Asbarez: After Uproar, Pashinyan Claims He Ordered ‘Dismissal’ of Educators

Hunanian Jack
by Asbarez Staff

 

 May 14, 2026

 

in Armenia, Featured Story, Latest, News, Top Stories

Schoolchildren in Aparan heading to a pro-Pashinyan election rally


Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan claimed on Thursday that he had ordered the dismissal of four school principals after an uproar erupted when teachers and schoolchildren attended his election rally on Wednesday.

The incident, which took place in Armenia’s Aragatsotn Provice on Wednesday was observed by the Akanates monitoring group, which reported what it said were election violations in a detailed report.

Pashinyan claimed he told the four school officials to resign, “pending an inquiry.”

“We will conduct an internal inquiry, and if turns out that there was an illegal order [by them,] they will definitely be sacked,” he told reporters.

In its extensive report, Akanates noted that its observers recorded on-site that principals and teachers from several schools in Aparan and nearby settlements participated in Civil Contract’s campaign during working hours.

“Of particular concern is that, under direct instructions from school administrations and teaching staff, students were taken out of classes in order to welcome the Prime Minister and ensure participation in the campaign event,” the report said.

“The students were also reportedly provided with ‘mandatory instructions in advance regarding their appearance, clothing, and even hairstyles, being urged to wear braids,” the report added.

“In some cases, observers ‘personally witnessed’ how the school principals and teachers, via phone calls, issued ‘loud and strict instructions’ demanding that children’s participation be ensured in ‘a mandatory and organized manner,” the Akantes group said.

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Trump’s Corridor in South Caucasus Nine Months On: Vagaries and Vulnerabiliti

Emil Lazarian
by Contributor

 

 May 15, 2026

 

in Commentary, Latest, Op-Ed, Top Stories

BY HRAIR BALIAN

On 8 August 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration at the White House establishing the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity. The agreement aimed to open a corridor linking Azerbaijan’s mainland to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s southern Syunik region, with reciprocal connectivity benefits for Armenia.

The corridor concept has deep roots — over a century of Azerbaijani and Turkish ambitions for unbroken land connectivity between their two countries, with Armenia as the geographic obstacle. The modern impetus came from Article 9 of the November 2020 ceasefire ending the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. For years, negotiations deadlocked over naming rights, jurisdiction, and control. The TRIPP deal broke that impasse by having Armenian officials retain legal border control while a private third-country company conducts checks — an idea previously floated under earlier administrations but given new branding and White House fanfare by Trump’s team.

Crucially, TRIPP has already achieved something underappreciated: it deferred Azerbaijan’s otherwise imminent military seizure of the corridor. President Aliyev had openly warned the corridor would be established “whether Armenia wants it or not.” U.S. engagement postponed that threat indefinitely.

What Was Agreed — and What Was Not
Nine months in, the most striking feature of TRIPP is how little has been operationally resolved. A January 2026 TRIPP Implementation Framework established a “TRIPP Development Company” — 74% U.S.-owned, 26% Armenian — to develop 43 kilometers of rail, road, fiber optic, and energy infrastructure through Syunik over an initial 49-year term. But the TIF is notably thin: no construction timetable, no dispute resolution mechanism, and — most strikingly — an explicit disclaimer that it imposes no legal obligations on either the U.S. or Armenia.

The security architecture is also ambiguous. Armenia formally retains sovereignty, but private contractors may assume day-to-day security responsibilities. The use of a U.S. intermediary company between Armenian and Azerbaijani customs officials is the central innovation — but the ongoing U.S.–Israel war against Iran makes deploying U.S. personnel near the Iranian border highly problematic.

Sovereignty erosion risks lurk in the Special Purpose Vehicles to be created under the development company. History consistently shows that states lose effective control of transit infrastructure not because they lack legal authority, but because exercising it becomes prohibitive once commercial and arbitration structures are in place.

Winners and Losers
Azerbaijan is the clearest winner: it obtains the direct Nakhchivan link it has sought since 2020, without military action. Turkey’s pan-Eurasian strategic ambitions are advanced. The U.S. gains a strategic foothold in the South Caucasus, mineral access, and a signature foreign policy achievement.

