising
freedom of religion or belief has been a series of violent attacks and
murders on those perceived as threats. In recent years the victims have
been Christians.

Turkey straddles Europe and Asia and has a population of over 72 million,
about three-quarters of them ethnic Turks. The next largest ethnic group
are the Kurds, with smaller numbers of ethnic Arabs, Circassians,
Armenians, Laz, Georgians, Greeks, Jews and others. An estimated 99 per
cent of the population are of a Muslim background, mainly Sunnis, with 20
to 30 per cent of the population being Alevis, and very small numbers of
Shias. The largest non-Muslim religious community are Christians, with the
Armenian Apostolic being the largest church followed by Syrian Orthodox,
Greek Orthodox, Catholics of various rites and Protestants. Baha’is and
Jehovah’s Witnesses are present in smaller numbers – in the case of Baha’is
around 10,000.

Political background

The "deep state" – military, security, bureaucracy and elite
representatives – have been unhappy with the rise of the ruling AKP party.
The deep state remains wedded to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s "secularism" as
they understand it. This entails overt state control of Islam through the
Diyanet, which reports directly to the Prime Minister, and enshrines
serious restrictions on the ability of non-Muslims and Muslims outside
state control to exercise freedom of religion or belief. It is difficult to
reconcile with the Constitution’s statement that the Republic is a secular
state, as this "secularism" gives state-run Sunni Islam rights which no
other group enjoys. It also imposes controls on state-run Sunni Islam
imposed on no other group, such as on the content of sermons. The Diyanet
is funded with tax collected from all citizens, regardless of their
religion or belief, and supports tax exemptions for the only mosques
permitted (those controlled by the Diyanet) and employs and pays the
salaries of their imams. No other faith, or indeed non-state-controlled
Muslim group, is permitted to train its clergy in Turkey.

Among the other problems flowing from the state definition of "secularism"
are continuing and long-standing problems caused by the ban on religious
communities’ themselves owning property. Communities as diverse as Alevi
Muslims, Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Protestants, and the Syrian Orthodox
Church have seen no significant progress in resolving property problems.
Examples include no progress on recognising Alevi Muslim cem houses as
places of worship and continuing vexatious legal cases aimed at depriving
the Mor Gabriel Syrian Orthodox Monastery in south-eastern Turkey of its
land.

As non-Muslim communities are under threat of violent attacks, the
Interior Ministry issued a circular in June 2007 asking law enforcement
forces to protect non-Muslim places of worship, and be watchful for plans
to attack them. A number of plans to mount attacks were subsequently
uncovered and prevented, for instance a plot to kill the pastor of a church
in Antalya. However, this step, although welcome, addresses only the
symptoms of intolerance, not the root causes.

Official protection for religious leaders, such as the Ecumenical
Patriarch, is widely seen by these communities as being designed as much to
control as to protect them. Suspicion of the authorities’ intentions
remains. Alevi Muslims broke off formal talks with the government over
denial of their rights, expressing frustration at the lack of concrete
progress in enabling them to exercise their religious freedom. Informal
workshops involving representatives of the Alevis, the Diyanet and others
continue. An August 2009 lunch meeting between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan and religious leaders, including Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew,
was followed by a visit to two Greek Orthodox sites. But no concrete
improvements ensued in their ability to exercise freedom of religion or
belief.

The rule of law

The Mor Gabriel cases – which started after state officials unilaterally
redrew land boundaries – highlight problems around the rule of law and how
society does or does not understand this, which has a serious impact on
freedom of religion or belief. Another trial drifting on with no sign of a
verdict is of two Turkish Protestants, Hakan Tastan and Turan Topal. They
are on trial for "insulting Turkishness" and defamation of Islam, following
their involvement in a Bible correspondence course in October 2006. The
trial in Malatya of the five men accused of murdering three Protestant
Christians in 2007 has drifted on since its start in November 2007. In 2009
police have avoided bringing witnesses to court on various occasions, and
no verdict appears imminent. Hopes that impunity for those who attack
Christians would be over remain disappointed.

Two recent victories in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) – by the
Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2008 and a Greek Orthodox Foundation in 2009 –
have still not led to the recovery of confiscated property. The ECHR
appears to be the only realistic hope of implementing in law some very
important aspects of the right to exercise freedom of religion or belief –
provided its judgments are implemented.

Violent attacks and murders

The Armenian, Greek and Alevi communities have in the past been subject to
mass pogroms and violent attacks that have resulted in migration of these
communities inside and outside of Turkey. There have also been in the past
murders of individuals for their beliefs, such as of the atheist and former
imam Turan Dursan in 1990. However, a recent series of murders has drawn
attention to the continuing need to address the problem of the murderous
intolerance of sections of Turkish society. These murders were of: Fr
Andrea Santoro, a Catholic priest in 2006; the Armenian Turkish journalist
Hrant Dink in 2007; and of two ethnic Turkish Protestants, Necati Aydin and
Ugur Yuksel, and a German, Tilmann Geske in Malatya in 2007. In July 2009 a
Catholic German businessman engaged to an ethnic Turk, Gregor Kerkeling,
was murdered by a mentally disturbed young man for being a Christian.

In August 2009 Turkish Protestant Ismail Aydin, who works for an
association spreading knowledge about Christianity, was taken hostage at
knifepoint. The young man responsible claimed that "this missionary dog is
trying to divide the country" and wrapped a Turkish flag around Aydin’s
head. He was seen on TV reports telling his captor that "this flag is mine
as well! I’m a Turk too, but I’m a Christian." His captor responded that
"you have betrayed the Turkish flag and country". The police rescued Aydin
and the attacker is being prosecuted. But the incident highlighted again
the dangerous unwillingness of many within Turkey to accept that there are
many ways to be a Turk.

What fuels violent attacks and murders?

Factors which encourage violence include; disinformation by public figures
and the mass media; the rise of Turkish nationalism; and the
marginalisation of smaller groups within society. All three trends feed off
each other, and all of Turkey’s smaller religious or belief communities –
those within Islam and Christianity, as well as Baha’is, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, atheists and agnostics – are affected by them. There has been
disinformation and defamation against Christians, in particular against
Protestants who share their beliefs with others in public discourse as well
as in the media.

A day after the Malatya murders, Niyazi Güney, a senior Justice Ministry
official, told Turkish parliamentarians that "missionary work is even more
dangerous than terrorism and unfortunately is not considered a crime in
Turkey". He repeated this in Milliyet newspaper. Terrorism and missionary
activity are thus presented as connected. Almost any manifestation of
Christian belief – including meetings in churches – is seen by those who
hold these views as "missionary activity".

Missionary activity has been on the agenda of the National Security
Council (MGK), which is chaired ex officio by the President and also
comprises the Chief of the General Staff, the commanders of all the
branches of the Turkish Armed Forces and several government ministers. In a
February 2005 evaluation of current and future challenges to Turkish
security, the MGK drew attention to "a need for social activities that will
prevent the spreading of organisations and ideologies that will have an
impact on Turkey’s unity". It suggested that "abusive missionary activities
should not be permitted". What exactly was meant by "abusive missionary
activity" was not defined.

The Turkish phrase used for missionary activity in official discussions
and formal papers, as well as by the xenophobic and nationalist parts of
society, has extremely negative connotations. "Misyonerlik faaliyetleri"
can be translated into English as missionary activities, which does not
convey either a positive or a negative evaluation of the activities. But
"misyonerlik faaliyetleri" has in Turkish the connotations of missionary
scheming, plotting and intrigues. Both words have negative connotations in
Turkish, and used together as one phrase convey a double negative
connotation.

"Missionary" conferences propagating such views continue to be held by the
Diyanet in provinces and townships using state facilities. Similar
activities are also conducted by the military and the Gendarmerie
(Jandarma) to "enlighten" their personnel – including conscripts – about
what they see as "missionary activities".

Associated with this is intolerance promoted within the school curriculum
(see below).

The intolerance in society towards non-Muslims also extends to atheists,
who cannot openly identify or organise themselves in Turkey.

Ergenekon and the "deep state"

The trial which began in 2007 of influential people – from the police,
army, bureaucracy, business, politics and the mass media – alleged to be
part of an ultra-nationalist group, Ergenekon, has revealed strong and
widespread opposition among them to freedom of religion or belief.
Ergenekon members are alleged to have maintained deathlists of people,
including Christians with a missionary background. The Malatya murder trial
is revealing plausible links between the "deep state" and the murders,
Turkish media noting that a link between the murders and the Gendarmerie
seems obvious. The Gendarmerie, it seems, knew in advance of the murders
and did not take steps to prevent them. Also according to the media, Fr
Andrea Santoro and his church were under surveillance by the National
Intelligence Organisation (MIT) secret police on the very day of his
murder.

