Clark Grad Takes Regional Job Anti-Defamation League Director

CLARK GRAD TAKES REGIONAL JOB ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE DIRECTOR

Worcester Telegram
NEWS/808210687/1006/NEWS07
Aug 21 2008
MA

A Clark University graduate and former Clinton resident has been named
the New England regional director for the Anti-Defamation League,
the organization announced yesterday.

Derrek L. Shulman of Needham will join the ADL after serving nearly
six years as the New England political director of the American Israel
Public Affairs Committee in Boston. Mr. Shulman is an adjunct faculty
member at Lassell College’s Graduate School of Elder Care Management,
where he teaches marketing and politics. He has also worked as a
daily newspaper reporter and columnist, with articles appearing in
publications such as The Boston Globe and Baltimore Sun, according
to the ADL. He was also a reporter for the Clinton Daily Item.

"We are entering a growth period at ADL, and Derrek is the perfect
choice to lead us through it," said Esta Gordon Epstein, Chair Elect of
the ADL’s New England Regional Board, in a statement released by the
ADL yesterday. "Derrek has the vision, people skills, and experience
to enhance our ability to build bridges between ADL and other groups
and communities, and to promote diversity and appreciation for our
differences."

A former Clinton resident, Mr. Shulman lives in Needham with his wife,
Beth, and their two young children. Mr. Shulman will replace interim
Regional Director Jonathan Kappel. Mr. Kappel was named interim in
the wake of a controversy. Former Regional Director Andrew H. Tarsy
was fired last year by National Director Abraham H. Foxman for calling
upon the organization to recognize the killings in Turkey as a genocide
and to support a congressional resolution on the matter.

Mr. Foxman said at the time that he and the ADL acknowledged the
massacre but feared that calling the slaughter a genocide might
imperil Jews living in Turkey. Under mounting pressure from Jewish and
Armenian groups, the ADL finally labeled the killings as "tantamount to
genocide," but stopped short of backing the congressional resolution.

Mr. Kappel will stay on as development director at the ADL. He said
Mr. Shulman, who could not be reached for comment last night, is
certainly aware of what the ADL has gone through in the past year,
but said he will start the job in October with a focus on the ADL’s
core mission of fighting anti-Semitism and all forms of bigotry.

http://www.telegram.com/article/20080821/

ANKARA: Turkey’s Top National Security Body Discusses Caucasus Union

TURKEY’S TOP NATIONAL SECURITY BODY DISCUSSES CAUCASUS UNION

Hurriyet
Aug 21 2008
Turkey

Turkey’s National Security Council (MGK) discussed Thursday the recent
situation in the Caucasus after the rise in tension in the region
had forced a change in the agenda. New developments in Turkey-Armenia
relations were also being discussed. (UPDATED)

MGK met in Istanbul on Thursday. Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip
Erdogan briefed the council on his recent visits to Russia, Georgia
and Azerbaijan, as well as the government’s plans to hold contacts
with Armenia on its proposal for forming a Caucasian union.

Foreign Minister Ali Babacan informed the council on the Tuesday’s
extraordinary NATO meeting in Brussels.

The start of the comprehensive talks to end the 44-year division
of Cyprus was expected to top the council’s agenda. However the
clashes between Russia and Georgia have forced the MGK to change its
agenda. The reunification talks in Cyprus would start on Sept. 3. MGK
said in its post-meeting statement that the cooperation with Northern
Cyprus would continue "in a highly sensitive manner" during the
negotiations.

The third item on the MGK agenda includes Iraq and Turkey’s fight
against PKK terrorism. The council reiterated its commitment in
fighting against PKK terrorism.

Under this topic, the status of Kirkuk was also discussed in the
meeting.

TENSION IN CAUCASUS

Clashes erupted in Caucasus on Aug. 8 when Georgian forces launched
an operation to regain control in the breakaway region of South
Ossetia. Russia’s harsh military response intensified the clashes and
the conflict spread wide into the other breakaway regions in Georgia.

Russia and Georgia had signed the peace deal and Moscow vowed to
withdraw its troops by Friday. Russia says there could be no talk of
territorial integrity of Georgia.

The conflict had proved that the political landscape in the region
would change. Turkey faces a tough task in ensuring a balance policy
for the neighboring region between pro-West Georgia and its energy
partner Russia.

Turkey had proposed the formation of a Caucasian union to strengthen
economic ties between the countries in the region to contribute to
the peaceful solution of the problems.

Erdogan had visited Georgia, Russia and Azerbaijan, and all of them
extended their support to the idea. Turkey also would hold talks with
Armenia, a country it does not have diplomatic relations, an attempt
welcomed by Yerevan.

The new era between Turkey-Armenia relations is expected to be
discussed at the MGK meeting. Turkey relaxed its air space quota
for Armenia following the Caucasus crisis after Turkish and Armenian
diplomats held a couple of rounds of secret talks.

President Abdullah Gul was expected to bring up the Armenian invitation
to watch a football game between the two countries’ national teams
in Yerevan on Sept. 6, however there was no reference to this subject
in the post-meeting statement. Gul is yet to decide whether to accept
the invitation or not.

Thursday’s MGK meeting was the last for the retiring Chief of Staff
Gen. Yasar Buyukanit, who would be replaced by Land Forces Commander
Ilker Basbug, on Aug. 30.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ANKARA: What Did You Do For EU Today?