Armenia’s gains are conditional and asymmetric. It faces a structural reciprocity gap: Azerbaijani cargo and passengers will enjoy privileged transit through Armenia, but Armenian cargo and passengers have no equivalent guarantees through Azerbaijan. Yerevan interprets “reciprocal benefits” to mean comparable access through Azerbaijani territory; Baku interprets it as overall mutual benefit — not identical arrangements. No mechanism currently exists to enforce Armenian reciprocal access, and no timeline has been committed to by Baku.

Armenia’s financial returns — a 26% equity stake, customs duties, and fees — are mentioned but not quantified. Foreign Minister Mirzoyan has stated plainly: if the railway section to Gyumri is not included, TRIPP loses its relevance. The financial model only functions if Armenia becomes a genuine east–west transit hub, not merely a service corridor for Azerbaijan.

Structural Choke Points
Two structural vulnerabilities could derail the entire project.

First, Armenia’s railway network has been under a 30-year concession to South Caucasus Railway, a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian Railways, since 2008. Russian Railways is in severe financial crisis ($51 billion in debt), and mandatory investment commitments have remained largely on paper. Pashinyan has formally requested Moscow to accelerate restoration of the Soviet-era rail segment foundational to TRIPP and has threatened to withdraw that segment from the concession if Russia fails to deliver. Armenia could legally do so, but the geopolitical complexity of compelling Moscow is considerable.

Second, TRIPP is legally entangled with a peace treaty that has been initialed but not signed. Azerbaijan insists Armenia remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which mentions Nagorno-Karabakh, before signing. Baku itself maintains constitutional provisions that imply claims to Armenian territory without acknowledging their controversial nature. Full border demarcation is years away, and the entire TRIPP corridor runs through this non-demarcated zone. The draft peace agreement contains no reference to the rights of displaced Karabakh Armenians, or the 19 Armenian hostages held in Azerbaijani jails.

The Missing Half: Turkey
TRIPP’s full economic promise to Armenia cannot be realized while the Turkish border remains sealed after 33 years. Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan has been explicit: the Kars–Gyumri railway is not a footnote to TRIPP — it is its western terminus. In April 2026, Turkish and Armenian officials met in Kars to establish a joint working group on reopening the line, but Turkey’s position remains that normalization awaits a signed Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement. Turkey is also constructing a parallel railroad on its territory. Armenia is the structurally weakest of the three parties in this triangular relationship.

The EU’s Absence
TRIPP is a bilateral deal witnessed by a U.S. president, not a multilateral framework — which structurally sidelines the European Union despite its deep strategic interest in the Middle Corridor’s success. The EU has welcomed the project rhetorically and is investing in Armenia through separate instruments (Resilient Syunik, Global Gateway) but is not a co-investor in TRIPP’s governance structure.

This is a missed opportunity. The EU brings deep experience in cross-border infrastructure governance through TEN-T and Global Gateway, large-scale financing capacity through the EIB and EBRD, and institutional continuity that does not depend on any single leader’s attention span. A 2026 European Commission study found the TRIPP route would cut travel times by up to 25% compared with the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railroad — meaning Brussels has already done the technical homework. A U.S.–EU co-management model — with Washington providing political guarantee and security, and Brussels providing bulk financing, technical governance, and institutional continuity — could address TRIPP’s two most glaring vulnerabilities: its dependence on Trump personally, and the absence of legally binding commitments.

The Iran Variable
The U.S.–Israel war against Iran is simultaneously strengthening TRIPP’s strategic rationale and threatening its physical implementation. With Hormuz shipping disrupted and Iran’s transit role compromised, the Middle Corridor’s value has sharply increased — cargo takes 12–15 days via the corridor versus 40 days by sea. But deploying U.S. personnel near the Iranian border is now difficult; site survey visits have already been postponed; and the commercial companies the U.S. hoped to attract are reassessing security risks. The same small U.S. team — led by Steve Witkoff — responsible for TRIPP is now primarily consumed by the Iran crisis.

Meanwhile, Russia is capitalizing on regional uncertainty. Azerbaijan is hedging — Aliyev recently visited Georgia to signal the Tbilisi route remains viable — and there are signs of Kremlin optimism that the Iran war has at least temporarily buried TRIPP.

