Armenia is holding general elections on 7 June, the country’s first such poll since 2021 and the traumatising military defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh that followed two years later. In 2023, after a series of offensives by neighbouring Azerbaijan, Armenian forces lost control of the mountainous enclave they had held since the 1990s. The entire ethnic Armenian population of the territory, more than 100,000 people, fled. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s government has since undertaken dramatic – and not universally popular – steps to acknowledge the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and to make peace with Azerbaijan, while also seeking to normalise its relations with Türkiye. 

It is little surprise that issues of war and peace stand at the top of every party’s electoral program. Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party has placed the message that he has brought peace to Armenia at the heart of its campaign. His opponents argue that he has made the country weaker by offering undue concessions to Azerbaijan. The election also has taken on geopolitical hues, with the government’s moves to distance Armenia from its traditional ally Russia, and edge toward closer ties with Europe, the U.S. and Türkiye, coming in for a barrage of criticism from the opposition, which favours repairing relations with Russia.

The high stakes have attracted an unprecedented amount of international involvement. U.S. Vice President JD Vance visited Armenia in February, while the European Union has sent a mission ahead of the election to help the government fend off what it claims to be the threat of Russian disinformation and interference. Though there is some evidence that the Kremlin has attempted to sway voters, officials and local analysts downplay the extent of any such effort by Moscow so far. Some observers argue that what Russian meddling has occurred is getting far too much outside attention. The opposition and watchdog groups go further, insisting that all the Western concern about Russia, including the dispatch of the EU mission, amounts to no more than an electoral ploy by the ruling party aimed at discrediting its adversaries. 

In the waning days of the campaign U.S. President Donald Trump made an enthusiastic endorsement of Pashinyan, and European officials have openly expressed their preference that Civil Contract come out on top. A Pashinyan victory would also be welcomed in Baku and Ankara, but Turkish and Azerbaijani officials have tried to keep their support quiet, given the high chance that it could backfire among Armenian voters suspicious of their long-time foes’ intentions. Meanwhile, opposition parties and independent media have decried alleged attempts by the authorities to stifle the opposition ahead of the vote and exploit the levers of state power to boost the ruling party.

These controversies notwithstanding, Pashinyan and his allies appear poised to prevail. Polls show Civil Contract with a commanding lead in the field of nineteen total parties and coalitions, and local analysts expect the ruling party once again to win a large majority in parliament, which is elected on a purely proportional basis. The margin will matter, though: as a condition for signing a peace agreement, Azerbaijan has demanded that Armenia change its constitution. A referendum to do so would require a two-thirds majority vote in parliament, meaning that if Civil Contract fails to meet that threshold the authorities will be unable to call a plebiscite, leaving prospects for the peace process in the balance.

The campaign is taking place at a moment of unprecedented change in Armenia’s relations with its neighbours and partners. Following its military defeats by Azerbaijan, Yerevan is seeking to normalise its ties with Baku. The two sides began negotiating an end to their conflict in 2021, before the full takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, and in early 2025 announced they had hammered out the text of a framework peace agreement. But Azerbaijan says it will withhold its signature until Yerevan removes provisions from the Armenian constitution that amount to an indirect territorial claim to the enclave. In August 2025, the talks got a major boost when Trump invited Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev to the White House. There, he announced an agreement to resolve one of the biggest sticking points between the sides: establishment of a transportation corridor connecting the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakchivan to the rest of the country via southern Armenia. This new project, called the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) – consisting of road, rail and pipelines – is the backbone of a broader effort to connect the economies of the two countries (as well as that of Türkiye) to reduce the chances of future conflict. 

The denouement of the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict also opens the door for Armenia to normalise its relations with Türkiye. Yerevan and Ankara have appointed envoys to prepare for normalisation and intensified contacts at many levels; in June 2025, Pashinyan made the first official visit by an Armenian leader to Türkiye since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Armenia’s highest priority is opening its borders: closed frontiers with Türkiye and Azerbaijan have stunted its economy since the 1990s. Türkiye is ready to open its border with Armenia but has until now deferred to its close ally, Azerbaijan, which wants Ankara only to do so when the peace agreement is signed. Knowing how important the border issue is to Yerevan, Baku fears it will lose its most powerful lever in talks with Armenia once the frontier is open. While Ankara is reportedly losing patience with Baku’s demands for patience, there is little sign yet that Turkish officials are willing to go over their Azerbaijani allies’ heads.

In parallel, Armenia has been pursuing a broader shift in its foreign policy. Russia has long been Armenia’s main security guarantor, but Armenian officials and its public became disillusioned with Moscow after it failed to rescue Yerevan from any of the military defeats it has suffered at Azerbaijani hands over recent years. Yerevan has been seeking to diversify its foreign partners, most notably by reaching out to European countries, the EU and the U.S. In March 2025, Armenia’s parliament adopted a resolution to launch the process of joining the EU, though – notwithstanding encouraging statements by European leaders – actual accession remains a distant prospect at best. 