WHAT DID YOU DO FOR EU TODAY?
Ismet Berkan

Turkish Daily News
Aug 21 2008
Turkey

I think Foreign Minister Ali Babacan takes the lead among politicians
who get annoyed by hearing the sentence "The government slows down
in the European Union reforms."

Babacan tries to explain the things done for the EU even in the most
stagnant periods. I am the editor-in-chief of a newspaper giving
full support to Turkey’s EU bid. We are trying to report every single
news story in the subject but if Babacan hadn’t said, I wouldn’t have
become aware that a total of 29 EU-related laws passed in Parliament
since the July 22, 2007 elections.

Babacan’s program is really hectic. He cannot say how many cities
he visited, which world leaders he met or which foreign ministers
he talked to, without looking at his itinerary. And this of course
is not stemming from his being a hardworking man; this is because of
Turkey’s increasing significance and being willing to take a key role
in important issues around the world.

Diplomacy traffic

Let me give you an example here: On Monday morning, Babacan woke up in
Ankara and started the day with working on Turkey’s National Program,
based on an EU road map for the next four years. Then he presented this
program at the Cabinet Council, got on a plane, headed to Istanbul and
hosted the Turkey-African League Summit, had a dinner with the African
leaders and top level officials and flew to Brussels at midnight. In
the early hours of Tuesday, Babacan attended the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, or NATO, extraordinary foreign ministers meeting on
the crisis in Georgia. He was back to Istanbul on the same evening
and then attended a dinner for the African guests hosted by President
Abdullah Gul. Don’t underestimate a NATO meeting, here Babacan met once
again with the State Secretary of the United States Condoleezza Rice;
in fact they were on the phone for the last three days. Then he met
Rice for the second time. Likewise, Babacan took the Caucasus issue
together with his French and German counterparts.

Until yesterday, he was playing a pivotal role in negotiations between
Iran and the West over the Iranian nuclear program. He will continue
to do so. In the meantime, Israel-Syria talks, Syria-Lebanon peace,
bilateral relations with Armenia, etc. are in line. So we are talking
about extraordinary efforts of a human being on a busy agenda.

Communication strategy

I had a chance to talk with Babacan during the Istanbul-Brussels
flight. It was not an interview or a press briefing. It was just a
casual conversation between us. He said that he will make appointments
with opposition leaders in the upcoming days to explain the "National
Program" and seek consensus.

The program is too technical. It states, let’s say, adaptation
of measurement and weighing scales by following such and such EU
directives but on the other side, it also talks about political reform
process, for instance adaptation of the Venice Criteria in the closure
of political parties.

Technical matters, which include a colossal 1,600 word article,
Turkish Trade Law regulations pending in Parliament, are relatively
easier subjects to deal with. But political reforms necessarily
contain constitutional amendments, so they are more sensitive and
certainly requires consensus.

But on the other hand, communication strategy to be followed inside
the country and this communication itself are as important as the EU
bid. If I do not even know that a total of 29 laws were passed in the
previous period, then the public opinion that the EU works stopped
cannot be blamed.

Perhaps the government should reconsider bringing EU reform packages
to Parliament for discussions again. Perhaps then we will revive the
public excitement for the EU bid and an EU promotion can be managed
this way. For instance, The Consumer Courts that now we have in the
system and owe to the Customs Union are in service for the benefit
of people, but this was not even communicated to the public properly.

Expectations of a high gear

I hope the government will take a high gear in the EU works after the
"National Program" and we go back to discuss positive agenda items
and our future.

There is this Georgia crisis by the way. NATO foreign ministers
convened 10 days after the war between Russia and Georgia. They will
probably have no solid decision. So I wonder if it is necessary to
question about why we have NATO. I think it is.

Georgia and the Caucasus are extremely critical areas that cannot be
left to Russia to be its back yard. But I wonder if the Western system
will be able to wake up from this 18-year long sleep and if it does,
isn’t it late?

"No, come on. Nothing had ended yet," say some optimists, but I
disagree with them.

Georgia will claim its place in history as one of the biggest failures
and inattention of the Western system.

And don’t forget that we have our share in this failure too!

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ANKARA: Turkey Readies For Dialo Gue With Armenia Over Caucasus Plan

TURKEY READIES FOR DIALO GUE WITH ARMENIA OVER CAUCASUS PLAN

Turkish Daily News
Aug 21 2008
Turkey

With Turkey on tour promoting the creation of a Caucasus alliance
platform following the Georgia-Russia war, it faces the difficult
question of how to communicate this idea to Armenia. Before departing
for Azerbaijan, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, said Foreign
Minister, Ali Babacan, will speak to his Russian counterpart Sergei
Lavrov this week, "after which the format of the contacts with Armenia"
will be determined.

Diplomatic sources told the Turkish Daily News that contact with
Yerevan could be held at the level of deputy undersecretary of the
Foreign Ministry. Unal Ceviköz was one of the Turkish diplomats who
held secret talks with Armenian counterparts in Switzerland.

"We may not have diplomatic ties but Turkey recognizes Armenia,"
said a Turkish diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity. He said
the absence of Yerevan in the Turkey-sponsored Caucasus solidarity
mechanism would be felt because it was Armenia that was most affected
by the latest war in the region.

In a conciliatory message to Armenia, President, Abdullah Gul, said
over the weekend that Turkey is "no enemy" to any country in the
region, stressing that the Georgia-Russia conflict has shown the need
for "early measures to resolve frozen problems" in the Caucasus.

