The Armenian Prime Minister has turned his social media into a viral regional sensation — but does his charm survive contact with reality?

Just days after two landmark European summits in Yerevan saw French President Emmanuel Macron dominate Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s social media feed, the latter’s posts have shifted back to the campaign trail. This time, he and Parliamentary Speaker Alen Simonyan were filmed eating sweet corn puffs aboard the party’s campaign coach, nicknamed the ‘happy bus’.

For a head of state, it’s an eccentric social media strategy that Pashinyan adopted well before the formal start to the campaign season, and one that has proven to be popular. From late February to March, he uploaded reels of himself and Simonyan on the Civil Contract bus, snacking on local treats, such as fried potato pirozhki, corn on the cob, sweet sujuk (stringed candied walnuts), and lavash bread. In another clip, Pashinyan is seen burning his hand before enjoying boiled potatoes en route with his fellow MP, attracting more than six million views.

It appears that for Pashinyan, whose Civil Contract party is seeking a third consecutive term in the upcoming parliamentary elections, the more clicks, the better. He pays close attention to his metrics and periodically shares his Meta analytics online.

On 11 May, he posted a screenshot to his more than 900,000 followers, showing that his Instagram page surpassed 100 million views in 30 days for the first time. In the caption, he wrote: ‘Thank you for following my pages. I love you all’, followed by emojis of a red heart and a hand-heart. The latter has become one of his signature campaign symbols emblazoned across promotional materials, from cookies and Civil Contract attire to baseball caps and party vehicles, including the bus.

The hand-heart is also embroidered on his new white button-down shirt, along with a yellow-orange ‘16’ – the Civil Contract ballot number – and the slogan, ‘Stand up for peace!’ He was first seen wearing it while campaigning in southeastern Armenia over the weekend, including in videos where he offered Armenian spelling lessons to Russian-Armenian tycoon and opposition Strong Armenia leader Samvel Karapetyan, mocking him after he mispronounced the words ‘adventure’ and ‘victory’ during public speeches.

Astghik Avetisyan, an independent PR and media specialist, tells OC Media that  Pashinyan’s social media approach is ‘a sophisticated yet high-risk model that integrates personalisation, populist framing, and tightly managed image control’.

She’s among the media and democracy experts pointing to a widening gap between curated digital messaging and a more confrontational political reality. Recent incidents covered by local news outlets involve members of the public and hostile rhetoric toward forcibly displaced Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, fuelling concerns over polarisation and online manipulation ahead of the 7 June vote.

https://oc-media.org/is-armenias-strategic-brand-of-democracy-at-risk/

Cracking the algorithm

Since the 2018 Velvet Revolution, Pashinyan has long used unfiltered Facebook Live broadcasts to bypass state-controlled media and communicate directly with the public. Eight years ago, the approach helped galvanise mass protests that led to the resignation of then-Prime Minister Serzh Sargsyan. Pashinyan later credited social media as one of the key tools behind the movement’s success.

Following his rise to power, Pashinyan continued to share real-time updates about the government primarily on Facebook, where he also hosted live Q&As with the public. He often offered glimpses of his personal life online, including live-streaming at the prime minister’s residence and his many attempts to increase the popularity of cycling.

‘[Social media] played a pivotal role in building trust, coordinating collective action, and fostering a sense of shared purpose’, says Avetisyan, who is also president of the Armenian PR Association. ‘At that stage, his communication style closely reflected grassroots dynamics and participatory engagement’.

‘Over time, however, this approach has become more institutionalised and strategically managed’,  she says.

In the aftermath of Armenia’s defeat in the 2020 Second Nagorno-Karabakh War, and the ensuing exodus of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh, Pashinyan’s digital platforms took a more serious, sombre turn.

During the 2021 snap parliamentary elections, Pashinyan’s feed consisted of multiple images of himself bowing at monuments, graveyards, and before his supporters.

He didn’t start experimenting with content creation again until 2024. In November of that year, Pashinyan went viral after shaving the signature beard he had worn since the Velvet Revolution and winking into the camera. He also began posting more consistently about his cycling tours.

But it wouldn’t be until October 2025 before Pashinyan truly cracked the algorithm. Young people from across the post-Soviet world transformed him into a popular meme after he posted a video of himself listening to Russian alternative rock star Zemfira’s 2000s hit, ‘PMML’, which has garnered more than 17 million views on Instagram.

