Is Turkey The New Tuscany?

IS TURKEY THE NEW TUSCANY?

Independent
Friday, 15 August 2008
UK

It straddles Asia and Europe – and is the holiday choice of the
chattering classes. As David Cameron joins them, John Walsh explains
why Turkey is having its moment in the sun

East and West: Istanbul, the Golden Horn, and the Asian part across
the Bosphorus in the distance

Next week, David Cameron is off to Turkey for his summer
holidays. Boris Johnson has just come back from there; he posed
on a boat in fetching red, floral, shorts. Boris, of course, has a
family connection with the place: his ancestor, Ali Kemal, a Turkish
journalist, served in the government of Ahmed Tevfik Pasha, Grand
Vizier of the Ottoman Empire. But Cameron? What is it about the place
that has brought the two most powerful Conservative politicians in
the UK, two Old Etonian members of the Bullingdon Club, to a country
of 70 million Muslim people with a dubious human rights record and
no access to a decent bottle of Château Pétrus 1985?

It could simply be that other places are just less appealing to the
modern politician. Australia is too far away; Africa is too volatile;
and visiting America would seem like sucking up to President Bush when
everyone is the world is preparing to say good riddance. Mauritius
is too keen on the modern slavery of indentured labour. Spain is too
contemptuous about British holidaymakers. Holidaying in France without
a personal invitation from Met Mme Sarkozy seems low-rent. Italy is
too familiar – didn’t MPs stop going to Tuscany, Umbria and Le Marche
at the end of the millennium? The Greek islands have been too overrun
by British students and clubbers since the mid-1970s.

It may, of course, be the heat. Turkey is scorching in August. You can
guarantee that, every single morning, up to 40 degrees of incinerating
rays will attack your flesh like a six-foot steam-iron. Mr Cameron has
been photographed splashing around a Cornwall beach in a black Peak
vest and with a body-board; he’ll need all the covering he can get.

A more sophisticated reason for visiting Turkey is to inspect its
unique status as the hinge between East and West – not just Asia
and Europe, but between Islam and Christianity, fundamentalism and
enlightenment, spiritual zealotry and decadent consumerism. Turkey is,
for a Tory mindset, the nearest bit of Asia you can visit while still
feeling safely in Europe. It’s Asia-lite. It’s a 98-per-cent Muslim
country without the scary bits: the fatwa, the jihad, the suicide
bombers. And within its boundaries, a modern East-West-style struggle
for the upper hand is taking place every day.

It was known to the Romans as Asia Minor, and in its northwest region,
the border of Europe and Asia is a daisy-chain of waterways – the
Dardanelles strait, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus that leads to
the north coast, thereby connecting the pleasure steamers and pedalos
of the Aegean with the scary Russian tankers of the Black Sea. The
western end of the Dardanelles is the location of Troy, which every
schoolboy knows as the setting of Homer’s Iliad. On the north shore
of the Sea of Marmara, the ancient Greeks founded a city called
Byzantium, which, renamed Constantinople, became the centre of the
Greek-speaking Roman Empire. The Ottoman Empire nabbed it in 1453, and
made it Europe’s largest, richest and most glamorous city in the Middle
Ages. Its name changed again to Stamboul, and was finally resolved
into Istanbul in 1930, during the reformsof Mustafa Kemal Ataturk.

Ataturk’s name, 70 years after his death in 1938, remains crucial in
the debate about modern Turkey. He was the commander of the Ottoman
forces in the First World War who wiped out the invading British
and Australian forces at Gallipoli, and became the key figure in
the nationalist movement that wrested control of Turkey back from
the French, Italians, Greeks and Russian-supported Armenians who had
controlled its regions for too long.

He was a pragmatic, pro-Western visionary who pulled Turkey out
of its dark ages through a mixture of democratic initiatives and
authoritarian diktats. He insisted Turks spoke Turkish (not Arabic,)
banned the fez (too Ottoman and, as it were, old-hat), he insisted
on the Western Gregorian calendar rather than the Middle Eastern,
he abandoned Arabic script for Roman letters, insisted Turkish
citizens took surnames, banned the old Sultanish harem practice of
polygamy, championed Turkish culture and gave everyone the vote. He
also separated church from state, and banned religion from having
any influence on politics. He gave the country a new sense of its
post-Ottoman identity, as a nation state rather than a mix of random
nationalities. And he insisted that the state should be entirely
Turkish (which meant, shockingly to modern eyes, shipping all Greek
speakers off to Greece and dispossessing the Kurds.)

This did wonders for national pride. Statues of the great man, dressed
in a sensible Western suit or astride a horse, can be found in every
one-mosque town across the nation, while his name or face appears on
stamps, currency notes, airports, and bridges. It gave the Turkish
people a self-consciousness and hostility towards both religion and
non-Turks that sustains to this day.

This may account for the feeling, common to every traveller, that
Turkey is a Janus-faced, mildly schizophrenic land of old and new. In
the west, around Bodrum and Izmir, where tourists flock every summer
to drink raki, hit the beaches and dive off boats, local women go out
to work, live as they please, drink and flirt in a very non-Muslim way;
the girls dress as if they were in Camden Town.

In the less touristy interior – in Kayseri, for instance, the
manufacturing city in the heart of Cappadocia, or further east towards
the Black Sea coast, things are more strait-laced: all the factories
have prayer-rooms for their workers, and the city is dominated by
a huge mosque. Women are required to preserve their modesty on pain
of death by "honour killings" (of which they were 2000 in the first
six years of this century.) Even on the south coast, in the popular
Bay of Antalya, local women still wear slave pants, bake pancakes in
the open air and perform feats of clairvoyance as they did 300 years
ago. The muezzin calling the faithful to prayer from the towers of
mosques may occasionally be drowned out by the throb of Turkish techno,
but he’s still around.

