What’s at stake in Armenia’s June election?

Reuters
May 19 2026
By Lucy Papachristou
May 19 – Armenia holds a parliamentary election on June 7 that pits the governing Civil Contract party, which is pursuing closer ties with the West, against an array of opposition parties, many of which are pro-Russian.
Opinion polls and analysts predict that Civil Contract, led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, will emerge as the largest party but will likely fall short ‌of the two-thirds majority needed to make changes to the constitution.
Here’s what to look out for:

REFERENDUM ON PEACE DEAL

* Civil Contract, in power since 2018, has spent much of the pre-election period touting its progress towards a peace deal with Azerbaijan after Pashinyan signed an initial agreement with Baku at the White House last August.
* A landlocked country of around 3 million, Armenia has been at war off and on with Azerbaijan since the late 1980s, mostly over the mountainous territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
* Baku retook full control of Karabakh in ⁠a lightning offensive in 2023, causing nearly all of the region’s 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia.

PRO-RUSSIAN OPPOSITION

* Armenia’s opposition is dominated by pro-Russian groups, several of which are tied to unpopular former presidents.
* The biggest challenger is the Strong Armenia party, led by an Armenian-Russian billionaire who is currently on trial for making calls to overthrow the government.
* Strong Armenia is running on a pro-business platform and has accused Pashinyan of attempting to stoke war with Moscow.

CHANGING TIES WITH RUSSIA

* Relations with Russia have frayed since 2023, when Azerbaijan retook Karabakh despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers.
* Armenia is a member of a Russian-led economic union and fully decoupling from Moscow, a major trading partner, would be difficult. The country is also heavily dependent on Russia and neighbouring Iran for energy supplies and hosts a large Russian military base.
* Russia has expressed ‌displeasure with ⁠Armenia’s westward pivot, saying it could spell “negative political and economic consequences” for Yerevan.Here’s what to look out for:

REFERENDUM ON PEACE DEAL

* Civil Contract, in power since 2018, has spent much of the pre-election period touting its progress towards a peace deal with Azerbaijan after Pashinyan signed an initial agreement with Baku at the White House last August.
* A landlocked country of around 3 million, Armenia has been at war off and on with Azerbaijan since the late 1980s, mostly over the mountainous territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.
* Baku retook full control of Karabakh in ⁠a lightning offensive in 2023, causing nearly all of the region’s 100,000 ethnic Armenians to flee to Armenia.

PRO-RUSSIAN OPPOSITION

* Armenia’s opposition is dominated by pro-Russian groups, several of which are tied to unpopular former presidents.
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* The biggest challenger is the Strong Armenia party, led by an Armenian-Russian billionaire who is currently on trial for making calls to overthrow the government.
* Strong Armenia is running on a pro-business platform and has accused Pashinyan of attempting to stoke war with Moscow.

CHANGING TIES WITH RUSSIA

* Relations with Russia have frayed since 2023, when Azerbaijan retook Karabakh despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers.
* Armenia is a member of a Russian-led economic union and fully decoupling from Moscow, a major trading partner, would be difficult. The country is also heavily dependent on Russia and neighbouring Iran for energy supplies and hosts a large Russian military base.
* Russia has expressed ‌displeasure with ⁠Armenia’s westward pivot, saying it could spell “negative political and economic consequences” for Yerevan.
* Armenian civil society groups have raised alarm over what they say are Russian state-sponsored disinformation efforts in the lead-up to the election. Moscow routinely denies it meddles in other countries’ internal affairs.

WARMING TO THE WEST

* Armenia last year adopted a law to launch its European Union accession process, and Pashinyan has sought to project Armenia as a key partner for Europe in the South Caucasus.
* ⁠Part of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement sees a proposed transit corridor built across Armenian territory to better connect Asia to Europe while bypassing Russia.
* An agreement signed with U.S. Vice President JD Vance during a visit this year to Yerevan could pave the way for an American company to build a new nuclear ⁠reactor in Armenia.

NORMALISATION WITH AZERBAIJAN, TURKEY

* Yerevan and Baku reached a U.S.-brokered peace agreement in August but have yet to sign a formal deal. Azerbaijan is demanding Armenia first change some wording in its constitution, which Yerevan says it is willing to do. A constitutional referendum is ⁠possible after the election.* Armenian civil society groups have raised alarm over what they say are Russian state-sponsored disinformation efforts in the lead-up to the election. Moscow routinely denies it meddles in other countries’ internal affairs.

