In this pre-election period, as expected, the topic of the army is on the agenda for the political forces, the debates around which are not distinguished by professionalism, to put it mildly, if not to say, the remote debates related to the RA armed forces are reduced to the domestic level. In the near future, we will look at the security programs of the leading forces participating in the National Assembly elections.

And before that, let’s note that the reasons for our defeat in the 44-day war are not avoided by both the authorities and the opposition forces in the internal political struggle. The point is that the observations related to some episodes here too are sometimes not quite true, that is, the assessments are exclusively political. And this is why we claim that the former military leadership of the 44-day military should have given public answers to several key questions in time. At one time, because during the pre-election period, they could become a reason for political speculation or be used against each other by political opponents.

Or at least before the key issues of the 44-day report were made public in this permitted section, if indeed they were there.

In particular, an important question is whether the relevant authorities, the General Staff of the RA Armed Forces, or the RA Ministry of Defense have a calculation or statistics about the injuries and casualties of the Armenian side in the 44-day war, as a result of the use of weapons, i.e., what percentage of them are attributed to ATS strikes, how many to artillery systems and so on. This is the first.

Secondly, in the context of the reasons for the defeat in the war, we also hear different points of view, including the presence or absence of these weapons or their uselessness.

Moreover, such claims were made by the government in the form of the Chairman of the Standing Committee on Security and Defense of the National Assembly Andranik Kocharyan, and from various opposition circles.

Therefore, it is necessary to listen to a military assessment: what is the share of the problem related to weapons and ammunition in the defeat in the 44-day war, and what was the advantage of Azerbaijan in terms of weapons, were they actually “Bayraktars” or long-range and high-precision missiles and systems?

Why not, what problem would the Iskander solve if deployed at the right place and time, what problem would only 4 units of Su-30 solve if all the “stributs” were bought, and what combat problem did they solve during the war, and it was.

It should be noted that yesterday the Minister of Foreign Affairs Ararat Mirzoyan reminded in a conversation with journalists. “We ourselves have said that we managed to get the planes, but not the missiles, the warheads, and we have to get that piece.”

Let us add that in 2018 Pashinyan’s family newspaper “Su-30. a step towards the doctrine of “reinforcement” with the text article: was published, where, in particular, it is stated:

“The most outstanding example was the acquisition of the Iskander operational tactical missile system. It is clear, however, that it will not be used from the first day of a possible war. On the one hand, it plays a deterrent role, and in case of active actions, it will take on the role of balancing an unfavorable situation or a decisive blow.

Tactically, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are more flexible. During the ArmHiTec-2018 exhibition, the Armenian-made UAVs, including combat UAVs, will be actively used during possible large-scale operations. However, their presence is not enough to ensure air superiority arising from the logic of preventive strikes.

A necessary condition to fill that gap is the presence of a fighter, and in the case of striving for perfection, the presence of a powerful multifunctional air force… On June 17, RA Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan published a photo on his Facebook page in which he was in the cockpit of a Russian Su-30СМ fighter. The Russian Su-30 is several times cheaper than the American F-35, corresponds to the logic of the professional training of our pilots to date, and, what is no less important, will not cause political problems. With technical data, it also meets the requirements necessary for possible combat operations.

The most important difference of this fighter from its predecessors is that it can hit important ground targets at operational-tactical depth. The technical data allows to arm missiles with a range of 100 km or more. In other words, conditionally, being in the airspace of the Republic of Armenia, the fighter is able to hit important targets in the territory of Azerbaijan.

According to “Kommersant”, one squadron of these planes, and that is the quantity, can seriously change the balance of forces. Strategically, these fighters will continue to play a deterrent role, but, unlike the Iskander, will be available at all stages of possible military operations. And in the case of an exceeding number of similar aircraft of the enemy, the effectiveness of the application will depend on the skill and training of the pilots. In general, the presence of Su-30s will not completely solve the problem of deterrence and deterrence. The problem can be solved only complex as a result of operations, only a part of which is in the range of military preparation”.

168.am wrote, that Andranik Kocharyan’s several-page letter-analysis related to the Su-30s was also attached to the 44-day report, which he presented to Pashinyan, and which was also mentioned during Pashinyan’s questioning in the investigative commission.

