THE TOPOL IS BETTER THAN THE PIONEER: HOW RUSSIA WILL RESPOND TO THE AMERICAN ANTI-MISSILE UMBRELLA
By Nikolai Khorunzhii
Translated by Elena Leonova
Agency WPS
DEFENSE and SECURITY (Russia)
April 16, 2007 Monday
RUSSIA’S INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILE OPTIONS; Following the announcement
of US plans for deploying missile defense system elements in Poland
and the Czech Republic, Russian experts have started discussing
reponse measures. These measures include the possibility of Russia’s
withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty.
Following the announcement of US plans for deploying missile defense
system elements in Poland and the Czech Republic, Russian experts
have started discussing reponse measures. These measures include
the possibility of Russia’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, signed in 1987.
"Russia has reasons for returning intermediate- and short-range
missiles to its arsenals." This statement from Chief of the General
Staff Yuri Baluyevsky launched the debate about whether we should
withdraw from the INF Treaty.
To be more precise, withdrawal from the INF Treaty has become a
substantial argument for the Russian military in other situations as
well. In August 2006, for example, when former US Defense Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld invited former Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov to
join the American initiative to replace nuclear warheads on ICBMs
with conventional warheads, Ivanov responded by advising his American
counterpart to think about withdrawing from the INF Treaty.
Even earlier – back in 2001, when we were discussing our "asymmetric
response" to America’s withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile
(ABM) Treaty in 2002 – Lieutenant-General Vyacheslav Romanov, head
of the National Nuclear Threat Reduction Center, said that if the
Americans deployed a national missile defense system, Russia would
respond by rebuilding its intermediate- and short-range missile group.
More flexible projects are being proposed now. For example, we could
pull out of the INF Treaty, but confine ourselves to equipping
the missiles in question with conventional warheads, not nuclear
warheads: so they would not pose a threat to Europe or China. And
if the USA refuses to update the treaty, leaving Russia with the
option of complete withdrawal (that is, possessing intermediate-
and short-range missiles with nuclear warheads), Europe and even
China would perceive this as Washington ignoring their interests.
All this sounds very elegant. But while strategic missiles may be
regarded as all-purpose, suitable for use across all directions and
distances, intermediate-range missiles are more specific in their
targets: any country within 5,500 kilometers of the launching point.
That includes China and Europe. And is there any fundamental difference
between replacing nuclear warheads with conventional warheads on
ICBMs, as Rumsfeld proposed, and doing the same with intermediate-
and short-range missiles? Either way, the threshold of use is lowered.
Another equally artful option is being discussed: asking all countries
that possess intermediate- or short-range missiles to sign the INF
Treaty. That means China, North Korea, India, Pakistan, Iran, and
some Middle East countries. If any of them refuse, we can announce
that Russia is withdrawing from the INF Treaty, while agreeing with
the United States that these missiles will be deployed only on the
territory of the countries that own them (so there shouldn’t be any
American missiles in Europe). And what if the Americans refuse? After
all, Russia doesn’t have any intermediate-range missiles – not even at
the design stage – but the United States is making rapid progress on
developing an intermediate-range missile for its submarines. And the
intimidated Europe would appeal to the United States for help. Then
the deployment of American intermediate-range missiles in Eastern
Europe would cause more problems for our country’s strategic nuclear
forces than it did in the 1980s, since NATO has now moved closer
to our borders. Those American missiles would be able to reach our
missile launch bases in minutes.
Moscow is capable of resuming production of missiles with a range
between 500 and 5,000 kilometers, within a relatively short time.
These could be Soviet-era designs like the RSD-10 Pioneer, destroyed
in compliance with the INF Treaty, or modern Iskander systems.
The Pioneer was indeed a good missile. The Soviet military greatly
regretted having to destroy its Pioneers after the INF Treaty came
into effect. However, unlike the Topol ICBM that followed it, the
Pioneer did not have the technology required to penetrate missile
defense systems. Russia plans to produce 17 Topol-M missiles this
year, compared to three in 2006. Then again, Strategic Missile Forces
Commander Nikolai Solovtsov said at a recent press conference that
his subordinates will take delivery of seven Topol-M systems this
year. There are also some problems with the new Bulava naval missile;
plans to equip a whole series of new Project Borei submarines with
Bulava missiles may be disrupted. And on top of all this, Russia
may now face the unanticipated costs of producing intermediate-range
missiles.
Mikhail Barabanov, science editor at "Eksport Vooruzhenii"
(Arms Exports) magazine, has calculated that producing 50-100
intermediate-range missiles would cost the same as producing several
dozen Topol-M ICBMs. Thus, it would be better to have more of the
all-purpose Topol missiles, rather than upgraded Pioneers which would
be limited in application.
As for short-range missiles, there are proposals to increase the range
of Iskander tactical missile systems from 280 to 500 kilometers. Russia
plans to acquire only 60 of these systems over the next nine years;
but 500 kilometers does not mean "from 500 to 1,000 kilometers,"
even with the help of wishful thinking. So it’s a stretch to count
the Iskander as part of the short-range missile class.
It has also been suggested that Russia should withdraw from the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty. But we wouldn’t
scare anyone by doing that, since we lag behind NATO across all
conventional arms indicators. Equating NATO with the CIS Collective
Security Treaty Organization (Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan) is unlikely to succeed; their scale simply
isn’t comparable, and there is hardly any contact between the two
organizations.
These days, the tasks of the politically frightening intermediate-range
ballistic missiles could be performed by far less costly air-launched
cruise missiles. According to the Rosbalt agancy, Russia conducted
successful tests two years ago of the Kh-555 cruise missile, with
a range of up to 5,000 kilometers, accurate to 18-26 meters, flight
speed up to 936 kilometers per hour at altitudes between 40 and 110
meters. All these qualities enable the Kh-555 to penetrate missile
defense systems. The ARMS-TASS agency reported recently that India and
Russia have launched joint efforts to develop a promising supersonic
cruise missile. Such a missile might be an appropriate "asymmetric"
response to US plans for deploying missile defense elements in Poland
and the Czech Republic.