INTERVIEW WITH DAVID PHILLIPS ON ‘MAPPING ISSUES BETWEEN TURKS AND IRAQI KURDS’
By Azad Aslan and Rebwar Karim Wali
Kurdish Globe
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June 1 2009
The Kurdish Globe in association with Hewler (daily Kurdish newspaper
published in Erbil) took the opportunity to interview David L. Phillips
in Kurdistan.
David Phillips is a senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council of the United
States and Director of the Project on Confidence-Building between Turks
and Iraqi Kurds. Phillips is currently an Associate Professor at New
York University’s Graduate School of Politics and Visiting Scholar at
the Centre for Study of Human Rights at Columbia University. He has
worked as a senior adviser to the United Nations Secretariat and as
a foreign affairs expert and senior adviser to the US Department of
State, where he participated in the ‘Future of Iraq Project.’ He has
held positions as a Visiting Scholar at Harvard University’s Center
for Middle East Studies, Executive Director of Columbia University’s
International Conflict Resolution Program, and the Director of the
Program on Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding at the American
University. He has also been a Senior Fellow and Deputy Director
of the Council on Foreign Relations’ Center for Preventive Action,
President of the Congressional Human Rights Foundation, and Executive
Director of the Elie Wiesel Foundation for Humanity. David Phillips
is author of From Bullets to Ballots: Violent Muslim Movements in
Transition (Transaction Press, 2008), Losing Iraq: Inside and Postwar
Reconstruction Fiasco (Perseus Books, 2005), Unsilencing the Past:
Track Two Diplomacy and Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation (Berghahn
Books, 2005). He has also authored many policy reports, as well as more
than 100 articles in leading publications such as the New York Times,
Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, International Herald Tribune,
and Foreign Affairs.
We started by asking David Phillips on his interest in Kurdistan:
‘My interest has always been about Iraq and about Iraqi Kurds in
particular.’ Phillips has been traveling to Kurdistan of Iraq since
1992. First time he had a trip to Kurdistan was in February 1992 to
participate in Patriotic Union of Kurdistan’s conference. Later in
August 1993 he participated in Kurdistan Democratic Party’s conference.
Globe and Hawler asked David to comment on his report that deals with
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) relations with Turkey. ‘We are
now at a very critical juncture (in Iraq). The election of President
Barack Obama and his plan to responsibly redeploy US forces from Iraq
means that American’s presence here will be reduced and finalized. It
is important that we focus leaving Iraq in a condition that is stable
and it is in peace with itself and peace with its neighbors. My view
is that the risks for Iraq are largely in the northern part of the
country. If it is going to be a spasm of violence that upsets President
Obama’s redeployment plan it will likely occur between Baghdad and
KRG around the issues like Kirkuk and disputed territories. Because
of the proximity and interests of frontline states Turkey and Iran
may involve in potential conflicts. So the US government needs to
carefully manage the situation here so that the chances for peace
and prosperity are maximized.
‘To me that means focusing on relation between Erbil and Ankara. The
most strategically important relationship for the KRG is Turkey. And
I am very encouraged that over the past year or so there has been a
positive trend established in KRG -Turkey relations. Ankara clearly
made a decision, a strategic decision, to cooperate with the KRG and
to stop vilifying President Barzani. And as a result of that there has
been a very carefully laid dialogue at the official level to talk about
the issues that concern Turkey and KRG. So this is good news. Those
talks have to result in outcomes where there is mutual benefit for both
people. In order to consolidate the progress, (apart from official
contacts), there are also needs to be a greater interaction between
Iraqi Kurds and Turks in area of mutual interest and benefit.
‘This brings me to discussion about our report to present President
Barzani, Prime Minister, Nechirvan Barzani, and other KRG officials
and also to go Turkey to present the report there to intellectuals
and journalists in that country. On April 13-15, 2009, the Atlantic
Council of the United States (ACUS) convened a group of Turks, Iraqi
Kurds and other Iraqis in Washington, D.C. The purpose of the meeting
was to map issues affecting relations between Turks and Iraqi Kurds
and consider collaboration. American and European experts also joined
the discussion. ‘
For David Phillips the Atlantic Council of the United States report
‘Mapping Issues Between Turks and Iraqi Kurds’ provides recommendations
to serve as the basis for discussion between Turks and Iraqi
Kurds. Future meetings are anticipated in Istanbul and Erbil. The
report selected a number of strategic areas to address in order to
enhance relations between Turkey and KRG. These areas include trade and
investment between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan; cooperation on energy
and its transport; disputed territories and resolving the status of
Kirkuk and its peaceful solution; minority rights in Kurdistan; and
the PKK presence in Kurdistan Region and diminishing public support
for the PKK in Turkey. Phillips said the ‘report describes each of
these issues and make some recommendations. Those recommendations
are the views of myself and they are drawn on the discussion held
with others but it does not represent the views of participants.’
