Jerusalem exhibit highlights little-known stories of Armenians recognized by Yad Vashem, revealing acts of courage and shared history between two persecuted peoples

JERUSALEM—Ara Jeretzian, a survivor of the Armenian Genocide, noticed chilling parallels to his own family’s experiences when Budapest’s Jews were ordered into a ghetto by the Nazis in 1944.

After having escaped the slaughter of Armenians, including his own family members, in Ottoman Turkey in 1918, Jeretzian used his influence as a commander in Hungary’s civil defense apparatus to save Jews in the city. 

“In this capacity, he founded a hospital that treated wounded Hungarian soldiers as well as Hungarian civilians free of charge and used this hospital to hide over 400 Jews,” said David Eisenstadt, who translated the placards of nine Armenians declared Righteous Among the Nations for a unique exhibit on Israel’s Holocaust Remembrance Day on Tuesday. 

“He even managed to equip 40 Jewish doctors and other medical personnel with forged certificates stating that they were Aryan.” 

When an informant told the authorities that Jews were being hidden in the hospital, Jeretzian showed up – in a Nazi uniform – and brandished a forged document stating that the hospital was protected territory.

“He was a genuine hero and a tremendous improviser,” Eisenstadt told ALL ISRAEL NEWS.

Another Armenian family, Grigori and Pran Tashchiyan, hid the children of a Jewish family in their home in Crimea during the war. They recruited their teen children, Hasmik and Tigran, to guard the younger Jewish children, ages 4 and 7, and rush them to hiding whenever the Germans came around.

Hasmik was quoted as saying, “After having experienced the Armenian Genocide, we decided we must help them survive.”

These are just some of the 24 Armenians recognized by Yad Vashem World Holocaust Remembrance Center as “Righteous Among the Gentiles” for saving Jews across Europe just 30 years after their own horrors.

Yisca Harani, a Jewish scholar on Christianity, organized an exhibit in Jerusalem’s Armenian Quarter to honor these heroes on Israel’s Holocaust Remembrance Day – a day she said touches Jews more deeply than any other.

“If I want to deliver the news that anyone can be compassionate and that survivors of the Armenian Holocaust helped Jewish people to survive their Holocaust, this is something that can penetrate the heart of anyone on that day,” she told ALL ISRAEL NEWS. “So to hear that there were Armenians who risked their lives to save Jews is very strong.”

Harani, who established the Religious Freedom Data Center, an organization that monitors violence against Christians in Israel, has long worked to create positive relations between Armenians and Jews. 

The exhibit was displayed at the Armenian seminary in the Old City, culled together by Harani and other Jewish volunteers.

On the road, as many Jews walked toward the Western Wall, volunteer Binyamin Klugger, an ultra-Orthodox Jew, stood outside the seminary inviting religious visitors to view the exhibit. Many were hesitant.

Klugger explained that Israelis generally lack understanding of who Christians are – and that they are not hostile. 

“Overseas, Jews live among all cultures, they have Christian neighbors, Christians friends,” he said. “Here, they don’t know anything about Christianity or Christians. They only [know] stories of their childhood: the Inquisition, pogroms. Christians are enemies.”

Klugger engages in conversations on his Facebook page, writing about Christian communities and churches. He was once criticized by his community for being photographed with the Latin Patriarch Cardinal Pierbattista Pizzaballa, who was wearing a large cross.

“I told them, ‘I thought he was a math professor and that was a plus sign,’” he said. “I laughed it off, but I asked them, ‘What is your issue with this symbol?’ It opens up conversations and I have the opportunity to explain, there are different communities here in Israel, and it is worth getting to know them.” 

Arek Kahkedjian, a tour guide who is Armenian – born and raised in Jerusalem – said Armenians and Jews share many historic and religious parallels.

“We are both very ancient nations, we have a lot of history. We are even mentioned in Titus Flavius Josephus’ book (War of the Jews),” Kahkedjian said. “Armenians are mentioned in the Bible and have a lot of connections to the Jewish people.”