Conclusion: A Corridor Without a Foundation?
TRIPP has achieved real, if fragile, results: it has substituted for a Russian-controlled corridor, deferred Azerbaijani military pressure on Syunik, and initiated the first genuine normalization of Armenian Azerbaijani relations in a generation.

But the project is built on compounding fragilities. Nine months in, not a single meter of construction has occurred on Armenian soil. There is no signed peace treaty, no finalized operating company contract, no resolved Russian railway concession, and now a war literally across the border. The governing Implementation Framework explicitly disclaims legal obligation on either party — an extraordinary admission for a project of this scale.

Armenia’s structural position remains asymmetric. It provides the territory, absorbs the sovereignty risk, hosts U.S. security personnel near the Iranian border, and depends on political processes entirely outside its control — a signed peace agreement, an open Turkish border, Azerbaijani reciprocity — for the promised dividends to materialize. Azerbaijan gets its corridor. Turkey gets its logistics hub. The U.S. gets its minerals and its trophy deal. Armenia gets a conditional promise and a 49-year commitment.

The deeper question TRIPP poses has not changed since 8 August 2025: is this a genuine crossroads of peace, or a corridor for everyone else’s prosperity? The answer lies in the details that remain stubbornly unresolved — the security contract, the railway concession, reciprocal access, the Armenian hostages in Azerbaijani jails, and the Turkish border sealed for 33 years.

Hrair Balian, JD, DoL, has served in leadership positions at the UN, OSCE, the International Crisis Group, and The Carter Center, working on conflict transformation in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, North & South Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East & Africa. He has served as Adjunct Professor at Emory University, School of Law.



BY HRAIR BALIAN

On 8 August 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration at the White House establishing the Trump Route for Peace and Prosperity. The agreement aimed to open a corridor linking Azerbaijan’s mainland to its Nakhchivan exclave through Armenia’s southern Syunik region, with reciprocal connectivity benefits for Armenia.

The corridor concept has deep roots — over a century of Azerbaijani and Turkish ambitions for unbroken land connectivity between their two countries, with Armenia as the geographic obstacle. The modern impetus came from Article 9 of the November 2020 ceasefire ending the second Nagorno-Karabakh war. For years, negotiations deadlocked over naming rights, jurisdiction, and control. The TRIPP deal broke that impasse by having Armenian officials retain legal border control while a private third-country company conducts checks — an idea previously floated under earlier administrations but given new branding and White House fanfare by Trump’s team.

Crucially, TRIPP has already achieved something underappreciated: it deferred Azerbaijan’s otherwise imminent military seizure of the corridor. President Aliyev had openly warned the corridor would be established “whether Armenia wants it or not.” U.S. engagement postponed that threat indefinitely.

What Was Agreed — and What Was Not
Nine months in, the most striking feature of TRIPP is how little has been operationally resolved. A January 2026 TRIPP Implementation Framework established a “TRIPP Development Company” — 74% U.S.-owned, 26% Armenian — to develop 43 kilometers of rail, road, fiber optic, and energy infrastructure through Syunik over an initial 49-year term. But the TIF is notably thin: no construction timetable, no dispute resolution mechanism, and — most strikingly — an explicit disclaimer that it imposes no legal obligations on either the U.S. or Armenia.

The security architecture is also ambiguous. Armenia formally retains sovereignty, but private contractors may assume day-to-day security responsibilities. The use of a U.S. intermediary company between Armenian and Azerbaijani customs officials is the central innovation — but the ongoing U.S.–Israel war against Iran makes deploying U.S. personnel near the Iranian border highly problematic.

Sovereignty erosion risks lurk in the Special Purpose Vehicles to be created under the development company. History consistently shows that states lose effective control of transit infrastructure not because they lack legal authority, but because exercising it becomes prohibitive once commercial and arbitration structures are in place.

Winners and Losers
Azerbaijan is the clearest winner: it obtains the direct Nakhchivan link it has sought since 2020, without military action. Turkey’s pan-Eurasian strategic ambitions are advanced. The U.S. gains a strategic foothold in the South Caucasus, mineral access, and a signature foreign policy achievement.

