Agence France Presse
17 octobre 2004 dimanche 7:56 AM GMT
Entrée de la Turquie dans l’UE: débat “malsain” pour M. Vauzelle (PS)
SAINT-ETIENNE-LES-ORGUES (Alpes de Haute Provence) 17 oct
Michel Vauzelle, président (PS) de la région PACA, a qualifié
dimanche de “malsain” le débat sur l’entrée de la Turquie dans
l’Union européenne car, a-t-il dit, il “permet à la droite et à
l’extrême droite de drainer tout ce qu’il peut y avoir d’anti-islam
en France”.
“On crée un faux problème, la question ne se pose pas aujourd’hui,
alors pourquoi maintenant nous mettre une épée dans les reins pour
qu’on se prononce”, a déclaré le président de Provence-Alpes-Côte
d’Azur, qui était interrogé par l’AFP lors d’une sortie sur la
montagne de Lure (Alpes de Haute Provence).
M. Vauzelle, dont la région compte une importante communauté
d’origine arménienne, a ajouté qu’il était pour sa part hostile à
l’entrée de la Turquie dans l’UE “tant que ce pays ne reconnaît pas
le génocide arménien”.
L’ancien ministre qui est partisan du Non au projet de constitution
européenne a par ailleurs donné une dimension symbolique à sa visite
à la montagne de Lure, lieu où, a-t-il indiqué, s’étaient regroupés
des opposants républicains à Napoléon III sous le second Empire, et
des résistants à l’Allemagne nazie durant la seconde guerre mondiale:
Ce Non signifie “résister à la mondialisation ultralibérale”,
inscrite dans le projet de constitution, a-t-il déclaré.
Alors que les militants socialistes doivent se prononcer sur cette
question début décembre, il a ajouté : “si la majorité dit oui, je
m’inclinerai”.

L’Express
18 octobre 2004
Turquie, l’affaire des femmes;
Tribune libre – Liliane Kandel
Kandel Liliane
Ce qui se joue autour de la candidature turque, c’est notre capacité
à répondre à l’offensive islamiste contre les droits des femmes
Il s’en est donc fallu d’un cheveu pour que les négociations
concernant la candidature de la Turquie à l’Union européenne ne
puissent pas même commencer. Ainsi, le dessin – et le destin – de la
future Europe se seront joués sur la question du droit des femmes;
plus précisément, du droit des femmes turques à l’adultère. A-t-on
vraiment saisi la signification de ce débat? A-t-on mesuré le chemin
parcouru depuis les années pas si lointaines où une dizaine de
féministes déposaient à l’Arc de triomphe une gerbe “à la femme
inconnue du soldat” et où, dans la plupart des pays occidentaux, les
femmes proclamaient – et imposaient – le droit de disposer librement
de leur corps?
Une éclatante victoire du féminisme, alors? Ne soyons pas exagérément
optimistes – ou naïfs. Nous ignorons tout des convictions féministes
(ou non) du commissaire européen à l’Elargissement. Nous ignorons
même si cet étrange incident n’a pas été une manipulation destinée à
prouver, in fine, la bonne volonté européenne du gouvernement de
Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Il n’empêche: c’est cet argument-là qui fut mis
en avant (et non, par exemple, la persistance de la torture dans les
prisons turques ou la négation obstinée du génocide arménien). Et ce
qui se joua dans cette affaire, ce fut une question brûlante: celle
de la réponse de l’Europe face au regain de l’offensive islamiste en
Turquie et l’évidence que celle-ci, à Istanbul et ailleurs, vise en
priorité les droits des femmes. Souvenons-nous des taliban.
Souvenons-nous qu’une des premières mesures du gouvernement Khomeini
fut l’imposition du port du tchador à toutes les Iraniennes et que,
depuis, une part importante du budget de l’Etat va aux milices
paramilitaires chargées de surveiller… la tenue vestimentaire des
femmes. Souvenons-nous des attaques lancées par nombre de groupes
islamistes contre la loi française sur la laïcité. Chahdortt Djavann
le rappelle dans son dernier livre Que pense Allah de l’Europe?: “Le
voile est l’emblème, le drapeau et la clef du système islamiste.” Le
voile, entendons la situation faite aux femmes, qui constitue, dans
le défi lancé aux démocraties par l’islam intégriste, un enjeu
géopolitique capital.