This is a country where, to modern urban voters, "secularism" is
synonymous with democracy. The majority of Turks want another Ataturk
in power – someone who will steer them towards the West than the East,
so there can be more "Anatolian Tigers," benefiting from the economic
freedoms of the 1980s, under Turgut Ozal’s Motherland Party.

"We need to protect our modern lifestyle. We don’t want very religious
or conservative people to govern us," a club owner called Ali Korur
told the BBC last year, "Some people worry that Ataturk’s revolution
is in danger, but I think people who are used to modern life will
never return to the age of ignorance."

The chief emblem of "ignorance" is the turban, or headscarf, worn by
religious women. It has become the centre of a noisy debate. Since
1997, when the army authorities booted out a government for being
too "Islamist," Turkish women have been banned by law from wearing
headscarves in "public offices." This can mean universities and schools
and, as two-thirds of the female population habitually cover their
heads, millions of women missed the chance to attend college. The
wearers were and are seldom dangerous radicals or fundamentalists,
but merely conservative-minded Muslims who take seriously their
religion’s stipulations about modesty.

The issue was tackled this February, when the Turkish parliament passed
an amendment that said: "No-one can be denied his or her right to a
higher education," and grudgingly allowed traditional scarves to be
worn on campus. Hostile voices complained it was the beginning of a
process which would impose religious beliefs on the population.

This is why Turkey is so fascinating to foreign intellectuals: it’s
an upside-down world where left-wingers yell at scarf-wearing girls
in the street, where modern Muslims worship secularism and dread
expressions of piety, and where the libertarian reforms of 80 years
ago are invoked, in the 2000s, to quell free expression.

The spirit of Ataturk lies behind Article 301, in the modern penal
code, which bans people from "insulting Turkishness." When Orhan Pamuk,
the Nobel laureate, talked about the Armenian massacres by Ottoman
Turks in 1915, he was arrested and tried (the charges were dropped,
but the world took notice). A woman journalist called Perihan Magden
wrote in favour of conscientious objection and was tried for "turning
people against military service". The prime minister, Recep Erdogan,
sued caricature artists for painting him as an animal, and won. No
wonder Turkey’s application for full membership of the EU has been
temporarily delayed.

David Cameron would be advised not to mention the Armenian events to
his hosts, or the fate of the Kurds, or the excellence of Midnight
Express, Alan Parker’s movie which offered a rather negative picture
of the Turkish prison system. Cameron should also avoid mentioning
Cyprus, or wearing a fez in public, or asking for tickets to the
camel wrestling (it was all over in January.) But he will surely be
intrigued by a nation on whose vital eight borders, from Iran and
Georgia to Bulgaria and Greece, such tumultuous history was fought
down the centuries, and where a lot more history seems destined
to happen, soon; a country with one foot in Islam and the other in
Western capitalism, stuck in the Ataturk past, puzzled by the changing
present and slightly paranoid about where its cultural future lies.

–Boundary_(ID_RdQ4LZrOTdiMAdP1JpjMvQ)–

Chuvashia Prosecutors Charge Youths With Hate Crimes

CHUVASHIA PROSECUTORS CHARGE YOUTHS WITH HATE CRIMES

Union of Councils for Jews in the Former Soviet Union
August 14, 2008
DC

The Novocheboksary, Russia (Republic of Chuvashia) branch of the
Investigative Committee charged a group of youths with hate crimes,
according to an August 13, 2008 article in the Kazan edition of the
national daily "Kommersant." Seven students face charges of inciting
ethnic hatred, hooliganism, assault, and vandalism in connection with
a series of attacks on ethnic minorities and youth groups associated
with trends that neo-Nazis view as "un-Russian" (including fans of
"racially impure" rap music). Over the course of four years, the
extremists assaulted their victims, posted leaflets calling for
violence against ethnic and religious minorities, and shattered
windows in an Armenian owned shoe store, which they spray-painted
with racist threats. Their four-year reign of terror came to an end
after a February 6, 2008 brawl with ethnic Russian rap music fans,
which ended in two rap fans being stabbed. The local FSB identified
the suspects and found neo-Nazi literature in their possession. One
suspect is being held in pre-trial detention, while the others have
signed a written pledge not to leave the city pending their trial.

Jerusalem Post – Analysis: What Does Moscow Want In Georgia?

ANALYSIS: WHAT DOES MOSCOW WANT IN GEORGIA?
By Brenda Shaffer

Jerusalem Post
Aug 14, 2008 23:32
Israel

In the last two weeks, many of us have learned that Tskhinvali is
the capital of South Ossetia; that South Ossetia is a region a bit
bigger than Luxembourg that is legally part of Georgia but ruled de
facto by Moscow; that the guy who formally replaced Putin is Dmitry
Medvedev; that the president of Georgia, Mikhail Saakashvili, has two
"a"s in a row in his surname and is a Columbia University graduate.

Russian troops travel atop a military vehicle while entering the
Black Sea port of Poti, Georgia.

Photo: AP

Slideshow: Pictures of the week What is this conflict about? What are
the ramifications, regionally, globally and for the Middle East? And
is there a viable way to solve this conflict?

The South Ossetian conflict with Georgia is not about nationalism or
religion. It is about power politics and Moscow’s desire to retain
influence in the former Soviet states that border it.

During the Soviet breakup, hundreds if not thousands of groups were
concerned about their future security and would have been happy to
use the opportunity to gain independence.

In fact the real story of the Soviet breakup is not about conflict,
but its absence.

Only six conflicts emerged in the region after the breakup – two
wars and four secessionist conflicts. While hundreds of ethnic and
religious groups live side-by-side in the Caucasus and Central Asia,
few actively sought independence following the end of rule from
Moscow, which teaches us that ethnic conflict is not the main source
of violence, but rather something else.