Armenia’s gains are conditional and asymmetric. It faces a structural reciprocity gap: Azerbaijani cargo and passengers will enjoy privileged transit through Armenia, but Armenian cargo and passengers have no equivalent guarantees through Azerbaijan. Yerevan interprets “reciprocal benefits” to mean comparable access through Azerbaijani territory; Baku interprets it as overall mutual benefit — not identical arrangements. No mechanism currently exists to enforce Armenian reciprocal access, and no timeline has been committed to by Baku.

Armenia’s financial returns — a 26% equity stake, customs duties, and fees — are mentioned but not quantified. Foreign Minister Mirzoyan has stated plainly: if the railway section to Gyumri is not included, TRIPP loses its relevance. The financial model only functions if Armenia becomes a genuine east–west transit hub, not merely a service corridor for Azerbaijan.

Structural Choke Points
Two structural vulnerabilities could derail the entire project.

First, Armenia’s railway network has been under a 30-year concession to South Caucasus Railway, a wholly owned subsidiary of Russian Railways, since 2008. Russian Railways is in severe financial crisis ($51 billion in debt), and mandatory investment commitments have remained largely on paper. Pashinyan has formally requested Moscow to accelerate restoration of the Soviet-era rail segment foundational to TRIPP and has threatened to withdraw that segment from the concession if Russia fails to deliver. Armenia could legally do so, but the geopolitical complexity of compelling Moscow is considerable.

Second, TRIPP is legally entangled with a peace treaty that has been initialed but not signed. Azerbaijan insists Armenia remove references to the 1990 Declaration of Independence, which mentions Nagorno-Karabakh, before signing. Baku itself maintains constitutional provisions that imply claims to Armenian territory without acknowledging their controversial nature. Full border demarcation is years away, and the entire TRIPP corridor runs through this non-demarcated zone. The draft peace agreement contains no reference to the rights of displaced Karabakh Armenians, or the 19 Armenian hostages held in Azerbaijani jails.

The Missing Half: Turkey
TRIPP’s full economic promise to Armenia cannot be realized while the Turkish border remains sealed after 33 years. Armenian Foreign Minister Mirzoyan has been explicit: the Kars–Gyumri railway is not a footnote to TRIPP — it is its western terminus. In April 2026, Turkish and Armenian officials met in Kars to establish a joint working group on reopening the line, but Turkey’s position remains that normalization awaits a signed Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement. Turkey is also constructing a parallel railroad on its territory. Armenia is the structurally weakest of the three parties in this triangular relationship.

The EU’s Absence
TRIPP is a bilateral deal witnessed by a U.S. president, not a multilateral framework — which structurally sidelines the European Union despite its deep strategic interest in the Middle Corridor’s success. The EU has welcomed the project rhetorically and is investing in Armenia through separate instruments (Resilient Syunik, Global Gateway) but is not a co-investor in TRIPP’s governance structure.

This is a missed opportunity. The EU brings deep experience in cross-border infrastructure governance through TEN-T and Global Gateway, large-scale financing capacity through the EIB and EBRD, and institutional continuity that does not depend on any single leader’s attention span. A 2026 European Commission study found the TRIPP route would cut travel times by up to 25% compared with the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railroad — meaning Brussels has already done the technical homework. A U.S.–EU co-management model — with Washington providing political guarantee and security, and Brussels providing bulk financing, technical governance, and institutional continuity — could address TRIPP’s two most glaring vulnerabilities: its dependence on Trump personally, and the absence of legally binding commitments.

The Iran Variable
The U.S.–Israel war against Iran is simultaneously strengthening TRIPP’s strategic rationale and threatening its physical implementation. With Hormuz shipping disrupted and Iran’s transit role compromised, the Middle Corridor’s value has sharply increased — cargo takes 12–15 days via the corridor versus 40 days by sea. But deploying U.S. personnel near the Iranian border is now difficult; site survey visits have already been postponed; and the commercial companies the U.S. hoped to attract are reassessing security risks. The same small U.S. team — led by Steve Witkoff — responsible for TRIPP is now primarily consumed by the Iran crisis.

