ArmenPress
March 17 2004
MARGARIAN MEETS OSCE CHAIRMAN-IN-OFFICE
YEREVAN, MARCH 17, ARMENPRESS: Armenian prime minister Andranik
Margarian met today with the visiting chairman-in-office of the OSCE,
Bulgarian foreign minister Solomon Passy, who has arrived in Armenia
after visiting neighboring Georgia and Azerbaijan. The goal of the
visit is to get first-hand information about South Caucasian problems
and the latest developments concerning regulation of the region’s
conflicts.
The prime minister expressed hope that the visit will have a
positive impact on the resolution of the conflicts promoting
establishment pf peace and stability and reiterated that Armenia’s
foreign policy is aimed at closer integration with Europe, recalling
that Armenia joined OSCE in 1992. Relations between Armenia and OSCE,
according to Margarian are important first of all with regard to
efforts aimed to help the conflicting sides resolve their dispute
over Nagorno Karabagh.
He underlined that Armenia stands for continuation of the
disrupted negotiations process finding that jointly implemented
projects, not only together with Azerbaijan, but also with Turkey,
without preconditions would significantly raise chances for a
peaceful solution through building confidence measures. “The sooner
our problems with Azerbaijan and Turkey are resolved the better for
all sides, as we are neighbors and are doomed to live side by side,”
he said, but added that Turkey is not prepared now to accept this
‘clear realities,” and therefore Armenia is against Turkey taking up
in 2007 the chairmanship over the OSCE. “Our position in this regard
may change only after Turkey establishes full diplomatic relations
with Armenia and opens its borders,” he said.
Margarian also said that Armenia was disappointed with the OSCE
chairman-in-office’s failure to condemn the brutal murder of an
Armenian officer in Budapest by an Azeri classmate. According to
Margarian, such a step would have been appropriate having in mind the
demeanor of Azeri authorities seeking to justify the crime.
The prime minister also praised the OSCE Yerevan office for its
productive cooperation with Armenian authorities, singling out its
assistance in helping draft a series of legislations.
Solomon Passy in turn said his conclusion was that a dialogue,
joint discussions are the best way for resolving all exiting
problems. He also welcomed Armenia’s position to start cooperation
with its neighbors without preconditions pledging also his support.
Later in the day Solomon Passy was received by foreign minister
Vartan Oskanian.

ArmenPress
March 17 2004
ARMENIAN FM CALLS FOR ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF KARABAGH’S RIGHT TO
SELF-DETERMINATION
GENEVA, MARCH 17, ARMENPRESS: Addressing the 60-th session of the
UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva on March 16, Armenian foreign
affairs minister Vartan Oskanian described the brutal murder of an
Armenian officer in Budapest by an Azeri classmate as “an example of
ethnic enmity.”
Armenian foreign affairs ministry said that the minister
reiterated Armenia’s commitment to respect of human rights and
briefed the session on what has been achieved in Armenia to this end
in the last ten years, singling out, particularly, the abolition of
death penalty, appointment of the first ever ombudsman and
legislative reforms.
Oskanian explained that the existing discontents in the region are
the direct outcome of abuse of human rights and called on the
international community to acknowledge the right of Nagorno Karabagh
population to self-determination.
During a one-day visit to Geneva Oskanian met with Irish foreign
minister Bryan Kowen to discuss the Wider Europe project. He also had
meetings with his Swiss, Estonian and Luxembourg counterparts and
visited also the deputy UN Secretary General, the chief director of
the UN Geneva office Sergey Orjonikidze.

PRESS RELEASE
Department of Armenian Studies, Haigazian University
Beirut, Lebanon
Contact: Ara Sanjian
Tel: 961-1-353011
Email: [email protected]
Web:
HAIGAZIAN UNIVERSITY
DEPARTMENT OF ARMENIAN STUDIES
invites to a lecture on
The Armenian Genocide in the Memoirs of Syrians
(in Armenian)
by
Dr. Nora Arissian
(Damascus)
Friday, March 19, 2004 – 7:30 p.m.
Haigazian University Auditorium – Mehagian building, Mexique Street,
Kantari, Beirut
N.B. Please accept this message as a personal invitation.