The parallels carry a tragic tone as well – including the Genocide and the Holocaust – while modern-day geopolitics make for tense diplomatic relations between the two nations: Armenia has ties with neighboring Iran, while Israel has relations with Azerbaijan, a hostile nation on Armenia’s border. 

“It’s all very connected and it’s all too complicated for a regular person to understand, but events like this that emphasize the similarities between the Jewish community and the Armenians – trying to introduce these to each other – could make things better,” he said.

Despite the connections and because of the geopolitics, Israel does not formally recognize the Armenian Genocide.

“It’s important to inform and educate people over here on the role that Armenians played in saving Jews during the Holocaust,” said Kegham Balian. “If I’m not mistaken, they saved the most Jews per capita, so that’s information that should be shared widely.”

Balian emphasized the importance of events like this and advocated for expanded public discussion and educational efforts.

“To bear in mind, this was after Armenians suffered their own genocide,” he said.

While the Nazis never reached Armenia during World War II, Armenians living in Europe – many of them refugees – saw the signs of genocide.

“For very altruistic, humanitarian reasons, they helped Jews in distress,” Eisenstadt said. “Sometimes they were Jews that they knew and in some cases they didn’t know them at all.”

Harani described such cases, including a 15-year-old Armenian boy who saw an elderly Jewish man outside and brought him into his home to hide, and an Armenian woman who went to the ghetto to demand the release of her neighbors.

“Every Jewish person should ask him or herself, ‘If I was there back then, would I risk my life? Would I risk my children?’” Harani said.

Nicole Jansezian is a journalist, travel documentarian and cultural entrepreneur based in Jerusalem. She serves as the Communications Director at CBN Israel and is the former news editor and senior correspondent for ALL ISRAEL NEWS. On her YouTube channel she highlights fascinating tidbits from the Holy Land and gives a platform to the people behind the stories.

https://allisraelnews.com/from-genocide-survivors-to-holocaust-heroes-armenians-honored-for-saving-jews 

Is Frustration With Armenia’s Pashinyan Enough to Bring the Pro-Russia Opposition to Power?

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party looks set to win parliamentary elections scheduled for June 7, yet only 26 percent of Armenians say they support the party, and a lot could change in the coming months (about a third of voters have yet to make up their minds). The results will also be more unpredictable if the Kremlin decides to ramp up election interference.

That is more likely following Pashinyan’s recent visit to Moscow, during which Russian President Vladimir Putin complained about Armenia’s effective withdrawal from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (of which both countries are members) and about the treatment of pro-Russia Armenian politicians. Pashinyan responded with a brief but tense lecture on democratic and online freedoms in Armenia. 

Indeed, social media has become Pashinyan’s main campaign tool. His posts have been particularly successful in recent months, with memes now circulating showing the prime minister looking melancholy while listening to Russian rock star Zemfira, playing the drums, and eating a pastry on a bus. The latter was so successful that he followed it up with similar clips eating corn, lavash (Armenian flatbread), and other foods.

Inevitably, though, turning election campaigns into a reality show has a flip side. Pashinyan was heavily criticized after he got into an argument on the Yerevan metro with a refugee from Nagorno-Karabakh who accused him of surrendering the disputed region to Azerbaijan. There was also another unpleasant incident in which a member of the congregation at a service in a Yerevan church tried to hit Pashinyan (a reminder of the politician’s conflict with the leadership of the Armenian Apostolic Church).

Nevertheless, Pashinyan’s online activity enables him to retain the initiative. His primary message is that Civil Contract is the party of peace, while his opponents want war. He never tires of repeating that the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is over, and an era of peace has begun. But to keep it on track, the logic goes, Pashinyan must remain in government to deliver the normalization of relations with Armenia’s neighbors.