Meanwhile, Russia is capitalizing on regional uncertainty. Azerbaijan is hedging — Aliyev recently visited Georgia to signal the Tbilisi route remains viable — and there are signs of Kremlin optimism that the Iran war has at least temporarily buried TRIPP.

Conclusion: A Corridor Without a Foundation?
TRIPP has achieved real, if fragile, results: it has substituted for a Russian-controlled corridor, deferred Azerbaijani military pressure on Syunik, and initiated the first genuine normalization of Armenian Azerbaijani relations in a generation.

But the project is built on compounding fragilities. Nine months in, not a single meter of construction has occurred on Armenian soil. There is no signed peace treaty, no finalized operating company contract, no resolved Russian railway concession, and now a war literally across the border. The governing Implementation Framework explicitly disclaims legal obligation on either party — an extraordinary admission for a project of this scale.

Armenia’s structural position remains asymmetric. It provides the territory, absorbs the sovereignty risk, hosts U.S. security personnel near the Iranian border, and depends on political processes entirely outside its control — a signed peace agreement, an open Turkish border, Azerbaijani reciprocity — for the promised dividends to materialize. Azerbaijan gets its corridor. Turkey gets its logistics hub. The U.S. gets its minerals and its trophy deal. Armenia gets a conditional promise and a 49-year commitment.

The deeper question TRIPP poses has not changed since 8 August 2025: is this a genuine crossroads of peace, or a corridor for everyone else’s prosperity? The answer lies in the details that remain stubbornly unresolved — the security contract, the railway concession, reciprocal access, the Armenian hostages in Azerbaijani jails, and the Turkish border sealed for 33 years.

Hrair Balian, JD, DoL, has served in leadership positions at the UN, OSCE, the International Crisis Group, and The Carter Center, working on conflict transformation in the Balkans, Eastern Europe, North & South Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East & Africa. He has served as Adjunct Professor at Emory University, School of Law.



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Student Essay Contest Winners from Uruguay and Armenia Awarded Los Angeles Vis

Talar Tumanian
by Contributor

 

 May 15, 2026

 

in Latest, News, Top Stories

(l to r) Taguhi Papyan (teacher-Armenia), Ruzanna Nikoghosyan (student-Armenia), Luciana Van Horenbeck (student-Uruguay), Lucia Cruz (teacher-Uruguay) at the Charter High School


LOS ANGELES — High school students Ruzanna Nikoghosyan of Armenia and Luciana Van Horenbeck of Uruguay recently returned to their home countries after their first visit to Los Angeles. The visit was their First Place prize awarded to them as the winners of a joint Uruguay-Armenia essay contest on the theme of the Armenian Genocide.

The Genocide Education Project arranged the educational portion of the itinerary, March 7 to 13, partnering with the contest organizers, the Armenian General Benevolent Union of Uruguay, the National Public Education Administration of Uruguay, and the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute in Armenia. 

Ruzanna Nikoghosyan Luciana Van Horenbeck

Javier Polatian, Director of Educational Affairs of AGBU Uruguay, led the delegation, which also included the students’ teacher-escorts, Taguhi Papyan (accompanying Ruzanna) and Lucia Cruz (accompanying Luciana).

The winners visited numerous educational institutions, engaging in meaningful exchanges and participating in classroom projects with their counterparts at public and Armenian schools, university Armenian programs, and cultural and advocacy institutions. They discussed themes of personal identity, memory, genocide denial and resistance, Armenian history, and current events.

Ruzanna Nikoghosyan discussed her discovery of her family’s story of survival during the Armenian Genocide. She said she had long been troubled by her grandfather’s inexplicable refrain, “Ani, so close, but so far away.” One day, standing on the banks of the Arax River and admiring the ancient city of Ani through barbed wire and with Turkish military watchtowers separating her from the city, she understood her grandfather’s meaning. She returned to her village and learned her family’s history, albeit with some mysteries still to be uncovered.

Contest winners and teachers with Maggie Goschin, Dir. Ararat Eskijian Museum, and Javier Polatian, AGBU Uruguay Dir., Educational Affairs

Luciana Van Horenbeck, whose essay addressed Armenian Genocide resistance through art, told U.S. students how she found refuge, comfort, and strength in the poems of Silva Kaputikyan, Vahan Tekeyan, and Moughegh Ishkhan. She said she believes the poems and the continued use of the Armenian language are forms of resistance and cultural preservation.