Ankara has refused to establish diplomatic ties with Yerevan, since
the former Soviet republic gained independence in 1991, because of an
Armenian campaign to secure international recognition of the Armenian
killings under the Ottoman Empire as genocide.

In 1993, Turkey also shut its border with Armenia in a show of
solidarity with its close ally Azerbaijan, then at war with Armenia,
dealing a heavy economic blow to the impoverished nation.

Diplomats from Turkey and Armenia met secretly in Switzerland in July
in a fresh effort to normalize ties, following three rounds of talks
in 2005 and 2006. No progress has been publicly made known.

Erdogan traveled to Moscow and Tbilisi last week to discuss the
Caucasus proposal.

On his visit to Baku, he said he and Azerbaijani President, Ilham
Aliyev, would discuss Ankara’s proposal to establish a regional
platform for stability and cooperation in the Caucasus that would
include Georgia, Russia and Armenia.

"We have vital interests in securing durable peace and stability in
the region," he told reporters.

–Boundary_(ID_be/gdUz9ET51KVi8inXyWw) —

Caucasus: If Russia Acted Differently And Future Possibilities

CAUCASUS: IF RUSSIA ACTED DIFFERENTLY AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES
Michael Averko

American Chronicle
s/71911
Aug 21 2008
CA

A series of destabilizing responses were likely if Russia did not
counterattack against the August 7 Georgian government strike into
South Ossetia. Russia would have probably faced a significantly
greater refugee crisis from what occurred. Georgian president Mikheil
Saakashvili might have had greater inclination to attack Abkhazia. Many
Russians would be pressing the issue of why their government did not
take action to deter the hypothetically stated situation.

These points relate to why Russia acted in the way it did. In doing
so, the Kremlin no doubt considered the rhetorical backlash it would
receive.

The Russian government was in a kind of "damned if you do, damned
if you don’t" scenario. They knew that a reasonably based (as far
as major powers conducting armed action) counterattack against the
Georgian government was not going to be met with open arms from Western
neo-liberals and neo-conservatives. On the other hand, a Russian
non-military response would probably not result in significant benefits
for Russia. On the contrary, some in the West would gloat about how
their guy Saakashvili had his way with "Russian surrogates" and Russia.

Russian foreign policy takes into account the Western post-Soviet
global advocacy that favors certain humanitarian issues over
others. Western laxness to the 1995 ethnic cleansing of 150,000 Krajina
Sebs and willingness to downplay Kosovo Liberation Army transgressions
lead Moscow to believe that the West would not be so scornful of a
"disproportionate" Georgian government attempt which victoriously
retook South Ossetia and Abkhazia.

In 1992, Russia assumed the role of peacekeeper in the disputed
South Ossetian and Abkhaz territories of the former Georgian Soviet
Socialist Republic (SSR). As the strongest force in the Caucasus,
the Russians were on better terms with the involved adversaries than
he belligerents were with themselves.

Comparative references are made to the Russian counterattack on Georgia
and the 2003 American led attack on Iraq. Of course, Saakashvili is
nowhere near the threat that Saddam Hussein posed. At the same time,
the territory of the former Georgian SSR borders Russia, whereas
Iraq is not even in the same hemisphere as the United States. In
1991, there was an international consensus for turning back Saddam’s
invasion of Kuwait. This included Syria and Turkey; two countries not
known for seeing eye to eye. In 2003, Syria, Turkey and other nations
expressed apprehension to the American led attack which overthrew
Saddam. For now, it appears that the suffering caused by the Russian
military action in Georgia will be considerably lower than what Iraq
has experienced since 2003.

Georgia’s best chance at successfully achieving a mutually agreed to
jurisdiction in South Ossetia and Abkhazia involve factors that some
will not find appealing. The least provocative factor grants the two
regions great autonomy. The other facet concerns Georgia and Russia
redeveloping closer ties. South Ossetia and Georgia are not currently
motivated to be a part of Georgia. Russia presently sees little reason
to please Georgian desires in the two disputed territories.

Attention has been given to Abkhazia’s ethnic makeup prior to the
Soviet breakup (17.8% Abkhaz and 45.7% Georgian, as per the 1989
Soviet census). The roughly 35% non-ethnic Abkhaz/Georgian population
took different positions on the Abkhaz-Georgian dispute. Many
fled post-Soviet war torn Abkhazia, with a good number remaining
(according to a 2003 census of Abkhazia, 43.8% of the population is
Abkhaz and 21.3% Georgian). The Abkhaz note that they were said to be
a majority in their region going back to about the mid-19th century
(based on not always accurate census taking). During the Stalin era,
the Abkhaz felt discriminated against when compared to the Georgians.

Abkhazia’s situation reveals how disputed territories have different
circumstances. Among the comparative specifics being history and human
rights, in conjunction with the overall will of the people from the
respective disputed territory. The disputed former Communist bloc
territories are Kosovo, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh
and Trans-Dniester.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

http://www.americanchronicle.com/article

The PKK And Kirkuk

THE PKK AND KIRKUK

Kurdish Globe
sp?id=965B6EB6C2B35ACBD2F138464E1FF1A1
Aug 21 2008
Iraq

Turkish soldiers take part in a military parade in the Turkish occupied
area of the divided capital Nicosia, Cyprus, Sunday, July 20, 2008. AFP

International world politics are in deep-crisis mode, with the
possibility of the advent of a new Cold War era, mainly between
Western bloc countries and Russia/China.