By the way, on one occasion, in response to our question, the acting Minister of Defense of Armenia, Suren Papikyan appreciated The role of su. But there is also a lot of speculation about the fighter, as it once was with the Iskander. Of course, professional opinions related to this or that weapon can clash, but if they are professional, and in this case, as we mentioned, we are interested in another question: how would it affect the outcome of the 44-day, if the necessary important “attributes” were purchased, and what issue did it solve by using it without them.

Thirdly, the personnel appointments made during Nikol Pashinyan’s reign or the selection of their candidates in the RA Armed Forces and the Defense Ministry, about which we have written many times, is also a less important issue in terms of ensuring influence on the outcome of the 44-day war. Naturally, the key questions do not end there, about which ones we wrote: it refers both to the issuing of the “number one readiness” order, and to the reduction of the military units of the first army corps, and to the fulfillment of the requirements of the legislation and the accurate and legal distribution and execution of powers, etc.

In other words, it should be clearly stated in percentage terms, what is the share of the political leadership in the defeat in the 44-day period, how much is the share of the military leadership and the army, and if the army did not perform some task, how much is the fault of the political leadership, how much is the fault of the military leadership and command?

These are questions that require a military assessment, which cannot be approached through a purely political prism, while we see the exact opposite, and in this case, learning is excluded.

In this case, it is also not possible to rule out political speculation, if clear answers to the above questions are not given publicly. On the other hand, the authorities or relevant authorities are evasive say clearly What percentage of desertions in war are in the regular army, and how many in the reserve, volunteer units, and how many in other structures? More than war After 6 years, the names of the victims have not been published. to say that the currently known official number (3833 person) may change, is not a very serious justification, especially when the list of victims of the September 2022 battles and not only of these battles is not published either.

By the way, in November 2025, NA Speaker Alen Simonyan announced that as a result of the 44-day war “is unknown 191 the person’s location, including: 172 serviceman and 19 of a civilian”.

But in March of this year, RA Minister of Justice Srbuhi Galyan answered the question of Garnik Danielyan, deputy of the “Hayastan” faction in the National Assembly: had informed.

“According to official data, we have 195 missing persons, 175 of whom are servicemen, and the rest are civilians.” 

It should be noted that 6 people are considered unknown by the Azerbaijani side in the 2020 war. What about? the victims then, as of January 2021, the Ministry of Defense of Azerbaijan, as their official number of victims, noted 2855, Baku Defense Department in May 2021 stated that the number of victims has become 2895, The number of Azerbaijani victims in 2025 has been announced՝ more than 2900.

Later Aliyev said that during the 44-day war of 2020 and the “anti-terrorist” operations of September 19-20, 2023, taken together: more more than 3000 victims was given by Azerbaijan. It is possible that the authorities of Azerbaijan are hiding the real number of their victims in the 44-day war. We are still not talking about the casualties among Syrian mercenaries and Turkish soldiers in the war.

Let’s go back to the pre-election campaign in Armenia and add that the armament is one of the factors in the army’s combat capability, that is, there are also other necessary factors. Then, the army is judged by its results during local or military operations (also the state), the rest is a matter of political interpretation.

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Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov referred to Armenia’s European aspirations, stating that the European Union is pulling Armenia into its orbit, and Yerevan is in danger of losing all its privileges within the EAEU framework. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said during the press conference held in New Delhi on the results of his participation in the BRICS ministerial meeting that Russia has close but not easy relations with Armenia.

“Those relations are close, allied. But at the same time, they are not easy,” Sergey Lavrov said, asserting that the West is trying to subjugate Armenia, like some other CIS members, “to break Armenia’s mutually beneficial economic, trade, and investment ties with its partners in the CIS and EAEU.”

“It is true, I heard that Prime Minister Pashinyan mentioned that he is busy with pre-election affairs and will not be able to go to the meeting of the leaders of the Eurasian Economic Union. It would be sad, of course, because this is a good opportunity to discuss the things that are hanging in the air,” the Russian Foreign Minister added.

Lavrov noted that EAEU member states will be able to discuss the issues related to attempts to bring Armenia into the sphere of influence of the West at the unification summit to be held in May.

“Now, I think, will be an optimal opportunity to discuss the problems that arise due to the fact that the European Union insists on bringing Armenia into its sphere of influence, including at the cost of risking the privileges that Armenia has under the Eurasian Economic Union. The opportunity to honestly and sincerely discuss all these issues will appear at the end of the last week of May, when the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the summit, will take place in Kazakhstan,” Lavrov said.