WARMING TO THE WEST

* Armenia last year adopted a law to launch its European Union accession process, and Pashinyan has sought to project Armenia as a key partner for Europe in the South Caucasus.
* ⁠Part of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace agreement sees a proposed transit corridor built across Armenian territory to better connect Asia to Europe while bypassing Russia.
* An agreement signed with U.S. Vice President JD Vance during a visit this year to Yerevan could pave the way for an American company to build a new nuclear ⁠reactor in Armenia.

NORMALISATION WITH AZERBAIJAN, TURKEY

* Yerevan and Baku reached a U.S.-brokered peace agreement in August but have yet to sign a formal deal. Azerbaijan is demanding Armenia first change some wording in its constitution, which Yerevan says it is willing to do. A constitutional referendum is ⁠possible after the election.
* Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey have been closed for decades, with the latter shuttering its frontier in 1993 in solidarity with its key ally Baku over the Karabakh issue.
* Progress has been made recently towards normalisation with Ankara, including in trade, but in general the process has been slow.

Reporting by Lucy Papachristou in Tbilisi; Editing by Mark Trevelyan and Alex Richardson* Armenia’s borders with Azerbaijan and Turkey have been closed for decades, with the latter shuttering its frontier in 1993 in solidarity with its key ally Baku over the Karabakh issue.

* Progress has been made recently towards normalisation with Ankara, including in trade, but in general the process has been slow.

Reporting by Lucy Papachristou in Tbilisi; Editing by Mark Trevelyan and Alex Richardson

Arrests and controversy following several heated campaign encounters with Pash

OC Media
May 19 2026

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan was involved in multiple heated arguments as he campaigned around Armenia ahead of the June elections in recent days, prompting arrests, criticism from observers, and reported calls for resignation.

During his campaign in Yerevan on Monday, tensions escalated when individuals in two different places approached Pashinyan with accusations related to the aftermath of the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War of 2020.

In one incident, an argument broke out with a Nagorno-Karabakh refugee, Artur Osipyan, who was later arrested on suspicion of hooliganism.

‘You should have gone and died in place of our children, […] you thieving animals. Why are you alive? Why are you alive, when you’re even talking about another 5,000 victims, you scum — why are you alive?’, Pashinyan told Osipyan during their exchange.

He further warned others not to approach him with what he described as ‘Kocharyan–Serzh–[Karapetyan]-like spy narratives’ — referring to ex-presidents Robert Kocharyan and Serzh Sargsyan, as well as Russian–Armenian tycoon Samvel Karapetyan.

Earlier the same day, another confrontation involved Arpine Sogoyan, an obstetrician-gynaecologist, who accused Pashinyan of ‘stealing [her] homeland’ and ‘destroying an entire generation’, referring to the victims of the 2020 war and subsequent escalations.

According to Factor, Sogoyan’s brother, Lieutenant Colonel Hrant Papikyan, went missing during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War.

Reports later emerged that she had been asked by the head of the clinic she works for to submit a resignation request, though her daughter, Tatevik Sogoyan, stated that no resignation had been submitted.

Yerevan Mayor Tigran Avinyan, on Monday, in a press briefing, ruled out ‘that any person would be fired for their political views’.

Separately, observers have criticised Osipyan’s detention.

Daniel Ioannisyan from the Independent Observer argued that there were no elements of hooliganism or other criminal offences in Osipyan’s actions, and that he had only ‘expressed political criticism directed’ at Pashinyan. Ioannisyan noted that Pashinyan, in turn, made ‘personal, dignity-insulting remarks’.

The Independent Observer demanded the ‘immediate removal of restrictions on Artur Osipyan’s liberty’, and urged authorities to issue a public apology if the response was found to be disproportionate or politically motivated.

A separate incident on Tuesday in the Lori region also drew attention, where an elderly man attempting to approach Pashinyan was forcibly removed by what appears to have been plainclothes police officers.

The man, later identified as Artyom Grigoryan, is the grandfather of Aram Manukyan, a soldier who died in the deadly fire at a military barracks in the village of Azat in Geghakunik in January 2023 that left 15 soldiers dead.

Grigoryan accused Pashinyan of being culpable for the incident and demanded justice.

Military officials sacked as fire kills 15 Armenian servicemen

In turn, Pashinyan dubbed such actions as provocations orchestrated by Karapetyan, claiming that those criticising him in public in such a manner were paid ֏200,000 ($510) to do so.

‘It’s become a trend — sending one person everywhere. Let’s not pay attention’, Pashinyan said.

More arrests and investigations

Separately, Armenian authorities on Tuesday reported a newly uncovered case of alleged vote-buying linked to Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia Alliance.

According to investigators, several individuals, despite legal restrictions on acts of charity during the pre-election period, paid rent for a number of voters in the Lori region.