The opposition decries these shifts in Armenia’s foreign outlook. Civil Contract is facing three main challengers, all of which have been critical of Pashinyan’s approach to matters of war and peace. The largest opposition force, according to polls, is Strong Armenia, a new party headed by Armenian-Russian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan. Two smaller forces, the Armenia Alliance led by former President Robert Kocharyan and Prosperous Armenia, led by populist businessman Gagik Tsarukyan, also have a reasonable chance of winning seats in parliament. 

Pashinyan has taken to calling these groups the “three-headed war party” during the campaign, claiming that war could reignite with Azerbaijan if any of them come to power. The trio of opposition parties, though, are vague about what they would do vis-à-vis Karabakh, Azerbaijan and Türkiye. They stop short of calling for retaking control of Karabakh; Kocharyan has blamed the enclave’s loss on Pashinyan’s estrangement from Russia, but also said the most that can be hoped for now is that the Karabakh refugees’ right of return is respected. Karapetyan, too, has acknowledged that circumstances do not allow for Karabakh to regain its de facto independence. He says the effects of TRIPP will be mixed for Armenia, and argues that it should have another backer besides the U.S. Kocharyan has taken a harder line on TRIPP, saying it serves only foreign (Azerbaijani, Turkish and U.S.) interests. Tsarukyan’s campaign focuses on economic issues, though he has also been critical of Pashinyan’s foreign policy. At any rate, none of his three main opponents have put forth a convincing alternative to Pashinyan’s approach. 

For his part, Pashinyan is campaigning explicitly on bringing peace to Armenia, as painful as its territorial losses have been for many Armenians. His campaign symbol is an outline of the map of Armenia, representing what he calls the “real Armenia”. By this, he means the idea that Armenians should concern themselves primarily with events inside Armenia’s recognised national borders, rather than the wider “historical Armenia”, referring both to Karabakh and parts of eastern Türkiye where large numbers of Armenians used to live. The “real Armenia” narrative seeks to underpin the logic of normalisation with Azerbaijan and Türkiye, as well as undermine domestic opponents, who invoke nationalist laments for “lost territories” to rally voters against him. It also helps dilute the influence of Armenian diaspora groups, who see these issues as central – and have long been thorns in Pashinyan’s side.

It is unclear how voters will respond to these duelling visions of Armenia’s security. Despite the traumatic losses of the past few years, many Armenians also resented the burdens that Karabakh placed on them and now appear to prefer moving on. Following the exodus from Karabakh in 2023, some in pro-Pashinyan circles worried that the refugees might pose a political challenge to the government, but that has not come to pass. While over 30,000 of the refugees have become citizens and are now eligible to vote, they remain a marginal constituency in an electorate of over one million. In addition, polls show that Armenians are much less anxious about security than they were a year ago and now see economic issues as their top concern. Still, misgivings about Pashinyan’s approach are visible as well: the same polls show more Armenians oppose TRIPP than support it. While Russia is significantly less popular among Armenians than it was before 2020, and Europe far more so, those trends have reversed somewhat in recent years, with Russia gaining popularity and Europe losing it since 2024. 

As Armenia has embraced stronger ties with Europe, Russia has been looking on with concern. Russian officials have called into question the benefits of European integration for Armenia and issued veiled threats about the costs of spoiling relations with Moscow. While Armenia has taken pains to remain in Russia’s good graces, and Pashinyan remains a frequent visitor to Moscow, there are rumblings of discontent within the Kremlin. When Pashinyan went to the Russian capital in April, President Vladimir Putin pointedly mentioned the advantageous price at which Russia sells natural gas to Armenia, implying that it could rise. Putin also told Pashinyan that “pro-Russian” candidates should be allowed to participate in the election, and mentioned that some such figures were in prison. It was a clear reference to Karapetyan, who was arrested in June 2025 after vocally supporting the Armenian Apostolic Church – which is close both to the political opposition and to Moscow – in its conflict with Pashinyan, and remains behind bars. (His nephew, Narek Karapetyan, has been the de facto leader of his campaign since then). 

After landmark summits of the EU and the European Political Community in Yerevan in early May, Putin suggestedthat Armenia should formally decide whether it wants to be on Russia’s side or Europe’s. As the election draws near, Russian regulators have blocked or created obstacles for several Armenian imports, a common Kremlin tactic to apply pressure on states with which it is unhappy.