From there, his content evolved into almost daily reels of Pashinyan stoically grooving to music in Armenian, French, Russian, and English, typically ending with a smile and a hand-heart gesture. They’re often captioned: ‘Good morning, have a nice day, and I love you all’, accompanied by more hand-heart emojis.

In April, he expanded his playlist to include American hip hop, including rappers Kendrick Lamar and Future — the latter of whom re-shared the clip on his own Instagram story.

Some of his other pre-election vlogs have ranged from the prime minister slurping soup to highlighting his party’s record on school and road renovations, posing with European officials, exchanging more insults with the opposition, and handing out pins in the shape of Armenia’s internationally recognised borders — another key symbol of his campaign and the ‘Real Armenia’ programme: Civil Contract’s effort to raise acceptance of Armenia’s internationally recognised borders along the lines of those in Soviet Armenia.

‘[Civil Contract] has come to the realisation that they can spin everything’, political analyst and director of the Yerevan-based think tank the Regional Centre for Democracy and Security, Tigran Grigoryan, tells OC Media.

‘Like in the example of Karabakh, you can sell one of the worst disasters in recent Armenian history as an achievement, and a lot of people aren’t just buying it, but amplifying this message’.

‘In terms of democratic development, it’s dangerous because of the lack of reaction to ongoing authoritarian tendencies’, Grigoryan adds.

https://oc-media.org/opinion-the-risks-of-pashinyans-fear-mongering-tactics-ahead-of-armenias-elections/

‘Real Armenia, the Republic of Armenia’ is also the title of a song by his musical group, Varchaband, which performed its debut concert in Yerevan on 30 January.

The upbeat tune was featured in the ruling party’s campaign video with teenagers breakdancing in a high school gymnasium as Pashinyan played the drums in the background.

Pashinyan has also frequently shared videos of himself practising drums online. In April, his band performed again in Yerevan, and later at an open-air concert  in Gyumri as part of what organisers called the ‘Voice of Peace Festival’.

The festival was financed by Fast Bank, a commercial lender owned by government-linked businessmen. The bank also funded a free concert under the same name in Yerevan’s Republic Square on 25 April.

Separately, on 23 April, the Independent Observer coalition of Armenian election-monitoring groups alleged that Civil Contract’s pre-election concerts sponsored by Fast Bank may have breached campaign finance rules, which prohibit businesses and legal entities from making direct donations to political parties.

https://oc-media.org/pashinyans-band-holds-debut-concert-in-yerevan/

Populist damage control

While world leaders attended the opening ceremony of the 8th European Political Community Summit — showcasing live Armenian song and dance performances and messages of peace, which were livestreamed on Pashinyan’s Facebook page — protesters gathered outside the venue. Among them were Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians, who demanded the release of 19 Armenian prisoners held in Baku and the protection of Armenian heritage in Nagorno-Karabakh.

Demonstrators, civic activists, and opposition figures also accused Armenian authorities of restricting free speech, exerting influence over the judiciary, and pressuring the Armenian Apostolic Church.

Beyond the summit stage, a similar contrast between public messaging and reported events emerged during a Palm Sunday appearance on 29 March, which was prominently featured on Pashinyan’s social media feed.

In the reel, he and Civil Contract MPs are shown attending a crowded church service and participating in the liturgy, with the clip ending on a light moment as he poses for a photograph with a visiting tourist from the UK. Local media, however, reported that 18-year-old Davit Minasian appeared to raise his arm toward the prime minister as he was leaving the service before being punched and restrained by bodyguards.

Minasian was later charged with hooliganism and remanded in custody for two months, before being unexpectedly released following public protests and appeals by activists.

According to Avetisyan, the contrast between Pashinyan’s online and offline communication ‘appears deliberate rather than incidental, suggesting a segmentation of communication channels’.

‘Social media serves to maintain emotional loyalty and symbolic connection, while offline rhetoric is often used to mobilise urgency, fear, and political polarisation’, she says.

Another confrontation to cause waves earlier that month showed Pashinyan raising his voice and wagging his finger at a refugee from Nagorno-Karabakh on the Yerevan Metro, after she refused to accept his party’s campaign pin depicting Armenia without Nagorno-Karabakh. She was among more than 100,000 ethnic Armenians forcibly displaced from the region following Azerbaijan’s military assault in September 2023.

In the exchange, Pashinyan referred to Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians as ‘runaways’, a remark he later said he regretted. In a post on Facebook, he invited the woman to meet again to apologise to her in person.

Avetisyan calls this a ‘classic case of reactive image repair’, but warns that when overused, it can be interpreted as ‘performative’ and ‘may deepen public scepticism, rather than rebuild trust’.