U.S. Turkey and Iraqi Kurds
For Phillips ‘Iraqi Kurdistan is potentially volatile and a threat to
regional stability. The status of Kirkuk, the resolution of disputed
territories, and relations among the KRG, Turkmen, and Arabs are
all flashpoints for conflict escalation. Turkey’s concern about
the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan is exacerbated
by the PKK’s presence in KRG-controlled territories. Conflict
escalation within Iraq or between Iraq and its neighbors, including
Turkey and Iran, would be a serious setbacks to both regional and
U.S. interests.’ Because of this David argued ‘the United States must
be fully engaged in managing important challenges in the region. The
State Department’s Bureau for Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) could appoint
an experienced and knowledgeable representative to work full time
on these issues. Alternatively, a "Special Envoy for Northern Iraqi
and Regional Issues" would help focus U.S. efforts to integrate the
interrelated themes of security, democracy, and development. The envoy
would also help raise the profile of these problems, streamline the
inter-agency process, and navigate the US Government architecture
for Iraq and Turkey.’
Phillips inserts that due to the U.S. strong relations both with
Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan the U.S. ‘does not want to be in a position
where it has to choose between Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan as allies,’
but must have its leverage on these two entities to come and find a
common stand to resolve their outstanding issues. ‘Turkey is one of
America’s strongest and most reliable allies. Straddling Europe and
Asia, it played a critical role containing the Soviet Union during the
Cold War. As a secular Muslim democracy, Turkey serves as an example
to other Muslim-majority countries. After 9/11, Turkey was a critical
staging area for operations in Afghanistan. .. Turkey’s cooperation is
also critical to other U.S. strategic interests: redeploying troops
from Iraq, constraining Iran’s nuclear development, and enhancing
energy security through the development of sources in the Caspian
and via transport in the Caucasus. Turkey is part of the G-20, and
has an important role to play in the global economic recovery.’
‘The United States’ argued David, ‘also has strong sense of
solidarity with Iraqi Kurds and the KRG. The U.S. -led "Operation
Provide Comfort" saved tens of thousands of Kurdish lives after the
1991 Gulf War. America’s security guarantee created conditions for
self-rule by Iraqi Kurds. Because U.S. armed forces were denied
access to Iraq through Turkey in 2003, the U.S. worked even more
closely with the KRG and its Peshmerga to stabilize northern Iraq
after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Peshmerga also played an
important role in liberating northern Iraq in 2003, and served as
hardened and effective fighters in support of the military surge. Not
one U.S. citizen, soldier or contractor has been kidnapped, wounded,
or killed in Iraqi Kurdistan. With regard to political cooperation
in Baghdad, Iraqi Kurds have consistently supported Iraq’s secular
and democratic tendencies.’
Promoting Economic Ties between Turkey and KRG
For Phillips improving economic ties between Turkey and KRG is
one of the essential preconditions for better relations between
the two. ‘Turkey dominates the market (Iraqi Kurdistan). Goods are
transported via the Habur Gate at Zakho. Up to 80% of goods sold in
Iraqi Kurdistan are made in Turkey. Between 2003 and 2007, Turkey
invested $6.32 billion, primarily in the energy and construction
sectors. Today there are 1,200 Turkish companies that are active
in Iraqi Kurdistan, including 300 construction firms that completed
$2 billion in infrastructure projects. Sharing water resources also
serves the interests of both Turks and Iraqi Kurds. The KRG plans $100
billion in construction projects; Turkey will benefit further. As
the 17th largest economy in the world, Turkey’s economic growth is
fueled by trade ties to the Middle East that use Iraq as a lynchpin
for transport.’
Phillips argues that ‘some of Turkey’s security establishment and
secular elite oppose trade with Iraqi Kurdistan, claiming that its
enrichment lays the ground for independence. They propose closing the
Habur gate and opening a land route through Syria for goods headed
to Iraq. They also point to the fact that Turkish businessmen report
delays and payment problems from transactions in Iraqi Kurdistan.’
The report recommends that ‘opening a second border crossing would
reduce congestion and generate additional customs fees for the
government of Iraq. The Habur gate at Zakho needs upgrading on both
sides of the border. Improving surface transport infrastructure,
including construction of an Urfa-Diyarbakir-Erbil highway, would
facilitate the transportation of goods. Trade fairs like the one
in Gaziantep, and the establishment of a free-trade zone near the
border would facilitate trade generating economic benefits to the
Southeast.’ The report also recommends KRG ‘to open trade promotion
offices in Istanbul, Bursa and Diyarbakir. Likewise, Turkey could
consider establishing a trade promotion/liaison office in Erbil
and Suleymania that could evolve into a diplomatic liaison office
and ultimately a consulate.’ More importantly, for David ‘economic
benefits to the Southeast would have the added benefit of moderating
Kurds in Turkey.’