The media has featured documents discovered in the Ergenekon investigation
proving that the Gendarmerie actively monitored missionary activities in
the Malatya region through informers, before and after the Malatya murders.
It should be noted that the activities being monitored were lawful acts of
teaching and promoting one’s beliefs. Unlawful disinformation or defamatory
practices limiting lawful enjoyment of human rights do not appear to have
been monitored or acted against.

Media intolerance

Protestant Turks have noted a significant decline in numbers of violent
attacks directed at their churches and religious leaders in 2009. This is
possibly due to a decline since 2007 in defamatory mainstream media
coverage of them. For example, a widely viewed national TV channel, ATV,
has stopped broadcasting reports of "illegal" churches, or Turks converting
to Christianity.

However, intolerant reporting and commentary continues in local and
ultra-nationalist newspapers, as well as on websites and blogs. One local
news website, Ilgazetesi, featured an article on 17 June 2009, entitled
"Local Missionaries", stating that "The primary goal of missionary activity
is to break the resistance of the people to imperialism and abuse! Making
them Jewish or Christian is the second goal." The continuing intolerant
mind-set of many is fuelled by such irresponsible media reports, and makes
members of vulnerable groups fear that violence against them could escalate
again.

No legal status as religious communities

Full legal recognition of all religious communities would be a major step
forward in both achieving freedom of religion or belief as understood in
the human rights standards Turkey has ratified, as well as addressing the
prejudice that non-Muslim religious communities are "foreign" and not
genuinely Turkish. At present, religious communities which existed in the
Ottoman Empire operate legally under an archaic system of imperial decrees
and regulations that deny them full legal status as religious communities
and restrict their freedom to function. Communities which did not have a
recognised existence before the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 have
little hope of gaining any kind of recognised status in law. Articles 37-45
of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, on "Protection of Minorities", should have led
to the recognition of then-existing non-Muslim religious communities in
their own right, as independent communities with full legal status – such
as the right to own places of worship. But this has not happened, not least
as the Treaty left it unclear what such recognition might mean. Bizarrely,
the government ministry which handles relations with many of Turkey’s
indigenous non-Muslim religious communities which existed before the
Lausanne Treaty is the Foreign Ministry.

The situation of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey is extremely complex
under the present legal framework. The official view of the state is that
different regulations apply to the various non-Muslim religious
communities. Firstly in the state’s view, there are the groups that count
as non-Muslim minorities within the meaning of the Lausanne Treaty. In the
view of the state, these are exclusively the Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks
and Jews. A second group are the non-Muslim minorities who were present in
Turkey in 1923 at the time of the Lausanne Treaty but were not recognised
by the state as minorities within the meaning of the Treaty. These are, for
example, the Syrian Orthodox Church, churches such as the Chaldean Church
and the Syrian Catholic Church, and the Roman Catholic Church.

However, it is very important to note that the communities in both these
groups actually exist today and have been recognised by the state as
existing – but they have not been legally recognized and have no legal
personality (Tuzelkisilik).

Besides the non-Muslim minorities are a number of so-called community
foundations that are attributed by the state to, but not necessarily
controlled by, certain non-Muslim minorities (such as Armenians, Greeks,
Syriac Orthodox, Jews and others) which have gained legal personality
(Tuzelkisilik). It is also important to note that, legally, there is no
link at all between these community foundations and the non-Muslim
minorities the state attributes them to.

Neither the Roman Catholic Church nor those Protestant churches that
existed in Turkey before 1923 have any community foundations that could be
attributed to them.

None of these non-Muslim minorities – whichever category the state sees
them as belonging to – have as religious communities the kind of rights to
religious freedom that Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights
envisages. In practice, all these communities are on a very similar legal
footing to newer communities such as Baha’is and Jehovah’s Witnesses, which
did not exist in Turkey in 1923, and which today have no legal status as
communities.

The 2004 Associations Law was welcomed by some newer communities, such as
Protestant and Jehovah’s Witnesses, as it allowed people within these
communities – but not the communities themselves – to form a legal entity
that would allow them to engage in some activities legally. However, the
"Association formula" is still rather new and some communities are
reluctant to use it. A major reason is that, being small communities, they
cannot fulfil the necessary requirements to establish an association. State
officials seem to pay more attention than is usual to associations
established in connection with religious communities.

There are also serious questions of possible inadequacies in the
"Association formula". One problem is that if those who run the foundation
and those who lead the community are not the same people, there is a
possibility that they may disagree with each other – which may leave the
community again without the possibility of legally carrying out activities.
The "Association formula" proposed by the government to "solve" the legal
personality problem does not provide a satisfactory solution. Whether it
will work effectively as a "limited" solution remains to be seen. This will
depend on both whether the formula is in practice found to be simple and
flexible enough for the needs of small communities, and whether audits and
decisions by state officials take account of this. These developments will
need to be closely monitored.

Even for long-established communities with the limited recognition which
has been conferred – without rights to for example own places of worship –
the attitudes of the Turkish state can be hostile and even threatening.
This has been seen in the case of the Armenian Apostolic Patriarch Mesrop
Mutafyan, who leads Turkey’s biggest Christian church, who was elected
Patriarch in 1998 against the express wishes of the Turkish authorities. He
has been forced to retreat into health-related seclusion, brought on by
years of pressure from the media, the public and from the Armenian
diaspora, some of which has dubbed him a traitor. Should Patriarch Mesrop
not recover, the Turkish authorities are likely to insist – as they have
done up to now – that his successor as head of the Armenian (as well as the
Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate must be a Turkish citizen resident in Turkey.
The Armenian Church may struggle to find a candidate with the diplomatic
and linguistic skills and the international experience for such a crucial
role in such a delicate and exposed position. This problem is of importance
not just for the Church but for the Armenian community as a whole.

Denial of recognition also leaves the adherents of many faiths vulnerable
to discrimination, as citizens have their religious affiliation recorded in
official records. In this way the state indicates which religions are
"legitimate" and which are not. The Baha’i community has about 10,000
members, but is not recognised as a religion. As the Baha’i faith therefore
cannot be chosen in the public registry, Baha’is are forced to choose
either Islam or leave the religion part of their Identity Card empty.

Who can own places of worship?

An aspect of this non-recognition is that even recognised religious
communities cannot themselves own properties such as places of worship.
Bizarrely, these must be owned by separate foundations not under the direct
control of the communities. This has drawn much attention, focused on the
passage of a series of Foundation laws – none of which have solved the
basic problem.

The most recent amendments to the Foundations Law have at least led to a
number of improvements to the functioning of these community foundations.
Yet even so the communities to which the community foundations are
attributed still complain about a number of severe problems relating to
their community foundations that have not been resolved. Expectations
outside Turkey that the amendments to the Foundations Law would also lead
to a complete solution for all the unresolved questions regarding legal
recognition of non-Muslim minorities have not been fulfilled. As Dilek
Kurban of the respected TESEV Foundation noted, the Foundations Law is
"incompatible with the principle of freedom of association, which is
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, the Constitution and
the [1923] Treaty of Lausanne".

It should be made clear that the Foundations Law can only be the right
place to resolve problems regarding the community foundations and is not
the right place to resolve the basic problems of non-Muslim minorities in
Turkey. That may only be expected from a new Constitution based on the
European Convention on Human Rights and implementation in law of religious
freedom.

Stalemate for Alevi Muslims

Alevi Muslims form between 20 and 30 per cent of the population, but the
overwhelming majority of their places of worship – cemevi or cem houses –
are not recognised by the state. The Alevi community organised a mass
demonstration, attended by tens of thousands of Alevis on 8 November 2010
expressing their frustration that they are still not treated as citizens
with equal rights, and calling for the abolition of both the Diyanet and
compulsory religious education lessons in public schools.

Another cause of frustration for Alevis is that their leaders – called
"Dede" or elders – are not entitled to legally hold that title. This dates
back to 1925, when Act No. 677 of 30 November 1341 (1925) "On the Closure
of Dervish Monasteries and Tombs, the Abolition of the Office of Keeper of
Tombs and the Abolition and Prohibition of Certain Titles" was brought in.
This abolished the title, and Article 174 (Preservation of Reform Laws) of
the Constitution makes it impossible to change this Law. This Article
states: "No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted
as rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which aim to
raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilisation and to
safeguard the secular character of the Republic, and which were in force on
the date of the adoption by referendum of the Constitution of Turkey."
Among the laws listed is Act 677.

Education about religion or belief

In contrast to the children adhering to the two non-Muslim religious
communities acknowledged in the education system – Christians and Jews –
Alevis, Baha’is, children of other faiths and atheists are forced to attend
de facto Sunni religious education classes in public and private schools.
Diyanet officials have occasionally indicated that they regard Alevism as a
part of Sunni Islam and do not respect their different interpretation of
Islam. This means that Turkey has not seen any need to alter the religious
education curriculum. In a court ruling (Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey,
Application no. 1448/04) the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) stated
that this is unacceptable.