Christina Chiranian, GenEd’s Educational Programming Assistant who teaches history at Sylmar Charter High School, organized the trip’s educational itinerary. She said her students were extremely enthusiastic about meeting Ruzanna and Luciana. “Yesterday’s guest speakers were amazing!” wrote one student, “I loved hearing about how language can be a form of resistance! It was cool to see how students do the same things we do in different countries… especially hearing it in Spanish from the visitors from Uruguay. It was an experience I’ll never forget.”

The teacher-escorts learned about educational methods in the U.S. “I thought that non-Armenians wouldn’t care about the Armenian Genocide,” said Papyan, “But here are ‘odar’ students not only learning, but excited and wanting to learn about Armenians.”

Students with their teachers and Polatian at the office of CA State Assemblyman John Harabedian

The essay contest was initiated in 2024 by Uruguay’s National Administration of Public Education in cooperation with the Armenian General Benevolent Union (AGBU). Participants must conduct research and submit an argumentative essay supported by evidence under the mentorship of a teacher. Finalists give an oral defense of their essays before the winners are chosen.

Contest leader Javier Polatian expressed his satisfaction with the contest’s trip results, saying, “GenEd is behind the real success of this trip. There was a perfect balance between higher education, public schools, Armenian schools, cultural organizations, and political organizations. It was all so perfect.”

Edita Gzoyan, who co-led the contest program on behalf of the Armenian Genocide Museum-Institute, expressed satisfaction with the growing partnership between organizations in Uruguay, Armenia, and the U.S. “We all believe deeply in the power of genocide education to connect young people, strengthen historical understanding, and promote responsibility toward the prevention of future atrocities,” said Gzoyan.

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Asbarez: New Novel ‘Never Hide from the Devil,’ Tells Armenian Tale of Courag

Emil Lazarian
by Contributor

 

 May 15, 2026

 

in Books, Latest, News, Top Stories

Inspired by a true story of resistance during the Armenian Genocide, this stirring coming-of-age novel is a parable of courage and impossible choices in the midst of unimaginable horror.

The government wants them dead.

Fourteen-year-old Suren Simonian, an Armenian, lives as most boys his age do in the city of Van, eastern Anatolia. He goes to school, gawks at boys’ fistfights, and does his best to avoid the Turkish gendarmes. Most days, he spends with his Turkish best friend, Hamza.

But in spring 1915, rumors spread through Van of Turkish massacres of Armenian villages. Now Turkish troops have massed outside Van with one goal—to exterminate the city’s Armenians.

As Suren struggles to understand what it means to be a man, he knows one thing for sure: When everything you’ve known and loved is at stake, the only answer is to fight back. You can never hide from the devil.

In a Starred Review, Kirkus Reviews writes the novel is “heart-wrenching, thought-provoking, and painfully timely.”

Dr. Khatchig Mouradian, Columbia University, author of “The Resistance Network” says, “The horrors perpetrators commit are only half the story of genocide. The other half is the resistance of its victims. N.T. McQueen delivers a powerful novel of courage and defiance in the face of annihilation.”

Marsha Skrypuch, author of “Making Bombs for Hitler” and the “Kidnapped from Ukraine” trilogy said its “written with short and compelling chapters, this novel plunges the reader with authenticity into this little-known act of defiance during the 20th century’s first genocide.”

Eric Z. Weintraub, author of “South of Sepharad” wrote: “Through the eyes of a young boy, McQueen crafts a devastating and unforgettable portrait of the 1915 Defense of Van—a story of resilience against impossible odds that delivers the history of the Armenian Genocide to a new generation.”

N.T. McQueen

N.T. McQueen is an avid writer and dedicated college lecturer. With a master’s degree in fiction from California State University, Sacramento, McQueen has brought unique perspectives on human nature to readers in his captivating novels “Never Hide from the Devil“ (Cennan, 2026), “The Cry of Dry Bones“ (2021), and “Between Lions and Lambs“ (2011). His writing has been featured in North American Review, Stonecoast Review, Entropy, Sunlight Press, Atticus Review, Dappled Things, Grief Digest Magazine, and Foreword Magazine. He lives in California with his wife and daughters and enjoys fishing, traveling, and a tasty cup of coffee. The novel is now available from Cynren Press.