Haigazian University is a liberal arts institution of higher learning,
established in Beirut in 1955. For more information about its activities
you are welcome to visit its web-site at <; . For additional information on the activities of its Department of Armenian Studies, contact Ara Sanjian at

The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec)
March 17, 2004 Wednesday Final Edition
Hockey is hurling on ice
by PAT HICKEY
Happy St. Patrick’s Day to all my Irish friends and the rest of you
who wish you were Irish on this finest of days.
I’d like to take this opportunity to enter the current debate over
the origins of hockey and declare that
no matter where the game started, it was Irishmen who got the ball
rolling, or was it the puck sliding?
In the past month, Nova Scotia and Virginia have staked claims as the
birthplace of hockey. In each case, these bids have been supported by
paintings from the early 19th century. And in both cases, we see
players with curved sticks playing what can only be described as a
game of hurling on ice. This is particularly evident in the Virginia
painting, which was done by John O’Toole, an Irish-American folk
artist. For the uninitiated, hurling is a uniquely Irish sport that
is renowned more for its violence than its skill. And if that doesn’t
describe hockey, what does?
Rich tradition: While we’re on a St. Patrick’s Day theme, it’s
appropriate to note the Irish contribution to North American sport.
Tommy Gorman and Ambrose O’Brien were among the founders of the NHL.
The Canadiens dynasties of the ’50s included all-star goalie Gerry
McNeil and Dickie Moore and the current roster features Michael Ryder
and Jim Dowd. King Clancy, Frank McGee, Joe Malone, Cy Denneny, Red
Kelly and Teeder Kennedy are among the Hall of Fame members who can
claim Irish ancestry.
Heavyweight champs Gene Tunney and Jack Dempsey were Irish and so is
John McEnroe, who can be found in the dictionary under Irish temper.
And if you’re looking for an all-Irish NBA team, how about Bill
Walton, Kevin McHale, Dick McGuire, Easy Ed Macauley and John
Stockton with Lenny Wilkens as coach?
The Fighting French? And then, of course, we have the Fighting Irish
of Notre Dame, although we’ve always felt the name didn’t quite fit
the reality.
The school is called Notre Dame because it was founded by Pere Edmond
Sorin. He was a member of the French congregation Sacre-Coeur that
continues to run the school to this day, and is also active here in
Quebec. I know a little something about the school’s history because
Sorin was a friend of my great-grandfather, the first Patrick
Valentine Hickey. Sorin recognized my great-grandfather’s
achievements as a journalist and publisher by awarding him the
Laetare Medal, which is presented annually to an outstanding Catholic
layman. The family took great pride in this award until it was
presented to John F. Kennedy, who gave new meaning to the word
layman.
I’ve always been puzzled why a school founded by French priests
became the Fighting Irish. True, three of the famed Four Horsemen –
Don Miller, Elmer Layden and Jim Crowley – were Irish and so was
legendary coach Frank Leahy.
But Norwegian-American Knute Rockne and Greek receiver Gus Dorais put
the school on the map; Armenian Ara Parseghian presided over the
team’s most recent success and the team’s stars over the years have
been named Bertelli, Hornung, Lujack, Ishmail and Montana.
One of my favourite stories about the Irish mystique surrounding
Notre Dame goes back to the 1970s, when Tom Clements led the Ottawa
Rough Riders to a Grey Cup championship. During the party following
the game, a tipsy Montreal columnist threw his arms around Clements
and said how great it was to see an Irishman lead the Riders to the
championship.
An embarrassed Clements thanked the writer, but went on to explain
that his ancestors came to the United States from Italy and changed
their name before Clements became one of the Fighting Irish.

The Times (London)
March 17, 2004, Wednesday
MGM to pay Las Vegas billionaire $ 1.6bn dividend
James Doran Wall Street Correspondent
Kirk Kerkorian, the billionaire Las Vegas casino and hotel magnate,
is poised for a big win in Hollywood as Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, the
movie studio he controls, contemplates paying him a special dividend
worth as much as $ 1.6 billion (£880 million).
MGM said on Monday that it was seriously considering a one-off
payment to shareholders to keep them happy.