Ce fut l’enjeu de l’épreuve de force – gagnée – sur le projet de Code
pénal en Turquie. Mais c’est aussi, en sens inverse, celui de
l’offensive “pro-hidjab” lancée il y a peu par quelques députés
européens (dont un Vert français et quelques nouvelles et paradoxales
“féministes”), l’objectif annoncé étant de faire condamner par les
instances européennes la loi française sur les signes religieux: un
autre combat, cette fois interne à l’Europe. Rien ne permet
aujourd’hui de prédire quelle en sera l’issue.

Le Monde
19 octobre 2004
Si le Conseil européen revient sur sa parole, ce sera très grave »

Kemal Dervis, ancien ministre, député d’Istanbul, au « Grand jury
RTL-«Le Monde»-LCI »
Propos recueillis par Gérard Courtois, Ruth Elkrief et Pierre-Luc
Séguillon
Les inquiétudes provoquées en France par la perspective des
négociations d’adhésion de la Turquie à l’Union européenne vous
font-elles craindre que Jacques Chirac revienne sur ses engagements ?
C’est normal qu’il y ait débat. Et je pense que le président Jacques
Chirac, jusqu’à aujourd’hui, s’en est tenu à sa parole. Mais il faut
que les gens tiennent parole ; c’est la base de toute confiance.
N’êtes-vous pas déçu par les critiques exprimées en France à l’égard
de la Turquie ?
Les citoyens veulent comprendre ce qui se passe et ils ont raison. Il
faut leur donner des éléments et un peu de temps.
Beaucoup de responsables français suggèrent qu’un partenariat
privilégié serait préférable à une adhésion en bonne et due forme.
Qu’en pensez-vous ?
Le statut privilégié proposé par certains n’est pas un objectif de
négociation qu’on puisse accepter. Car personne n’arrive à définir ce
privilège : si c’est de ne pas voter au Parlement européen et de
n’avoir pas de voix au Conseil européen, ce n’est pas un privilège,
c’est une sorte de deuxième classe.
La Commission européenne elle-même, dans son rapport favorable à
l’ouverture des négociations, envisage que celles-ci puissent être
suspendues…
Ça ne me choque pas. Négocier ne veut pas nécessairement dire
aboutir. Je n’aimerais pas que cela arrive, mais la Turquie aussi
pourrait dire « On arrête » ; le droit est des deux côtés.
Que se passerait-il si le Conseil européen du 17 décembre ne fixait
pas de date pour l’ouverture des négociations ?
Si le Conseil européen revient sur sa parole, solennelle et unanime,
ce sera très grave. Il y a deux ans, il a décidé que les négociations
commenceraient « sans délai » en cas de feu vert de la Commission. Il
faut donc qu’elles démarrent le plus tôt possible, dans trois mois,
dans six mois après la décision du Conseil. Nous nous y attendons. Si
l’Europe revient là-dessus, il y aura un gros problème et une
réaction très forte en Turquie, très émotive.
La Commission estime qu’il faudra confirmer la solidité des réformes
démocratiques engagées en Turquie. Ce processus de réforme vous
semble-t-il irréversible ?
Ce n’est pas seulement le gouvernement, mais la nation turque tout
entière qui est engagée dans le projet européen et le projet de
démocratie approfondie. Ces réformes sont absolument sincères. Mais
c’est vrai que les habitudes ne peuvent changer du jour au lendemain.
Certaines lois ont été appliquées pendant des décennies. Il faut que
les juges, la police, tout le monde intériorise cette nouvelle donne.
Dans les années 1970, il y a eu un gouvernement de colonels en Grèce,
c’était encore le fascisme en Espagne et au Portugal, la dictature en
Europe de l’Est. Il y a eu beaucoup de progrès dans toute cette
périphérie européenne. Le message démocratique de l’Europe est très
puissant.
Un des points d’achoppement entre l’Europe et la Turquie est celui de
la reconnaissance du génocide arménien, en 1915- 1917. Contestez-vous
qu’il y ait eu génocide ?
J’aimerais saisir cette occasion pour exprimer une douleur profonde
pour les massacres d’Arméniens qui ont eu lieu pendant la première
guerre mondiale. Il faut reconnaître ces souffrances et exprimer un
très profond regret, sans oublier non plus les massacres de musulmans
de l’autre côté. Mais il faut dépasser ces mémoires historiques.