The regions of the Middle East, East Europe, and Caucasia are focal
points for international contention. The war in Iraq, the conflict
between Georgia and Russia, the row over Iran’s nuclear program,
and the missile defense system deal signed this week between the
U.S. and Poland despite Russia’s serious objections indicate the
dangerous path of world politics.

Kurdistan as a geostrategic region in the Middle East and its
approximate closeness to the Caucasus (through north Kurdistan/Turkey
Kurdistan) without doubt makes it a very strategic region, thus
attracting the attention of international powers.

The Kurdish nationalist movement in general has been caught unprepared
and disoriented in this sensitive period when the great powers are in a
deep struggle for restructuring world politics and the economy. South
Kurdistan’s political actors’ relevant organization and united
stance thankfully elevated the political status of southern Kurds
(Iraqi Kurds) to a recognizable position. The divided, disoriented,
and confused state of affairs of Kurdish political movements in other
parts, however, not only reduces the chance and opportunities for the
realization of Kurdish national rights, but at the same time presents
a serious menace on further political gains of southern Kurdistan
(Iraqi Kurdistan), particularly on the issue of Kirkuk. In this
confused state of affairs, the PKK is the major reason and it must
be dealt with swiftly.

The Ergenekon case in Turkey not only exposed the dark side of the
Turkish state’s illegal acts, but it also revealed the PKK’s relation
with Ergenekon. The Istanbul public prosecutor’s accusation about
Ergenekon throws serious doubt on the PKK’s real intentions and
its dirty relations with it. Ergenekon is not what most observers
claim-a gang supported by some high-ranking military officials. It is
a legacy of Teskilati Mahsusa, a clandestine organization set up by
the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), which played a major role
in the Armenian Genocide in 1915 and the formation and development
of the Kemalist movement following World War I.

The PKK is a Trojan horse in Turkey, used initially to fragment the
Kurdish national movement during the 1980s and later to destabilize
Iraqi Kurdistan from the 1990s to the present. The incorporation of
Kirkuk into Kurdistan Region will be a historical turning point for
a century-long Kurdish national movement, and the reality is that,
among all others, it is Turkey that exerts all its pressure and
threats not to allow this to happen. The only serious weapon that
Turkey has to destabilize southern Kurdistan is the PKK card and it
plays it well. Military and political destabilization of Kurdistan
Region of Iraq and constant threat of a possible Turkish invasion is
a key stumbling block in the way of southern Kurds to press further
on Kirkuk.

It is crucial to notice that without a resolution to the PKK problem,
the incorporation of Kirkuk to Kurdistan Region will barely be
possible. Southern Kurdish political actors’ seriousness in the Kirkuk
issue must be reflected on the issue of the PKK. This card must be
taken out of the hands of Turkey without further delay.

http://www.kurdishglobe.net/displayArticle.j

A Newer World Order

A NEWER WORLD ORDER

Socialist Worker Online
er-world-order
Aug 21 2008
IL

Lee Sustar looks at the political impact of Russia’s invasion of
Georgia.

Russian soldiers look on as Georgia burns

THE RUSSIA-Georgia war has revealed a new balance of power in the
world–and exposed the hypocrisy of U.S. politicians and the media
who decry the imperialism emanating from Moscow, but embrace it when
it’s made in the USA.

John McCain, of course, wins the prize for setting the most outrageous
double standard. "In the 21st century," he informed us, "nations
don’t invade other nations." Unless, of course, we’re talking about
Afghanistan or Iraq, and the invading power happens to be the United
States. McCain demanded and immediate pullout of all Russian forces
from Georgia and insisted upon its "territorial integrity"–even as
he claims the right for the U.S. to occupy Iraq for the next 100 years.

The supposedly progressive Barack Obama sounded little different. "I
have condemned Russian aggression, and today I reiterate my demand
that Russia abide by the cease-fire," he said. "Russia must know that
its actions will have consequences."

One can imagine how a President Obama would respond if Russian Prime
Minister Vladimir Putin or President Dimitri Medvedev declared that
he wouldn’t withdraw all troops from Georgia right away, but would
leave behind a large occupation force in order to be "as careful
in getting out of Georgia as we were careless in getting in." That,
of course, is Obama’s excuse for keeping up to 50,000 U.S. troops in
Iraq for "force protection," the defense of U.S. military personnel
and "anti-terrorist" missions–the same kind of pretext that Russia
used to move beyond Georgia’s disputed South Ossetia region to a
full-fledged invasion.

The media has been even more two-faced than the politicians. The
same news outlets that parroted the Pentagon whitewash of civilian
casualties in the horrific U.S. blitz on Falluja in Iraq in 2004 or
aerial bombardment of wedding parties in Afghanistan now breathlessly
report on the Russian bombs and artillery shells that hit apartment
buildings and markets.

For the U.S. media, when Washington military action causes civilian
deaths–between 600,000 and more than 1 million in Iraq, according
to some estimates–it’s "collateral damage," a regrettable but
unavoidable part of modern warfare. Yet when a Russian plane drops a
bomb that kills innocent bystanders, it’s a barbaric disregard for
human life. One wonders just how much more unpopular the U.S. war
in Iraq would be if the media worked as hard at exposing civilian
casualties in that country as it has in Georgia.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

TO POINT out this U.S. hypocrisy isn’t to downplay the imperial nature
of Russia’s latest occupation of Georgia. Georgia may have initiated
the conflict by trying to smash the Russian-backed separatists among
the Ossetian minority–and likely did so with a green light from the
U.S. But Russia seized the opportunity to make an example of Georgia
through military might–and not for the first time.