‘In today’s media environment, audiences are particularly sensitive to inconsistencies,’ Avetisyan says. ‘As such, damage-control strategies must align with broader behavioural patterns; otherwise, they may reinforce perceptions of manipulation’.

A group of Armenian civil society organisations condemned Pashinyan’s remarks, saying they reflect a broader pattern of rhetoric among Civil Contract officials and risk promoting hate speech, deepening social divisions, and causing further harm to people forcibly displaced from Nagorno-Karabakh.

Armenia’s Human Rights Defender Anahit Manasyan has also called on officials to exercise restraint when discussing issues involving refugees and forcibly displaced people.

Who’s the target audience?

According to Grigoryan, Pashinyan’s campaign symbolism of hand-heart gestures, Armenia-map pins, and influencer-style videos are deliberately non-political and designed to appeal to younger voters.

‘Politics is not attractive to younger people, and there are a lot of studies showing that they’re the most apolitical segment of the population’, Grigoryan says.

Avetisyan similarly argues that Pashinyan’s social media attempts to reach a broader, diverse audience, including younger demographics, and particularly those who are less ideologically rigid and more responsive to emotional and symbolic messaging.

However, she adds, ‘this broad targeting strategy entails trade-offs.’

‘While it enhances visibility and engagement, it can also reinforce polarised interpretations of political reality and deepen existing societal divides’.

Yet, while experts agree on who Pashinyan is targeting, opinion polls demonstrate he may not be succeeding. Indeed, a public opinion survey conducted in February 2026 by the US-backed International Republican Institute (IRI) showed that only 7% of respondents aged 18–35 trust the incumbent leader.

‘Making viral content while listening to Zemfira is probably a good way to capture Gen Z and Alpha’s attention, but to me, it looks worrying’, 30-year-old Anna, who did not wish to use her real name, tells OC Media. ‘I would rather see on my feed his ideas and suggestions on how to improve things and what can be done to make our lives easier, safer, and better’.

Nevertheless, Anna plans to vote for Civil Contract in June. For her, the upcoming elections have become a matter of ‘choosing the lesser evil’. She supports the party’s efforts to bring Armenia closer to the EU and hopes for greater freedom of movement.

‘I don’t want Armenia to go back to the 1990s’, Anna says. ‘We all see what’s going on in Russia now — they are cut off from the world, no internet, say goodbye to freedom of speech and your internet. And that’s just the tip of the iceberg’.

In contrast, Karni Keushgerian, a 22-year-old master’s student in international relations and diplomacy at the American University of Armenia, finds that Pashinyan’s online communication has been working so far.

‘A lot of the opposition’s social media strategy is just responding to what Pashinyan posts. So ultimately, everything that gets posted, whether that’s pro or anti-Pashinyan — it’s successful’.

While Keushgerian hasn’t yet decided who she will be voting for, she knows it won’t be for the main opposition parties or for Civil Contract. She doesn’t support Pashinyan’s foreign policy decisions on Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Nagorno-Karabakh. She also disagrees with the ruling party’s domestic politics ‘when it comes to the violence they have shown towards civic organisations, and also the Church’.

‘I generally don’t agree with Pashinyan’s “Real Armenia” ideology’, she says.

Pashinyan’s reach outside of Armenia, however, is a whole different story.

‘[Pashinyan] stands out. He’s in a region surrounded by authoritarian countries’, Nerses Hovsepyan, a PhD candidate at the University of Amsterdam, points out to OC Media.

Russian-language content creators on TikTok and Instagram also spoofed part of Pashinyan’s contentious meeting in early April with Russian President Vladimir Putin, during which he subtly praised Armenia’s unrestricted internet access.

Likewise, comments under Pashinyan’s posts are often flooded with Russian-language users, many from countries within the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

‘They clearly like him. It’s unusual, it’s odd. It’s very relatable. People from these really consolidated authoritarian countries find it very amusing that the leader of a nation can listen to teenage Russian songs like Zemfira’, Hovsepyan says.

He has also seen a significant number of Azerbaijani commentators writing, ‘you’re the best leader’.

‘I do believe there’s a certain psychological aspect to it, when you’re so used to strongman politics. Such hardline nationalists, corrupt regimes, and then you see your immediate neighbour whom you’ve demonised for so long, having this fun, happy, and relatable, likeable leader posting this relatable, likeable stuff on social media’, Hovsepyan says. ‘That makes them appreciate Armenia’s leader’.