The company does not have very many shareholders to placate, however,
as Mr Kerkorian owns 74 per cent of the 235 million shares in
circulation.
Sources close to the movie studio behind the James Bond franchise
said that the company was considering a payment of between $ 6 and $
9 a share. Such a paymentwould reap between $ 1 billion and $ 1.6
billion for Mr Kerkorian.
If MGM pays out at the highest end of expectations Mr Kerkorian will
see his $ 3.4 billion fortune swell to $ 5 billion.
MGM has been under pressure to offer a bonus to investors since it
failed to buy the entertainment assets of Vivendi Universal, the
French utility company, that were eventually bought by NBC, the US
broadcaster.
Alex Yemenidjian, the MGM chairman and chief executive, said in a
statement that the company had not made a decision about the special
dividend, which would mark the first shareholder payout since the
company floated in 1997.
But he added: “Our management remains committed to sharing the
company’s wealth with our shareholders.”
Mr Kerkorian, 86, has bought and sold MGM and pieces of it many times
over the past 35 years. It is estimated that he has invested some $ 3
billion in the company in total.
While the special dividend is the most likely course of action for
MGM, analysts believe the company is still considering other options
in its bid to keep Mr Kerkorian happy.
Many have said that the movie studio, which is awash with cash, could
seek to go private, or pursue a sale.
MGM’s 2003 revenues were about $ 1.7 billion, mainly because of
successful DVD sales of the films Legally Blonde 2: Red White and
Blonde and Jeepers Creepers 2.
The company retired all its debt last year and saw record cash flow
of about $ 193 million. It expects $ 600 million to $ 900 million of
free cash flow until2006.
Mr Kerkorian is said to prefer some sort of share-based transaction
because such a deal would be more tax advantageous.
The billionaire investor has not always been the consummate dealmaker
he is today.
The son of Armenian immigrants, he dropped out of school at the age
of nine to become a street newspaper vendor.
He ran away to become a pilot in the RAF during the Second World War
before returning to America to set up a private airline.
Today he is the 97th richest man in the world and owner of the MGM
Grand Hotel and Casino in Las Vegas through his investment company,
which is named Tracinda Corporation after his daughters Tracy and
Linda.

ITAR-TASS News Agency
TASS
March 17, 2004
Duma ratifies protocol on anti-terrorist operations in CIS
By Lyudmila Alexandrova
MOSCOW
The State Duma, lower house of Russia’s parliament, has ratified a
protocol on the procedure of organising and conducting anti-terrorist
operations on the territory of CIS countries.
The protocol was signed by Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Ukraine in
Chisinau on October 7, 2002 at a session of the Council of CIS Heads
of State. It determines the tasks and the procedure of organising and
conducting joint anti-terrorist operations on the territory of CIS
countries.

ITAR-TASS News Agency
TASS
March 17, 2004
Russian general calls for peaceful solution of conflict in Georgia
By Anatoly Yurkin
MOSCOW, March 17
General Igor Rodionov, a Russian State Duma deputy, told Itar-Tass on
Wednesday that Georgia and Ajaria should solve their conflict
exclusively by peaceful means. Rodionov used to command the troops of
the trans-Caucasian military district in the 1980s. He believes that
Ajaria’s geographic location and multi-ethnic population totally
rules out the use of force as a means to solve disputes in this part
of the trans-Caucasian region.
“The specific features of waging military hostilities in highland and
woodland areas enable a defending side to deter considerable forces
that are on the offensive by conventional means,” Rodionov
emphasized.
“Besides, the Armenians and Azerbaijanians residing in this territory
may exploit the current situation to announce their right to an
autonomy. Bloody events, which may lead to more human casualties than
the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, can repeat,” the general
went on to say.
Asked to comment on the causes of the current conflict between
Tbilisi and Batumi, Rodionov replied that nationalist extremist
forces, which caused the tragic events early in the April of 1989,
were rearing their heads in Georgia again. It was then that slogans
for making Georgia a home only for the Georgians and demands to
liquidate autonomous republics in the Georgian territory appeared for
the first time. “Therefore, the sides should sit down to talks and
try to settle the conflict with Russia’s help,” Rodionov emphasized.