Sinon, on ne rend pas service à la paix. Or l’idée forte de l’Europe
est justement qu’elle est une puissance de paix.

La Croix
19 octobre 2004
La cathédrale arménienne rassemble la communauté. Anniversaire.
Depuis cent ans, la cathédrale arménienne est un lieu central pour la
communauté de Paris.
SENEZE Nicolas
Silencieuse et lumineuse dans les volutes d’encens, la très belle
cathédrale arménienne de Paris, dans le 8e arrondissement, n’est
malheureusement pas ouverte au public. Nos églises ne sont que des
lieux de culte , souligne Kégham Torossian, président du conseil de
laïcs qui gère la paroisse. Dommage : il s’agit sans doute de la plus
belle de la diaspora arménienne. Mais pour les Arméniens de Paris,
l’édifice, qui a fêté au début du mois son centenaire, est bien autre
chose qu’un monument, c’est le lieu central de leur foi.
C’est en 1904 que la cathédrale a été inaugurée. Un btiment financé
par un richissime arménien de Tiflis (l’actuelle Tbilissi, capitale
de la Géorgie), un roi du pétrole séjournant régulièrement à Paris et
regrettant de ne pas y trouver d’église arménienne. Dès le XVe
siècle, il y a eu des Arméniens à Paris, raconte Kégham Torossian.
Mais c’est surtout dans le courant du XIXe siècle, avec les
persécutions turques, que beaucoup d’Arméniens ont commencé à
arriver. Et plus encore après le génocide de 1915. Aujourd’hui, 400
000 à 450 000 Arméniens vivent en France, principalement fidèles de
l’Eglise apostolique arménienne (lire ci-contre). Si 150 000 d’entre
eux vivent en région parisienne, une grande partie est présente dans
le couloir rhodanien (ainsi, 10 % des habitants de Valence sont-ils
d’origine arménienne !). Dans la mesure où nous étions chrétiens,
notre intégration a été facile. D’autant plus que l’Eglise arménienne
a toujours dit à ses fidèles que s’ils n’avaient pas d’église
arménienne près de chez eux, ils pouvaient aller dans une église
catholique ou orthodoxe , souligne Kégham Torossian, lui-même élevé
dans une école catholique. J’ai appris la messe en latin avant de
l’apprendre en arménien , sourit-il.
Mais cette intégration facile est peut-être aussi le point faible de
la communauté. Aujourd’hui, la plupart des Arméniens nés en France ne
pratiquent plus la langue. De même pour la lecture et l’écriture ,
regrette Kégham Torossian, qui craint une dissolution de la
communauté . Résultat : un seul des 40 prêtres arméniens présents en
France y est né ! Toutes les diasporas disparaissent, constate encore
avec lucidité Kégham Torossian. Combien d’Italiens, de Polonais ou
d’Espagnols d’origine parlent encore leur langue ?
NICOLAS SENÔZE
L’Eglise arménienne.
Premier pays officiellement chrétien, en 301, l’Arménie rejette en
505 les conclusions du concile de Chalcédoine (451). Se constitue
alors l’Eglise apostolique arménienne dont le siège est aujourd’hui à
Etchmiadzine.
Aujourd’hui, elle compte cinq millions de fidèles dans le monde. Son
chef est le catholicos Karékine II.
Depuis 1742, il existe également une Eglise arménienne catholique qui
compte 200 000 fidèles dans le monde, dont 30 000 en France. Son
patriarche, Jean-Pierre XVIII Kasparian, siège à Beyrouth.

La Nouvelle République du Centre Ouest
19 octobre 2004
A la découverte des pays de l’Est ;
Les soirées interculturelles, organisées par Batiss’Caf, ont ouvert
une nouvelle saison samedi soir à la salle de Lanthenay en mettant à
l’honneur les pays de l’Est. Quatre-vingts personnes ont partagé ce
moment de convivialité fait de découvertes et d’échanges.
La Géorgie, l’Arménie et l’Azerbaïdjan, trois pays blottis dans les
montagnes du Caucase, entre mer Noire et mer Caspienne, étaient
représentés à travers notamment leur cuisine traditionnelle. Era et
Karina, Géorgiennes et Tzarik, Arménienne, se sont affairées toute la
journée pour mitonner des plats spécifiques de leur pays d’origine.