Support IALA’s work by purchasing it at their Bookshop.org storefront.

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168: Problem of enough. the opposition can win if…

Ara Felekian

May 15, 2026

The existence of the “Civil Contract” party and Nikol Pashinyan in the status of power is an anomaly. It happened once in 2018. and has been going on for eight years, threatening not to stop the state’s destruction even after June 7.

The society is aware of this anomaly, if not completely, then at least in qualitative layers. At the same time, the same society is almost out of touch with political processes, including today’s pre-election campaign, and responds inadequately to alarms about the threats facing the state and calls for the need to remove the government to prevent them. As a rule, it is qualified by the callers as latent pro-government, as a behavior of not openly supporting the CP.

However, in reality, if not completely, then to a large extent, the unconnected layers are indifferent not because they secretly want to support Nikol Pashinyan, but they do not give in to the aggressive slogans of the opposition and when they think about it, they often do not find the answer to the question of what will happen if it is possible to remove KP from power.

In mathematical language, removal of KP and Nikol Pashinyan from power is a necessary but not sufficient condition. On the one hand, it means that without the removal of the CP, Armenia has virtually no chance of being saved from destruction. But on the other hand, the removal of CP and Pashinyan does not automatically imply the appearance of a chance and the salvation of the state only due to the removal of the destroyers.

Read also

  • On June 8, CP will no longer be in power. how to prevent vote theft. Aram Orbelyan
  • Lavrov’s hidden threat. What can Armenia lose on the way to “European aspirations”?
  • WHAT IS THIS CRYING DOING, HE FEELS LIKE A DOG, WHAT IS GOING TO HAPPEN? WE WILL NOT GIVE A COUNTRY TO ALIEV’S CANDIDATE. ARMAN TATOYAN 

People want to know what will happen after June 7, if we finally manage to have an Armenia without CP through united forces. Blaming people for this desire is at least not honest, because with this desire, simple people show much more serious statism than all those who blindly see the salvation of everything only in the change of government, considering what needs to be done after that as secondary.

Armenia has found itself in this tragic situation, among other factors, also, and perhaps first of all, because in 2018, people just blindly threw themselves into the squares, and many of them were thrown into the squares just for the sake of a change of power, which was declared at that time not as a means to serve some high goal, but as an overarching goal.

All those who today are suspicious of the calls with only a change of power, but not with a clear vision of the future, do not want to repeat the mistake of eight years ago, do not want to participate a second time in a process that can complete the last element of the destruction of the state.

The election is exactly three weeks away. On the one hand, it is hopelessly little, but on the other hand, if it works effectively, it is at least enough for the opposition forces to be able to not only inform people directly, but also to explain with faith-inducing depth what will happen after the change of power.

Today, Armenia is faced not with good or best solutions, but with the imperative to avoid the worst. All thinking people can certainly become supporters and voters of the opposition if they are presented with the “sufficient” component after the “necessary” one.  

Harutyun Avetisyan




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Armenpress: Kazakh President signs decree on introducing AI into secondary edu

Badalian Vardan
World10:42, 14 May 2026
Read the article in: ArmenianRussian:

President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has signed a decree aimed at integrating artificial intelligence (AI) technologies into the country’s secondary education system, Kazinform news agency reported.

Under the decree, the Kazakh government is expected to approve, by July 1, a comprehensive action plan for 2026–2029 focused on the large-scale introduction of AI into schools.

The plan will include mechanisms for personalized learning, the development of digital infrastructure, teacher training, and the protection of students’ personal data.

Read the article in: ArmenianRussian:

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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US energy secretary says Iran is “frighteningly close” to constructing nuclea

Tatoyan Vazgen
Iran11:28, 14 May 2026
Read the article in: ArmenianRussian:

US Energy Secretary Chris Wright told lawmakers that Iran is “frighteningly close” to constructing nuclear weapons, insisting that the country is “weeks away” from enriching one ton of its uranium to weapons-grade levels, CNN reported.