Along with this discourse, the RA authorities claim that they have no plans to leave the EAEU, they do not want to be “extorted” from the Russian Federation. “If I were to conduct a policy contrary to the EAEU, the EAEU would be in a paralyzed state today, because decisions in that structure are made by consensus, and no decision can be made if I am against that decision,” Nikol Pashinyan said.

These statements of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in New Delhi can be described as a combination of “soft power” and direct diplomatic pressure implemented by Moscow. Lavrov’s words that Yerevan “risks losing all its privileges within the framework of the EAEU” are beyond the scope of ordinary diplomatic rhetoric and carry the nature of a threat.

Economic privileges as political leverage

The “loss of privileges” pointed out by Lavrov first of all refers to energy tariffs, preferential customs regimes and access to the Russian market. This is a direct hint that economic mutual benefit for Moscow is no longer a derivative of political loyalty. If earlier the EAEU was presented as a purely economic project, now Russia openly uses it as a braking mechanism to curb the Western aspirations of the Armenian authorities.

The double-edged sword of consensus

If Pashinyan emphasizes that Armenia can paralyze the structure by using the right of consensus, Lavrov’s words suggest the opposite scenario. Consensus can also work against Armenia. Other EAEU members, at the urging of Moscow or out of their own interests, can block economic initiatives of vital importance for Yerevan. Lavrov’s review of the May summit allows us to conclude that Moscow is preparing to subject Armenia to a “collective interrogation” within a narrow circle of EAEU member states.

“Questions hanging in the air” and the inevitability of drastic steps

Lavrov’s wording, “to discuss the issues that are hanging in the air”, indicates that Russia has accumulated a stock of grievances that no longer fits into the domain of labor discussions. The “sadness” of the Russian Foreign Minister regarding Pashinyan’s possible absence is not a personal regret, but a political impulse. Moscow is no longer inclined to tolerate the policy of “and-and” or, as the RA authorities claim, the policy of balancing, but how Moscow will be able to block this policy is still a question.

However, one thing is obvious: Russia has decided to take drastic measures. This can be expressed in the form of “soft” sanctions, which can be legally formulated as a requirement of EAEU standards, but in reality will be political sanctions.

For Armenia, a situation is emerging where insistence on not leaving the EAEU may not be enough to preserve the economic benefits of membership, as Moscow now puts the question directly: either complete integration and rejection of the Western vector, or nullification of “privileges”.

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US President Trump’s administration should offer a “grand deal” to Azerbaijan, which provides for the lifting of restrictions on the sale of weapons by the United States to Azerbaijan in exchange for the release of dozens of political prisoners by Baku.

Analysts of the American think tank “Atlantic Council” expressed a similar opinion by publishing The article with the caption “It’s time for the US-Azerbaijan “big deal””.

Atlantic Council experts believe that changes in the United States’ relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan, the upcoming elections in Armenia and the need for a final peace agreement will make the success of such a deal more likely.

Mentioned is that efforts to reach that deal should be based on the model that the White House used in negotiations with Belarus, which has released more than five hundred political prisoners. To put it more simply, “Atlantic Council” analysts’ proposal is political trade with Baku.

“By negotiating targeted sanctions relief in exchange for the release of political prisoners in Belarus, the White House has helped free more than 500 people from unjust captivity. A similar deal with Azerbaijan in the South Caucasus will bring great benefits with much less risk,” the authors write.

It is noted that in order to implement this “big deal” in Azerbaijan, the Trump administration must work with Congress, because in order to remove the restriction on arms sales, it is necessary to cancel subsection 907 of the Freedom Support Act passed by the US Congress in 1992, better known as Resolution 907.

“In order to implement this ‘grand deal’ in Azerbaijan, the Trump administration must work with Congress to propose lifting restrictions on arms sales to Baku in exchange for the release of unjustly imprisoned individuals.” This is a rare moment for a mutually beneficial bipartisan decision and a relatively inexpensive way to strengthen the United States’ relationship with an important strategic energy and transportation partner bordering Iran and Russia. “If the right moment is chosen, Armenia can also support this initiative if the release of political prisoners includes the Armenians currently held in Azerbaijan,” the article states.

The experts of the “Atlantic Council” next presented their proposals on “what to do with Resolution 907” and “in what sequence to build” the proposed agreement with Azerbaijan. In this context, they added that relations between Washington, Baku and Yerevan are changing, and in February, Armenia and Azerbaijan “received unprecedented US attention” when US Vice President JD Vance visited these countries.

Full article on the source website.

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