‘To avoid detection and reduce the traceability of their actions, the group members used intermediaries and vehicles belonging to them. The funds were mainly provided in cash, and employees of affiliated companies, as well as people from their circles, were involved in the process of receiving and distributing the money. In order to make tracking the movement of funds more difficult, they also planned to use Russian bank cards for financial transactions’, the Anti-Corruption Committee said in its statement.

This comes to be the latest uncovered case of alleged vote-buying from Karapetyan’s Strong Armenia. Since the start of the election campaign on 8 May, such reports have been made almost daily, predominantly concerning Karapetyan’s affiliates.

Also on Tuesday morning, Armenian authorities raided about 15 addresses in Yerevan for yet undisclosed reasons. According to Factor, the searches were being conducted to find weapons and ammunition.

Armenia launches investigation into alleged plot to assassinate Pashinyan

Other incidents raise concerns

A number of civil rights organisations have expressed ‘deep concern’ regarding the death of Armen Hovhannisyan, who reportedly took his own life at the Mental Health Centre following his detention after tearing down campaign posters for Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party.

The civil rights defenders called for an ‘immediate, independent, and effective investigation’ into the circumstances of his alleged suicide and the legality of his detention.

In a separate case, campaign events led by Defence Minister Suren Papikyan in Lori were disrupted on 16 May by supporters of the Strong Armenia Alliance.

Authorities initiated criminal proceedings on charges of campaign obstructions, placing six people in pre-trial detention and another four under house arrest.

Another individual from Lori has also been placed under house arrest on suspicion of hooliganism over a social media post targeting a Civil Contract supporter.

Armenia keeping tabs on Russia-linked churches ahead of elections

May 19 2026

With just weeks to go before parliamentary elections in Armenia, Yerevan’s National Security Service is closely monitoring the activities of the Armenian Apostolic Church and its supporters within the Russian Orthodox Church.

The activities of the Armenian Apostolic Church (AAC), led by the Supreme Patriarch and Catholicos of All Armenians Karekin II, are being closely monitored by Yerevan’s National Security Service (NSS) in the run-up to Armenia’s parliamentary elections.

The authorities suspect the Armenian Apostolic Church (IO, 14/11/25) of helping Moscow’s attempts to manipulate the 7 June vote and of being part of Russia’s array of hybrid attacks directed against the South Caucasus nation (IO, 14/11/25).

Tensions between Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Karekin II reached their high point in December when the premier said during a question-and-answer session in parliament that he “does not need a Catholicos who will obey him” but a Catholicos “who will not obey a lieutenant-colonel from a foreign special service”.

SVR connections

This was a thinly veiled reference to Karekin II’s brother, Archbishop Ezras Nersisyan, who the NSS alleges was recruited by the KGB in the 1980s and continues to work for Russian intelligence.

Suspicions were further fuelled after Metropolitan Anthony of Volokolamsk, head of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate (DECR), made a discreet courtesy visit to Nersisyan in Moscow.

The metropolitan has himself long been suspected of working for Russia’s SVR foreign intelligence service, having in 2023 notably awarded a Swedish priest an SVR medal, along with a message from the service’s director Sergey Naryshkin.

Places of worship under surveillance

According to our sources, three sites are under particularly close surveillance in the run-up to the elections. The first is the Holy See of Etchmiadzin, which the NSS already raided on 27 June last year to arrest archbishop Mikael Ajapahyan, with the help of the service’s Alpha group.

The second is the Cathedral of the Holy Mother of God in Gyumri, north of Yerevan, also home to the Russian 102nd military base. It was from this cathedral that Ajapahyan called for a military coup against the authorities in Yerevan.

Finally, the NSS is also keeping an eye on Yerevan’s Church of the Intercession of the Most Holy Mother of God, also the headquarters of the Russian Orthodox Diocese of Armenia, established in 2023 with the support of Metropolitan Leonid of Klin. He is known as the “Prigozhin in a cassock” because of his ties with Russia’s late Wagner militia founder Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Leonid regularly voices his disapproval of Pashinyan’s actions against Karekin II, as well as Yerevan’s growing ties with Greek-American and European Christian and Orthodox circles. This rapprochement was evidenced by the visit of US Vice-President J.D. Vance in February.

ICJ: Trials of Armenians in Baku do not meet fair trial standards

Mediamax, Armenia
May 19 2026

ICJ: Trials of Armenians in Baku do not meet fair trial standards

Yerevan /Mediamax/. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) has published a report on the problems within Azerbaijan’s justice system.

The report states that the rights of the Artsakh leaders were violated in the Baku military court, and the trials are marked by “practices that violate basic guarantees of justice. It explicitly records that these trials do not comply with international human rights law standards.