Sans oublier les « petites mains » qui ont apporté une aide précieuse
aux cuisinières du jour.
Perochki (pte frite farcie de purée de pomme de terre et
assaisonnement) et radjabouki (briochettes au fromage) accompagnaient
l’apéritif et donnaient le ton géorgien. Les deux entrées faisaient
découvrir aux papilles la cuisine du Caucase russe avec une salade
olivier et un pod-chouboï. Le tolma arménien, plat de résistance, fut
accompagné de l’adjebsandal azerbaïdjanais. Les convives se sont
régalés en goûtant ces saveurs nouvelles et fort appréciées.
L’ambiance festive était complétée avec les musiciens des groupes «
La Filipendule » et « Zangora » reprenant les musiques populaires
traditionnelles des pays de l’Est. Il n’en fallait pas plus aux
participants pour entamer une danse entre deux plats. Cela leur
permettait de garder une petite place pour le dessert !
Era avait passé la journée de la veille à confectionner des
ptisseries de son pays. Troubouchka et nejenka furent engloutis avec
gourmandise. Les premiers sont des cornets de pte fourrés de crème.
Les seconds des gteaux meringués avec au milieu soit des pommes,
soit des raisins ou encore des marrons.
Une nouvelle vie
Une soirée pour découvrir une autre culture que la sienne est le but
recherché par les organisateurs de Batiss’Caf. Se retrouver autour
d’un repas est un moyen agréable d’y parvenir. Mais au-delà de la
nourriture, c’est toute une richesse de liens, d’échanges qui se
créent et une compréhension de nos différences qui font parfois si
peur.
C’est surtout un moyen d’insertion formidable qui permet de ne pas
rester isolé et qui facilite l’intégration.
Le thème des pays de l’Est a été choisi car, à l’été 2003, environ
dix familles en provenance des régions du Caucase sont arrivées à
Romorantin. Demandeurs d’asile, ils sont toujours dans l’attente de
la décision avec une volonté de s’intégrer, d’être utile.
Un exemple parmi d’autres, Era et son mari Erik ont bénéficié de
l’aide du Secours populaire. Aujourd’hui, ils sont tous deux
bénévoles de l’association. Les cours de français proposés par
Batiss’Caf leur ont permis, en un an, de parler notre langue. Les
enfants, scolarisés et qui apprennent très vite, aident également
leurs parents dans cet apprentissage.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ARMENIAN HOSTAGE IN IRAQ SAVED
16.10.2004 13:28
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ 47-year-old Armenian citizen of Lebanon Aram Nalbandian,
who was taken hostage by Iraqi militants, has been set free. As reported
by RFE/RL, Nalbandian was taken hostage on his way to Fallujah on
September 27. The fighters asked $100,000 for the hostage. However, on the
day the mediator was to pass the ransom the US troops bombarded Fallujah.
As result of the operation the house, where the hostages were kept, was
ruined and the fighters were killed. Nalbandian and one more surviving
hostage stayed under the debris for two days until the rescuers found them.

PRESS RELEASE
Bible Society of Armenia
6/26 Zakiyan St.
Yerevan 375015, Armenia
Tel: (+374 -1) 58.55.09, 56.49.06
Fax: (+374 – 1) 54.24.39
E-mail: [email protected]
October 15, 2004
BRINGING THE BIBLE TO SCHOOLS, SHIRAK
YEREVAN–Within its three-day trip to the Region of Shirak a delegation
of Bible Society Board members and World Vision International
Organization visited five main towns of the region of Shirak and met
with 113 school principals, as well as some teachers and students. The
visit to regional capital Gyumri was paid in December 2002 where there
was a meeting with the local principals. This is the region, which was
hit by a strong earthquake on December 7, 1988, causing 25.000 victims
and huge damages; the church of All Savior built at the main square,
collapsed.
During October 5-7, 2004, on the eve of the Feast of the Holy
Translators, the Bible Society and World Vision International delegation
members visited the Regional Capital Gyumri, Akhourian, Ashotsk,
Amassia, Artik and Maralik. Among the delegation members were HG
Archbishop Vartan Keshishian, the representative of the Primate of the
Armenian Catholic Church; Ms. Karine Harutiunian, World Vision
International Church and Community Relations Manager; and Arshavir
Kapoudjian, Bible Society Board Secretary. The delegation was always
accompanied by the Primate of Shirak, HG Bishop Mikayel Ajapahian.