Turkey is obliged by this judgment to take action to ensure that the same
problem does not reoccur for anyone. However, as Turkish news agencies
reported on 25 August 2008, then Minister of Education Hüseyin Çelik
claimed the decision was about the old curriculum. As Alevi beliefs are
included in the new curriculum, the Minister claimed the ECHR judgment was
inapplicable. Implementation of the judgment is still pending before the
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers.

Teaching of other subjects includes disinformation about or defamation of
faiths. Missionary activity is listed as one of the national threats in
compulsory public school books that are taught in Grade 8 classes on the
History of Turkish Republican Reforms and Atatürkism. The textbook states
that missionaries "try to fulfil their goals through the significant
financial support of foreign powers, some non-governmental organisations
and from their own supporters. Missionaries exploit the financial hardships
of people. They translate texts related to their own beliefs into different
languages and distribute them free of charge and accordingly use written
and visual media for their propaganda purposes. They are a threat to the
national unity and integrity of our state and nation."

Those at risk from violent attack think such sentiments – propagated
through the school system and mass media – are major factors in violent
attacks and murders motivated by intolerance.

As a participating State of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE), Turkey has agreed to implement measures "to counter
prejudices and misrepresentation, particularly in the field of education".
Initiatives to assist this include the Toledo Guiding Principles on
Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools. However the
authorities have shown no visible interest in providing fair education on
religions and beliefs in schools.

Discrimination within the public service

It is virtually impossible to find people from non-Muslim backgrounds in
high level civil servant positions and impossible in senior ranks in the
military. While there are non-Muslims employed at lower levels there are
frequent allegations that they experience discrimination and are never
allowed to take a high ranking position. Syriac Orthodox Christians, for
example, have complained to Forum 18 that their young people are never
allowed the possibility of careers leading to senior positions in the
military or the civil service – even when they are fully qualified for such
careers. Many are deeply disappointed, Forum 18 has been told, when they
realise that they are not seen as "genuine" Turks, and so will never be
allowed the chances to serve their country which those seen as "genuine"
Turks have.

Religious clothing

A 1934 Law which according to Article 174 of the Constitution may not be
altered or abolished bans wearing religious garments on the streets, with
Muslims being the initial targets. With the exception of the Ecumenical
Patriarch, the Armenian Patriarch and the Chief Rabbi, no religious
minority leaders until the 1980s acted against this ban. Enforcement has
been more sporadic recently, but many religious leaders choose not to wear
religious clothes outside their place of worship, partly because of this
Law and partly – in the case of members of religious minorities – for fear
of provoking attacks. Foreign Greek, Russian and Georgian Orthodox priests
have complained in recent years that they have been forced to remove their
cassocks and crosses before being allowed to enter the country.

The wearing of headscarves by Muslim women has long been a controversial
issue. The AKP party’s move to allow female university students to wear
headscarves was prevented by the Constitutional Court, and caused much
debate and hostility in the secular sectors of the population. Although it
is prohibited to attend university wearing headscarves, or any religious
symbol, this prohibition is not consistently implemented. It has become a
symbolic issue that seems to embody the questions of whether Turkey will
continue to be a "secular" country – as the state defines this – or not.

Conscientious objection to military service denied

Conscientious objection to compulsory military service is not permitted.
Conscientious objectors of military age (including among the roughly 3,000
Jehovah’s Witnesses) face an unending cycle of prosecutions and
imprisonments. In the ECHR case of Ülke v. Turkey (Application no.
39437/98), the Court found that such punishment was a violation of the
prohibition in the European Convention of Human Rights of torture, inhuman
and degrading treatment. Turkey continues to disregard the 17 October 2007
call of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers for it "to adopt
rapidly the legislative reform necessary to prevent similar violations."

Internet censorship

Access to the website of well-known atheist Richard Dawkins is prevented
in Turkey through a court decision. His books, as also those of other
atheists, are however permitted, despite legal attempts to ban them.
Similarly, access to a website dedicated to Turan Dursun, a well-known
Turkish atheist murdered for his beliefs in 1990, is barred.

Conclusion

Many people and communities have for a long time faced obstacles in
carrying out peaceful religious activity – activity that is protected in
the international freedom of religion or belief agreements that Turkey has
committed itself to. The long-standing lack of willingness to legally
recognise religious communities in their own right, the disinformation by
public officials and the public education system, ultra-nationalism and
mass media intolerance behind violent attacks and murders, and the Turkish
definition of "secularism" are the clearest examples of this. They cause
serious doubt about whether the country is really committed to universal
human rights for all.

Other obstacles include: problems around the rule of law; discrimination
against Alevi Muslims; discrimination within the public service; lack of
freedom to wear religious clothing in public institutions; denial of
conscientious objection to military service; and limited internet
censorship.

Turkish citizens committed to human rights for all have argued to Forum 18
that the protection of the right of all to freedom of religion or belief,
as laid down in the international human rights standards which Turkey is
party to, should be the standard used by the authorities in all affected
fields. They also argue strongly that positive steps should also be taken
by the authorities to eliminate social hatred against all groups that are
the targets of intolerant attitudes. (END)

More analyses and commentaries on freedom of thought, conscience and
belief in Turkey can be found at
< mp;religion=all&country=68>.

A compilation of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) freedom of religion or belief commitments can be found at
< id=1351>.

A printer-friendly map of Turkey is available at
< s/atlas/index.html?Parent=mideast&Rootmap=turk ey>.
(END)

© Forum 18 News Service. All rights reserved. ISSN 1504-2855
You may reproduce or quote this article provided that credit is given to
F18News

Past and current Forum 18 information can be found at

http://www.forum18.org/
http://www.missio.de&gt
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?query=&a
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpedition
http://www.forum18.org/
http://www.forum18.org/

F18News Summary: Russia; Turkey;

FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway

The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one’s belief or religion
The right to join together and express one’s belief

========================================== =======

23 November 2009
RUSSIA: PROPOSED MISSIONARY RESTRICTIONS – A PAPER TIGER?
id=1378
Justice Ministry proposed amendments to the 1997 Religion Law and the
Administrative Violations Code imposing draconian controls on religious
activity have provoked protest from religious communities and have now been
removed from the Ministry’s website. Andrei Sebentsov, secretary of the
government’s Commission for Issues Concerning Religious Associations, told
Forum 18 News Service that the parliamentary Religion Committee has refused
to consider the proposals, leading the Ministry to approach the
parliamentary Security Committee. He says the proposed draft is "so clearly
against the demands of the Constitution that the presidential
administration would hardly support it." Yet Muslims, Old Believers,
Protestants and some Russian Orthodox remain concerned. The draft echoes
proposals the Ministry made unsuccessfully in 2006, but Vitali Vlasenko of
the Baptist Union believes the threat of their adoption is now greater,
since "society is scared by religious extremism".

27 November 2009
TURKEY: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM SURVEY, NOVEMBER 2009
=1379
Ahead of the UN Human Rights Council May 2010 Universal Periodic Review of
Turkey, Forum 18 News Service has found that the country continues to see
serious violations of international human rights standards on freedom of
religion or belief. A long-standing crucially important issue, with many
implications, is that Turkey has not legally recognised religious
communities in their own right as independent communities with full legal
status – such as the right to own places of worship and the legal
protection religious communities normally have in states under the rule of
law. Additionally, the most dangerous threat to individuals exercising
freedom of religion or belief has been a series of violent attacks and
murders on those perceived as threats; in recent years the victims have
been Christians. Turkish citizens have argued to Forum 18 that the
protection of the right of all to freedom of religion or belief, as laid
down in the international human rights standards which Turkey is party to,
should be the standard used by the authorities in all affected fields. They
also argue that the authorities act against the intolerance fuelling
violent attacks and murders.
* See full article below. *

27 November 2009
TURKEY: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM SURVEY, NOVEMBER 2009

d=1379
By Dr. Otmar Oehring, Head of the Human Rights Office of Missio
<;, and
Güzide Ceyhan

Ahead of the UN Human Rights Council May 2010 Universal Periodic Review of
Turkey, Forum 18 News Service has found that the country continues to see
serious violations of international human rights standards on freedom of
religion or belief. The single most important and the most long-standing
issue is the fact that – despite undertaking to do so in the 1923 Lausanne
Treaty – Turkey has not legally recognised non-Muslim religious communities
in their own right as independent communities with full legal status – such
as the right to own places of worship and the legal protection religious
communities normally have in states under the rule of law. This problem
faces all religious communities in Turkey, including those which were not
present in 1923. Even the majority Sunni Islamic community is not
recognised in this way, instead being under the control of the Diyanet, or
Presidency of Religious Affairs, which reports directly to the Prime
Minister. Additionally, the most dangerous threat to individuals exercising
freedom of religion or belief has been a series of violent attacks and
murders on those perceived as threats. In recent years the victims have
been Christians.