The report exposes structural and institutional problems in Azerbaijan’s judicial system, and presents the trial of the Artsakh leaders as an illustration of acute problems with the judicial system of the country.

ICJ recorded that the trials of Artsakh leaders “were conducted before a military court, the defendants were denied effective access to counsel of their choosing, case materials were withheld or provided in a language the accused did not understand, defence motions were systematically dismissed without reasoning and omitted from the trial record; interpretation was inadequate or absent, and public access, including access by accredited diplomatic representatives, was denied.”

“According to publicly available reports, these trials are marked by practices that violate basic guarantees of justice “a fundamentally unfair procedural situation has been created, where the defence is deprived of any realistic opportunity to contest the charges or prove innocence. In such conditions, the very concept of a fair trial turns into a formality, devoid of any content,” the report states.

As for the separate trial of former Artsakh State Minister Ruben Vardanyan, the ICJ report notes that the charges against him date back to 1988, when Vardanyan did not hold any position in Artsakh.

“The prosecution of Vardanyan for conduct alleged to have occurred in 1988 raises fundamental concerns under the principle of legality. Vardanyan held no political position at the time the charges relate to and could not have foreseen that conduct from that era would form the basis of criminal charges upon his later entry into political office. The principle of legality requires that criminal liability be foreseeable and that criminal law be applied with precision and clarity, not selectively against individuals based on their subsequent political activities,” the report explains.

ICJ urged Azerbaijani authorities to “ensure that any appeal in the cases of the former Artsakh officials is heard by an ordinary civilian. Ensure the provision of case materials to the defence in a language the accused understands and ensure adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence in all proceedings, including on appeal.”

How Can Turkey–Armenia Trade Easing Impact the South Caucasus Dynamics?

Special Eurasia
May 19 2026

How Can Turkey–Armenia Trade Easing Impact the South Caucasus Dynamics?

Executive Intelligence Snapshot

Turkey’s decision to lift restrictions on direct trade declarations with Armenia marks a limited but symbolically significant shift after three decades of a closed border.

The measure does not reopen the frontier or restore full diplomatic ties, yet it signals Ankara’s readiness to adjust to new power relations following Azerbaijan’s gains in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia views the opening as a strategic economic necessity amid isolation and weakened ties with Russia.

The move carries wider implications for regional trade corridors and the balance of influence among Turkey, Russia, and Iran.

Context

Turkey has removed restrictions that prevented goods transiting via third countries from listing Armenia or Turkey as the direct origin or final destination. The land border, closed since 1993 due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Ankara’s support for Azerbaijan, remains shut, and diplomatic relations are still not fully restored. The practical economic effect of the customs change is modest for now, but it breaks with a long-standing pattern of complete closure and signals a cautious opening.

The decision follows Azerbaijan’s victory in the 2020 Karabakh war and subsequent operations that sharply reduced the Armenian presence in the region and allowed Baku to fully restore its control on the Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Buoyed by the success of the Turkey–Azerbaijan axis, Ankara now feels able to adopt a more flexible stance towards Yerevan without jeopardising its strategic partnership with Baku. Turkish officials are advancing normalisation through controlled, incremental steps, with technical talks ongoing and no fixed timetable, seeking to project an image of a pragmatic regional stabiliser and central actor in the South Caucasus.

Why Does It Matter?

For Armenia, the partial trade opening is a strategic requirement. After losing the Nagorno-Karabakh and experiencing a deterioration in relations with Russia, Yerevan is searching for new economic and diplomatic outlets to reduce isolation. Improved access to trade channels through Turkey could lower logistics costs, generate new economic opportunities, and give Armenia greater room for manoeuvre in regional affairs.

A major unresolved issue remains the 1915 Armenian genocide. Turkey continues to reject that term, whereas Armenia regards recognition as a core element of its national identity. This unresolved historical dispute continues to block deeper political reconciliation and could limit the durability of economic normalisation if not addressed at some stage.

The South Caucasus has gained geoeconomic importance after the Ukraine conflict and the worsening of Russia–West relations, turning the region into a strategic corridor linking Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, Turkey, and Europe. Armenia risks exclusion from emerging trade flows if it cannot shift from an isolated position to that of a transit node.

Turkey’s calibrated opening gives Ankara greater leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan, while reinforcing its claim to shape regional trade and security arrangements. By moving in small, controlled steps, Turkey can test reactions from Baku, Moscow, and Tehran and adjust its pace without committing to full normalisation. This approach allows Ankara to present itself as a stabilising force and gatekeeper for access to European and Asian markets through the Caucasus.