The Tsarist rulers of old Russia conquered Georgia more than two
centuries ago. After a brief interlude following the Russian Revolution
of 1917, Georgia was again imprisoned in Stalin’s USSR. The Georgian
nationalist movement revived in the 1980s despite murderous repression
by the supposedly liberal Mikhail Gorbachev, the last president of
the USSR.

The 1991 collapse of the USSR saw the non-Russian "federal republics,"
including Georgia, gain independence. With Russian imperialism in
crisis, U.S. imperialism was determined to fill the vacuum, not only
in Moscow’s former puppet states in Eastern Europe, but in countries
formerly part of the USSR.

Georgia, however, was slow going for the U.S. The pro-Western Georgian
nationalist leader, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, pushed a "Georgia for the
Georgians" line that frightened the 30 percent of the population that
was non-Georgian–people whom Gamsakhurdia ominously referred to as
"guests." The first non-Communist Party head of Georgia in the waning
days of the USSR, Gamsakhurdia went on to revoke the autonomous
status of Abkhazia and North Ossetia, which had been enshrined in
the USSR’s constitution. Resistance from the Abkhazians and Ossetians
led to civil war and ethnic cleansing and, with Russian intervention,
de facto independence for both regions since 1993.

The situation was little changed under the regime of Eduard
Schevardnadze, the former foreign minister of the USSR who returned
home to Georgia to take over the presidency after Gamsakhurdia was
ousted in a coup. During Schevardnadze’s decade in power, Russia and
the U.S. jockeyed for influence in Georgia.

Washington found a willing business partner in Schevardnadze. He was
in favor of an oil pipeline that would bypass Russia. He was also
a career Soviet politician who had run Georgia in the 1970s and who
refused to take a consistent anti-Moscow line. In 2003, an election
year in Georgia, Schevardnadze set off alarm bells in Washington by
making a deal with the Russian electrical power monopoly AES, which
followed an earlier "strategic partnership" with the huge Russian
gas company Gazprom.

In late 2003, the U.S., then still in the confident "Mission
Accomplished" phase of the Iraq war, decided to up the ante. It
backed the U.S.-educated lawyer Mikheil Saakashvili, the leader of
the mass protests of the "Rose Revolution" that ousted Schevardnadze
after his party tried to rig parliamentary election results. Modeled
on the rebellion that drove Slobodan Milosevic from power in Serbia
in 2000, the Rose Revolution was sustained in part by money from the
foundation controlled by billionaire financier George Soros. In the
wake of the Rose Revolution the Soros foundation and other donors,
as well as the United Nations Development Project, even paid salaries
for 11,000 civil servants as part of a three-year aid program.

The U.S. saw the Saakashvili government as a means to accelerate its
energy and defense plans for Georgia. Saakashvili’s presidential
inauguration in 2004 was attended by then-Secretary of State
Colin Powell, who announced $166 million in immediate aid as well
as a three-year, $500 million aid package to promote "economic
reforms." This was only part of a steady stream of U.S. dollars
to a country of just 4.6 million people. According to one study,
Georgia is the second highest recipient of U.S. aid per capita in
the world. Meanwhile, the European Union and the World Bank pledged
another $1 billion in assistance to Saakashvili’s government.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

SOON, THE White House was ready to plant the U.S. flag in the heart
of the South Caucasus. George W. Bush visited Tbilisi in May 2005 to
"underscore his support for democracy, historic reform and peaceful
conflict resolution," as the U.S. Embassy in Georgia put it in a
press release. These "reforms," according to Kakha Bendukidze, the
Russia-based industrial oligarch turned Georgian economy minister,
meant that the Georgian state would privatize "everything that can
be sold, except its conscience."

With Saakashvili in power, Washington moved aggressively to create in
Georgia a crucial gateway for oil and gas pipelines that could bypass
Russia on the north and Iran on the south. It was under Saakashvili
that the long-sought Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline was finally
completed in 2005, providing a means to get oil from Azerbaijan on
the Caspian Sea across Georgia to a Turkish port on the Mediterranean.

The U.S. had to strong-arm Western oil companies into building
BTC–ultimately, BP agreed to take the lead. The U.S. also had to
pressure the International Finance Corporation, the private development
arm of the World Bank, to loan $250 million for construction of
the pipeline.

"In the South Caucasus, U.S. and European state interests are bound
up with the commercial interests of major oil companies that form the
principal Caspian energy consortia," wrote Damien Helly and Giorgi
Gogia, two experts on Georgian politics. "To secure their investments
in the Caspian Sea Basin, these companies have found allies among
U.S. geostrategists who support a strong U.S. presence among Russia’s
neighbors. High-level former officials such as Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Brent Scowcroft, John Sununu, James Baker and Richard Cheney (when
he was head of Halliburton) have all visited Baku [Azerbaijan] and
the Caspian region and lobbied in favor of the oil companies."

These U.S. economic and political projects had to be secured
militarily. Thus, in the wake of 9/11, the U.S. began to send military
advisers to Georgia. That move rankled Moscow, which also accused
Georgia of doing too little to stop the flow of arms and insurgents
across its border into neighboring Chechnya, where separatists were
fighting the Russian armed forces.