Pashinyan has also been stressing Armenian sovereignty—which means reducing the country’s dependence on Russia. Although he tries not to directly criticize the Kremlin, few are fooled by his caution.

Finally, Pashinyan’s campaign has highlighted integration with the EU. This resonates less with voters, though, because Armenians understand that even in a best-case scenario, it will take decades to achieve. 

Pashinyan’s main rivals are from Armenia’s pro-Russia opposition, which is represented in the elections by the parties of three men: Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, former president Robert Kocharyan, and businessman Gagik Tsarukyan. Although they have much in common, they are in no hurry to enter into a coalition together—partly because of personal ambition, partly out of reluctance to share voters.

If all three groups did make it into parliament, they could theoretically rally behind a consensus candidate for prime minister. Something similar happened following last year’s mayoral elections in the northern Armenian city of Gyumri when all the opposition parties backed a pro-Russia candidate, Vardan Ghukasyan (although he was arrested a few months later on corruption charges).   

The pro-Russia opposition hopes that a combination of Pashinyan’s unpopularity and support from Moscow could help it win. It’s undeniably true that many Armenians would vote for anyone just to be rid of Pashinyan, whom they see as a traitor and blame for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh. 

However, converting this frustration into an electoral victory will be challenging. For the moment, Karapetyan’s party (which was backed by Putin) is the most popular of the three. But the tycoon is currently under house arrest (he was accused of plotting a coup last year), he does not have much experience of public politics, and under Armenian law his dual citizenship excludes him from becoming a parliamentary deputy (let alone prime minister).

Tsarukyan has always been cautious and avoided direct conflict with the authorities, and Kocharyan is widely disliked due to his track record in power: at the moment, just 3 percent of Armenians say they would vote for his party.

Pashinyan’s chances are further boosted by the fact that he faces hardly any competition from the country’s pro-EU political forces. In the past, pro-EU parties criticized the government for its ties to Moscow, but Pashinyan’s obvious desire to reduce dependence on Russia means there is now little difference between them. 

The upcoming elections have turned Armenia into a geopolitical battleground between Russia and the West for the first time. The Kremlin previously considered Armenia part of its sphere of influence, regardless of who was in charge. However, everything changed after Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and Azerbaijan’s victory in Nagorno-Karabakh. Now, officials in Yerevan talk about “decolonization,” cooperation with Washington, and EU integration.

U.S. Vice President JD Vance visited Yerevan in February and gave his public backing to Pashinyan. There was also an announcement of plans for multibillion-dollar U.S. investment—in addition to the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) linking Europe and Asia that will be built across Armenian territory as part of a peace deal with Baku.

In addition, the European Political Community Summit and the first ever EU-Armenia summit will be held in Yerevan in May. And Brussels has pledged to help Yerevan counter Russian hybrid warfare.

Pashinyan’s supporters, as well as Armenian civil society groups, have accused Moscow of directing the country’s pro-Russia opposition, and there has been much talk in the run-up to the June vote about information attacks and mobilizing Russian Armenians to vote. Critics of Pashinyan claim such dangers are being exaggerated to justify persecution of the opposition.

This situation is redolent of the buildup to Moldova’s parliamentary elections in 2025. While Russia’s economic and media influence in Armenia is stronger than in Moldova, it is at least partly offset by the reputational damage Moscow suffered through failing to intervene on behalf of its official ally when Armenia lost Nagorno-Karabakh and during skirmishes on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. As a result, even the pro-Russia opposition in Armenia seeks to downplay its links to Moscow.

It’s hard to deny that a victory for the pro-Russia opposition would mean Yerevan turning toward Moscow, and a halt to the peace process with Azerbaijan and Turkey. The opposition has already promised that if it comes to power, it will punish Pashinyan and his supporters for “surrendering” Nagorno-Karabakh. 