In the meantime, Russian State Duma deputies have also expressed
their concern with the recent developments in the trans-Caucasian
region. The deputies told Itar-Tass on Wednesday that peaceful means
should be found to settle the crisis in relations between Tbilisi and
Batumi.
Lyubov Sliska, the first vice-speaker of the Russian State Duma,
backed up Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov’s peace mission to Ajaria which
diverts the sides from the armed conflict. “The purpose of his visit
to Ajaria is to promote normal diplomatic settlement of this
conflict,” Sliska stressed.
“Russia is the guarantor of Ajaria’s autonomy under the state
treaties which were signed in Moscow in 1921,” Konstantin Zatulin, a
member of the CIS Committee for the CIS affairs and ties with
compatriots,” said. The Russian State Duma deputies and Moscow Mayor
Yuri Luzhkov who are currently staying in Ajaria have produced
positive results because it delayed the use of force against the
Ajarian autonomy.
Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the leader of the Liberal Democratic Party of
Russia (LDPR), told Itar-Tass on Wednesday that Zhirinovsky had sent
a telegram to Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili with a request
to refrain from the use of force against Ajaria and to lift the siege
against the autonomy.

ITAR-TASS News Agency
TASS
March 17, 2004
Escalation of conflict in Adjaria may be avoided – Passy
By Tigran Liloyan
YEREVAN
Solomon Passy, the OSCE chairman-in-office and Bulgarian Foreign
Minister believes that the escalation of the conflict around Adjaria
can be avoided and called on the parties to the conflict to begin
dialogue.
Dialogue is the best means in diplomacy and it is the right mechanism
to avoid escalation, he said at a press conference in the Armenian
Foreign Ministry on Wednesday.
For his part Armenian Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanyan noted that “a
quite tense situation” around Adjaria causes concern to the Armenian
authorities. He is confident that “further escalation of the standoff
will have negative consequences for Georgia and the whole region.”

ITAR-TASS News Agency
TASS
March 17, 2004
Karabakh issue can be settled only through Armenian-Azeri dialog
By Tigran Liloyan
YEREVAN
Solomon Passy, the OSCE chairman-in-office and Bulgarian Foreign
Minister is confident that the Karabakh conflict can be settled
peacefully. He made the statement at a press conference after the
talks with the Armenian leadership in Yerevan on Wednesday. The
minister believes that the dialogue is a magic formula that can lead
to the settlement of the conflict. Neither the OSCE nor anybody else
can resolve the Karabakh conflict, Passy said, adding that therefore
the OSCE encourages the sides for dialogue and search of a
comprehensive solution.
The OSCE chairman-in-office noted that he met with Ilkham Aliyev on
Tuesday, with Robert Kocharyan on Wednesday — the leaders who wish
to solve the problem.
Passy also stressed that he will spare no efforts even to partially
promote the conflict settlement till the end of his OSCE
chairmanship.

Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part A (Russia)
March 17, 2004, Wednesday
Election results: Putin is ceasing to be a “human rating”
There’s no sensational news. As expected, Vladimir Putin was
re-elected as president of Russia on March 14.
He took first place, 57% ahead of his nearest rival, Communist
candidate Nikolai Kharitonov; as the Kommersant newspaper observed,
this is a record margin for Russia. The previous record had been set
by Boris Yeltsin in 1991, when he defeated Nikolai Ryzhkov by a
margin of 40.5%.
However, when compared to other leaders in former Soviet states,
Putin – with his 57% winning margin – only ranks eighth. He is ahead
of President Robert Kocharian of Armenia (who won with a margin of
21.26%) and President Leonid Kuchma of Ukraine (14.25%). But the top
spot is held by President Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan, of
course, who got 99.5% of the vote in his last election. The
Turkmenbashi is closely followed by President Emomali Rakhmonov of
Tajikistan (96.97%), President Mikhail Saakashvili of Georgia
(96.27%) and President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan (91.9%). In this
company, Putin hasn’t broken any records.