For Russia, Georgia was seen as a red line that the U.S. and NATO could
not cross. In the early 1990s, Russia had no choice but to allow the
expansion of NATO to include its former satellites in Eastern Europe
and the three former Soviet Republics on the Baltic. But the U.S. push
to include Georgia and Ukraine in the alliance–as well as efforts
to place anti-missile systems in the Czech Republic and Poland–was
too much for the Kremlin.

After Saakashvili took over in Tbilisi, U.S.-Russian tensions over
Georgia increased dramatically. In 2004, NATO approved Georgia’s
"Individual Action Partnership Plan," the first step toward membership
of the alliance, and stationed a liaison officer in Tbilisi. In the
years since, the U.S. and Israel have sent military trainers to upgrade
Georgia’s military to NATO standards, and Saakashvili has showed his
loyalty to the U.S. by sending 2,500 Georgian troops to participate in
the occupation of Iraq. By 2007, the Georgian armed forces, previously
a ragtag outfit unable to defeat irregular militias in South Ossetia
or Abkhazia, was well-drilled, lavishly equipped and NATO-ready. The
U.S. pushed for a fast-track acceptance into the alliance.

All that state-of-the-art weaponry, of course, is now smashed or
captured by the Russian army, and the armed forces shattered by the
Russian occupation. What began as the latest U.S. attempt to use a
small nation as an outpost of the American Empire has ended with a
brutal invasion by a rival empire, one just as determined to police
its own "backyard" as the U.S. has been in Latin America. And in
the wake of the Russia-Georgia war, oil-rich Azerbaijan–which has
its own separatist region populated by ethnic Armenians allied with
Russia–will think twice about crossing Moscow to sign up with the
U.S. and NATO.

But the consequences of the Russian invasion go far beyond the
South Caucasus region. The war has exposed the expanded NATO as
a hollow organization. "For an organization that has come to rely
heavily on words and symbolism, NATO issued a disconcertingly evasive
communique at its emergency meeting on Georgia," journalist Vladimir
Socor wrote. "The first mention of Russia appears only in the second
paragraph, and it is a positive mention: NATO ‘welcomes the [armistice]
agreement reached and signed by Georgia and Russia.’ No reference to
the Russian military duress, under which this flawed armistice was
‘reached.’ The communique urges prompt, good-faith implementation of
the armistice, politely ignoring its loopholes."

So much for NATO’s vaunted "one-for-all, all-for-one" principle. The
U.S. and NATO have bankrolled and armed a tiny nation, encouraged or
tolerated a military attack that was bound to trigger a response from
a neighboring great power–and, when that small country was invaded
and occupied, the U.S. stood back and did nothing.

So much for the neoconservative dream of a "new world order" under
U.S. domination, guaranteed by pre-emptive warfare and regime
change. The U.S. wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were intended to
allow Washington to consolidate its grip on the Middle East and
project its power into the Caucusus and Central Asia. Instead, the
U.S. finds itself militarily overstretched, incapable of protecting
its new client states and unable even to get a strong resolution
out of NATO condemning Russia’s invasion of Georgia–to say nothing
of NATO countries’ reluctance to commit troops to the losing war
in Afghanistan.

There are other examples of waning U.S. imperial clout–the ouster
of Pervez Musharraf as dictator of Pakistan being the latest serious
example. The cracks in the empire, in turn, are widened by the ongoing
U.S. financial crisis which is increasingly dragging down the entire
world economy. The entire U.S. economic model–the pro-business,
free-trade neoliberal program–is being discredited. The recent
collapse of the latest World Trade Organization negotiations is a
case in point.

U.S. imperialism is far from a spent force, of course. The country
still has enormous military might and economic resources, and a
President Obama would likely bring in a foreign policy and military
team that’s more competent than the Bush administration hacks. But
no matter who’s in charge in the White House, the shift in the world
balance of power–economically, militarily and politically–is bound
to lead to further instability and crises.

http://socialistworker.org/2008/08/21/a-new

Book Review: Help Is On The Way

BOOKS: HELP IS ON THE WAY
By Joshua Muravchik

Wall Street Journal
Aug 21 2008

Most international-law experts have long agreed that war
is permissible against a government that commits or tolerates
atrocities against its own subjects. This rule does not apply to
instances of run-of-the-mill repression, but it does apply to abuses
of extraordinary severity. The government at fault is deemed to have
forfeited its claim to sovereignty, and other states may send troops to
stanch the bloodshed. Nobody has defined where the threshold lies, but
it was obviously crossed — to take two notorious examples — in the
case of Hitler’s Holocaust and Pol Pot’s maniacal regime in Cambodia.

The problem is that no one lifted a finger in response to either
horror. While international law rests in part on intuitive justice,
it also rests on custom. What have states actually done by way of
humanitarian intervention? Not much. Decades back, the case often
cited in legal literature was the landing of Western forces in the
Congo in the 1960s to protect Europeans caught in the middle of
a multi-sided civil war. But rescuing whites stranded in African
chaos made an uninspiring example. A more promising precedent was
Tanzania’s invasion of Uganda in 1978 to oust Idi Amin. Tanzania,
however, insisted that its action was taken in response to territorial
violations by Ugandan forces, not to Amin’s murderous domestic record.

In short, the case book on "humanitarian intervention" seemed
hopelessly thin until the 1990s. In the decade between the Cold
War and the war on terror, global diplomacy focused on a series of
crises ripe for humanitarian intervention: Somalia, Rwanda, Bosnia,
Kosovo. In these cases, however, the performance of outsiders was
decidedly mixed. The firmest, timeliest response came in Kosovo,
where the atrocities were fewest; the least effort was made in Rwanda,
where they were greatest. In Bosnia, intervention began too late;
in Somalia, it ended too soon.