While a win for the pro-Russia forces currently looks unlikely, there is a lot that could still change, such as the level of Russian interference, or the escalation of the war in the Middle East. As Pashinyan has linked a Civil Contract win to the ongoing peace process, if Armenia’s former regional enemies were to turn their backs on negotiations, it would put him in a difficult position. Admittedly, neither Baku nor Ankara wants to see Yerevan become a Russian proxy, so they will likely refrain from any surprise moves until after the election.

https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2026/04/vojna-mir-i-socseti-kuda-vedet-predvybornaya-kampaniya-v-armenii 

Armenia’s best strategic option is not renewed dependence on Russia or a full alignment with the West, but a doctrine of credible neutrality backed by self-defense, balanced diplomacy, and institutional strength. As the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran reshapes the region and Armenia remains exposed to pressures from regional powers, exclusive alignment with any one bloc would increase rather than reduce its vulnerability. The article argues that Armenia’s policy of diversification, along with its connectivity ambitions the “Crossroad of Peace”, already points toward a neutrality. Such a strategy would only be viable if anchored in durable peace with Azerbaijan, stronger deterrence, and reforms. It offers the path to avoid becoming trapped in other powers’ wars in a fragmenting regional order and to become useful to multiple sides.

The expanding U.S.-Israeli war against Iran is not just another Middle Eastern crisis. It is reshaping the strategic environment around the South Caucasus and exposing how vulnerable small states are when regional order breaks down. Armenia, bordering Iran and still facing security risks from Azerbaijan, is directly exposed to the fallout. But the crisis also raises a larger question: What grand strategy is available to a small state caught between rival powers, with no credible alliance guarantee from any of them?

For Armenia, the answer must be neither renewed dependence on Russia nor a futile search for a NATO-style security umbrella from the West. It may be a harder, but more realistic course: armed deterrence and credible neutrality. In Armenia, neutrality may be treated as passivity, or as a euphemism for weakness. In Western policy circles, it can be misread as hesitation or geopolitical drift. Both views are wrong. For vulnerable states, neutrality is not necessarily the absence of strategy but can be a strategy in itself, if it is backed by deterrence, institutions, and diplomatic discipline.

Such a framework would not be as radical break from Armenia’s current foreign policy as many assume. Despite some lazy shorthand in news reports, Armenian leaders have generally not described their strategy as a “pivot to the West.” The official line has been diversification: widening foreign relations and partnerships in multiple directions. The government’s “Crossroads of Peace” concept – calling for regional infrastructure connectivity – points in the same direction. At its core, it is a connectivity project, not a bloc project. It assumes that Armenia’s long-term value lies in linking regions, routes, and markets rather than serving as a geopolitical outpost. In that sense, neutrality is less a rejection of Armenia’s current course than a clearer strategic _expression_ of it.

Since the failure of the Russian-led security system to protect Armenian interests, Yerevan has moved to deepen ties with the United States and Europe, expand defense cooperation with France and India, and reduce its dependence on Moscow. At the same time, Armenia has preserved neighborly relations with Iran, which remains its only non-hostile southern outlet. That dual reality matters. Armenia cannot afford isolation from the West, but it also cannot survive by turning every regional relationship into a test of loyalty to one bloc or another.

This is why neutrality deserves serious consideration. A viable neutrality model would not mean disarmament, moral ambiguity, or geopolitical naivete. It would mean building a doctrine around four principles: no foreign military domination, credible self-defense, balanced diplomacy in all directions, and economic usefulness to multiple sides. Switzerland is the classic example.

Since 2020, Armenia has lived through war, mass displacement, Russian security umbrella failure, and the spillover effects of conflicts well beyond the South Caucasus. Now the U.S. war against Iran is adding another layer of uncertainty. A state in that position cannot afford a grand strategy built on wishful thinking. It needs a framework designed to reduce exposure to great-power confrontation, not intensify it.