On the security side, Azerbaijan retains a clear strategic, economic, and military advantage, backed by close cooperation with Turkey. Armenia is attempting to rebuild its security posture after experiencing the limits of Russian protection.

Russia views the gradual rapprochement between Yerevan and Ankara with growing concern, as it could erode the Moscow’s influence in the South Caucasus. Iran is also wary of any reconfiguration of regional corridors that might further empower the Turkey–Azerbaijan axis or sideline Tehran in emerging trade arrangements.

Outlook

The current thaw between Turkey and Armenia is cautious and incomplete, centred on technical trade measures rather than full political reconciliation. Short-term progress is likely to continue through incremental steps, provided Ankara can reassure Baku and avoid sharp pushback from Moscow and Tehran. Armenia will try to convert limited openings into broader economic gains and transit roles, but its success depends on further easing of restrictions and a gradual rebuilding of security guarantees.

The unresolved genocide dispute and Armenia’s security vulnerabilities remain major constraints on deeper normalisation. A more substantial shift would require political dialogue on historical issues and clearer arrangements on regional corridors and security, which are unlikely in the near term. Over time, even modest customs changes can signal a wider geopolitical adjustment in the South Caucasus, with Turkey seeking a stronger ordering role, Armenia striving to escape isolation, and Russia and Iran attempting to prevent marginalisation in emerging trade and security structures.


*Report in media partnership with Notizie Geopolitiche

Listen to What Vladimir Putin Is Saying About Armenia

The National Interest
May 19 2026

Listen to What Vladimir Putin Is Saying About Armenia

May 19, 2026
By: Joseph Epstein

Putin and other Kremlin insiders are threatening a hybrid warfare campaign to bring down Armenian leader Nikol Pashinyan. The Trump administration should back him up.

For years before Russia invaded Ukraine, Western leaders reassured themselves that longtime Russian President Vladimir Putin was merely posturing. The consensus held that Russia’s all-out propaganda blitz—talking heads on state TV denying Ukrainian sovereignty, calls for referendums in the east, and warnings of Euro-Atlantic encroachment—was empty political posturing and was not meant literally. Even weeks before the invasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, now rightly remembered as a stalwart hero of Ukraine’s defense, insisted that Russia’s threats to invade were mere rhetoric. Until they were not.

The same vocabulary is now being aimed at Armenia, and last week, Putin took it on himself. Days after Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan explicitly announced that Armenia was not Russia’s ally in the war on Ukraine, Putin warned that the country is “now living through everything that is happening on the Ukrainian track”—a path that began with Ukraine’s move toward the EU and ended in “the coup d’état, the Crimea story, the position of southeastern Ukraine, and military actions.” As an alternative, Putin proposed an overt referendum on whether Armenia should break with Russia, followed by “a soft, civilized, and mutually beneficial separation.”

The threat behind Putin’s words could not have been clearer. Even so, others within his orbit went a step further. Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova alleged that Yerevan had been drawn into an “anti-Russian orbit” by the European Union—the same framing of Euro-Atlantic encroachment into the historical Russian sphere of influence that the Kremlin used to justify its war on Ukraine. Not to be outdone, Russian state propagandist Vladimir Solovyov argued for Russia to expand its “special military operation” into Armenia.

What Is Russia Planning in the Caucasus?

The South Caucasus was, until recently, Moscow’s domain. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 to punish Tbilisi’s Western pivot. To the south, the Kremlin played off Armenia and Azerbaijan against one another—guaranteeing Armenia’s security while selling weapons to Azerbaijan—in order to keep the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict frozen, and thereby maintain its regional indispensability. That arrangement collapsed in late 2020, when Azerbaijan retook most of Nagorno-Karabakh after a six-week war, and again in 2022, when Moscow tied up its capacity in Ukraine. After Azerbaijan retook Nagorno-Karabakh in its entirety in 2023, a regional detente set in, and both Yerevan and Baku began turning to other mediators. The August 8, 2025 peace summit—which placed Washington at the center of the South Caucasus for the first time — was the final blow to a Russian position already in retreat, and the foundation of an American one.

This is Washington’s problem. The ongoing situation in Armenia is the first stress test of a major, though under-celebrated, achievement of President Donald Trump’s second administration. The Armenia–Azerbaijan peace deal put the United States in operational control of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) corridor spanning the two countries, benefiting both and significantly improving the US position in the South Caucasus. If the Kremlin engineers a change of government in Yerevan by whipping up hardline anti-Azerbaijan sentiment in Armenia, the deal goes back on the table, and so does America’s foothold.