The traces of the tragic event were still obvious in the cities and
villages, in the streets and schools. Amassia, the last North Western
town of the country bordering Turkey, is called `The Siberia of
Armenia,’ where the temperature during winter time is -47 It was hard
to see only two dozen of people in the streets at 3pm. It seemed as if
we were there after a battle. Therefore it was really a consolation to
meet teachers and students in an old school. `I hope our new
generation will be able to continue our task by this initiative,’ a
principal said before the meeting starts.
The meetings have usually been opened by the Board Secretary who, in his
keynote address, presented the gathered public with the 200-year history
of United Bible Societies and the13-year history of the Bible Society
Armenia and its mission, and introduced the six different books to be
given to schools.
By seeing that the Bible entered schools and found its place in the
curriculum, HG Arch. Keshishian expressed his joy stating: `We all are
aware that it is our religion and faith that has kept our existence. The
past record tack is not only a historical fact, but also a reality,
which gives meaning to our life.’ Conveying her thanks to the Bible
Society for joining this project, Ms. Harutiunian added: `We hold
special love and affection towards this region. You remember the day, 16
years ago, when we delivered a check for your spiritual uplifting and we
are here once more for the same purpose. Our mission is to be
Christians. You are the people to take these books to our new
generation. This is how you can support us.’
All the meetings were concluded by the Primate HG Bishop Ajapahian.
First he wholeheartedly expressed his gratitude to the Bible Society and
World Vision International for this unique and generous support for his
Diocese and addressed to the gathered principal and teachers: `I am
well aware that it is a very difficult task to be a village teacher.’
It required devotion and commitment from everybody. His Grace presented
the difficulties of the Diocese, especially the lack of manpower,
adding: `I am confident that such literature will replace the pastors.
With these books you are called to be a shepherd to guide our young
people and enlighten their life. This literature is novelty for you.
Moreover, it is useful. There is nothing archaic here; the traditional
and the modern are mixed together.’ Then he stressed the necessity of
the Bible, which is Holy and must be worshiped by reading and not
regarding as an idol. After 70 years of communism the Church once again
holds its responsibility and enters schools to give Biblical and
Christian education. `Neither by replacing the former ideology, nor by
imposing belief, it does make the new generation find their Christian
identity. We should learn how and what to give to each other through
this identity.’
At the end of the visits, the Board Secretary paid visit to HE
Archbishop Nerses Ter-Nersessian, the Primate of the Armenian Catholic
Church in Armenia. His Eminence also is the Vice-Chairman of the Bible
Society Board. The Board Secretary shared his impressions about this
three-day visit to the region and discussed the issue on how to reach to
the educational and spiritual needs of the people.
The Bible Society of Armenia was established in 1991, when the late
Catholicos Vazgen I and representatives of the United Bible Societies
signed a memorandum of understanding regarding the translation,
publication and dissemination of the Holy Bible in Armenia. The Bible
Society of Armenia is committed to the widest possible meaningful and
effective distribution of the Holy Scriptures in languages and media
which meet the needs of people, at a price they can afford. The Board of
Trustees of The Bible Society of Armenia consists of representatives of
the Armenian Apostolic Church, the Armenian Catholic Church and the
Union of Armenian Evangelical and Baptist Churches.
For further information on Bible Society of Armenia and its activities,
call (374-1) 58-55-09 or 56-49-06; fax (3741) 54-24-39; e-mail
[email protected]

A1 Plus | 13:57:37 | 18-10-2004 | Social |
YEREVAN MUNICIPALITY TURNS ITS ATTENTION TO DILAPIDATED BUILDINGS
After Yerevan municipality’s routine session on Monday, Ashot Sargssyan,
the chief of the municipality public utilities unite, told journalists
several dilapidated buildings being in precarious state would be repaired
by the end of this year.
Urban Planning Ministry’s figures show there are 90 buildings in Armenian
capital that are badly in need to be repaired.
Several bridges are also planned to be repaired as soon as possible,
Sargssyan said.