The only groups that achieved de facto independence within former
Soviet republics were those that Moscow supported.

Moscow actively aided the de facto independence of groups that
resided in geographically strategic points: Nagorno-Karabagh (ethnic
Armenians in Azerbaijan); South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia;
and Transniestria in Moldova.

Moscow’s support of these groups’ secession provided leverage for
Russia in these new states during the Soviet breakup and until
today. Minority groups in Georgia were especially enticing objects
for support: Georgia is the key to the land-locked Caspian region. If
you control Georgia, or it is unstable, there is no need for Russia to
muscle the rest of the Caucasus and Central Asia: all these land-locked
states need Georgia to access the sea and to export their energy
resources to Europe without transiting Russia.

In contrast, the Kremlin didn’t support its fellow Russians, for
example in the Baltic states, who were shipwrecked abroad when the
Soviet Union collapsed, without language or citizenship rights.

The South Ossetian conflict emerged in the early 1990s, on the eve
of the Soviet breakup.

Why did it reerupt now?

Five factors seem to be at play. First, this spring Georgia asked
to join NATO. Despite Washington’s unequivocal support for Tbilisi,
European states expressed reservations about accepting Georgia before
it resolved its border conflicts with Russia. The re-firing of the
conflict will surely increase the potency of that concern and push
Georgia’s NATO membership beyond the horizon.

Second, Russia wants to retain its domination of the European natural
gas market. Europe’s energy dependence on Russia is growing from day
to day, and this endows Moscow with significant income and political
clout. A large part of the natural gas that Russia markets to Europe
is actually from Central Asia, and Moscow coerces those states to
sell it to Russia at half the price for which it then resells it
to Europe. In recent months, Central Asian states have explored
circumventing Russia and transporting their gas resources directly
to Europe via Georgia. The present conflict clearly upsets these plans.

Third, the Kremlin made it clear that if Washington recognized the
independence of Kosovo (as it did), Moscow would recognize and support
the independence of the secessionist regions in the Caucasus. Russia
is extremely vulnerable to ethnic conflict (remember Chechnya and
friends?) and did not want the Kosovo precedent on the table.

Fourth, Moscow wants to foil US plans to deploy ballistic missile
shields in Eastern Europe. Threatening a close ally of the US gets
the message to Washington.

Fifth, following the installation of Dmitri Medvedev as president of
Russia, in-fighting in the Kremlin seems to be at play, and Moscow’s
disproportionate response to Tbilisi may be influenced by this.

What does this new war mean for the Caucasus region, globally and
for the Middle East? If Washington fails to act effectively, the
conflict will deal a big blow to US credibility in the former Soviet
Union and beyond. If Georgia, Washington’s darling, is not supported
in its hour of need, then how can Tashkent or Baghdad feel at ease?

This war also has ramifications for the international efforts to
prevent Iran from attaining nuclear weapons. Russia’s policy toward
Iran is generally affected by the state of US-Russian relations. If
the sides do not come to an understanding on the Georgia conflict soon,
Moscow can not be expected to cooperate with the US on Iran.

Is there a way out of this crisis? There seem to be two policy
options on the table. One is that the US, the states of the former
Soviet Union and newly independent countries in Eastern Europe take
a united and tough stand.

The second option is that the US offers a new grand bargain to Russia:
Washington gives in on issues that are important to Moscow, such as
missile defense and Kosovo, and the US gets its way in the Caucasus
and Iran.

The second option seems the best for the US and Israel, but the first
seems the most likely, considering the current climate of relations
between Washington and Moscow.

Dr. Brenda Shaffer is a faculty member at the University of Haifa,
specializing in the politics of the Caucasus, Central Asia, Iran and
energy issues.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Mongolia The Next Rising Star In Medals Per Capita List

MONGOLIA THE NEXT RISING STAR IN MEDALS PER CAPITA LIST

Los Angeles Times
5:38 PM, August 14, 2008
CA

Medals Per Capita adores getting all snooty at the snooty big countries
and lavishing attention on the chronically overlooked and, in that
vein, will take this opportunity to salute to the hilt one Mongolia.

Now, the proper noun "Mongolia" doesn’t tend to come up in day-to-day
American dinner conversation, but Medals Per Capita aspires to change
that by announcing that after Thursday’s results in Beijing, Mongolia
barged from No. 10 clear to No. 3 in the real rankings of the Olympics.

These rankings, of course, represent a rational, prudent, authentic
antidote to the thoughtless, sloppy, phony Medals Table, which simply
lists medals won and calls it a shiftless day. The top of the Medals
Table features some sort of fracas between China and the United States,
blah-blah-blah-blah-blah, plying standard ignorance to ignore that it’s
a lot more commendable to wring two Olympic medals from a population
of 2.9 million (Mongolia) than to get, oh, 35 from 1.3 billion (China)
or 34 from 303 million (United States).

Those "big two" are having some sort of snit because one side’s
gymnasts seem quite possibly 11 years old, while at least both have
ample agreeable weather — one even has a California in it — while
Mongolia, now…

Mongolians reside on soil seldom arable and in cold so remorseless
that Ulan Bator finishes No. 1 in the World’s Coldest Capital City
(WCCC) standings, so they would be 2,996,081 of the most rugged,
fibrous human beings on Earth, starting with Tuvshinbayar Naidan.

Naidan, a former wrestler, evidently threw a bunch of people around
the judo rink, reaped his nation’s first-ever gold medal and said to
reporters, "There are no words that can describe my happiness."

Medals Per Capita would like to agree, given MPC’s chronic fondness
for the sparsely populated. Why, Mongolia would be the most sparsely
populated independent country on Earth, 2,996,081 residing in space
roughly the size of Alaska, earning a description from Reuters as
"the windswept Central Asian nation," yet forging a glistening MPC
of 1,498,041.