Turkey straddles Europe and Asia and has a population of over 72 million,
about three-quarters of them ethnic Turks. The next largest ethnic group
are the Kurds, with smaller numbers of ethnic Arabs, Circassians,
Armenians, Laz, Georgians, Greeks, Jews and others. An estimated 99 per
cent of the population are of a Muslim background, mainly Sunnis, with 20
to 30 per cent of the population being Alevis, and very small numbers of
Shias. The largest non-Muslim religious community are Christians, with the
Armenian Apostolic being the largest church followed by Syrian Orthodox,
Greek Orthodox, Catholics of various rites and Protestants. Baha’is and
Jehovah’s Witnesses are present in smaller numbers – in the case of Baha’is
around 10,000.

Political background

The "deep state" – military, security, bureaucracy and elite
representatives – have been unhappy with the rise of the ruling AKP party.
The deep state remains wedded to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s "secularism" as
they understand it. This entails overt state control of Islam through the
Diyanet, which reports directly to the Prime Minister, and enshrines
serious restrictions on the ability of non-Muslims and Muslims outside
state control to exercise freedom of religion or belief. It is difficult to
reconcile with the Constitution’s statement that the Republic is a secular
state, as this "secularism" gives state-run Sunni Islam rights which no
other group enjoys. It also imposes controls on state-run Sunni Islam
imposed on no other group, such as on the content of sermons. The Diyanet
is funded with tax collected from all citizens, regardless of their
religion or belief, and supports tax exemptions for the only mosques
permitted (those controlled by the Diyanet) and employs and pays the
salaries of their imams. No other faith, or indeed non-state-controlled
Muslim group, is permitted to train its clergy in Turkey.

Among the other problems flowing from the state definition of "secularism"
are continuing and long-standing problems caused by the ban on religious
communities’ themselves owning property. Communities as diverse as Alevi
Muslims, Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Protestants, and the Syrian Orthodox
Church have seen no significant progress in resolving property problems.
Examples include no progress on recognising Alevi Muslim cem houses as
places of worship and continuing vexatious legal cases aimed at depriving
the Mor Gabriel Syrian Orthodox Monastery in south-eastern Turkey of its
land.

As non-Muslim communities are under threat of violent attacks, the
Interior Ministry issued a circular in June 2007 asking law enforcement
forces to protect non-Muslim places of worship, and be watchful for plans
to attack them. A number of plans to mount attacks were subsequently
uncovered and prevented, for instance a plot to kill the pastor of a church
in Antalya. However, this step, although welcome, addresses only the
symptoms of intolerance, not the root causes.

Official protection for religious leaders, such as the Ecumenical
Patriarch, is widely seen by these communities as being designed as much to
control as to protect them. Suspicion of the authorities’ intentions
remains. Alevi Muslims broke off formal talks with the government over
denial of their rights, expressing frustration at the lack of concrete
progress in enabling them to exercise their religious freedom. Informal
workshops involving representatives of the Alevis, the Diyanet and others
continue. An August 2009 lunch meeting between Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan and religious leaders, including Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew,
was followed by a visit to two Greek Orthodox sites. But no concrete
improvements ensued in their ability to exercise freedom of religion or
belief.

The rule of law

The Mor Gabriel cases – which started after state officials unilaterally
redrew land boundaries – highlight problems around the rule of law and how
society does or does not understand this, which has a serious impact on
freedom of religion or belief. Another trial drifting on with no sign of a
verdict is of two Turkish Protestants, Hakan Tastan and Turan Topal. They
are on trial for "insulting Turkishness" and defamation of Islam, following
their involvement in a Bible correspondence course in October 2006. The
trial in Malatya of the five men accused of murdering three Protestant
Christians in 2007 has drifted on since its start in November 2007. In 2009
police have avoided bringing witnesses to court on various occasions, and
no verdict appears imminent. Hopes that impunity for those who attack
Christians would be over remain disappointed.

Two recent victories in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) – by the
Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2008 and a Greek Orthodox Foundation in 2009 –
have still not led to the recovery of confiscated property. The ECHR
appears to be the only realistic hope of implementing in law some very
important aspects of the right to exercise freedom of religion or belief –
provided its judgments are implemented.

Violent attacks and murders

The Armenian, Greek and Alevi communities have in the past been subject to
mass pogroms and violent attacks that have resulted in migration of these
communities inside and outside of Turkey. There have also been in the past
murders of individuals for their beliefs, such as of the atheist and former
imam Turan Dursan in 1990. However, a recent series of murders has drawn
attention to the continuing need to address the problem of the murderous
intolerance of sections of Turkish society. These murders were of: Fr
Andrea Santoro, a Catholic priest in 2006; the Armenian Turkish journalist
Hrant Dink in 2007; and of two ethnic Turkish Protestants, Necati Aydin and
Ugur Yuksel, and a German, Tilmann Geske in Malatya in 2007. In July 2009 a
Catholic German businessman engaged to an ethnic Turk, Gregor Kerkeling,
was murdered by a mentally disturbed young man for being a Christian.

In August 2009 Turkish Protestant Ismail Aydin, who works for an
association spreading knowledge about Christianity, was taken hostage at
knifepoint. The young man responsible claimed that "this missionary dog is
trying to divide the country" and wrapped a Turkish flag around Aydin’s
head. He was seen on TV reports telling his captor that "this flag is mine
as well! I’m a Turk too, but I’m a Christian." His captor responded that
"you have betrayed the Turkish flag and country". The police rescued Aydin
and the attacker is being prosecuted. But the incident highlighted again
the dangerous unwillingness of many within Turkey to accept that there are
many ways to be a Turk.

What fuels violent attacks and murders?

Factors which encourage violence include; disinformation by public figures
and the mass media; the rise of Turkish nationalism; and the
marginalisation of smaller groups within society. All three trends feed off
each other, and all of Turkey’s smaller religious or belief communities –
those within Islam and Christianity, as well as Baha’is, Jehovah’s
Witnesses, atheists and agnostics – are affected by them. There has been
disinformation and defamation against Christians, in particular against
Protestants who share their beliefs with others in public discourse as well
as in the media.

A day after the Malatya murders, Niyazi Güney, a senior Justice Ministry
official, told Turkish parliamentarians that "missionary work is even more
dangerous than terrorism and unfortunately is not considered a crime in
Turkey". He repeated this in Milliyet newspaper. Terrorism and missionary
activity are thus presented as connected. Almost any manifestation of
Christian belief – including meetings in churches – is seen by those who
hold these views as "missionary activity".

Missionary activity has been on the agenda of the National Security
Council (MGK), which is chaired ex officio by the President and also
comprises the Chief of the General Staff, the commanders of all the
branches of the Turkish Armed Forces and several government ministers. In a
February 2005 evaluation of current and future challenges to Turkish
security, the MGK drew attention to "a need for social activities that will
prevent the spreading of organisations and ideologies that will have an
impact on Turkey’s unity". It suggested that "abusive missionary activities
should not be permitted". What exactly was meant by "abusive missionary
activity" was not defined.

The Turkish phrase used for missionary activity in official discussions
and formal papers, as well as by the xenophobic and nationalist parts of
society, has extremely negative connotations. "Misyonerlik faaliyetleri"
can be translated into English as missionary activities, which does not
convey either a positive or a negative evaluation of the activities. But
"misyonerlik faaliyetleri" has in Turkish the connotations of missionary
scheming, plotting and intrigues. Both words have negative connotations in
Turkish, and used together as one phrase convey a double negative
connotation.

"Missionary" conferences propagating such views continue to be held by the
Diyanet in provinces and townships using state facilities. Similar
activities are also conducted by the military and the Gendarmerie
(Jandarma) to "enlighten" their personnel – including conscripts – about
what they see as "missionary activities".

Associated with this is intolerance promoted within the school curriculum
(see below).

The intolerance in society towards non-Muslims also extends to atheists,
who cannot openly identify or organise themselves in Turkey.

Ergenekon and the "deep state"

The trial which began in 2007 of influential people – from the police,
army, bureaucracy, business, politics and the mass media – alleged to be
part of an ultra-nationalist group, Ergenekon, has revealed strong and
widespread opposition among them to freedom of religion or belief.
Ergenekon members are alleged to have maintained deathlists of people,
including Christians with a missionary background. The Malatya murder trial
is revealing plausible links between the "deep state" and the murders,
Turkish media noting that a link between the murders and the Gendarmerie
seems obvious. The Gendarmerie, it seems, knew in advance of the murders
and did not take steps to prevent them. Also according to the media, Fr
Andrea Santoro and his church were under surveillance by the National
Intelligence Organisation (MIT) secret police on the very day of his
murder.

The media has featured documents discovered in the Ergenekon investigation
proving that the Gendarmerie actively monitored missionary activities in
the Malatya region through informers, before and after the Malatya murders.
It should be noted that the activities being monitored were lawful acts of
teaching and promoting one’s beliefs. Unlawful disinformation or defamatory
practices limiting lawful enjoyment of human rights do not appear to have
been monitored or acted against.