Zaman, Turkey
Oct 18 2004
‘Turkey will Enliven Aging Europe’
Kalypso Nicolaidis, a professor at Oxford University and the French
National Administration School, predicts that Turkey would have a
‘Viagra’ effect on Europe in terms of population, economics, and
politics upon Europe. Nicolaidis explained that Turkey’s young and
dynamic population would provide great opportunity to Europe, which
is getting older day by day. Nicolaidis emphasized that Turkey’s
membership would not be the danger to ‘strong Europe’ as the French
imagine.
In a meeting on Turkey held at the French International Research
Center attended by Turkish parliamentarians and French social
scientists, Nicolaidis, EU advisor to Yorgo Papendreu, likened Turkey
to ‘Viagra’. Nicolaidis explained that Turkey would bring dynamism in
political and economic areas in addition to boosting the population.
While the metaphor caused people to laugh at the meeting, the
academician of Greek origin said he would write an article with this
title. In a statement to Zaman, Nicolaidis said, ‘Turkey should focus
on the question, “How will we respond to the prejudices of the
European public?”
Diasporas Produce Prejudice
At a meeting with French parliamentarians and government members last
week in Paris, Aydin Apaydin, the co-chair of the Turkey-European
Union (EU) Mixed Parliamentary Commission disclosed that the work of
the Armenian Diasporas was behind France’s prejudices against Turkey.
Apaydin said that a senator had said: “The Armenian Diaspora has
nourished the French public for years. There is also a campaign that
‘another Diaspora’ will come here as refugees. It is not possible for
the French people to change their views quickly when they have been
nourished with these arguments for years.” Apaydin told Zaman that
French politicians would bring up the alleged Armenian genocide issue
sooner or later.
10.17.2004
Ali Ihsan Aydin
Paris

PINR – The Power and Interest News Report
Oct 18 2004
”Russia’s Slippery Foothold in Abkhazia”
n October 3, presidential elections were held in Abkhazia, a
mini-state on the Black Sea that broke away from Georgia in 1993,
after a war of independence that cost several thousand lives and
created at least a quarter million Georgian refugees (more than half
the region’s population) through ethnic cleansing. The first
contested elections in Abkhazia since it achieved de facto
independence (the mini-state is not recognized by any foreign
government), they were meant to enhance Abkhazia’s international
credibility. Instead, the elections have thrown the mini-state into
political confrontation and temporary paralysis in the wake of a
nearly even split of votes between the two leading candidates —
Moscow-backed Raul Khajimba and businessman Sergei Bagapsh.
With a small population of which ethnic Abkhazians are the third
largest group after Russians and Armenians, and suffering from
economic sanctions and a Georgian blockade, the mini-state has
depended for its existence on Russian economic support and military
protection in the form of “peacekeepers” from the Confederation of
Independent States. The United Nations also monitors the stand-off,
but Russia plays the decisive role in maintaining the status quo,
pending the restart of stalled negotiations between Abkhazia and
Georgia, which seeks support from the Euro-American alliance, which
backs Georgian claims to sovereignty over Abkhazia.
Abkhazia has strategic importance for all of the interests involved
in its fate. Fearing extermination as an ethnic group with its own
territory, the Abkhazians are determined to do anything possible to
preserve their tenuous hold on independence. The pro-Western Georgian
regime of President Mikhail Saakashvili, which must attempt to
satisfy nationalist sentiment, is equally committed to bringing
Abkhazia under Tbilisi’s control and repatriating Georgian refugees.
The Euro-American alliance wants to contain instability in the
Transcaucasus so that oil supplies from the Caspian Sea are secure as
they flow through Georgia, which is at the center of the Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline. The West is also interested in thwarting attempts by Russia
to reassert influence in the Transcaucasus, which it lost after the
fall of the Soviet Union. Russia, in contrast, is using Abkhazia as a
means to gain a foothold in the Transcaucasus and check Euro-American
bids for hegemony in the region.
Within this pattern of conflicting interests, Russia is the only
actor in the position to alter the status quo decisively — Moscow
can choose to deepen its support of Abkhazia, even to the point of
recognizing its independence officially, or it can move toward a
settlement that would restore Georgian sovereignty over the
mini-state in return for a greater share of influence in the
Transcaucasus. From the geostrategic perspective, Abkhazia is a test
of Russian power — all the other actors are locked in their
positions by virtue of their perceived interests relative to the
regional balance of power, whereas the course of action that would
maximize Russian power is an open issue that divides Moscow’s
security establishment.