That placed the Mongolians just behind the No. 2 Australians with all
their flip-flops and cute animals and swimming prowess, even while
both trail a gathering Armenian dynasty that’s getting serious here.

Armenia, another country of 2.9 million, coming off zero medals
in Athens that followed one in Sydney and two in Atlanta, suddenly
has hoarded four bronzes, the latest from Greco-Roman wrestler Yuri
Patrikeev in the 120-kg event. It romped to its third straight day of
MPC throne-sitting, and you could feel the entire MPC board shudder
— or at least I could — by a classic MPC intimidation that lowered
Armenia’s MPC from a dreamy 989,529 to a celestial 742,147.

The top 10 (with a special nod to Cuba, which finished third in Athens
MPC and is getting noisy in Beijing):

1. Armenia (4) – 742,147 2. Australia (16) – 1,287,554 3. Mongolia (2)
– 1,498,041 4. Georgia (3) – 1,543,614 5. Switzerland (4) – 1,895,380
6. Cuba (6) – 1,903,992 7. Slovenia (1) – 2,007,711 8. Azerbaijan
(4) – 2,044,429 9. The Netherlands (7) – 2,377,902 10. Hungary (4)
– 2,482,729

Selected Others:

15. South Korea (16) – 3,077,053 22. France (15) – 4,270,519 23. Italy
(13) – 4,472,717 34. United States (34) – 8,936,019 36. Russia (14)
– 10,050,150 40. Spain (2) – 20,245,526 43. China (35) – 38,001,274
46. Brazil (4) – 47,977,146 50. Mexico (1) – 109,955,400 52. India
(1) – 1,147,995,898

Check the first-day listings, led by Australia, here. And further
updates here and here.

–Chuck Culpepper

Culpepper is a contributor to The Times.

Situation In South Ossetia "Potentially Explosive" – Spanish Daily

SITUATION IN SOUTH OSSETIA "POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE" – SPANISH DAILY

RedOrbit
14 August 2008, 18:00 CDT
TX

At dawn last Thursday, Georgian troops launched a brutal and
unexpected land and air attack on Tskhinvali, the capital of
South Ossetia. A few hours later, Russia counterattacked with all
its military might. Shortly afterward Abkhazia went to Ossetia’s
defence, confronting Georgia. The Russian troops easily took control
of the situation in Ossetia. They crossed the border into Georgia
and harassed Gori, the country’s second city, which is very close
to Tbilisi, the capital. In the face of such a forceful reaction,
Georgia declared a ceasefire, but Russia continued its "preventative"
penetration into Georgian territory until it had secured its rear-guard
positions. Shortly before receiving French President Sarkozy, currently
serving as EU president, in Moscow, Russia also declared a ceasefire
through a provisional truce.

Georgia’s unexpected attack on South Ossetia occurred just at the
beginning of the "Olympic peace." On Friday, just hours after the
fighting began, Putin and Bush hardly knew what to say to each other
when they were together in Beijing at the spectacular opening of the
Olympic Games. Nevertheless it is quite improbable that the decision
for Georgia to attack South Ossetia was made independently by the
foolish President Saakashvili, a faithful pawn of Bush’s in the region.

Although analyses of the attack are not yet clear, everything
indicates that the purpose was to test how Russia would respond to a
provocation in the Caucasus region after having lost its influence
in the Balkans. What was demonstrated is that the Russia of Putin
and Medvedev is not the Russia of Yeltsin. Their current reaction
capability and political intelligence in defence of their own specific
interests is much better. What is most likely is that the attack has
to do with Bush’s latest foreign policy mistake and with the first
positive action by the European Union, an action that was also brave
and autonomous. This was the time for the EU to start asserting itself
in an area where it should be exercising influence.

At any rate, despite the truce, the Caucasus region is potentially
explosive. Let us examine some historical aspects that will help to
understand the situation.

The Ossetians are a Caucasian people, ethnically different from
the Georgians, who have traditionally had good relations with
Russia. They have enjoyed autonomy since the time of the czars. With
the independence of Georgia after the disintegration of the USSR in
1991, South Ossetia – North Ossetia is part of Russia as an autonomous
province – remained an enclave in Georgian territory. This situation
provoked a military conflict that ended in a precarious agreement
by which South Ossetia became a de facto independent territory of
Georgia under Russia’s protection. The Abkhazians, also located
within Georgian territory but ethnically different from Georgians in
addition to being Muslims, found themselves in a similar position,
which helped widen Russia’s narrow strip of access to the Black Sea
which remained after Ukraine got its independence.

In addition to all this, since 2006, the only pipeline carrying oil
from the deposits near the Caspian Sea north of Iraq and the former
Soviet republics north of Afghanistan that does not pass through Russia
has crossed Georgian territory. For that reason, Georgia has become an
enclave that is strategic for Western control of oil in that region. At
the NATO summit last April, Georgia and Ukraine were candidates to join
the Alliance. Because of pressure from Russia they were not admitted.

Up to now Russia has not forced the issue of independence for South
Ossetia and Abkhazia, leaving them in an uncertain legal limbo of
de facto independence. Nevertheless, the Russian foreign minister
announced last winter that the recognition of Kosovo as an independent
state would have implications on the situation of South Ossetia and
other territories in the Ca ucasus.

After the military activity of the last few days, some observers have
asked, "Why yes to Kosovo and no to South Ossetia and Abkhazia? The
legal precedents involving several breaches of international law
in the Balkans comprise another factor in the conflict. Also keep
in mind that other countries in the region – Daguestan, Chechnyia,
Ingusetia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia – are also notorious
centres of instability. In this sense the Balkans are a minor theme
in comparison to the Caucasus region.