Media intolerance

Protestant Turks have noted a significant decline in numbers of violent
attacks directed at their churches and religious leaders in 2009. This is
possibly due to a decline since 2007 in defamatory mainstream media
coverage of them. For example, a widely viewed national TV channel, ATV,
has stopped broadcasting reports of "illegal" churches, or Turks converting
to Christianity.

However, intolerant reporting and commentary continues in local and
ultra-nationalist newspapers, as well as on websites and blogs. One local
news website, Ilgazetesi, featured an article on 17 June 2009, entitled
"Local Missionaries", stating that "The primary goal of missionary activity
is to break the resistance of the people to imperialism and abuse! Making
them Jewish or Christian is the second goal." The continuing intolerant
mind-set of many is fuelled by such irresponsible media reports, and makes
members of vulnerable groups fear that violence against them could escalate
again.

No legal status as religious communities

Full legal recognition of all religious communities would be a major step
forward in both achieving freedom of religion or belief as understood in
the human rights standards Turkey has ratified, as well as addressing the
prejudice that non-Muslim religious communities are "foreign" and not
genuinely Turkish. At present, religious communities which existed in the
Ottoman Empire operate legally under an archaic system of imperial decrees
and regulations that deny them full legal status as religious communities
and restrict their freedom to function. Communities which did not have a
recognised existence before the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923 have
little hope of gaining any kind of recognised status in law. Articles 37-45
of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, on "Protection of Minorities", should have led
to the recognition of then-existing non-Muslim religious communities in
their own right, as independent communities with full legal status – such
as the right to own places of worship. But this has not happened, not least
as the Treaty left it unclear what such recognition might mean. Bizarrely,
the government ministry which handles relations with many of Turkey’s
indigenous non-Muslim religious communities which existed before the
Lausanne Treaty is the Foreign Ministry.

The situation of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey is extremely complex
under the present legal framework. The official view of the state is that
different regulations apply to the various non-Muslim religious
communities. Firstly in the state’s view, there are the groups that count
as non-Muslim minorities within the meaning of the Lausanne Treaty. In the
view of the state, these are exclusively the Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks
and Jews. A second group are the non-Muslim minorities who were present in
Turkey in 1923 at the time of the Lausanne Treaty but were not recognised
by the state as minorities within the meaning of the Treaty. These are, for
example, the Syrian Orthodox Church, churches such as the Chaldean Church
and the Syrian Catholic Church, and the Roman Catholic Church.

However, it is very important to note that the communities in both these
groups actually exist today and have been recognised by the state as
existing – but they have not been legally recognized and have no legal
personality (Tuzelkisilik).

Besides the non-Muslim minorities are a number of so-called community
foundations that are attributed by the state to, but not necessarily
controlled by, certain non-Muslim minorities (such as Armenians, Greeks,
Syriac Orthodox, Jews and others) which have gained legal personality
(Tuzelkisilik). It is also important to note that, legally, there is no
link at all between these community foundations and the non-Muslim
minorities the state attributes them to.

Neither the Roman Catholic Church nor those Protestant churches that
existed in Turkey before 1923 have any community foundations that could be
attributed to them.

None of these non-Muslim minorities – whichever category the state sees
them as belonging to – have as religious communities the kind of rights to
religious freedom that Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights
envisages. In practice, all these communities are on a very similar legal
footing to newer communities such as Baha’is and Jehovah’s Witnesses, which
did not exist in Turkey in 1923, and which today have no legal status as
communities.

The 2004 Associations Law was welcomed by some newer communities, such as
Protestant and Jehovah’s Witnesses, as it allowed people within these
communities – but not the communities themselves – to form a legal entity
that would allow them to engage in some activities legally. However, the
"Association formula" is still rather new and some communities are
reluctant to use it. A major reason is that, being small communities, they
cannot fulfil the necessary requirements to establish an association. State
officials seem to pay more attention than is usual to associations
established in connection with religious communities.

There are also serious questions of possible inadequacies in the
"Association formula". One problem is that if those who run the foundation
and those who lead the community are not the same people, there is a
possibility that they may disagree with each other – which may leave the
community again without the possibility of legally carrying out activities.
The "Association formula" proposed by the government to "solve" the legal
personality problem does not provide a satisfactory solution. Whether it
will work effectively as a "limited" solution remains to be seen. This will
depend on both whether the formula is in practice found to be simple and
flexible enough for the needs of small communities, and whether audits and
decisions by state officials take account of this. These developments will
need to be closely monitored.

Even for long-established communities with the limited recognition which
has been conferred – without rights to for example own places of worship –
the attitudes of the Turkish state can be hostile and even threatening.
This has been seen in the case of the Armenian Apostolic Patriarch Mesrop
Mutafyan, who leads Turkey’s biggest Christian church, who was elected
Patriarch in 1998 against the express wishes of the Turkish authorities. He
has been forced to retreat into health-related seclusion, brought on by
years of pressure from the media, the public and from the Armenian
diaspora, some of which has dubbed him a traitor. Should Patriarch Mesrop
not recover, the Turkish authorities are likely to insist – as they have
done up to now – that his successor as head of the Armenian (as well as the
Greek Orthodox) Patriarchate must be a Turkish citizen resident in Turkey.
The Armenian Church may struggle to find a candidate with the diplomatic
and linguistic skills and the international experience for such a crucial
role in such a delicate and exposed position. This problem is of importance
not just for the Church but for the Armenian community as a whole.

Denial of recognition also leaves the adherents of many faiths vulnerable
to discrimination, as citizens have their religious affiliation recorded in
official records. In this way the state indicates which religions are
"legitimate" and which are not. The Baha’i community has about 10,000
members, but is not recognised as a religion. As the Baha’i faith therefore
cannot be chosen in the public registry, Baha’is are forced to choose
either Islam or leave the religion part of their Identity Card empty.

Who can own places of worship?

An aspect of this non-recognition is that even recognised religious
communities cannot themselves own properties such as places of worship.
Bizarrely, these must be owned by separate foundations not under the direct
control of the communities. This has drawn much attention, focused on the
passage of a series of Foundation laws – none of which have solved the
basic problem.

The most recent amendments to the Foundations Law have at least led to a
number of improvements to the functioning of these community foundations.
Yet even so the communities to which the community foundations are
attributed still complain about a number of severe problems relating to
their community foundations that have not been resolved. Expectations
outside Turkey that the amendments to the Foundations Law would also lead
to a complete solution for all the unresolved questions regarding legal
recognition of non-Muslim minorities have not been fulfilled. As Dilek
Kurban of the respected TESEV Foundation noted, the Foundations Law is
"incompatible with the principle of freedom of association, which is
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, the Constitution and
the [1923] Treaty of Lausanne".

It should be made clear that the Foundations Law can only be the right
place to resolve problems regarding the community foundations and is not
the right place to resolve the basic problems of non-Muslim minorities in
Turkey. That may only be expected from a new Constitution based on the
European Convention on Human Rights and implementation in law of religious
freedom.

Stalemate for Alevi Muslims

Alevi Muslims form between 20 and 30 per cent of the population, but the
overwhelming majority of their places of worship – cemevi or cem houses –
are not recognised by the state. The Alevi community organised a mass
demonstration, attended by tens of thousands of Alevis on 8 November 2010
expressing their frustration that they are still not treated as citizens
with equal rights, and calling for the abolition of both the Diyanet and
compulsory religious education lessons in public schools.

Another cause of frustration for Alevis is that their leaders – called
"Dede" or elders – are not entitled to legally hold that title. This dates
back to 1925, when Act No. 677 of 30 November 1341 (1925) "On the Closure
of Dervish Monasteries and Tombs, the Abolition of the Office of Keeper of
Tombs and the Abolition and Prohibition of Certain Titles" was brought in.
This abolished the title, and Article 174 (Preservation of Reform Laws) of
the Constitution makes it impossible to change this Law. This Article
states: "No provision of the Constitution shall be construed or interpreted
as rendering unconstitutional the Reform Laws indicated below, which aim to
raise Turkish society above the level of contemporary civilisation and to
safeguard the secular character of the Republic, and which were in force on
the date of the adoption by referendum of the Constitution of Turkey."
Among the laws listed is Act 677.

Education about religion or belief

In contrast to the children adhering to the two non-Muslim religious
communities acknowledged in the education system – Christians and Jews –
Alevis, Baha’is, children of other faiths and atheists are forced to attend
de facto Sunni religious education classes in public and private schools.
Diyanet officials have occasionally indicated that they regard Alevism as a
part of Sunni Islam and do not respect their different interpretation of
Islam. This means that Turkey has not seen any need to alter the religious
education curriculum. In a court ruling (Hasan and Eylem Zengin v. Turkey,
Application no. 1448/04) the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) stated
that this is unacceptable.