Fostering Cooperation on Energy Extraction and Transport
Energy sector is another crucial area that Turkey and KRG can cooperate
and this may work effectively to improve relations between Turkey and
KRG. ‘Turkey is a growing consumer of energy products. It produces
only 48,000 BBD, but requires 800,000BBD. Turkey’s Pet Oil signed a
PSA (Petroleum Sharing Agreement) in 2002 to develop the Shakal bloc
between Kifri and Kalar in Sulaymania governorate. It later signed a
PSA to develop the Bina-Bawi bloc just north of Erbil. Genel Enerji
signed a PSA in 2003 to develop the Tak Tak and Kewa Chirmila blocs
about 60 kilometers north of Kirkuk. Ankara has prevented the Turkish
Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) from bidding on oil and gas contracts
in Iraq. Turkey currently depends on Russian gas transported across
the Black Sea via the "Blue Stream" pipeline and across Ukraine,
Moldova, Romania and Bulgaria via another pipeline. Should volumes
be high enough, new natural gas discoveries east of Sulaymania could
represent an alternate supply for both Turkey and Europe to Russian
gas. In addition to the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik Pipeline, a gas pipeline
will be required as natural gas fields in Iraqi Kurdistan come on
line. Gas from Iraq is also needed to fill up the Nabucco pipeline
and make it profitable.’
The problem with regard to energy transport via Turkey is the lack
of Hydrocarbons and Revenue Sharing Laws that stalled in 2007. Oil
transported to Turkey / Ceyhan via Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline requires
a certificate of origin from government of Iraq. Baghdad refuses
to issue the required certificate due to the absent of national
Hydrocarbons Law. ‘Turkey strongly supports the adoption of a
Hydrocarbons Law by the federal government, arguing that it would
strengthen ties between the KRG and Baghdad. Until then, Turkey
forbids assistance to the KRG’s energy sector and bans oil exports
from Iraqi Kurdistan via pipelines in Turkey.’
The report recommends that ‘the government of Iraq and KRG should build
on the recent export agreement to finalize the national Hydrocarbons
and Revenue Sharing Laws.’ The report urges ‘Nabucco investors should
base economic forecasts on the assumption that the government of Iraq
and KRG will resolve their differences enabling gas supplies to come
on line by 2011.
Kirkuk Question
Kirkuk is a very crucial issue that has potential to disrupt stability
of Iraq and ‘could pit Kurds against Arabs and Turkmen. Failure to
resolve Kirkuk’s status peacefully also risks embroiling Turkey,
which believes that Kirkuk’s accession to Iraqi Kurdistan would be a
precursor to independence. Actions by Turkey could lead to regional
conflagration. ‘
Phillips acknowledges the Kurdish position with regard to Kirkuk
as ‘Kurds believe that Article 140 was already a compromise, and
accordingly they refuse further concessions and reject alternative
arrangements.’
Phillips recommends the following with regard to the question
of Kirkuk and disputed territories: Postponing an agreement on
Kirkuk’s status will increase volatility and aggravate the anxiety
of minority groups. Postponing a determination on Kirkuk will
also result in delays enacting the Hydrocarbons and Revenue Sharing
Laws. Resolving the Kirkuk conundrum requires restraint, statesmanship
and concessions. However gradual steps that are consistent with
Article 140 are the alternative to violence. UNAMI’s scenarios should
be discussed by Iraqi groups in a structured dialog emphasizing
collaboration. The process itself is a conflict resolution exercise
with the prospect of building momentum towards further compromise
and reconciliation. A Special Envoy on Northern Iraqi and Regional
Issues could assist the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq in managing Kirkuk
and demarcation disputes.
Addressing the PKK presence in Iraqi Kurdistan
The most crucial issues that stand between proper relations between
Turkey and KRG are the presence of PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan. Phillips
argued that Ankara demands cooperation from the KRG in its efforts
against PKK. Turkey ask KRG to arrest PKK leaders, interdict
funds for the PKK transported via the Erbil airport, establish
check points limiting travel and media access, and close pro-PKK
political parties. As PKK is a deeply emotional issue for Turks,
Phillips argues unless the KRG takes meaningful steps, it would be
difficult for rapprochement between Turkey and KRG.