Thus the ingredients of conflict are all present: ethnicity, religions,
nationalism to excite the people; oil and energy policy as real
economic factors; Russia’s outlet to the Black Sea and limits to the
area controlled by NATO as basic geostrategic factors; proximity to
war zones (Afghanistan and Iraq) or of conflict (Iran and the Middle
East ) as centres of military interest. Therefore to play with war
in the Caucasus region is to play with fire. We hope these brief and
tragic days have served as a lesson to certain sorcerer’s apprentices.

Originally published by La Vanguardia website, Barcelona, in Spanish
14 Aug 08.

(c) 2008 BBC Monitoring European. Provided by ProQuest LLC. All
rights Reserved.

Georgian Roulette

GEORGIAN ROULETTE

Al-Ahram Weekly
14 – 20 August 2008
Egypt

The war between Georgia and Russia harks back to the Cold War with
ominous overtones, writes Ayman El-Amir*

Little Georgia has stomped on the toe of its neighbouring Russian bear
in order to enhance its credentials for NATO membership and the Russian
bear responded with fury. Resurgent Russia, with its newly-found sense
of power and wealth, has been vexed by the Western alliance’s drive
to hem it in through planting a series of anti-missile shields in
Poland and the Czech Republic, which Russia considers a threat to its
national security. What if Georgia, too, joined NATO and accepted a US
anti-missile defence system on its territory pointing at Russia? It
is bad timing to test the new Russian leadership and a bad gamble
in the sensitive, oil-and-gas rich Caucasian region. After all, the
US under the John F Kennedy administration brought the whole world
to the brink of nuclear war in 1962 because of the pre-position of
Soviet missiles in Cuba, 100 miles away.

With separatist Chechnya still aflame in its backyard, Russia hardly
needs a new war on its hands, but the Georgian challenge is too much
to bear for the big bear. Nothing could be more telling of the extent
of Russia’s aggravation than Foreign Minister Serge Lavrov’s televised
reaction to the conflict in which he pointed to the European Union’s
flag firmly planted on the left side of Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili (and Georgia’s flag to his right) as he made several TV
appearances on Western networks. Lavrov’s exasperated comment was
"That tells it all". It is no secret that Georgia is energetically
seeking NATO membership with President George W Bush’s blessings,
against Russia’s strong opposition.

For five decades the US and the Western alliance (NATO) fought
relentlessly to break up the former Soviet Union and liberate the
East European countries held hostage behind "the iron curtain", as
Winston Churchill described it. The main objective was to eliminate
the challenge posed by the "Evil Empire" as former president Ronald
Reagan called the former Soviet Union. Little provision was made for
splinter regions that could come to life asserting separate ethnic,
religious or nationalist identities once the cohesion of the former
Soviet Union was unglued. That is how Chechnya, South Ossetia,
Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, the republic of Transnistria in Moldova
and other splinter regions came about, exacerbating regional tension
in the Caucasus and igniting armed conflict.

Moreover, with huge oil, gas and uranium deposits unveiled in the
territories of the former Soviet republics, it became a matter of
strategic Western interest to keep these resources out of the reach of
a rising Russia and to deprive it of a new sphere of influence. This is
demonstrated by the European Union’s support of the construction of a
$5.8 billion gas pipeline running for 3,400 kilometres from Central
Asia through Georgia to supply gas to Western, Southern and East
European countries, bypassing Russia. The idea behind the Nabucco
project is to weaken Russia’s Gazprom hold on gas supplies to the
countries of these regions. It is a fact that Russia has raised, and
will still raise, the price of gas exports to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

Then there is the question of the US- driven global war on
terror, particularly in Afghanistan, and the containment of
Iran. The US has, for the past decade, been fostering military,
intelligence and monitoring, pre-positioning and training alliances
with former Soviet republics such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan and Azerbaijan. The presence of US military advisors and
intelligence-gathering experts in countries bordering on Russia makes
the latter nervous. In the war on terror Russia finds itself in the
paradoxical situation of being an uncomfortable partner with the
US because of the secessionist movement in its backyard region of
Chechnya and also as an oppressor of nationalist aspirations that
it supports in South Ossetia. This region, with a population of
150,000, includes an indeterminable number of Russians and Russian
passport-holders. The Russian- Georgian war that started under the
Russian claim to protect the indigenous Russian population seems to
have come to a halt with the Russian president’s announcement that
his country has ceased military operations.

For analysts who advocate that the Cold War is back, the
Russian-Georgian conflict, with its international ramifications,
offers supporting evidence. With the downfall of the former Soviet
Union Russia was left with nothing but debt, poverty and some
remaining military assets. Its 13 constituent republics, the so-called
Commonwealth of Independent States, were blown to the wind but ended
in Western hands. Before its newly found oil and gas bonanza, Russia,
under Boris Yeltsin, was so poor that in 1997 it defaulted on its
international debt repayment, sending the global financial markets
on a scary downward spiral. Russia was stripped of its disintegrated
Warsaw Pact military alliance while NATO expanded, adding new members
from the former Soviet Union. The historic political transformation
was more about the break-up of the former Soviet empire than about
the liberation of the nations behind "the iron curtain". Many
of these nations, particularly the Asian republics, are ruled by
former communist dictators or newly-crafted autocrats fashioned in
the communist tradition, running rigged elections, suppressing the
opposition and the whole galore.

The now full-blown Russian-Georgian war is not about the so-called
persecution of ethnic Russians in South Ossetia. It is about Georgia,
being emboldened by Western encouragement, pushing the limits and
Russia, energised by a new sense of power, reclaiming its vital
interests in its former sphere of influence. Since the collapse
of the former Soviet Union, the world was ripped apart, replaced
by an American world order dominated by loose military power and
globalisation. Russian ambition, running parallel to that of China
and India, has put on the table a new world order. It is not exactly
Yalta all over again, but big powers still claim their privileges. If
the US can claim the illegal privilege of conquering, destroying
and dividing Iraq for whatever kaleidoscopic purpose it may claim,
so Russia can invade Georgia to protest its vital interests. Other
countries in the region are on notice not to try to block the Russian
fleet’s re-entry into the Black Sea where it left its home base as
the fighting with Georgia began.