Turkey is obliged by this judgment to take action to ensure that the same
problem does not reoccur for anyone. However, as Turkish news agencies
reported on 25 August 2008, then Minister of Education Hüseyin Çelik
claimed the decision was about the old curriculum. As Alevi beliefs are
included in the new curriculum, the Minister claimed the ECHR judgment was
inapplicable. Implementation of the judgment is still pending before the
Council of Europe Committee of Ministers.

Teaching of other subjects includes disinformation about or defamation of
faiths. Missionary activity is listed as one of the national threats in
compulsory public school books that are taught in Grade 8 classes on the
History of Turkish Republican Reforms and Atatürkism. The textbook states
that missionaries "try to fulfil their goals through the significant
financial support of foreign powers, some non-governmental organisations
and from their own supporters. Missionaries exploit the financial hardships
of people. They translate texts related to their own beliefs into different
languages and distribute them free of charge and accordingly use written
and visual media for their propaganda purposes. They are a threat to the
national unity and integrity of our state and nation."

Those at risk from violent attack think such sentiments – propagated
through the school system and mass media – are major factors in violent
attacks and murders motivated by intolerance.

As a participating State of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation
in Europe (OSCE), Turkey has agreed to implement measures "to counter
prejudices and misrepresentation, particularly in the field of education".
Initiatives to assist this include the Toledo Guiding Principles on
Teaching about Religions and Beliefs in Public Schools. However the
authorities have shown no visible interest in providing fair education on
religions and beliefs in schools.

Discrimination within the public service

It is virtually impossible to find people from non-Muslim backgrounds in
high level civil servant positions and impossible in senior ranks in the
military. While there are non-Muslims employed at lower levels there are
frequent allegations that they experience discrimination and are never
allowed to take a high ranking position. Syriac Orthodox Christians, for
example, have complained to Forum 18 that their young people are never
allowed the possibility of careers leading to senior positions in the
military or the civil service – even when they are fully qualified for such
careers. Many are deeply disappointed, Forum 18 has been told, when they
realise that they are not seen as "genuine" Turks, and so will never be
allowed the chances to serve their country which those seen as "genuine"
Turks have.

Religious clothing

A 1934 Law which according to Article 174 of the Constitution may not be
altered or abolished bans wearing religious garments on the streets, with
Muslims being the initial targets. With the exception of the Ecumenical
Patriarch, the Armenian Patriarch and the Chief Rabbi, no religious
minority leaders until the 1980s acted against this ban. Enforcement has
been more sporadic recently, but many religious leaders choose not to wear
religious clothes outside their place of worship, partly because of this
Law and partly – in the case of members of religious minorities – for fear
of provoking attacks. Foreign Greek, Russian and Georgian Orthodox priests
have complained in recent years that they have been forced to remove their
cassocks and crosses before being allowed to enter the country.

The wearing of headscarves by Muslim women has long been a controversial
issue. The AKP party’s move to allow female university students to wear
headscarves was prevented by the Constitutional Court, and caused much
debate and hostility in the secular sectors of the population. Although it
is prohibited to attend university wearing headscarves, or any religious
symbol, this prohibition is not consistently implemented. It has become a
symbolic issue that seems to embody the questions of whether Turkey will
continue to be a "secular" country – as the state defines this – or not.

Conscientious objection to military service denied

Conscientious objection to compulsory military service is not permitted.
Conscientious objectors of military age (including among the roughly 3,000
Jehovah’s Witnesses) face an unending cycle of prosecutions and
imprisonments. In the ECHR case of Ülke v. Turkey (Application no.
39437/98), the Court found that such punishment was a violation of the
prohibition in the European Convention of Human Rights of torture, inhuman
and degrading treatment. Turkey continues to disregard the 17 October 2007
call of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers for it "to adopt
rapidly the legislative reform necessary to prevent similar violations."

Internet censorship

Access to the website of well-known atheist Richard Dawkins is prevented
in Turkey through a court decision. His books, as also those of other
atheists, are however permitted, despite legal attempts to ban them.
Similarly, access to a website dedicated to Turan Dursun, a well-known
Turkish atheist murdered for his beliefs in 1990, is barred.

Conclusion

Many people and communities have for a long time faced obstacles in
carrying out peaceful religious activity – activity that is protected in
the international freedom of religion or belief agreements that Turkey has
committed itself to. The long-standing lack of willingness to legally
recognise religious communities in their own right, the disinformation by
public officials and the public education system, ultra-nationalism and
mass media intolerance behind violent attacks and murders, and the Turkish
definition of "secularism" are the clearest examples of this. They cause
serious doubt about whether the country is really committed to universal
human rights for all.

Other obstacles include: problems around the rule of law; discrimination
against Alevi Muslims; discrimination within the public service; lack of
freedom to wear religious clothing in public institutions; denial of
conscientious objection to military service; and limited internet
censorship.

Turkish citizens committed to human rights for all have argued to Forum 18
that the protection of the right of all to freedom of religion or belief,
as laid down in the international human rights standards which Turkey is
party to, should be the standard used by the authorities in all affected
fields. They also argue strongly that positive steps should also be taken
by the authorities to eliminate social hatred against all groups that are
the targets of intolerant attitudes. (END)

More analyses and commentaries on freedom of thought, conscience and
belief in Turkey can be found at
< mp;religion=all&country=68>.

A compilation of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) freedom of religion or belief commitments can be found at
< id=1351>.

A printer-friendly map of Turkey is available at
< s/atlas/index.html?Parent=mideast&Rootmap=turk ey>.
(END)

© Forum 18 News Service. All rights reserved. ISSN 1504-2855
You may reproduce or quote this article provided that credit is given to
F18News

Past and current Forum 18 information can be found at

http://www.forum18.org/
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_id
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_i
http://www.missio.de&gt
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?query=&a
http://www.forum18.org/Archive.php?article_
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/xpedition
http://www.forum18.org/
http://www.forum18.org/

Critics’ Forum Article – 11.02.09

Critics’ Forum
Literature
Perennially Transnational: Armenian Literature after the Genocide
By Myrna Douzjian

As a graduate student in Comparative Literature, I recently had the
opportunity to present a talk entitled "Post-Genocide Armenian
Literature of the Homeland and Diaspora" to students in an Armenian
Studies undergraduate seminar at USC.

I was initially confounded by the notion of having to unify a vast
period of literary production in two complex and fluid locales – the
homeland and the Diaspora. The term homeland lacked geographical and
historical fixity – Western Armenia, Karabagh, Javakhk, the Armenian
SSR, and the two periods of the Republic of Armenia (pre-Soviet and
the contemporary, post-Soviet) had to be taken into account.

Defining the Diaspora presented a separate slew of considerations: the
generation of Genocide survivors; the distinctions in perspective that
their successors would come to offer; different waves of voluntary
dispersion throughout the 20th century; and an abundance of locales
and shifting centers of literary output (Argentina, Canada, France,
Lebanon, Russia, Syria, US, etc.) were factors contributing to the
heterogeneous nature of the Diaspora. I would have to convey that
Armenian Diaspora literature represents various networks of
ever-changing communities and a diverse range of diasporic
experiences.

But even these issues were not the most important of my worries. There
remained the rather conspicuous fact that, for the most part, I had
studied and read about literature in the homeland and Diaspora
separately. Subcategories in Armenian literary studies abound:
Eastern, Western, Soviet, Armenian Republic, French-Armenian,
Armenian-American, second generation Armenian-American, ad
infinitum. Academic scholarship perpetuates the specialization of
Armenian literature into narrower, separate subfields, thereby
limiting the amount of dialogue that acknowledges the connections
between the parts of the whole. What thread would tie it all together
in order to produce a coherent lecture?

Certainly, the conscientious critic strives to bring out the
particularities in the work of individual authors. Thus, an attempt at
effectively homogenizing nearly a century of Armenian literary
production would seem like a counter-intuitive move, positioned
directly against the norm. But I’ve come to understand that the
attempt to find a unifying thread in the Armenian literature of the
last century proves, nevertheless, to be a worthwhile endeavor. When
viewed as a whole, Armenian literature after the Genocide exhibits a
striking constant: its transnational character.

In academic terms, the concept of "transnationalism" involves a
constant negotiation of cultural identity with the identity of others
– neighbors, colonizers, and empires – and a grappling with the power
dynamics involved between various positions, including dominant and
dominated, and central and peripheral. Throughout the 20th and 21st
centuries (and certainly well before that) Armenians have been living
in the interstices, between cultures and identities, thereby
problematizing the traditional definition of the nation-state. As a
result, Armenia, or the homeland, has existed as a place; but its
presence as a state of mind in the cultural imagination has arguably
had equal weight. The significance of geographical specificity becomes
lessened in this regard: Armenian literature, no matter where or when,
has a transnational character, because it has always existed at the
intersection of cultures as well as power politics.