Still, acceptance of the idea grew, and in 2005 and 2006 the
United Nations enshrined in various resolutions what it called the
"responsibility to protect." With "Freedom’s Battle," Princeton
historian Gary J. Bass buttresses the legitimacy of humanitarian
intervention by reacquainting us with three 19th-century episodes
in which military invasions were undertaken to rescue populations
subjected to terrible abuses. He describes the naval efforts of
Britain, France and Russia in support of the Greeks fighting for
independence from Turkey in the 1820s; the suppression by France of
communal warfare between Druse and Maronites in Lebanon and Syria
in the 1860s; and Russia’s defense of Bulgarians against Ottoman
"horrors" in the 1870s.

Mr. Bass relates these episodes masterfully, providing a wealth of
detail in fluid prose. Although he aims to make a point — about the
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention — his accounts are full and
fair-minded. "Freedom’s Battle" is a pleasure for the learning one
can take away from it and for the opportunity it provides to reflect
on how much things have changed since the 19th century, and how much,
in certain ways, they have not.

The battles between Muslims and Christians in Lebanon — eventually
resolved not only by outside force but also by a power-sharing
arrangement representing each sect — seem painfully familiar. So
does the assiduity with which Russia played every humanitarian crisis
solely for its own aggrandizement. The poet Byron was the apotheosis of
philhellenism, journeying to Greece to join its fight for independence,
and his disappointment in the real-live Greeks he met sounds like so
many contemporary encounters of Westerners with the Third World.

Preludes to current debates can be heard in Thomas Jefferson’s forecast
of universal democracy as well as in John Quincy Adams’s rejection
of a donation for Greek relief on the ground that he would rather see
the money spent "at home." One feels a frisson of a contrary kind in
reading the scale of the massacres that galvanized the conscience of
the 19th century — death merely by the thousands. So innocent seem
those days before slaughters by the millions.

I am not sure, however, that Mr. Bass’s story leads to the conclusion
he aims for. He claims that "the tradition of humanitarian intervention
once ran deep in world politics." But his accounts offer ambiguous
evidence. In every case the victims were Christians mistreated by
Muslims, and in each case those urging rescue appealed directly to
Christian solidarity. Napoleon III, preparing to send soldiers to Syria
to protect the Maronites, invoked the glory of the Crusades. How far
is all this from rescuing white people in Africa?

Worse, even the religious solidarity was sometimes feigned. Russia
long arrogated the right to intervene as protector of Christians
under Ottoman rule, but Mr. Bass quotes Disraeli’s plausible report
"that the Russian ambassador had told him that ‘Russia did not care
a pin for Bulgaria, or Bosnia . . . what it really wanted was the
Straits.’ " Mr. Bass provides a wrenching chapter on the World War I
massacre of Armenians by the Turks, focusing on U.S. ambassador Henry
Morgenthau’s vain appeals for intervention. This massacre eclipsed
the killings in Greece, Syria, Lebanon or Bulgaria — and yet went
unimpeded. So much for the "tradition" of humanitarian action running
"deep" in world politics.

Finally, Mr. Bass tackles some of the difficulties — then and
now — of humanitarian intervention. On one end of the spectrum,
few states are willing to risk the lives of their own citizens
to rescue others. On the other, humanitarian concern may be put
forward as a pretext for what are really imperial designs. Today
the first difficulty is much more likely than the second — think
only of the unrelieved sufferings of Darfur. I’m with Mr. Bass in
wishing for a greater willingness to intervene, but I suspect that
interventionists are on stronger ground appealing to natural justice
than to "tradition."

Mr. Muravchik, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute,
has just completed a book about democrats in the Middle East.

Syria’s Assad Pays A Call To The Kremlin

SYRIA’S ASSAD PAYS A CALL TO THE KREMLIN
By Benny Avni

New York Sun
-a-call-to-the-kremlin/84353/
Aug 21 2008
NY

UNITED NATIONS — With Russia issuing new threats against America
over its planned missile shield, one of the Bush administration’s
least favorite Middle Eastern leaders, President al-Assad of Syria,
is on a two-day visit to the Russian resort city of Sochi, where he
is expressing support for the Kremlin’s war on Georgia and making
deals to buy fighter jets.

Russia’s confrontation with the West is escalating, with Moscow vowing
to respond — and not only through diplomacy — to America’s agreement
yesterday to deploy 10 interceptor missiles in Poland. Russia also
is countering Western calls for Georgia’s territorial integrity to be
recognized with a bill in the Russian parliament that would officially
recognize the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the two
separatist regions of Georgia at the center of the Russia-Georgia
conflict.

"The war, which was triggered in Georgia, is the culmination of
attempts to encircle and isolate Russia," Mr. Assad told the Russian
daily Kommersant on the eve of a two-day visit to Sochi at President
Medvedev’s invitation. "Georgia started this crisis, but the West is
blaming Russia."

Asked about the purpose of his visit, Mr. Assad said, "Of course
military and technical cooperation is the main issue. Weapons purchases
are very important."