There is also a U.S. interest in such an outcome. Washington does not need Armenia to become another forward operating platform in a crowded geopolitical contest. That would likely increase Armenia’s vulnerability, provoke counterpressure from Russia and Iran, and raise the odds that the South Caucasus becomes another arena of proxy competition. A more neutral Armenia, by contrast, could serve U.S. and European interests better: a more stable frontier state, a bridge between the West and East, more open to diversified economic ties, and less likely to collapse back into exclusive Russian dependency. In other words, neutrality in Armenia should not be read in Washington or Brussels as anti-Western.

Armenia has also shown that it is not merely a passive object of regional shocks. It has adapted, diversified, and absorbed external pressures with more resilience than many expected. That resilience suggests that Armenia’s best chance lies not in choosing a patron, but in building a position that multiple sides can live with.

Neutrality cannot simply be declared into existence. It requires consensus, military credibility, functioning institutions, and time. It also requires a more stable regional environment than Armenia currently has. That points to the central precondition: peace with Azerbaijan. Without a durable peace settlement, Armenia remains a frontline state. Investment risk would remain high, diplomacy constrained, and every external relationship filtered through the expectation of renewed conflict. But if peace gradually takes hold, Armenia’s strategic identity could begin to change—from permanent security consumer to regional intermediary.

In fragmented regions, states and cities that can offer predictability, access, and political flexibility often acquire outsized importance. Gulf hubs such as Dubai and Doha have long benefited from that role as centers for finance, logistics, and discreet diplomacy. Yet prolonged regional war also changes the calculus of safety. If volatility spreads across the Middle East, the demand for secure and politically flexible locations will grow. Armenia cannot replace Dubai at scale, but it could emerge as a safe haven and one of alternative platforms for flows of people, capital, business activity. It could also serve as a platform for dialogue for those seeking a more stable environment at the edge of the crisis.

Armenia has some real advantages: transnational networks, widespread diaspora, experience absorbing external shocks, and a location that becomes more relevant when surrounding systems grow less stable.

Armenia’s economic record over the past five years reinforces that point. Despite war, displacement, regional isolation, and repeated external shocks, Armenia has remained among the faster-growing economies in the world, averaging roughly 8 percent annual growth from 2021 to 2025. Part of that performance was driven by external circumstances, especially the spillover from the Russia-Ukraine war. But it also demonstrated something real about the country’s economy, driven by hi-tech sector. Importantly, emerging investments in large-scale data centers and AI capacity—indicate a shift toward close integration into global digital value chains.

Armenia also has a recent precedent for adaptive gain. The Russia-Ukraine war unexpectedly redirected people, skills, and capital into Armenia, contributing to that strong growth. The dangers from a prolonged Iran war are probably much greater, but it does also show that Armenia is not just a passive victim of regional upheaval.

The right policy question, then, is not whether Armenia can become another Switzerland or Yerevan replace Gulf hubs. It is whether Armenia can become useful enough, stable enough, and credible enough to make neutrality work in its own way. For Washington, that should be a serious proposition. U.S. policymakers often assume that states on Russia’s periphery must ultimately choose between camps. But for some states, especially those living beside multiple conflict zones, survival may depend precisely on avoiding irreversible alignment. If the goal is long-term stability rather than symbolic geopolitical trophy-taking, then the United States should be open to outcomes that do not look like formal Western integration. Armenia is one of those cases.

The country still faces hard constraints: unresolved conflict with Azerbaijan, Turkish pressure, Russian leverage, Iranian sensitivities, and weak enforcement capacity. None of that disappears under a neutrality doctrine. But a neutrality strategy could give Armenia something it currently lacks: a coherent way to diversify externally without becoming an outpost for someone else’s war. Armenia does not need a romantic mythology of neutrality. It needs a practical neutrality agenda—sequenced, defended, and linked to peace, deterrence, and institutional reform. And for the United States and European Union, supporting such a path may be wiser than pushing another vulnerable state into a binary choice it cannot safely sustain.

David Akopyan