The Middle Corridor—the trade route connecting Europe to Central Asia—is the only major commercial artery that bypasses Russia, China, and Iran simultaneously. That matters because Central Asia holds some of the world’s largest untapped reserves of rare earths. The United States currently depends on China for roughly 70 percent of its rare earth supply, a dependency Beijing has already weaponized in trade disputes. Lose Yerevan, and TRIPP shuts down.
A Russian invasion of Armenia at this stage is highly improbable. Russian forces are tied down in Ukraine. Moreover, Russia and Armenia do not border each other: in order to reach Armenia, Russian forces would need to pass through Georgia, Azerbaijan, Turkey, or Iran, each posing its own military or political problem.

What is more likely—and in fact already underway—is an intensified hybrid campaign to bring down Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and reinstall a Kremlin-aligned government in Yerevan. The Kremlin’s opening is the June 7 parliamentary election. Pashinyan’s principal challenger is the political vehicle of Samvel Karapetyan—a Russian-Armenian billionaire enriched by Russian state contracts who has lobbied for closer ties with Moscow, railed against the peace deal, and is now under house arrest on charges of plotting a coup.

How America Can Stop a Russian Takeover in Armenia

Fortunately, the United States has a major asset in the fight against Russia for influence in Armenia: the Armenian people themselves. The Armenians have not forgiven Russia for standing aside as Azerbaijan retook Nagorno-Karabakh, and they remember that every leader since independence except Levon Ter-Petrosyan governed in Moscow’s pocket. The demand for a Western pivot is real.

Washington has tools to make that pivot durable. The United States can build out a strategic transit partnership centered on TRIPP and support Armenia’s nascent AI and technology sector. Each prospective investment or partnership does double duty: economic upside for Armenians, geopolitical insulation against Moscow.

Washington also has tools against the Kremlin’s preferred candidate. Executive Order 14024 authorizes the Treasury Department to sanction individuals who “undermine democratic processes or institutions in the United States or abroad” for the benefit of the Russian government. The same authority was used against Bidzina Ivanishvili, founder of Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream party. Karapetyan fits the same description: a Russian-state-contracts billionaire campaigning for closer ties to Moscow.

The strangest piece of this puzzle sits in Washington itself, where the Armenian-American diaspora organizations that should be the strongest advocates for a US–Armenia partnership are working against it. The Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), the Armenian diaspora’s main lobbying organization in the United States, has remained generally bipartisan for most of its existence, recognizing that a strong US-Armenia relationship cannot be maintained in the long run if the movement aligns openly with one political party. Yet ANCA policy director Alex Galitsky recently accused Trump of “genocidal ethnic cleansing of [Nagorno-Karabakh],” “genocide in Palestine,” and “threaten[ing] genocide against Iran”—language that aligns the organization with the American far left and amplifies Iranian-aligned talking points. ANCA has also organized legislators to undermine the peace deal, including Senator Adam Schiff, and amplified Robert Amsterdam, a Kremlin-aligned lobbyist who represents Vadim Novinsky, the Ukrainian oligarch who fronted Moscow’s effort to weaponize a breakaway Orthodox faction against Kyiv on charges of “Christian persecution.” Amsterdam has appeared with Karapetyan’s nephew on right-wing podcaster Tucker Carlson’s program to recast Karapetyan as a defender of Christianity persecuted by his own government. The Kremlin is using the same playbook it used against Ukraine—talking out of both sides of its mouth to different fringe audiences—with a new target in mind.

Pashinyan is not a perfect leader. Yet for all his various faults, he is attempting to take Armenia out from under Moscow’s thumb. He deserves America’s support, and the diaspora organizations running interference for the Kremlin must be treated as exactly that.

The West’s mistake on Ukraine was not ignorance, but disbelief. For years, Moscow shouted what it thought of Kyiv’s drift westward, and Western capitals minimized the rhetoric. Armenia now sits at the edge of the same pattern. The language is intimately familiar to anyone who listens, and the pressure campaign is already underway. The date is June 7. Washington has time to lock in the gains of the peace deal and anchor the South Caucasus in a Western orbit—but only if it understands that when the Kremlin repeats itself, it means it.

About the Author: Joseph Epstein

Joseph Epstein is the director of the Turan Research Center, a senior fellow at the Yorktown Institute, an expert at the N7 Foundation, and a research fellow at the Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar Ilan University. He also sits on the advisory board of the Alekain Foundation, a nonprofit dedicated to providing education to women and girls in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. He specializes in Eurasia and the Middle East, and his work has been featured in various outlets such as Newsweek, The Wall Street Journal, The Hill, the Atlantic Council, Novaya Gazeta, RFE/RL, Foreign Policy, and others.