Risks of domestic disinformation

Online, however, Pashinyan and his party aren’t the only ones to saturate the internet with political marketing.

Former Yerevan Mayor Hayk Marutyan, also a comedian, seized the opportunity to parody Pashinyan’s contrasting online and offline image through his own skits on social media, receiving tens, sometimes hundreds of thousands of views. Marutyan later announced on 21 March that his ‘social reformist’ party, New Power, is running in the parliamentary elections.

Multiple political groups have also heavily invested in advertising on Meta. Media.am reported in January that over the course of three months, between $50,000–$98,000 is estimated to have been spent on political ads.

Grigoryan points out that while the ruling party and the EU have warned of threats of foreign manipulations and interference — primarily by Russia — domestic disinformation is also a huge issue.

‘If you go to TikTok, it comes up with so much political content,’ he says. Government-affiliated accounts attack the opposition party, while the opposition has been leaning on AI-generated content and deep fakes.

In February, when Strong Armenia leader Samvel Karapetyan could not attend a party event due to being under house arrest on multiple charges, party members projected an AI-generated version of him. Later that month, Strong Armenia released a fully AI-generated campaign video on Youtube featuring a fictitious superhero, Mister Uzh (Mister Strength), coming to rescue Armenians from high prices and lack of work opportunities.

In general, Grigoryan notes that many people online are not media literate, especially older people, ‘so it’s very easy to trick them’.

However, he emphasises that while the opposition is only now turning to social media, Civil Contract has long been active on TikTok, Instagram, and Facebook, cultivating narratives and working with curated networks of political and social media influencers since the 2021 snap elections.

‘They meet with them on a permanent basis, regularly. These are political analysts, even Facebook activists, and some journalists. They’ve been feeding their narratives for a while now, for three to four years. And these people are now amplifying the messages, all of the programme’s messages’, he says.

An investigation published in late April by CivilNet revealed that Pashinyan’s deputy chief of staff, Taron Chakhoyan, was listed in archived registration data for the pro-government outlet, MediaNews.site. The website is accused of coordinating a media manipulation scheme to shape political discourse online by amplifying fake or suspicious social media accounts. Chakhoyan has denied any connections to the site.

Grigoryan adds that Civil Contract has built its own media infrastructure, including influence over the public broadcaster, which, according to the IRI poll, is the most trusted source of information.

‘They have the advantage of controlling public TV, which has once again, in recent Armenian history, become a propagandistic mouthpiece’, he says. ‘I would call it a propaganda infrastructure’.

Europe goes to the Caucasus, but that is just the beginning of the story

This is the Monday Commentary prepared by Dr Dennis Sammut, Director of LINKS Europe and Managing Editor of commonspace.eu

Dozens of European presidents, prime ministers, and other senior leaders descended on Yerevan last week to participate in the 8th Summit of the European Political Community (EPC). For a day or two, you could not go anywhere in the centre of the Armenian capital without bumping into a European leader and his entourage.

The summit itself was by and large uneventful, with seven-minute set-piece speeches, during which leaders heaped praise on Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. This followed the traditional welcome, whereby leaders were greeted individually by Pashinyan, which lasted for hours. There was an unusually long “red carpet’. NATO Secretary General, Mark Rutte sprinted the last part of his walk, remarking that this was the “longest red carpet ever”. But otherwise, the Summit was uneventful. There was speculation about the Azerbaijani participation in the Summit. In the end, President Ilham Aliyev addressed the summit online. It would have been nice if he were present in person, but clearly, not possible yet, and an online presence was the next best thing.

The following day, it was time for bilateral relations, and the first EU-Armenia summit took place with the participation of Ursula von der Leyen, president of the European Commission, and Antonio Costa, president of the European Council. This was a more substantial affair, during which the EU heaped praise, and some financial support for Armenia, and importantly highlighted how it proposed to engage with Armenia in the future. Armenia had made the journey from being a Russian outpost, which it was until 2018, to becoming the EU’s favorite in the South Caucasus – a “status” achieved not least because of Azerbaijani aloofness, and Georgia’s bizarre anti-EU trajectory.

On 4-5 May, Europe went to the Caucasus, but the consequences are far from clear.