Rather venomously, the Vedomosti newspaper observed that it’s good to
know Putin “is a well-read person who has visited the Hermitage and
the Tretyakov Gallery,” not to mention “the museum that is the
Kremlin.” Thus, says Vedomosti , there is some hope that “he won’t
wish to follow the example of Saparmurat Niyazov and become ‘the
father of the Russian people,’ president for life, with a golden
statue of himself rotating to follow the sun on Red Square and/or
Palace Square.”
Meanwhile, there were plenty of reasons to worry during the voting
process – as expected, most concerns were related to voter turnout.
According to Nezavisimaya Gazeta , in the lead-up to the election, “a
clear and unambiguous directive was sent out to the regions: 70 and
70.” In other words, state officials at all levels of government were
instructed to ensure that voter turnout was no less than 70% and the
priority candidate received no less than 70% of the vote.
The objective set by the Kremlin was acted upon, says Nezavisimaya
Gazeta . As soon as voting began, victory reports started coming in
from the Russian Far East: almost everywhere, voter turnout was
higher than it had been for the parliamentary elections.
Predictably, the most active voters were military personnel (almost
all of them voted) and rural residents. Residents of large cities
proved to be far more lazy and irresponsible.
Among the regions, according to Gazeta , the highest turnout was (as
usual) reported by the ethnic republics.
Kabardino-Balkaria took the lead with turnout at 94.76%. It was
followed by Mordovia (91.29%), Ingushetia (91.09%), and Chechnya, of
course (89.65%). Unexpectedly, the lowest turnout levels were
recorded in the Irkutsk region (49%) and the Krasnoyarsk territory
(48.45%).
The authorities of the Irkutsk region had done all they could not to
be left behind: according to Nezavisimaya Gazeta , In the city of
Irkutsk even people without official residency permits were allowed
to vote at some polling stations. Neither maternity hospitals nor
general hospitals nor universities were overlooked. Cars fitted with
loudspeakers cruised the streets of Irkutsk all day, urging citizens
to go and vote. Nothing helped.
There had been warnings in the media: leaders of the regions with the
lowest voter turnout levels would face a real threat of the Kremlin’s
displeasure after the election.
At this point, the main target of this displeasure is said to be
Governor Alexander Khloponin of the Krasnoyarsk territory. The Vremya
Novostei newspaper notes that this is all the more upsetting because
before this election, the Krasnoyarsk territory had been considered
something like “the New Hampshire of Russia” – that is, an “average”
region on all counts. The same might be said of the Irkutsk region.
Vremya Novostei requested comments from Igor Bunin, director of the
Political Techniques Center. He explained that the changed situation
in these regions is due to the fact that “large industrial regions
like Irkutsk and Krasnoyarsk are accustomed to elections with a
normal amount of competition, so they weren’t very happy about the
lack of options.”
Vremya Novostei points out that both are “oligarchic” regions.
Alexander Khloponin came from the Interros conglomerate; and the
Irkutsk region is “the fiefdom of Russia’s aluminum corporations.”
Nevertheless, according to the sources of Vremya Novostei , the
presidential administration even seemed glad to see these results.
The Kremlin considers them to be evidence that all the talk of
“directives from Moscow” is nothing more than the invention of
journalists with too much time on their hands.
Nezavisimaya Gazeta offers its own explanation of the uneven
distribution of election results among the regions.
As Nezavisimaya Gazeta emphasizes, incredibly high turnout in some
regions and complete voter apathy in others are not correlated in any
way with living standards or awareness of the law in those regions.
“The high turnout figures are not coming from regions where the
people are relatively prosperous and very aware of the Constitution.
They are coming from regions where the regional leaders are dominant
and the people are submissive.”
In the opinion of Nezavisimaya Gazeta , voter turnout in the
presidential election has become “a vivid indicator of the degree of
authoritarianism and enserfment of the citizenry.”
Nezavisimaya Gazeta also finds it necessary to warn that
“Turkmenistan style” voting is not without its dangers for the
regime.
“Turnout in excess of 90% has generally been reported in regions that
rely on subsidies from the federal government. It’s a kind of deal:
the federal government provides funding in return for regions
providing ballot papers filled out in the proper way.” The
arrangement is legally flawless, says Nezavisimaya Gazeta , but
politically dangerous: “If oil prices crash, could the Kremlin find
enough money to buy loyal votes? What if the next election becomes a
mechanism of blackmail?”