“Frighteningly close. They are weeks, a small number of weeks away to enrich that to weapons-grade uranium,” CNN quoted Wright as saying at the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee at a hearing. “There’s still a weaponization process that happens after that, but they’re quite close to constructing nuclear weapons.”

Enriching uranium above a certain threshold — around 90% — means it can be used to create nuclear weapons. Asked by Democratic Sen. Richard Blumenthal about the status of Iran’s other reported 11 tons of uranium, Wright said the levels of enrichment ranged up to 60%, though Iran has “a lot of” 20% enriched uranium, which he called “very concerning.”

Blumenthal then pressed Wright on whether President Donald Trump would have to go after all of Iran’s uranium stockpiles in order to stop the enrichment.

“I think that’s the wise strategy,” Wright said. “Ultimately, the goal is to prevent future enrichment of uranium as well. Yes, to have a safe world, we need to end their nuclear program.”

Multiple Trump administration officials have cited Iran’s enriched uranium stores as part of the rationale for the war with Iran. Trump has also said he wants Iran to surrender its enriched uranium in order to reach a deal to end the conflict.

Iran officially denies pursuing nuclear weapons, maintaining that its nuclear program is solely for peaceful, civilian purposes.

Read the article in: ArmenianRussian:

Published by Armenpress, original at 
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Netanyahu’s coalition takes first step toward new elections in Israel

Elizabeth Jabejian
World12:13, 14 May 2026
Read the article in: Armenian:

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s coalition submitted a bill to dissolve parliament, taking a preliminary step toward holding new elections later this year, The Associated Press reported.

The proposal sets the stage for a formal vote to dissolve parliament and schedule new elections. Israeli media said a preliminary vote is expected next week.

Netanyahu’s coalition is near the end of its four-year term and must hold new elections by the end of October. But some of Netanyahu’s ultra-Orthodox governing partners have urged him to push up the vote slightly to early September.

The bill calls for elections “no less than 90 days” after it is approved, giving Netanyahu flexibility to choose a date when he feels he has the best chance of success.

The outgoing coalition has presided over a turbulent term that included the Oct. 7, 2023, Hamas attacks and wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.

Opinion polls have indicated that the coalition, comprised of religious and nationalist parties, could struggle to win reelection, according to AP.

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Latvian Prime Minister Evika Silina resigns

Anna Tamamian
Europe12:54, 14 May 2026
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Latvia’s Prime Minister Evika Silina said ‌she would resign on Thursday, triggering the collapse of her coalition government just months before an election is due in October, Reuters reported.

“I am ⁠resigning, but I am not giving up,” Reuters quoted her as saying in a televised statement.

Latvian President Edgars Rinkevics, who is tasked by the constitution to select a leader of the government, will meet all parliamentary parties on ‌Friday.

Silina, ⁠of the center-right New Unity party, was left without a ruling majority in the parliament on Wednesday after the left-wing ⁠Progressives party said it was withdrawing its support.

The decision followed the firing at the ⁠weekend of Progressives’ Defense Minister Andris Spruds over the handling of ⁠incidents involving stray Ukrainian drones flying into Latvia from Russia, according to Reuters.

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Almost 20 million people in Sudan still face acute hunger, monitors say

Torgomian Varazdat
World17:48, 14 May 2026
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Some 19.5 million Sudanese people, or more than 40% of the population, ‌are facing acute hunger, according to a report by a global hunger monitor, Reuters reported.

The spread of hunger and famine has become a hallmark of the three-year-old war in Sudan, which is estimated to have killed hundreds of thousands of people as well as devastating the economy and agriculture and displacing 14 million.

The estimate by the ⁠U.N.-backed Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) is slightly lower than last fall’s of 21.2 million people, but some 14 areas in the country’s North Darfur, South Darfur, and South Kordofan states remain at risk of famine, where 135,000 people face “catastrophic” levels of hunger.

“Ongoing hostilities – especially around major supply routes, such as El Obeid in North Kordofan – and the possibility of renewed siege‑like conditions continue to heighten risks,” the ⁠IPC said in a statement.

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