The European show of strength in Yerevan, at least in numbers, did not go unnoticed in Moscow. In public, Russia has tried to show it is not unduly concerned, but there has been a lot of gnashing of teeth in Moscow behind the scenes, and sometimes in public too. The Armenian Ambassador to Russia was summoned to the Russian Foreign Ministry for a dressing down about the presence of Ukrainian president Zelenskiy at the EPC summit, and his speech there; Vladimir Putin himself casually remarked that Armenia was a member of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and this was incompatible with Armenia’s EU aspirations. We all remember the circumstances in which Armenia joined the EAEU, but that notwithstanding, the Pashinyan government has been carefully balancing EAEU membership with closer relations with the EU. Putin’s intervention was therefore misguided and misleading.

But there is a more important core issue here. Putin’s whole strategy, including the war against Ukraine, is aimed at consolidating the Russian position in the near abroad. Armenia looked in that regard like a Russian success story. Not anymore. And last week was a visible _expression_ of a new Armenia, and a new resolve of Europe to stand with Armenia in the face of Russian bullying and pressure.

Europe’s embrace of Armenia was also watched carefully by another geopolitical regional player – Iran. Iran may have its hands full at the moment with the ongoing war with the US and Israel. But the Caucasus countries, and particularly Armenia and Azerbaijan, have a border with Iran, not to mention centuries of historical relations. What happens in the Caucasus is of primary interest to Iran. Managing this interest is a challenge for the region and whoever engages with it.

The third geopolitical player that was watching the Europeans gathered in Yerevan is the United States. For a moment, one could sense that the US was losing interest in the region. Then came 8th August, and the Trump-Aliyev-Pashinyan meeting in the White House. Trump discovered the Caucasus, and it appeared to give him the success story as a peacemaker that he longed for. From that came TRIPP, “an idea and a route” that will require a lot of money and political will to implement. That was already in question before 28th February. Now, as a minimum, all sides will have to go back to the drawing board. After 8 August, the EU was left looking rather silly, with all its efforts since 2021 at Armenia-Azerbaijan peace and reconciliation, overshadowed by Trump’s theatrics. But there is now a new reality, and the EU may have a role yet.

For Armenia, Azerbaijan remains the elephant in the room. Pashinyan has gone a long way to redefine Armenia-Azerbaijan relations. This is still “work in progress”. But the EU needs to engage carefully and sensitively, but not meekly, on this issue too. Kaja Kallas, the EU High Representative, went to Baku immediately after Yerevan to emphasise this inclusivity.

On the same day (6 May), EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Magdalena Grono spoke about the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process and the role of external players during a panel discussion held within the framework of the Yerevan Dialogue international forum 2026.

EUSR Grono noted that the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace process has been a “wonderful and powerful” one, adding that it has received important support from external partners.

“I think that the two capitals themselves were the owners of this project and gave it crucial importance,” she said.

Grono underscored the role of the leadership shown by both sides, noting that they want to be partners in the sense that the agenda is set by the regional actors themselves, while external partners support where their approach is useful.

She added that all possibilities for cooperation had been discussed, expressing hope for new opportunities for regional cooperation when the time is right. She also stressed the importance of addressing humanitarian issues.

In Yerevan last week, the European Union and wider Europe assembled in the EPC, showing its commitment to Armenia and the South Caucasus region. It was necessary. It was timely, but it was also just a start.

In its approach to the South Caucasus over the last thirty years, Europe has been largely reflexive: responding to events. It has lacked a strategic approach and a regional vision. Both require patience, perseverance, and flexibility, but in the end, they make policy towards the region more sustainable.

In the South Caucasus, people have long memories, and the EU has no institutional memory. It fails to build on its own success, and it fails to learn from its mistakes. The region is too important and is too close to Europe either to be ignored or to be approached lightly.

The Armenian parliamentary elections on 7 June will define Armenia’s future, as well as that of the region. In many ways, the EPC Summit and Armenia-EU summit were a loud statement of support for the current Armenian trajectory. However, in the end, it is up to the Armenian people to make a decision. Europe must support the democratic process that makes this possible, and after 7 June, must be ready to stand with Armenia in case Moscow and Tehran do not like the result.

Source: This is the Monday Commentary prepared by Dr Dennis Sammut, Director of LINKS Europe and Managing Editor of commonspace.eu

https://www.commonspace.eu/node/13897

French-supplied CAESAR self-propelled artillery systems appeared publicly for the first time in Armenia during rehearsals for the country’s Republic Day parade, scheduled for May 28 in central Yerevan, signaling a concrete and visible shift in Armenian military hardware away from its traditional Russian-origin inventory.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan had previously announced that the government would showcase military equipment acquired during his tenure at the May 28 event, describing it explicitly as a “report to citizens” on his administration’s defense reforms, according to Armenpress, Armenia’s state news agency.