Syria reportedly is seeking to buy Russian MiG-31 fighter jets, as
well as help in revamping its air defense systems. Moscow has been
rebuilding the Syrian port of Tartus, which served as Russia’s main
Middle Eastern naval base during the Cold War. On his arrival in
Sochi yesterday, Mr. Assad agreed to let Russia reopen its base in
Tartus; with the pact signed, a fleet led by Russia’s sole aircraft
carrier, the Admiral Kuznetsov, a missile cruiser, the Moskva, and
several submarines is headed to the Mediterranean Sea from bases
in the northern Russian port city of Murmansk, the Russian Web site
newsru.com reported.

Mr. Assad’s visit is part of "our ongoing efforts to help put back on
track the settlement in the Middle East," the Russian ambassador to the
United Nations, Vitaly Churkin, told The New York Sun, rejecting any
linkage between Mr. Medvedev’s invitation and Russia’s confrontation
with the West over Georgia. The trip is "the usual bilateral thing,"
Syria’s U.N. ambassador, Bashar Jaafari, added.

But the hastily arranged visit raised some eyebrows in Israel. "It
is very important for Russia to gain a military foothold in the
Mediterranean," the Israeli author Gideon Remez, whose recent book,
"Foxbats Over Dimona," focuses on the Soviet military intervention
in the Middle East in the 1960s, said. "Syria is part of what Moscow
considers the ‘near abroad.’ So if you ask me whether this is part
of renewed alliances along Cold War lines, the answer is yes, and
for Israel this is a very dangerous game."

The Kremlin has put increasing pressure on Israeli officials in recent
months, arguing that if Israel wants Russia not to arm its enemies
Iran and Syria, it should end its military support for Russia’s foes —
and specifically for Georgia, where Israeli arms dealers and military
trainers have been active since President Saakashvili gained power
in early 2004. Yielding to Russian pressure, Foreign Minister Tzipi
Livni reportedly leaned successfully on the defense contractors,
who then largely ended Israel’s military activities in Georgia.

"Whether it’s the right thing to do or not, we shouldn’t end our
support for Georgia just because the Russians don’t like it, because
I simply don’t believe their promises," Mr. Remez said.

Hezbollah and Hamas routinely used Russian-made Katyusha and Grad
missiles against Israel after Russia sells them to Syria and Iran, he
added, noting that Iranian and Russian interests are now converging. In
the dispute over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, he said, Iran supports
Russia’s ally Armenia, which has a largely Christian population,
against mostly Shiite Azerbaijan.

Secretary of State Rice was in Warsaw yesterday, where she officially
signed the deal to deploy part of America’s missile shield on Polish
land. "Missile defense, of course, is aimed at no one," she said. But
Russia’s Foreign Ministry said in a statement that if the system is
deployed, the Kremlin "will be forced to react, and not only through
diplomatic demarches."

Russia’s response "bordered on the bizarre," Ms. Rice said.

In Moscow, the Duma was called for an emergency session, scheduled for
Monday, to consider new legislation that would officially recognize
the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the Daily Telegraph
reported. A French proposal for a U.N. Security Council resolution that
called on Russia to withdraw its troops from Georgia immediately and
recognize its "independence and territorial integrity" was rejected
by Moscow on Tuesday. Instead, Mr. Churkin yesterday proposed a
counter-resolution that omits any mention of Georgia’s territorial
integrity.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

http://www.nysun.com/foreign/syrias-assad-pays

Turkish National Security Council Meets Over Strategic Issues

TURKISH NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS OVER STRATEGIC ISSUES

Arab Monitor
Aug 21 2008
Italy

Istanbul, 21 August – The Turkish National Security Council (MGK)
met today at the headquarters of the Turkish Staff Officers’ school
in Istanbul for a thorough discussion about the repercussions of
the NATO-Russian crisis over Georgia on the balance of power in the
Caucasus region and its consequences for Turkey’s national security
interests. Prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan is scheduled to brief
the MGC on his visits to Russia, Georgia and Azerbaijan, and foreign
minister Ali Babacan will report about the NATO emergency meeting
that took place in Brussels two days ago.

Prime minister Erdogan is expected to report about the outcome of
his efforts to draw the Russian, the Georgian and the Azerbaijan
governments into a joint Caucus stability pact. The stakes for Turkey
are high, as Ankara, as a NATO member, intends to maintain support
for the territorial integrity of Georgia, without however ruling out
the possibility of a secession of South Ossetia and Abhkazia. Given
the strategic importance of energy policy for Turkey, Ankara has no
intention to harm its relations with Russia.

Another issue of prime importance for the MGK meeting will be the
relationship with Armenia: following the crisis in Georgia, Turkey
intensified ongoing talks between Turkish and Armenian officials aimed
at improving bilateral relations and healing historic rifts. Regarding
the improvement of Turkish-Armenian relations, one of the decisions
to be taken in today’s MGK meeting will be the eventual visit of
President Abdullah Gul to Erevan in occasion of the Turkish-Armenian
football match on 6 September.

Last but certainly not least, the issue of the Iraqi city of Kirkuk
will be on the MGK’s agenda today: Turkey has been pressing the United
States to prevent the Kurdish militia Peshmerga and the Iraqi Kurdish
regional government from taking over Kirkuk through a combination
of Kurdish militias’ actions on the ground and a staged referendum,
backed by the Kurdish Iraqi President Jalal Talabani. On this issue,
the United States have failed to meet Turkey’s expectations and have
not been capable of imposing a Provincial Electoral Law on the Iraqi
government, that would have kept the Kurdish Peshmerga militia out
of Kirkuk and granted constitutional rights to the Sunni Arab and
the Turkmen communities of the area, as requested by Turkey.