However, there are also some other points of view. Vremya Novostei
takes up a philosophical question: “Is all this evidence that Russian
democracy is vulnerable? Undoubtedly.” But whether we can say that
democratic institutions in Russia “are becoming totally degraded” –
that, according to Vremya Novostei , still remains to be determined.
What is actually being proposed as a basis for comparison? “Did we
witness a true triumph of democracy in 1996 and 2000? Or did the
threat of a communist or neo-communist revanche seem so realistic at
the time that it was acceptable to ‘overlook’ obvious departures from
the canons of democracy?”
What’s more, as Vremya Novostei recalls, four years ago voter turnout
was higher than this week’s figure – 69% versus 61%.
As for the “almost Central Asian” voting results – according to
Vremya Novostei , the first question to ask is this: “At whose
expense did the favorite improved his tally?”
Vremya Novostei says it was primarily at the expense of the
Communists: “In 2000, Gennadi Zyuganov received almost 30% of the
vote, but Communist candidate Nikolai Kharitonov got only half that
figure now.”
Then again, Vremya Novostei notes that it’s very difficult to answer
the following question: whether it’s a good thing that a substantial
proportion of Communist voters have chosen to vote for Putin this
time.
On the one hand, “from the standpoint of the market economy and
carrying out further reforms,” it seems to be a good thing. On the
other hand, “anyone who still remembers the history of the 20th
Century is bound to have somewhat unpleasant feelings at the sight of
universal love and approval for the incumbent regime.”
Novaya Gazeta observer Boris Vishnevsky points out: “The election of
1991 was an ‘election of hope.’ It seemed to be a logical extension
of the ‘springtime of democracy’ in 1990, and there were hopes that
this would melt the ice floes separating Russia from the normal
world, once and for all.” And Yeltsin was elected precisely because
those hopes were associated with him.
Moreover, throughout the following years many people remained
convinced that Yeltsin was a real democrat.
As a result, the idea of democracy as such was discredited. The
general impression was that the “conquests” of democracy amounted to
inflation, devaluation, a default, and wars in Chechnya.
On the other hand, this widespread conviction made it impossible for
a democratic opposition to Yeltsin to arise, so a Communist comeback
essentially became the sole alternative to the existing order.
It was fear of a Communist comeback that made it possible to increase
support for Yeltsin thirty-fold in 1996.
That was when the regime became convinced that obedient television
channels, “managed democracy,” and a strict hierarchy of governance
could work electoral miracles. These skills proved very useful in the
course of “Operation Successor.”
As a result of all this, by 2004 elections have become an empty
formality. Boris Vishnevsky says: “No wonder Russian voters are
completely apathetic about elections – just like Soviet voters were
apathetic about all elections that resulted in a convincing victory
for ‘the indestructible bloc of Communists and non-Party members.'”
People are aware that their votes don’t affect anything. Bitterly,
Vishnevsky asks: “Have we come all the way from hope to apathy in
only thirteen years?”
However, it is clear that the democratic press has still retained its
faith in the power of the written word, in these new conditions.
“How lovely all this is,” says Yevgeny Kiselev, editor-in-chief of
Moskovskie Novosti . “First Putin tramples the political ground so
that nothing can grow on it.” Some of those who decide to oppose the
regime become emigres, others find themselves in jail. And “more
cautious” politicians have preferred “to hide – since no one wants to
meet the same fate as Khodorkovsky. But when it became clear that the
election outcome was a foregone conclusion and therefore of no
interest to anyone, the regime suddenly became alarmed.
Titanic efforts were made to boost voter turnout (right up to
demanding absentee ballots from sick people before admitting them to
hospital, and even from arrestees before sending them to pre-trial
detention centers).
As Kiselev puts it, Putin wanted “to defeat himself” – that is, to
better his own result from four years ago (as he succeeded in doing).