This is not Prague Spring 1968 or the Hungarian revolution of Imre
Nadj in 1956 when both were in the firm grip of the former Soviet
Union. But a shadow of the Cold War’s spheres of influence still
reigns. It is a replay of the 1962 Cuban missile crisis without
missiles, but with Russia shadowboxing the Western alliance in the
Caucasus. While the European Union and NATO have been chipping away
at the republics of the former Soviet Union, they will not go to war
with Russia over the Caucasus.

There are many claims of splinter groups in the region to autonomous
rule or independence and, as Prime Minister Vladimir Putin put it, "If
[autonomous] Kosovo can claim and be granted independence, why can’t
South Ossetia?" And indeed, why can’t the Kurds? And of all nations,
why have the Palestinians been denied the right to self-determination
on their territory for almost a century?

After the end of the American century, with all its achievements and
failures, the new world order needs a fresh look that should factor
in the many changes that have come into play during the second half
of the 20th century, and which haven’t been fully accounted for.

* The writer is former Al-Ahram correspondent in Washington, DC. He
also served as director of United Nations Radio and Television in
New York.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

International Fest: After Hiatus, Event Is Back This Weekend

INTERNATIONAL FEST: AFTER HIATUS, EVENT IS BACK THIS WEEKEND
By Caitlin Murray

Niagara Gazette
August 14, 2008 06:05 pm
NY

After a two-year hiatus, the International Festival is back.

And this weekend, it’s being expanded into a two-day affair, with free
all-day events, music and food vendors at Gill Creek Park in an effort
to win back the audience that may have forgotten about the event.

"We talked to a lot of people in block clubs and local area and they
enjoyed the festival and missed it," said Jim Szwedo, president
of the Niagara Street Area Business and Professional Association,
which runs the event. "We have a lot more school-aged kids now so
what we’re doing now is important for the people in our area."

The festival got pushed to the backburner when it became difficult
to get the business community involved and long-standing members of
the association were less active, making it tough to recruit a team
to do the months of preparation needed for the fest.

"They were bad financial times — it was harder to get sponsors,"
Szwedo said. "It’s not like other festivals where they get $15,000
from the city. Everything we do is all privately funded."

Though Niagara Falls has a host of ethnic-specific events,
including the popular Italian and the African-American festivals,
the International Festival is for everyone — a direct reflection
of the Niagara Street area’s diverse composition, said Ron Anderluh,
revitalization coordinator for Niagara Street’s Business Association.

"When all the immigrants came over, they settled on the East
Side," Anderluh said. "We don’t want to lose our history within our
area. Italians, Germans, Scandinavians, Irish, Armenians — we all
played a big part in building the city of Niagara Falls and that’s
what’s we’re trying to celebrate."

Vendors scheduled to set up shop Saturday and Sunday will be offering
Italian, Polish, American and Indian food, among others. Other booths
will offer local history and other merchandise, said Anderluh, who
hopes more vendors will continue to sign up in the days leading up
to the event.

"My dream and the dream of the business association is to have this
become one of the biggest fests of the area," Anderluh said. "In order
to do that, we have to get the cooperation of all these different
ethnic groups to support it by coming out and showing some of their
past customs we don’t want to see lost."

But there will be plenty of the usual American festival-type offerings,
too. A free bounce house, petting zoo, beer tent and face painting
will be running all weekend.

Before the festival took a break, it drew as many as 5,000
people. Szwedo is hoping the event’s return will receive a warm
welcome.

"Meet your neighbors," he said. "Realize there are a lot of good
people in the Niagara Street area, and we’re expecting them all to
come out. Meet the people who actually care about the area."

The Starbucks Effect

THE STARBUCKS EFFECT
By James Kilner

Reuters
St.Petersburg Times.ru
August 15, 2008
Russia

Almost non-existant a decade ago, coffee culture now dominates the
streets of Russian cities.

A waitress serves customers in a Le Pain Quotidien cafe in
Moscow. Russian cities have experienced a boom in Starbucks-style
cafes.

MOSCOW — A frothy cappuccino or fresh mozzarella salad is no longer
enough. Russia’s growing middle classes now want service with a smile.

With much of Europe and North America saturated, the newly affluent
among Russia’s 143 million people are an attractive target for Western
coffee shop chains eager for growth, and Starbucks and Costa Coffee
are among brands now found in Moscow.

But where once any alternative to Soviet-style fried meats and
dill-laced boiled vegetables was a thrill, increased competition now
means superior service is important to attract and retain customers.

This is a challenge, says Ian Zilberkweit, an American part-owner
of the Russian franchise for the Belgian coffee shop chain Le Pain
Quotidien.

He and his Armenian-American business partner have drawn up bonus
schemes and share plans to persuade staff to shake off Soviet habits
and instill loyalty in a typically casual sector.

"The Soviet system meant there was no system for treating people
nicely," said Zilberkweit, who has just opened his fifth store. "It
was all about shifting products."

Cash from energy and commodity exports has boosted Russia’s economy
since a crisis in 1998. The World Bank estimates real incomes rose
by 80 percent between 1998 and 2007 to nearly $8,000 per person —
roughly level with Mexico and Lithuania.

Data from Moscow-based Business Analytica shows the number of bars,
cafes and restaurants in Moscow rose by a third between 2004 and
2007 to 6,600, with the fastest growth at the mid-priced level. Big
chains now own around a third of the outlets in Moscow, double the
proportion in 2004.