Russia’s Shaky Foothold
The international status of Abkhazia was determined officially by a
1999 declaration at the Istanbul summit of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed by Russia, the United
States and European powers, that affirmed “strong support for the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Georgia” and branded earlier
presidential elections in Abkhazia as “unacceptable and
illegitimate.” Although Moscow has abided by the declaration to the
extent that it has maintained a public stance in favor of a
negotiated settlement that would restore some form of Georgian
sovereignty, its actions on the ground have supported the
mini-state’s independence.
Moscow’s “two-track policy” worked effectively to prolong the status
quo until Georgia’s 2004 “Rose Revolution” that brought Saakashvili’s
pro-Western and nationalist regime to power. Tbilisi’s posture of
calling for a diplomatic settlement that would grant Abkhazia
“generous autonomy” and simultaneously threatening force against the
mini-state if it did not meet Georgian demands has caused rethinking
in Moscow.
It is undisputed that Sukhumi is a client of Moscow. Approximately
three-quarters of Abkhazia’s residents have Russian citizenship and
passports, the mini-state uses the ruble rather than the Georgian
lari as its currency, Russian investments and Russian tourists to its
Black Sea beaches (400,000 in the past year) are essential to its
faltering economy, and Moscow provides pensions to many Abkhazians.
With more than half its population unemployed and endemic crime as a
result, the Sukhumi regime would collapse without Moscow’s economic
support and military presence.
The question for Moscow now is what to do with its preponderant
influence in Abkhazia. That question becomes relevant because
Tbilisi’s tilt toward the West has altered the balance of power in
the Transcaucasus, disadvantaging Russian interests. The more
assertive that Tbilisi becomes, the more pressure Moscow is under to
move Abkhazia out of its state of limbo. The Euro-American alliance,
which wants the conflict resolved diplomatically in Georgia’s favor,
is a restraining influence that forestalls military action by
Tbilisi, but it also emboldens Tbilisi to count on its demands
eventually being met.
Moscow decision makers are, in general, divided into factions that
still hold out for some accommodation with the West and others that
believe that Russia needs to go it alone and rebuild its spheres of
influence wherever possible. The debate is complicated by the
contradiction between Russia’s appeal to its sovereignty in Chechnya
and its de facto opposition to Georgia’s similar claims. The
two-track policy toward Sukhumi is an example of how the broad
division of Russia’s political class on the country’s strategic
doctrine often results in compromises and stalemating positions.
Tbilisi’s pro-Western orientation has provided opportunities for
Moscow hardliners to gain some leverage over their opponents and to
press their “neo-imperialist” vision of Russia’s strategic future.
Evidence of increasing power for Moscow’s hardliners is the opening
up in September of direct rail traffic between Russia and Abkhazia.
The move was met with charges from Tbilisi that Moscow was attempting
to “annex” the mini-state. Moscow replied that Tbilisi’s assertive
position threatened to ignite a general war in the Caucasus. Russian
President Vladimir Putin made it plain that neither economic nor
military pressure would resolve the problem of Abkhazia and blessed
the rail link. Moscow’s stand is that the rail link will improve
trade in the Caucasus, which skirts the sovereignty question.
In addition to weakening the economic blockade of Abkhazia
significantly, Moscow also approved of the presidential elections
there, against the position of the United States and European powers
that they were illegitimate. Successful competitive elections would
have enhanced Sukhumi’s claims to legitimacy, open the way to the
possibility of formal recognition, or at least some associated status
for the mini-state with Russia or with the alliance of Moscow and
Belarus. As it turned out, the elections ended in confusion and
indecision, marking a setback, though not a defeat, for Moscow’s
hardliners.
Abkhazia’s Elections
Abkhazia’s continued close relations with and dependence on Russia
was not an issue in the recent presidential elections. The population
of Abkhazia that remained after the expulsion and flight of its
Georgian majority has been firmly in favor of outright union with
Russia, some kind of formal association with it or regularized
independence under Russian protection. That consensus is rooted in
the preference of the ethnic Russian and Armenian segments of the
population for Russia over Georgia, and most of all, an ethnic Abkhaz
resistance to Georgian rule that is based on historical experience.