Most of all, however, he was seeking “a completely different kind of
mandate” – carte blanche for any transformations he chooses to make –
and he could get this by winning an absolute majority of the vote
(not just the majority of those who actually voted, but a majority in
terms of eligible voters).
This second goal was not achieved, despite the extensive use of state
resources (or perhaps precisely because the efforts applied were
excessive).
In the words of Leonid Radzikhovsky, an observer for Versiya weekly,
the people decided to “slack off” in this election: “After all, this
is just about the only liberty that still remains to us.”
Radzikhovsky emphasizes that he sees no ideological opposition to the
regime in this line of conduct – in contrast to an election boycott,
as emphatically promoted in recent weeks by Yevgeny Kiselev on the
pages of Moskovskie Novosti . For Radzikhovsky, there is a clear
difference between “a boycotter who spends voting day lying on the
couch for the sake of an idea, with the sanction of Yevgeny Kiselev,”
and a “slacker.”
“The boycotter wants everyone else to do the same – he has a firm
opinion about how to engage in politics, and how we ought to put
Russia in order (with or without Putin).” But the “slacker” really
doesn’t want everyone else to slack off – since that would mean he’d
have to drag himself to the ballot box after all: “Because unfairness
is preferable to disorder, and he definitely doesn’t want to see a
repeat of 1991-93.”
To illustrate the popularity of this attitude, Versiya cited the
results of its own opinion poll. People were asked which of the
post-1917 regimes they view as the most stable.
Leonid Brezhnev’s stagnation era used to be ranked highest in polls
of this kind – until recently. But times change, and the views of the
electorate change with them: the top place is now held by – of
course! – Putin (37%). In second place – a real sensation, this! – is
Stalin (18%). Brezhnev has dropped to third (11%). He is followed by
Lenin (9%), Andropov (8%), and Khrushchev (4%). At the bottom of the
ranking are post-Soviet reformers Gorbachev (2%) and Yeltsin (1%). It
seems that democratic values have become greatly tarnished in the
eyes of Russian citizens.
Further details are added to the picture by a poll from Yuri Levada’s
Analytical Center, published in Novye Izvestia . It indicates that
the capitalist path of development has no more than 20% support in
Russia, while only around 9% of respondents identify themselves as
consistent liberals.
The Levada agency’s poll indicates that support for revising the
results of privatization has risen from 25% to 31% over the past four
years. The idea of returning to a state-regulated economy now has 29%
support; and restoring state subsidies for fundamental sectors of the
economy would be approved by 15% of respondents.
Meanwhile, only 13% of respondents were in favor of continuing
reforms and strengthening the positions of private capital. The
number of those in favor of private ownership of land has also
fallen, from 8% to 6%.
Leonid Sedov, senior analyst at the Levada Center, says Russia “now
has a combination of a conservative citizenry, unadapted to
modernization, with a gigantic bureaucracy concerned solely for its
own welfare.”
According to Novye Izvestia , it follows that over the next four
years Russia can expect to see existing attitudes being maintained.
However, most analysts believe Russian society is now on the
threshold of significant changes. It seems that almost everyone has a
different opinion about Putin’s policy program for his second term.
In Novaya Gazeta , Boris Kagarlitsky says: “Anyone who thinks the
next four years will simply be a continuation of the previous term is
mistaken.”
In his first term, says Kagarlitsky, Putin was engaged only in
entrenching his own power, without getting involved in economic and
social problems: “Even the battle against the oligarchs was not an
expression of any coherent strategic course: it was a matter of
removing everyone who was obstructing the Kremlin.”
This battle had little impact on the lives of ordinary citizens: for
some time now, they have thought of the war in Chechnya as something
happening far away; while the crackdown on the media and the
increasing influence of the security and law enforcement agencies
seem to have made a strong impression only on the West. Kagarlitsky
observes that terrorist attacks in Russian cities have probably
served to strengthen the regime rather than weakening it: “The more
frightened we are, the more we love our leaders.”
And so Putin has defeated his opponents, winning the election. “Now
the stage has been cleared for one political performer. What kind of
performance shall we see?”
Kagarlitsky notes that the president isn’t concealing his plans: he
proposes to continue the liberal economic reforms. Next in line are
reforms to housing and utilities, and the conclusive
commercialization of health care and education. The Russian market
will be opened up to Western companies. And so on.