To take a simple example, Soviet Armenian literature, if considered
part of literature of the homeland, was always based on an interaction
between Soviet policies and Armenian interests. Throughout this
period, authors in the Armenian SSR had to manipulate their actual
priorities according to the Soviet party line and the dictates of
Socialist Realism. Although the amount of pressure placed on writers
varied depending on the political climate in Moscow, punishment
through exile and limitations placed on the articulation of national
and ethnic concerns remained unchanging issues for Armenian
writers. Similarly, though in the era of post-Soviet independence, the
work of contemporary writers like Berj Zeytountsyan, Aghassi Ayvazyan,
and Kourken Khanjyan has addressed the lasting effects of the Soviet
regime on the new nation-state as well as the rise of the influence of
neocolonial powers, most notably Russia and the US.

As a result of the transnational character of the Armenian experience,
a fixation in the literary criticism of the last two decades has been
the question of where to place Armenian literature in the context of
global literary trends. Authors and critics have constantly evaluated
the literature of the Republic in comparison with "European
standards." Just as Armenia continues to be subjected to the Great
Game – the world powers’ quest for leverage over the Transcaucasus
region – the literature of the homeland struggles to affirm its
cultural viability. By the same token, Diaspora literature has defined
itself based on an awareness of itself in relation to external
socio-political and cultural forces. Its struggle for cultural
viability therefore represents the difficult tug of war between
Armenians’ resistance against and assimilation into dominant cultures;
and, its transnational themes include dual or hybrid identities,
language, cultural transference (such as the use of memory and history
in the grand narrative that unities Armenians), cultural survival, and
the Genocide.

To take a specific example from the literature, Simon Vratzian’s
semi-autobiographical work Kianki Ughinerov begins with a description
that highlights the age-old relevance of transnationalism to
Armenians:

In the beginning was the land of Armenia and the Kingdon of Bagratuni
– Ani. And Ani became the Volga. And the Volga became the Crimea. And
Crimea became the Don. And the Don became the Republic of Armenia. And
the Republic became the entire world. And the Armenian became a
citizen of the world. This is my story, and, changing names, the story
of all Armenians, past and present. (Qtd. In Richard G. Hvannisian,
"Simon Vratzian and Armenian Nationalism." Middle Eastern Studies
5. No. 3. Oct. 1969. P. 192.)

Being located between various flows of cultural capital or on the
periphery of hegemonic cultural activity – in other words, struggling
with and against the cultural and political forces around it – binds
together the multiple locales that the terms homeland and Diaspora
encompass. And since the historical definition of the homeland as a
place has itself changed, Armenian cultural identity, and by
implication, the obsessions of so much of its literature, is defined
by both the status and the struggles of a complex, transnational
identity.

Literary and cultural critic Gayatri Spivak sees Armenia and the
Diaspora as a model that can be applied to a great deal of
contemporary global realities. She writes, "Any theory of postcolonial
hybridity pales into insignificance when we consider the millennial
ipseity of the Armenian, existing in uneasy double bind with the
hybridity imposed by the locale" (Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Other
Asias. Blackwell Publishing: Malden, 2008). In simpler terms, the
identity (the "ipseity") of Armenian literature and the Armenian
experience lies somewhere between the global and the local; it is
defined by the "uneasy" combination of the two. And rather than
representing an anomaly, the transnational character of the Armenian
experience is fast becoming the norm. Likewise, irrespective of the
geographical divisions intrinsic to the categories of Armenian
homeland and Diaspora, the literature of the two shares a strong
common ground – the constant necessity of negotiating the politics and
identities of various others..

Homeland and Diaspora are widely accepted, nearly undeniable
categories for things Armenian – in the arts, academia, politics, news
media, and, above all, daily life. Having found at least one framework
by which to represent Armenian literature in its variety, I was able
to let go of these occasionally divisive designations, however
unintentional they might be. At a time when politics has driven a wide
rift between the Diaspora and the homeland (now defined in the
traditional sense of the nation-state), I found that literature and
literary criticism offered us a reminder of the inextricable link
between the two.

All Rights Reserved: Critics’ Forum, 2009.

Myrna Douzjian is a doctoral candidate in the Department of
Comparative Literature at UCLA, where she teaches literature and
composition courses.

You can reach her or any of the other contributors to Critics’ Forum
at [email protected]. This and all other articles published
in this series are available online at To sign
up for a weekly electronic version of new articles, go to
Critics’ Forum is a group created to
discuss issues relating to Armenian art and culture in the Diaspora.

www.criticsforum.org.
www.criticsforum.org/join.

A web of Peace

A web of Peace

Social media and conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. The
opportunities offered to Armenian and Azeri peace activists, the debate
in the region

27.11.2009 From Yerevan, Onnik Krikorian

In the 15 years since a ceasefire agreement put the conflict between
Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed territory of Nagorno Karabakh
on hold, various peace proposals have faltered. But if Armenia’s first
president was even forced to resign over talk of a concessionary deal by
nationalist hardliners in his government opposed to a compromise
settlement, the main obstacle in recent years has been public opinion.

Bellicose rhetoric directed against Armenians in Azerbaijan has become
common and recently even spilled out into something as trivial as
Eurovision, while political forces in Armenia on both sides of the
divide have recklessly exploited the conflict to either maintain or come
to power. Meanwhile, the local media continues to perpetuate negative
stereotypes of the "enemy" while propaganda and misinformation has
drowned out what little genuine discussion did exist.

New generations of Armenians and Azerbaijanis are also unable to
remember a time when both lived side by side together in peace,
sometimes even intermarrying, with nationalistic rhetoric becoming
increasingly effective in post-Soviet societies where tolerance and
critical independent thinking is discouraged to justify usually
undemocratic systems of governance. Some even consider alternative or
moderate views on the conflict as tantamount to treason.

True, Armenians and Azeris have been meeting at conferences, workshops
and other events aimed at promoting regional stability and peace
building initiatives, but none have had any noticeable effect on
improving relations between the two countries. Critics even argue that
the very process of conflict resolution is flawed in itself. What there
needs to be first, they argue, is conflict transformation.

Until then, even Internet forums initially established to facilitate
communication and dialogue between the two sides have nearly always
ended up as a continuation of the conflict on a new albeit virtual
battle ground.

Yet, despite the risks, the increasing popularity of sites such as
Facebook as well as other new mediums for self-expression such as blogs
offers new potential for social media and other online tools to move in
to fill the information gap. Although not a means to an end in
themselves, these tools could have a significant potential as part of
other traditional conflict resolution, management and transformation
initiatives.

`These new tools can be used to foment violence or to foster peace,’
wrote Global Voices Online Executive Director Ivan Sigal in a paper,
Digital media in conflict-prone societies, for the Center for
International Media Assistance (CIMA) earlier this year. `[However] it
is possible to build communication systems that encourage dialogue and
nonviolent political solutions,’ the former researcher on citizen media
at the US Institute of Peace added.

Micael Bogar, Projects Manager at the American University’s Center for
Social Media agrees, but says that many working in the area of conflict
resolution remain uninterested in using low cost or free tools even if
they could prove more effective than what exists at present. And as
international donors are generally not interested in lower cost
initiatives, NGOs can also receive larger grants for activities even if
they turn out to be ineffective or unsustainable.

Nevertheless, those who realize that establishing trust and forming
friendships has to occur on a regular basis could use such tools as
Facebook and Skype to cross ceasefire lines, closed borders and
monitored telephone lines before and especially after actually meeting.

`I think you can’t do it just with social media tools,’ says Bogar, `but
as we’ve seen over the past 15 years, you definitely can’t do it by
meeting in Tbilisi for a weekend every summer. It becomes an
`entertainment’ and I’ve had experience with those conferences in
Georgia where it’s just one big coffee break and a waste of money.
However, I think that both approaches combined could propel things along.’

Bogar is nevertheless cautious, believing that much of civil society
currently working on peace building initiatives is not serious about its
work. Genuine peace builders have their own radical character compared
to others, she argues. `I think that when you have those fundamental
elements in an activist or a conflict-resolution advocate then it’s
going to be a natural move to go into social media,’ says Bogar.

`For those who aren’t using it, they’re both just older and unaware of
it or simply uninterested in using cheap tools when they can receive big
grants to keep themselves in business.’

Of course, new approaches are also risky, especially in Azerbaijan where
many citizens don’t want to be known to be in contact with Armenians,
but the potential is there. After months of limited online contact, for
example, a recent meeting between Armenian, American and Azeri teenagers
in the U.S. revealed such problems, but Dotcom Program Manager Elizabeth
Metraux says that there is also reason for hope.

The project run by PH International uses citizen media to bring
participants together in an online blogging project. Participants only
periodically meet.

`I had those moments when I would have said that this is not going to
work and sometimes you just think that there is no way that these
students are going to find consensus,’ admits Metraux. Inevitably, when
you’re doing a program like this, and my background is with the Israelis
and Palestinians, you’re really optimistic that the students will find
commonality, but then something is said and it gets explosive.