The CAESAR systems visible during parade rehearsals are among the most significant Western weapons Armenia has received in recent years, and their public display carries both military and political meaning in a country that has been rapidly reorienting its defense relationships following the catastrophic loss of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023.

The CAESAR, which stands for Camion Équipé d’un Système d’ARtillerie, is a French-developed 155mm self-propelled wheeled howitzer produced by Nexter, now part of the KNDS group. Mounted on a truck chassis rather than a tracked platform, the CAESAR combines strategic mobility, it can be transported by air and deployed rapidly over road networks, with the firepower of a conventional heavy artillery piece. The system fires standard NATO 155mm ammunition to ranges exceeding 40 kilometers with extended-range munitions, and its wheeled configuration allows it to reposition quickly after firing, reducing vulnerability to counter-battery fire.

The CAESAR has seen extensive operational use with the French Army in Afghanistan, Mali, Iraq, and other theaters, and France has supplied the system to Denmark, Morocco, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, and Ukraine, among other customers. Its appearance in Armenian service marks a meaningful step in the country’s transition toward NATO-standard artillery calibers and the Western logistics and training ecosystems that accompany them.

Armenia’s pivot toward Western defense suppliers has accelerated dramatically since September 2023, when Azerbaijani forces retook Nagorno-Karabakh in a 24-hour military operation that the Armenian military was unable to contest effectively. The operation exposed the limitations of Armenia’s Russian-supplied military equipment and, more fundamentally, the collapse of the security relationship with Moscow that Yerevan had relied upon for decades. Russia, Armenia’s nominal ally through the Collective Security Treaty Organization, provided no meaningful military assistance during the crisis, and the Armenian government subsequently announced its suspension of participation in CSTO activities. That political rupture opened the door to defense cooperation with France, the European Union, and other Western partners that would have been difficult to pursue while the Russian security relationship remained operative.

The French government’s decision to supply CAESAR systems to Armenia is politically significant given the system’s prominence in Ukraine, where it has been used extensively against Russian forces and has become one of the most recognizable symbols of Western artillery support for Kyiv. Supplying the same system to Armenia, which shares a border with Russia and Azerbaijan, is a statement about the depth of France’s commitment to Armenian defense capacity-building that goes beyond the technical specifications of the weapon itself.

The specific quantities of CAESAR systems delivered to Armenia have not been confirmed in the available source material, and the full scope of French military deliveries to Yerevan remains only partially public.

Russia’s President Vladimir Putin has warned Armenia that Moscow would reconsider bilateral relations if Yerevan pursues EU membership

Authors

Ivan Khomenko

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will not attend the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit in Astana on May 28–29, delegating participation to Deputy Prime Minister Mher Grigoryan.

According to Armenian outlet News.am, Pashinyan said he had informed Russian leader Vladimir Putin during his April visit to Russia, as well as Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, about his decision in advance.

The Armenian leader linked his absence to the country’s parliamentary election campaign ahead of the June 7 vote and a military parade scheduled for May 28 in Armenia. The announcement follows renewed tensions between Yerevan and Moscow after Pashinyan also did not attend Russia’s Victory Day parade in Moscow on May 9.

Putin later suggested that Armenia should hold a referendum on leaving the EAEU and pursuing European Union membership, describing it as a potential “soft, intelligent and mutually beneficial divorce.” The Russian leader also referenced Ukraine, stating that Kyiv’s “conflict” with Moscow began after its attempt to move toward the EU.

Speaking to reporters, Pashinyan said Armenia currently has no plans to organize a referendum on EAEU membership. “We respect all our partners in the EAEU, as well as our participation in the Union,” Pashinyan said.

The Armenian prime minister also rejected Putin’s description of interstate relations as a “divorce.”

“We are confusing interstate relations with marriage. Armenia in interstate relations is guided by interstate logic,” Pashinyan said. “We are full members of the EAEU. And while we are members of the EAEU, we fully participate in all decision-making.”

Pashinyan said Armenia would continue implementing legislation aimed at deepening relations with the European Union and pursuing democratic reforms. “We will also move forward within the framework of the law on deepening relations with the EU and membership in the EU, that is, along the path of democratic reforms,” he said.

Earlier, Azerbaijan introduced Turkish-made missile-armed naval drones into the Caspian Sea amid growing security tensions and increasingly strained relations with Russia and Iran. The move was viewed as part of Baku’s broader effort to diversify its defense partnerships and reduce reliance on Moscow.