Armenian ambassador praises Canada as group accuses Carney of dialing down pea

MSN
May 19 2026

The Canadian Press
Armenian ambassador praises Canada as group accuses Carney of dialing down peace push

Story by Dylan Robertson

OTTAWA — Armenia’s ambassador in Ottawa is praising Canada’s ongoing support for democratic reforms in the Caucasus nation — even as a group representing Armenian-Canadians says the federal government is easing up on efforts to bring peace to the region.

“For us, democracy is not just a simple slogan. It was a choice in a very difficult geopolitical reality,” Ambassador Anahit Harutyunyan told The Canadian Press.

“Everyone in Armenia understands how important it is. That’s why we have the engagement of countries like Canada, closely supporting Armenia’s aspiration.”

Harutyunyan spoke after Prime Minister Mark Carney visited the Armenian capital of Yerevan earlier this month.

Armenia has for decades been locked in a territorial dispute with Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Canada and other countries recognize that region as part of Azerbaijan, despite its population being largely ethnic Armenian.

As tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh were rising in 2023, Azerbaijan restricted access to the region and cleared out more than 100,000 residents. Canada described those residents as having been “forcibly displaced to Armenia.”

That same year, the government of Justin Trudeau opened an embassy in Yerevan and weighed in multiple times on the conflict. Ottawa also joined an EU security mission to deter escalation along Armenia’s border with Azerbaijan.

Ottawa also has sought to support what it called “fragile” democracies in former Soviet states such as Armenia. That includes efforts to counter Russian disinformation.

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia has tried to position itself as a European democracy. Freedom House has tracked significant improvement in Armenia over the past decade, as well as some backsliding in recent years, such as corruption and political influence in courts.

The International Observatory for Democracy in Armenia, meanwhile, has accused Yerevan of suppressing opposition voices and consolidating power ahead of a June 7 election. Canada is likely to send observers to monitor that election.

“We have a lot of work to do, and that’s why we’re engaging closely with Canadian authorities,” Harutyunyan said.

The Liberals have rarely mentioned issues in the Caucasus region since Carney took office.

Sevag Belian, head of the Armenian National Committee of Canada, said the Armenian diaspora is “a bit confused” about Ottawa’s approach to the region. He pointed out that Carney did not publicly call out Azerbaijan’s approach to the peace process or the power consolidation undertaken by Armenia’s government during his visit.

“The visit to Armenia really was just a photo-op,” Belian said, noting Carney did not publicly raise concerns about Azerbaijan’s detention of Armenians or its destruction of Armenian cultural sites.

Belian said the Carney government only raised these publicly in a statement last August. Carney touched briefly on what he called “humanitarian issues” during his visit to Yerevan earlier this month.

Speaking in the capital on May 4, the prime minister noted that there had been no hostilities along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border for months.

“A peace process is proceeding. We’re encouraged by that. We will do what we can, as Canada, in supporting it,” Carney said.

Belian said his community is concerned about Canada strengthening its ties with Turkey, a country Canada says committed an act of genocide against Armenians a century ago. Turkey denies that claim.

Carney is likely to visit Turkey in July for a NATO summit. Just seven years after Ottawa restricted arms sales to Turkey — and five years after it tightened those restrictions over concerns Turkey was diverting arms to Azerbaijan — Turkey has pitched the idea of a strategic partnership with Canada.

Belian said Carney’s visit to Yerevan suggested a shift away from standing up for democracy and human rights.

“He sort of fell short of addressing them, the way they were being addressed by Ottawa over the last several years. That is a bit concerning to us,” he said.

Harutyunyan said her country is committed to human rights and political reforms, and to living in peace with its neighbours.

“Canada’s support matters because it strengthens the resilience of Armenian democratic institutions, and sends a message that democracies like Armenia should not be left alone and must be supported,” she said.

Harutyunyan said Armenia is also trying to capitalize on Carney’s focus on trade diversification. Armenia sent representatives to a recent major mining conference in Toronto.

The ambassador noted U.S. President Donald Trump is brokering a peace agreement that would involve a large American investment across borders to create strategic trade corridors in the region that might deter further conflict.

“We would like to see more engagement in Canada, but I think having this high-level political engagement creates a very good ground, for turning this collaboration into something concrete and result-oriented,” she said.

This report by The Canadian Press was first published May 19, 2026.

Dylan Robertson, The Canadian Press

Armenian opposition leader warns of Azerbaijani interference ahead of June 7 e

Panorama, Armenia
May 19 2026

Armenian opposition leader Arman Tatoyan on Tuesday accused Azerbaijan of attempting to interfere in Armenia’s upcoming parliamentary elections, saying the actions were designed to benefit Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and his Civil Contract party.

