Created in 2022 after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the European Political Community (EPC) was designed to solve a structural problem: Europe had geopolitical responsibility without geopolitical architecture. Too many crises, too few instruments.
Its format was deliberately undefined, neither based on an enlargement process nor a treaty system. It is neither an alliance nor an institution. Rather, it is a political space allowing coordination without structural commitment. It is now meeting for the seventh time, with the next summit scheduled in Ireland in November 2026 (European Council EPC framework and summit calendar). But the real question in Yerevan is whether the EPC can produce anything more than political statements.
From the courtyard of Yerevan State University, where I teach, Europe appears less like a coherent actor and more like a set of overlapping intentions that occasionally align but rarely accumulate into continuity. This is the real story of the EPC: it reveals Europe’s preferred mode of governance – episodic convergence.
Europe converges under pressure and disperses when pressure fades. Ukraine proved the first part; everything since has confirmed the second.
The EPC can be understood as a political prototype put into circulation before Europe has decided what it actually wants it to become. Its strength is breadth – it gathers almost the entire European political space in one room. But breadth is not capability. What is missing is the internal wiring that turns presence into action: shared mechanisms, binding commitment, and continuity between meetings.
As a result it feels like an experiment rather than an instrument. It is not failing, but nor is it becoming a stable system. Europe is still testing whether political proximity alone can generate strategic output – the EPC brings Europe together but it doesn’t yet make Europe act together.
Hosting the EPC in Armenia is not simply outreach; it reflects a shift in Europe’s geopolitical perimeter. Armenia sits in a structurally unstable environment shaped by three forces: Russia’s declining role as a security guarantor, Turkey’s expanding regional influence, the EU’s incomplete geopolitical presence. In this context, Europe is not a fixed reference point but a contested space of alignment. Yerevan matters because it is where Europe’s external commitments meet local security reality.
The EPC now faces a clear test: converting high-level political dialogue into tangible results. The focus in Armenia must shift from broad declarations to concrete cooperation in the South Caucasus. Four high-priority themes emerge.
Firstly, connectivity corridors between Europe, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia must be diversified, which means developing rail, road, energy, and digital connections via the Trans-Caspian corridor (such as the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route) without reliance on chokepoints. The EU Global Gateway initiative would offer a suitable funding mechanism for this, yet greater synchronisation is needed between EPC members, export credit agencies, and regional actors.
Then there’s the security environment in Armenia, which faces threats of disinformation, cybersecurity risks, and political manipulation. EPC members should consider more structured support – especially ahead of elections – including cooperation on cyber defence, information integrity, and institutional safeguards.
Thirdly, the region’s energy sector remains vulnerable. Armenia is not a key transit state but may still be helpful for overall integration between the Black Sea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia regions. Key areas include power transmission networks and hydrogen.
The EPC’s structural weakness are also the gaps between meetings. Continuity can be improved without creating heavy institutions. For instance, the early selection of future hosts, time-bound thematic working groups, and designated lead countries for key files would preserve flexibility while improving operational continuity.
The EPC was never designed to replace EU enlargement or accession processes. Its value lies in its flexibility – a parallel political space that accelerates reform, reinforces convergence, and strengthens alignment for partners such as Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine.
But summits don’t become systems unless they are anchored by mechanisms that survive between them. Without that, political proximity becomes ceremonial – visible but strategically thin. Yerevan shows that Europe still behaves as if institutional presence equals geopolitical capacity. But presence is not capacity. The EPC guarantees visibility; it does not guarantee impact.
For Armenia and similar partners, the EPC is not judged by symbolism but by predictability. Is Europe a reliable strategic actor in environments where security conditions are unstable and external guarantees have proven fragile? Credibility is not built through communiqués, but through consistency over time.
The EPC is now part of that test and the meeting in Yerevan highlights a broader shift in European geopolitics. Europe is no longer defined only at its institutional centre. It is increasingly shaped at its perimeter – where security, infrastructure, and political alignment intersect under pressure.
The EPC will not be judged by attendance or declarations. It will be judged by whether it can translate political proximity into coordinated action.
Dr Cristina Vanberghen is a professor at the faculty of International Relations, Yerevan State University. She writes in a personal capacity.
https://www.euractiv.com/opinion/yerevan-and-the-end-of-europes-comfortable-politics/