Starbucks Corporation, which is closing shops in North America,
opened its first branch in Moscow in 2007 and now has five, and Costa
Coffee opened in March through a joint venture. Starbucks declined to
give details of its plans but Costa aims to open at least 200 cafes
in Russia.

"All companies are focusing on the Russian market in all leisure
sectors, not just coffee. It’s a country that Costa has to be in,"
said UBS analyst Stamatis Draziotis.

Le Pain Quotidien’s Zilberkweit said the potential in Russia was just
too great to miss out on.

"In Europe, real incomes are not going up due to rising prices, but
in Russia it’s different," he said, wearing a grey London Business
School sailing club shirt. "Because the domestic economy is growing
like crazy, incomes are still going up like crazy."

By the end of this year, Le Pain Quotidien aims for eight outlets
in Moscow, rising to 50 within four years. Sales now stand at about
$5 million but are targeted to rise to $20 million by 2009, said
Zilberkweit.

A former investment banker at HSBC bank, he said competing in Russia’s
lucrative dining market is further complicated for foreign firms
because spending patterns and business costs differ from those in
the West.

Le Pain Quotidien projects itself as part-bakery, part-cafe,
part-restaurant.

The interiors are wooden, a counter sells freshly baked bread and
pastries — supplied by a bakery which Zilberkweit part-owns — and
the menus are based mainly around soups, salads and light main meals.

But Russian customers spend their money differently from people in
other countries.

About 50 percent of Le Pain Quotidien’s sales are from food in Russia
compared with 35 percent in Britain, for example. Rent is by far the
biggest expense in Russia while staff salaries are the main expense
in Europe.

Its prices in Russia are similar to the rest of Europe — $3 for a
croissant, $7 for a bowl of soup and $17 for a fish pie — and diners
usually add on a tip of around 10 percent.

With prices high and rising, Russian customers are no longer willing
to stomach slow, erratic and surly Soviet service.

"If I see a new place which I want to go into, I do worry what the
service will be like," said Natalya Miloserdova, 27, puffing on a
cigarette outside the tour agency where she works.

"You pick a place to eat where you know the service will be good."

Zilberkweit said service has been a neglected aspect of retail in
Russia as most staff grew up without experiencing any.

"We were unbelievably frustrated two years ago because we would get
these people in and we would just want them to smile and they wouldn’t
even know why," he said.

Smiling staff can make the difference in Russia’s increasingly crowded
cafe sector.

"The customer, five years ago, in Russia would have been only too
happy if within five minutes’ walk there was a place to have a coffee
latte," he said.

"Now, he has 10 choices and demands much more."

Another Soviet hangover Zilberkweit has had to confront was a drop
in an employee’s work ethic after promotion.

"In Russia, the moment you give somebody a title they stop working,"
he said. "Now, we give people more money and more responsibility but
not a new title."

Emil Nolde, Tout En Couleurs Explosives

EMIL NOLDE, TOUT EN COULEURS EXPLOSIVES

Libératio
vendredi 15 aoÃ"t 2008
France

Peinture. Aux Sables-d’Olonne, avant une rétrospective parisienne,
sont exposées 80 aquarelles du peintre allemand.

HENRI-FRANCOIS DEBAILLEUX

Emil Nolde au musée de l’abbaye Sainte-Croix, rue de Verdun, les
Sables-d’Olonne (85). Jusqu’au 7 septembre. Rens. : 02 51 32 01
16. A signaler aussi l’exposition de Katharina Ziemke, intitulée
Haut-Karabakh (même lieu, mêmes dates).

0 réaction Cette exposition d’Emil Nolde (1867-1956) intitulée les
Â"Images non peintesÂ" (Â"Ungemalte BilderÂ") n’est pas une grosse
exposition. Elle ne réunit que 80 aquarelles. Ce qui ne veut pas
dire pour autant qu’elle est anecdotique, bien au contraire. Mais
elle n’entend pas rivaliser avec la rétrospective consacrée a
l’artiste, qui sera présentée aux galeries nationales du Grand
Palais de septembre a janvier prochain et qui ira ensuite au musée
Fabre de Montpellier au printemps 2009.

Benoît Decron, le directeur du musée de l’abbaye Sainte-Croix
aux Sables-d’Olonne s’en explique : Â"Nous n’avions pas le budget
pour faire une exposition plus importante. Et nous nous sommes mis
d’accord avec la Réunion des musées nationaux, qui organise la
rétrospective, pour qu’il n’y ait pas d’ambiguïté ni de confusion.Â"
D e fait, premier point important, les aquarelles ici rassemblées,
qui sont en outre présentées pour la première fois en France, ne
seront pas exposées a Paris, ni a Montpellier. Elles proviennent
toutes de la Fondation Ida-et-Emil-Nolde sise a Seebull dans le
Schleswig-Holstein (nord de l’Allemagne) et sont ici montrées en
̩change du pr̻t dՁ"uvres de Gaston Chaissac appartenant au mus̩e
de l’abbaye Sainte-Croix.

Reclus. Deuxième point, ces aquarelles sont le résultat d’une
histoire particulière. A partir de 1937, les nazis vont confisquer
ou d̩truire bon nombre dՁ"uvres de Nolde, ou les exposer dans
l’exposition de l’art dégénérÃ&#xA 9;, Â"Entartete KunstÂ", et lui
interdisent de peindre. Mais l’artiste, reclus dans sa maison-atelier
de Seebull, réussit a travailler en cachette. Et se met donc a faire
des aquarelles qui sont plus discrètes et faciles a dissimuler en
cas de contrôle.

Entre 1938 et 1945, il va en peindre 1 300 qu’il comptait pour une
part reproduire ultérieurement en peinture et en plus grand format. De
fait, de 1945 a 1951, Nolde réalisera 65 toiles.