Tatoyan, who is the prime ministerial candidate of the Wings of Unity party, said in a Facebook livestream that recent remarks by Azerbaijani officials amounted to direct involvement in Armenia’s political process. He pointed to comments by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev suggesting Armenians needed “psychiatrists, psychologists and doctors,” which drew no official response from Yerevan.

“Afterwards, Azerbaijani publications and lawmakers issued threats, calling Armenians an ‘irrational society’ and insisting that before the elections they must be shown that force, the iron fist, is still in place. This is clear interference,” Tatoyan said.

He added that he would submit evidence of the interference to the European Union delegation in Armenia.

“If the EU acts against Russian interference based on government statements, which is good, then Azerbaijani interference must be prevented equally,” he said. “We must protect the Armenian people so that elections are held not in fear, but in the interests of our country and people.”

Armenia is set to hold parliamentary elections on June 7. 

Armenian opposition bloc urges diplomats, observers to address rising tensions

Panorama, Armenia
May 19 2026

Armenia’s opposition Hayastan alliance has appealed to foreign diplomats and international election observers, warning that the political environment ahead of the June 7 elections has deteriorated beyond the bounds of normal democratic competition.

In a statement addressed to embassies accredited in Armenia and international monitoring missions on Tuesday, the alliance accused Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government of intensifying pressure on political opponents and fostering a climate of fear, intimidation and political hostility.

“The pre-election period is unfolding amid unacceptable domestic political tensions and has clearly moved beyond the framework of political struggle,” the statement said.

The opposition bloc alleged that the authorities are seeking to suppress dissent, restrict freedom of _expression_ and discourage free political participation as public discontent with the government grows.

According to the alliance, the ruling regime is relying on state institutions and administrative resources to secure its continued hold on power, while undermining the conditions necessary for free and competitive elections.

The statement accused the government of carrying out politically motivated prosecutions, institutional repression and selective justice, while also alleging misuse of administrative resources and a lack of judicial independence.

The alliance further claimed that senior government officials, including Pashinyan, have publicly pressured prosecutors and law enforcement agencies to take punitive action against political opponents.

Among the incidents highlighted was the reported death of an Armenian citizen in a psychiatric institution on May 17. The opposition alleged the individual had been isolated by law enforcement one day earlier after being accused of damaging a campaign poster linked to Pashinyan.

The alliance also condemned escalating hate speech, public intimidation and threats targeting opposition members and supporters.

It specifically pointed to comments made by Pashinyan during a live broadcast on May 18, accusing the prime minister of using inflammatory rhetoric, including threats and profanity, against opposition leaders.

The opposition bloc also criticized international organizations and foreign partners, accusing them of failing to respond adequately to developments in Armenia and warning that perceived double standards risk undermining public trust in democratic institutions.

The Hayastan alliance called on diplomatic missions and international observer groups to provide a proportionate assessment of the situation and requested an urgent meeting to discuss what it characterized as the government’s unconstitutional conduct ahead of the vote.

Analyst urges opposition unity ahead of June elections in Armenia

Panorama, Armenia
May 19 2026

Political analyst Vladimir Martirosyan has called on Armenia’s opposition forces to abandon fragmented campaigning and embrace a collective “mutual aid alliance” as the country approaches its June 7 parliamentary elections.

Writing on social media on Tuesday, Martirosyan argued that no single party or figure can independently challenge Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party, stressing that solidarity is the only effective countermeasure. “Just as no one from the opposition can alone form a majority in parliament, no one can alone resist and surpass the government in campaigning,” he stated, underscoring the futility of isolated efforts.

The analyst cited a recent episode in which a physician targeted by Pashinyan’s rhetoric quickly became the focus of widespread support. According to Martirosyan, the response transcended routine social media reactions, evolving into a coordinated wave of political, media, and civic solidarity. “This was not a typical Facebook reaction. It was the first working manifestation of the ‘mutual aid alliance’ I spoke about,” he noted.

Martirosyan emphasized that such collective defense mechanisms are crucial to dismantling the government’s strategy of isolating and intimidating its critics. “The moment a targeted person receives broad support and public protection, the mechanism begins to break down. Fear starts to shift sides,” he explained, adding that this approach should extend to teachers, journalists and civil society members.

In a postscript, Martirosyan highlighted the Hayastan alliance’s warnings about potential territorial concessions, insisting that the issue must be elevated beyond partisan discourse. He argued that the threat represents a fundamental challenge to Armenia’s statehood and requires a unified opposition response.

Martirosyan’s proposal frames solidarity not as a public relations tactic but as a transformative political technology capable of reshaping Armenia’s opposition culture. Whether this “mutual aid alliance” gains traction could prove decisive in the opposition’s ability to mount a credible challenge in the June 7 vote, he added.