The public, having voted for Putin, is hoping that stability will
continue – just like in the past four years, when there haven’t been
any noticeable reforms, but living standards have increased little by
little. However, those times are over.
The problems are building up, and something must be done about them:
the “good fortune of oil” cannot last forever.
The Kremlin team is ready for battle: with television broadcasting
brought under control and the opposition crushed, this is just the
right time to launch some unpopular reforms.
Kagarlitsky says: “During his first term in office, Putin wasn’t a
politician – he was an approval rating. A symbol, an office, whatever
– but not a state leader charting a course of his own.”
And that was the very reason for his overwhelming popularity. As the
media often observed, he was “the president of hope.”
But as soon as he starts taking action, the situation will change.
In the Gazeta newspaper, Andrei Ryabov says: “As soon as he takes the
first steps along the path of complicated, unpopular reforms, the
president will immediately encounter the risk of losing support.” The
almost-universal approval he has now will inevitably be eroded.
At present, it’s hard to predict what will happen after that. Ryabov
believes that Russian politics will be “greatly polarized.” The
groups that find their expectations cheated will start seeking
someone new to express and protect their interests. And the
requirements for a new leader will be fairly stringent: “To clearly
formulate a program for redistributing property, weakening the power
and influence of the rich, and so on.” Meanwhile, the president will
be forced to seek a new support base for his reforms, “since the
state bureaucracy is unlikely to become a reliable ally for the head
of state in this cause.”
So who might become a reliable ally for Putin, at a time when
attitudes are shifting again?
The Izvestia newspaper says: “It must be admitted that both the
Russian elite and the public have always cherished the idea of there
being some kind of ‘special cohort’ made up of the very purest,
bravest, and cleverest people – a kind of political special squad,
capable of moving those mountains which the ‘plebes’ don’t even dare
to approach.”
As everyone knows, Putin’s first term has seen an influx of
“siloviki” – people from a security and law enforcement background –
into the upper reaches of political power. Certain unnamed pollsters
have even calculated that the proportion of such people in the
highest echelons of government has risen from 5% in the Soviet era to
50% now.
In Yezhenedelnyi Zhurnal , Alexander Golts observes: “The Russian
president’s words about secret service agents having accomplished
their mission of infiltrating the government seemed like an
unsuccessful joke until recently – but now those words have become an
obvious reality.”
According to Izvestia , the mobilization of special service personnel
into politics is by no means an end in itself; rather, it is “a
search for that impetus which would be capable of launching reforms –
as seen from above.”
Then again, there is also a danger here: if the siloviki are “drawn
into” the market as well as politics, there will be more and more
“werewolves in uniform” corruption.
Needless to say, there would also be some threats to democracy.
As Alexander Golts emphasizes, the people from a secret service
background seriously claim that “they owe all their good qualities –
their matchless analytical capablilites, brilliant education, strong
will, courage – to the Soviet special service, the secret police of a
totalitarian state.”
Neither should we forget, says Golts, that it was a state “steadily
moving towards its own destruction.”
Apparently, there are still far more questions than answers.
The New York Times says: “We pose the familiar questions: is Mr.
Putin a reformer or a hard-liner? Is he his own man or is he
controlled by the dreaded siloviki, the former security officials who
have become the powers in the Kremlin? Was it the president or the
siloviki who arrested the oil mogul Mikhail Khodorkovsky, seized
control of the news media from private owners, purged and re-purged
the benighted dystopia of Chechnya?” ( Gazeta published a translation
of this article.)
One thing is clear, the New York Times observes sadly: “Vladimir
Putin is never going to become a Western-style, liberal-democratic
politician, no matter how much we wish it… A reforming liberal
leader in Russia is the Holy Grail of Kremlinology, but the search
for one is as misguided and hopeless as that for the relic of the
Last Supper.”
Russian analysts hold similar views. At any rate, in one of his
post-election interviews, Gleb Pavlovsky thoughtfully observed that
“a state cannot be better than its society.”
And those are the scales on which we will have to balance throughout
Putin’s second term in office.