Although Georgian and Abkhazian claims are traced by their advocates
through competing histories dating back to the Middle Ages, the
proximate situation triggering the present conflict was the change in
Abkhazia’s status in the Soviet Union under Stalin’s regime in 1931
from an autonomous republic in its own right to an autonomous
republic of Georgia. Under Stalinist rule, Georgians were encouraged
to settle in Abkhazia, and Abkhazian culture, which had only acquired
a written alphabet in the late nineteenth century, was downgraded.
When the Soviet Union broke apart in 1991, Georgian nationalists led
by Zviad Gamsakhurdia took control of the new state, proclaiming a
“Georgia for the Georgians” policy. Fearing ethnic extinction or at
least subjection, the Abkhazians resisted, resulting in the 1992-1993
war of independence, won by Abkhazia with the help of fighters from
related Caucasian peoples — notably the Chechens — and support from
Moscow.
With the Russian-Chechen conflict intensifying, the Chechens tilted
toward Georgia, leaving Abkhazia with only Moscow’s de facto backing.
All five candidates in the recent election pledged loyalty to Moscow,
reflecting the anti-Georgian consensus in the mini-state. Their only
differences, if any, hinged on vague distinctions between the kind
and degree of “independence” that Abkhazia should enjoy.
The election was primarily fought over economic issues, revolving
around the power of different factions in economic institutions. The
two leading candidates represented different factions, with Khajimba
leading the existing power structure and Bagapsh calling for
“reform,” which he promised would not affect existing property
relations. This division, which had less to do with policy than
personnel, made Khajimba the clear favorite, because he had been the
only candidate to be granted a meeting with Putin, including a photo
opportunity. Khajimba, an ex-K.G.B. agent and prime minister of
Abkhazia under the outgoing regime of Vladislav Ardzinba — who had
governed the region from the Soviet era — was seen as Moscow’s man
and he was given campaign support by Moscow political operatives.
Khajimba’s opponent Bagapsh had also been an official in the Soviet
regime and was currently head of the national energy company. He had
formed a coalition of opposition groups, including the following of
Alexander Ankvab, a popular ex-interior minister of Abkhazia, who had
been excluded from candidacy on a technicality.
The election was far closer than analysts expected and was marred by
charges of ballot rigging and intimidation, especially in the Gali
district, which has a large Georgian population, among which are
repatriated refugees. After a week of confusion and a revote in Gali,
which the leading candidates agreed to, although it violated the
mini-state’s constitution, the Central Electoral Commission declared
Bagapsh the winner with 50.08 percent of the vote, triggering the
resignation of three of its members, a suit by Khajimba challenging
the election’s validity and Ardzinba’s refusal to countenance its
results. The fate of the election is now in the hands of Abkhazia’s
Supreme Court.
Analysts attribute Moscow’s failure to have its candidate score a
clear-cut victory to heavy-handed campaign tactics by Khajimba’s
Russian operatives, especially a pop concert on the eve of the
elation, which many voters considered a crude attempt to pander to
them for support. As the situation stands, however, Moscow has not
lost much ground from the election fiasco. Both Bagapsh and Khajimba
remain pro-Moscow and, although each warns that the other is flirting
with civil war, Abkhazian dependence on Russia and unity against
Georgia will probably contain any fratricidal tendencies. At most,
the hardliners in Moscow have lost the aura of legitimacy that they
wanted for the mini-state, and they still even might gain that if the
judicial system successfully resolves the electoral conflict.
Conclusion
In light of Euro-American reluctance to do any more than urge a
negotiated resolution to the Abkhazia problem that asserts Georgian
sovereignty, while refraining from backing that position militarily
or economically, Moscow is free to experiment with a neo-imperialist
policy in the Transcaucasus, attempting to keep Chechnya in Russia
and Georgia out of Abkhazia.
At the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on October 11,
Russian delegate Alexander Fomenko argued that Abkhazia was not
historically part of Georgia, but was a “gift” from Stalin, echoing
the Abkhazian “historical argument” for independence. Moscow’s more
assertive posture toward the West is a sign that it is beginning to
dig in for a protracted confrontation in the Caucasus that will test
its will and the resolve of the West.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Michael A. Weinstein
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an analysis-based
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