Phillips argues that ‘Iraqi Kurds insist there is no military solution
to Turkey’s Kurdish question. They maintain that funds and recruits
will continue flowing to the PKK until Turkey recognizes Kurdish
identity and takes real steps to address the historical and current
grievances of Turkish Kurds.’
For Phillips ‘ultimate solution (to the PKK question) resides in the
continued democratization and development, as well as some amnesty
arrangement for the PKK rank and file. Democratization would be
advanced by releasing DTP (pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party)
detainees and implementing legal reforms.’ These legal reforms are
‘reforming Article 7 of the constitution (which defines citizenship
as Turkish), amending or abolishing regressive legislation such as
the Anti-Terror Act and Articles 215, 216, 217, 220, and 301 of the
Penal Code, and fully implementing cultural reforms would go a long
way to enhancing the rule of law and Turkey’s overall democratic
development. Measures are also needed to reform the judiciary,
which is rigid, unaccountable, and deeply conservative.’ David also
recommends that ‘Ankara may reject negotiations with Ocalan (PKK’s
arrested leader), but democratically elected DTP members could be
effective interlocutors. Erdogan should meet with the DTP MPs and
explore substantive talks through the DTP.’ He further suggests
that ‘improved relations between Turkey and the KRG would act as
a confidence-building measure to Kurds in Turkey thereby reducing
tensions in the Southeast. Keeping Turkey on track towards EU
membership is also essential to continued improvement of Turkey-KRG
relations.’ Phillips argued that the reason why the PKK exists and
why they have popular support among the Kurds in Turkey is because of
their feeling of social, cultural, economic and political interests
have been ill-served by Turkish state. So Turkey has to take specific
steps in order to further advance the political, cultural rights for
the Kurds in Turkey. Launching TRT-6 is a very positive steps in a
fact that PM Erdogan opening the stage and uttering in Kurdish break
a taboo in Turkey.’
On its part KRG, suggests Phillips along with government of Iraq
‘should issue a joint statement labeling the PKK an ‘illegal foreign
organization’ operating without authorization from Iraqi territory
and demand that the PKK leave Iraq immediately. It is important to
show support and empathy for Turkey’s concerns.’
Overall
The Globe asked Phillips whether the highly complex and historically
accumulated problems between Turkey and Kurds both the Kurdish question
in Turkey and the problematic relations between Turkey and KRG can
be resolved by such recommendations and policy designs. Phillips
argued that ‘if Turkey is further integrated into EU there are certain
standards that it must obey and these standards will transform Turkey
to resolve its problems particularly for the southeastern part of the
country. We leave in an era where natural boundaries are less and less
important where integration is the hallmark of progress. So integration
of Turkey into Europe, the integration of Turkey with Iraqi Kurdistan,
and the integration of Turkey and Iraqi interests are all part of a
broader strategy to promote regional peace and stability.’
The Hewler asked in the likelihood of US withdrawal of troops from
Iraq and further tensions and conflicts between the Kurds and Arabs
would the US ask Turkey to look after Iraqi Kurdistan? Or perhaps in
the case of disunity between the Iraqi Kurds and Arabs would there
be any scenario for Iraqi Kurdistan to join Turkey as a federal
system? What would the US position be in such scenario?
‘The Obama administration has goals and schedules to join down its
forces in Iraq. It uses the term ‘responsible redeployment’. That
is not cut and run. That means to leave an Iraq that is stable. The
US wants very much to redeploy but it is not going to leave Iraq in
disarray. That being said there is some serious challenges that Iraq
faces. Continuing threat of al-Qaeda, increasingly authoritarian rule
from Baghdad, and problems between federal government of Baghdad and
KRG are all serious issues, and the US needs to use its leverage over
the next years or so to help the parties resolve this issues.’
David argued that ‘the United States has a pivotal role to play
promoting integration within Iraq, between Iraq and Turkey, and
between Iraqi Kurdistan and Turkey. However, ultimate responsibility
rests with political leaders representing the interests of Turks and
Iraqis, including Iraqi Kurds. Their vision, courage and willingness
to compromise will be critical to facing the challenges ahead. In
addition, civil society can help create conditions for sustainable
peace and prosperity. Track two activities also encourage proactive
steps by officials and as a safety net to prevent violence in case
events take a negative turn.’
He further inferred that ‘ACUS, if requested, will continue to support
contact, communication and cooperation between Turkish and Iraqi
Kurdish civil society representatives. As long as a facilitator is
required, it stands ready to convene the parties and help them overcome
differences. It will also convey impressions and recommendations to
concerned governments. The ultimate objective, however, is to create
a critical mass of integrated activities so that the parties can
themselves work on solutions based on a shared vision for the future.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayArticle.j