`There were a lot of tears, but they would eventually pull themselves
out of it,’ she continues. `We started off with students not even making
eye contact, but by the time we were done they were giving each other a
hug or trading email addresses. That was really an inspiring moment, but
my optimism is definitely tempered by a realization that these are young
people who are soon going to be on the frontlines.

The leaders are talking to each other, but God forbid that people
actually do,’ Metraux concludes wryly.

In recent months, however, an unlikely catalyst for rapprochement came
with the detention and eventual imprisonment of video blogging activists
Adnan Hajizade and Emin Milli in Azerbaijan. Their cause was supported
by a small number of Armenians in the republic as well as a few in the
traditionally more nationalist Diaspora. Facebook and Twitter were the
primary methods used to spread information.

Young Armenians and Azerbaijanis were finally able to see into the lives
of each other and, in many cases, realized they weren’t so different
after all.

With his own experience of training young Armenian, Azeri and Georgian
activists in using new media tools, International Federation of Liberal
Youth (IFLRY) Secretary General Bart Woord realizes the potential, but
also adds a word of caution. Such tools can also be used inefficiently
and incorrectly, he says, and also to heighten existing tensions by
those opposed to peace and reconciliation.

`New media tools will certainly help in getting people better acquainted
with each other, but at the same time can also be used to reaffirm
existing biases. Just search on the Internet for Armenian and
Azerbaijani web sites and you can find a lot of trash and very harmful
discourse from nationalist websites,’ he says. `I’m mildly optimistic,
but at the same time think we should be very cautious about what we find
on the Internet as well.’

Time will tell whether those involved with peace building and conflict
resolution initiatives will migrate at least some of their activities
online, but for now, while some peace activists such as Georgi Vanyan in
Armenia are very open in their offline and online activities, others are
not. Indeed, many deny access to journalists and shy away from any
independent media coverage, preferring to keep everything closed with
all information remaining under strict control.

There are other problems too.

`Personally I believe that it is possible,’ says regional analyst and
Osservatorio Azerbaijan correspondent, Arzu Geybullayeva. `It’s a long
shot, but because you only target a certain group of people, you also
need to communicate with those who don’t have access to the Internet.
What about the masses – those who don’t have internet access or the
opportunity to meet, talk, learn, and explore? Yes, it can play a role,
but it needs to be more widely available.’

Nevertheless, as Internet penetration and especially mobile access
increases across the region, online social networking and new media
tools offers an opportunity to change the situation. Therefore,
Geybullayeva is hopeful.

`I would very much like to see more debate among bloggers in Armenia and
Azerbaijan,’ she adds. `We really need some kind of initiative for this
because I would really like to see borders opened and conflict resolved.
My mother says that when she went to school she had Armenians among her
friends. I would very much like myself or my children when they grow up
to be able to say the same kind of thing to their children as well as
their friends.’


Onnik Krikorian will be presenting on the role of new and social media
in conflict resolution at the E-Society I Media conference in Skopje,
Macedonia, on 2-3 December, and co-presenting with Arzu Geybullayeva on
the same topic at the Social Media for Social Change conference in
Tbilisi, Georgia, in April next year

rticleview/12189/1/407

http://www.osservatoriobalcani.org/article/a

Delegation Of Turkish Intellectuals Visits Armenian Parliament

DELEGATION OF TURKISH INTELLECTUALS VISITS ARMENIAN PARLIAMENT

ArmInfo
2009-11-26 18:54:00

ArmInfo. A delegation of Turkish intellectuals and a number of
public organizations engaged in gender problems visited the Armenian
National Assembly on Thursday. The Turkish delegation is in Armenia
as part of the program "European Integration and Gender problems",
Urban Sustainable Development Fund.

The parliamentary press-service told ArmInfo the Turkish delegation
expressed desire to meet with Armenian women parliamentarians to
discuss the problems related to national programs on women problems
and European integration process in the country.

Armenian women parliamentarians received the delegation and pined
hopes with promotion of the Armenian-Turkish dialogue by means of
women softness.

Demir Rahime Bulut, Professor of Bosphorus University, said she is
studying the works by Armenians writing in Turkish language and has
learnt much about new facts of activity of Armenians in Turkey. In
this context, Naira Zohrabyan, parliamentarian from Prosperous Party
of Armenia, expressed confidence that Rahime Bulut will be impartial
helping Turkey to admit the historical truth, since every country
becomes stronger also when it recognizes its own history.

For their part, parliamentarians H. Naghdalyan and K. Achemyan said
active meetings will help the parties know each other better. They
highlighted the importance of meetings between intellectuals of the
two countries that are able to form public opinion.

Larisa Alaverdyan, Anahit Bakhshyan and Zaruhi Postanjyan representing
Heritage Party are sure that more contacts between the two publics
will promote confidence building and true presentation of history
will be in favor of the two peoples.

The Turkish delegation thanked the parliamentarians for warm reception
and free talks and came out for promotion of contacts to boost the
Armenian-Turkish dialogue.

‘Beeline Armenia Adds 16,000 Mobile Subscribers In Q3’

‘BEELINE ARMENIA ADDS 16,000 MOBILE SUBSCRIBERS IN Q3’

Digital Media Asia
November 25, 2009 Wednesday

DMASIA-25 November 2009-‘Beeline Armenia adds 16,000 mobile subscribers
in Q3’

Vimpelcom Armenia saw its revenues fall 7.8 percent year-on-year to
AMD 19.16 billion (RUB 1.61 billion) in the third quarter. Revenue
generated by mobile operations was RUB 637 million, down 16.6 percent
versus the corresponding period of the previous year, while fixed-line
revenues increased 7.9 percent to RUB 974 million. OIBDA was up by
1.5 percent year-on-year to RUB 825 million, with an OIBDA margin
of 51.2 percent. Mobile OIBDA plunged 9.2 percent year-on-year to
RUB 306 million, and fixed-line OIBDA was up 9 percent to RUB 519
million. The operator, which uses the brand name Beeline, added 16,000
mobile subscribers in the quarter to reach a total base of 502,000
at end-September. Vimpelcom Armenia had 18,100 broadband subscribers
at 30 September. ARPU was up 1.6 percent sequentially to AMD 5,117,
while MOU increased by 12.8 percent quarter-on-quarter to 269.0.

Prime Minister Of Armenia And Yerevan Mayor To Run For RPA Executive

PRIME MINISTER OF ARMENIA AND YEREVAN MAYOR TO RUN FOR RPA EXECUTIVE BODY

ArmInfo
2009-11-26 18:45:00

ArmInfo. Prime Minister of Armenia Tigran Sargsyan and Yerevan Mayor
Gagik Beglaryan will run for the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA)
Executive Body, Galust Sahakyan, RPA Vice Chairman, Head of RRA
Faction, said in a press conference on Thursday.

The parliamentarian said that the candidatures of the prime minister
and the mayor will be advanced during the elections to the RPA
Executive Body at the next RPA Congress on November 28. G. Sahakyan
said that the RPA Executive Body staff will be enlarged i.e. it will
comprise 14 instead of present 12 representatives. After the new staff
is elected, the RPA Leader, President of Armenia Serzh Sargsyan will
elect the Vice Chairmen of the Party. G. Sahakyan did not rule out
that Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan will be elected one of the RPA
Vice Chairmen.

As regards the rumors that Prosecutor General and Head of the National
Security Service of Armenia will be allegedly dismissed, G. Sahakyan
said the RPA has not discussed the given issues.

Statement Of The NKR National Assembly: Azerbaijan Openly Gaining Ti

STATEMENT OF THE NKR NATIONAL ASSEMBLY: AZERBAIJAN OPENLY GAINING TIME TO CHANGE MILITARY AND POLITICAL BALANCE IN THE REGION

ArmInfo
2009-11-26 18:38:00

ArmInfo. The National Assembly of the Nagorny Karabakh Republic adopted
a statement in connection with the latest developments related to
the Nagorno-Karabakh issue on November 25.

The statement in particular says that the latest developments of
the Karabakh settlement have proved the non-constructiveness of
Azerbaijan. The authors of the statement affirm that Azerbaijan is
just prolonging time expressing its complaints with international
mediation to start a new war against Artsakh. Under these conditions,
the Artsakh parliament assesses the statements of the Azerbaijani
high-ranking officials as an expression of hopeless negotiating party
which is full of dangers for peace settlement. The NKR government has
repeatedly urged international organizations about the Azerbaijani
aggressive foreign policy. All this is accompanied by regular breaches
of the cease-fire on the contact line between Karabakh and Azerbaijan.

With this statement, the NKR parliament focuses the attention of
the OSCE Minsk group, mediator countries’ parliaments, OSCE and
CoE on these dangerous developments. Azerbaijan makes continuous
efforts to distort the essence of the Karabakh conflict and the
negotiations casting doubt on the efficiency of all the efforts by the
international community to establish peace and security in the region.
The NKR parliament proposes the NKR foreign ministry to release this
statement at the forthcoming OSCE Ministers’ council session in Athens.