Elfes. Enfin, dernier point, toutes ces Å"uvres, ici accrochées quatre
par quatre, sont de grande qualité. On y retrouve les habituels sujets
de prédilection de Nolde (nature et paysages de sa terre natale),
mais aussi beaucoup de portraits (la famille, des couples, des groupes
de femmes), des scènes bibliques et des thèmes de la mythologie
nordique avec elfes et géants. Le tout avec une belle manière, dans
certaines aquarelles, de faire dialoguer l’abstraction et la figuration
qui souvent ne tient qu’a un fil ou a un oiseau. A une petite barque
près certaines seraient même totalement abstraites. Ce qui frappe
le plus : une explosion parfaitement maîtrisée des couleurs, en
taches, en bandes, en mouvements. Â"Ce sont de véritables brÃ"lots de
couleurs, hallucinatoires, violemment opposées ou contrastées. On
dirait que l’auteur est quelqu’un qui tombe du quinzième étage
et qui dans le temps de sa chute se souvient de toute sa vieÂ",
souligne Decron. Comme une catharsis et une bonne introduction a la
future rétrospective parisienne.

–Boundary_(ID_JuEpWt3BIlQsXl/L/4j8xw )–

Russian Assault Raises Market Risks

RUSSIAN ASSAULT RAISES MARKET RISKS
By Dan Dorfman, [email protected]

New York Sun
United States
August 15, 2008

For the moment, at least, Wall Street is greeting the Russian invasion
of Georgia and the Kremlin’s broken promises of a cease-fire and
a withdrawal of its troops from the former Soviet state as just
ho-hum. Oil prices, in particular, have been falling despite the
invasion, with light, sweet crude down $0.99 yesterday, to close at
$115 a barrel on the New York Mercantile Exchange.

A former Merrill Lynch strategist, Bill Rhodes, argues that Wall
Street’s dismissal of the burgeoning conflict in Georgia is a
mistake. "The situation is a matter of considerable concern and bears
close watching because it raises an obvious question: How far is
Russia ready to go?" he says. "Is there yet another Russian assault
to come, such as in Azerbaijan, Ukraine, or Armenia? Or maybe the
Baltic states?"

While Wall Street, which is still reeling from the shock of a serious
liquidity squeeze, views the invasion as a nonevent, Mr. Rhodes,
who heads up the Boston-based institutional adviser Rhodes Analytics,
says that "the market would react sharply if there’s another Russian
military action." Another invasion, he says, "wouldn’t also be looked
upon as a nonevent."

At press time, Russian troops within Georgia were still occupying
the city of Gori, the birthplace of Josef Stalin.

One of Georgia’s big economic enticements is the world’s second
biggest pipeline, a key transit point for oil to Europe and America
from the Caspian region. The pipeline, which delivers an estimated
800,000 barrels a day, or about 1% of the world’s supply, starts in
Azerbaijan and extends to Turkey, where the oil is loaded on boats
for transportation across the Mediterranean.

An energy consultant at West Coast liquidity tracker TrimTabs
Investment Research, Bob Berke, says an explosive situation could
develop. Russia could easily destroy the pipeline if it wanted to,
and "if it did," he says, "it would be an act of war against Europe
and America, all hell would break loose, and it would likely drive
up the price of oil to about $170 a barrel."

A London-based money manager, Raymond Stahler, views Russia’s refusal
to honor its promises of both a truce and a cease-fire in Georgia as a
clear message that it intends to reassert itself as a more prominent
and forceful player on the world stage, which he believes is apt to
create more international tensions. "Since no one at this time will
stand up to them, at least militarily, I think we’re likely to see
increasing Russian use of military force and additional support of the
West’s enemies, including sponsors of terrorism," he says. "In short,
it’s a rebirth of the Cold War."

Mr. Stahler, who is a principal of Stahler Dearborn Ltd., also thinks
Georgia’s problems with Russia may be far from over, especially
since Prime Minister Putin has made it clear he firmly opposes the
pro-Western Georgian government and its desire to join the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization.

This conflict, in addition to Mr. Putin’s personal disagreements
with some prominent Russian business leaders and widespread internal
corruption at the local government level, raises questions about the
stability and goals of Russia’s leadership and putting money to work
in the Russian stock market.

Money manager John Connor, who about a decade ago created the Third
Millennium Russia Fund, which in the past five years has posted an
impressive 33% annual growth rate, takes a far less ominous view
of the invasion. "It’s more of a geopolitical game, essentially a
warning to both America and NATO," he says. "Georgia started something,
and Russia started something bigger."

Mr. Connor expects the Russian-Georgian crisis to be resolved within
a few weeks, owing to international pressure, with Russia returning
the territory to Georgia. He also expects Mr. Putin, whom he describes
as "a pretty smart guy, but who is cranky and shoots from the hip,"
to retire in a year or two and let President Medvedev, his former
chief of staff, run the show.

This year, Mr. Connor’s fund, which has assets of $120 million, is on
the losing side, as the Russian market — stung by a reflection of
the meltdown of stock markets around the globe, falling oil prices,
and the Georgian crisis — has fallen about 23%. The fund itself is
down about 20%, after having been up 8% at the end of June.

Mr. Connor acknowledges that investing in Russia isn’t for widows
and orphans, but "you’re getting a great return for high risk and
for putting up with a lot," he says. He points in particular to
such positives as lofty 8% economic growth, a strong currency, lots
of undervalued stocks, big dividends (many in the 6% to 9% range),
and an average low price-to-earnings market multiple of eight.

Some of his top picks include Russia’s biggest bank, Sberbank,
telecommunications giants VimpelCom and Mobile TeleSystems, and
fertilizer producer UralKali.

The bottom line: Is Mr. Putin, as some speculate, trying to re-create
the Soviet Union? If so, as one trader put it, "they should change
the name of the James Bond film to ‘From Russia Without Love.’"