Foreign intervention on the ruling party’s side has been no less direct. Fears that Russia might seek to influence Armenia’s vote prompted the EU to send a pre-election team to Yerevan to advise the Armenian government on combating such manipulation. At the request of the Armenian government, Brussels is planning a longer-term mission aimed at boosting Armenia’s ability to combat foreign disinformation, illicit financing flows and other “hybrid” threats. The first EU-Armenia summit, held on 4 May, served as a show of support to Pashinyan ahead of the election. At the gathering, senior European officials promoted the ruling party, prompting objections from the opposition and watchdog groups. The UK also has deployed a team to Pashinyan’s office to advise the campaign, and France and the U.S. are providing physical security for Pashinyan. Meanwhile, Vice President Vance directly endorsed Pashinyan in a February visit to Yerevan. 

The Armenian government has welcomed the assistance, and Armenia’s intelligence service and senior officials have warned of foreign attempts to influence the election. They have been careful, however, not to name Russia publicly. In conversations with Crisis Group, Armenian officials downplayed the threat from alleged Russian attempts to influence the vote. Local analysts believe that while Russian leaders are unhappy with Pashinyan, they can live with him, given that he has shown desire to maintain fluid relations with Moscow. Pro-Russia sentiment in Armenia may be rising from the doldrums, but it is no longer a strong political force.

Azerbaijan and Türkiye also favour a Pashinyan victory, worrying that if the opposition parties were to come to power, they would slow down or halt the normalisation processes. For obvious reasons, though, they have kept their preferences mostly to themselves, except for a comment by Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan expressing hope for a Pashinyan win that was seized upon by Armenia’s opposition. While some speculated that they might take action to bolster Pashinyan ahead of the vote – such as releasing Armenian prisoners held in Azerbaijan, compromising on the question of the Armenian constitution or agreeing to at least a partial opening of the Armenia-Türkiye border – they have done no such thing.

Given the lack of strategic options for Armenia following its repeated military defeats by Azerbaijan, there seems to be little the opposition could do to relitigate the results of those conflicts. The bigger risk is to the constitutional referendum that, for now, represents a crucial hurdle for the peace process. Azerbaijan has demanded that, before it signs the peace agreement, Armenia must remove language in the constitution’s preamble, which refers to a 1990 declaration of independence that called for reunification of Armenia with the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, then part of Soviet Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan argues that this wording amounts to a territorial claim that is incompatible with peaceful relations between the two states. Pashinyan has agreed to adopt a new constitution without that language, and the Armenian authorities are planning to hold a referendum in 2027 on a new constitution. But it is not clear that Civil Contract will win the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament that it needs to call a referendum on the issue. While the main opposition forces have not made explicit their position on the plebiscite, they are likely to oppose it. 

A failure to hold the referendum would have unpredictable consequences for the peace process. It is possible that Pashinyan could find another way to amend the constitution, but Azerbaijani officials have said they want a referendum so that it is clear Armenian society endorses renunciation of the territorial claim. Many fear that a popular vote presents a big risk: even if Armenians are not interested in further conflict, they may be loath to go to the polls to support a position they feel Azerbaijan is pushing onto them. The chances a referendum would fail are considerable. While Azerbaijani officials have said they would regard that outcome as a sign Armenians are not interested in peace, it is less evident how they would respond if Pashinyan wins, but without the two-thirds majority needed to call a plebiscite. Some in the region suggest that this scenario might in fact be the best way to move the peace process forward: if Pashinyan were to score a convincing victory but still fall short of a two-thirds majority, Baku could see value in making progress on other elements of normalisation, like a partial opening of the Armenian-Turkish border, while agreeing to delay the constitutional changes until a more propitious moment.

Whether they have made their preferences known or not, external powers should avoid interfering in the election’s conduct and support whichever constellation of forces takes office. All outside states should respect Armenia’s intentions to build good relations with Europe and the U.S. while maintaining friendly ties with Russia, rather than pushing Yerevan into a binary choice about its geopolitical orientation. Armenia’s foreign partners should encourage a democratic process and discourage the authorities from putting political pressure on the opposition. Concerns have arisen in this regard, as police have arrested dozens of officials from opposition parties, including Karapetyan. While Armenia’s friends are eager to support Pashinyan’s foreign policy, they should avoid doing so in ways that could encourage the ruling party’s anti-democratic impulses, on the understanding that a sustainable peace process and reasonably balanced foreign policy require buy-in from across Armenia’s political spectrum.

Azerbaijan for its part should recognise the constraints Armenia’s government is under because of the country’s democratic process. It should not interpret failure to hold a constitutional referendum as a rejection of peace. Baku should continue its constructive engagement with Yerevan to ensure progress in the peace process regardless of the election results, working toward a full renunciation by both sides of territorial claims on the other.

All Armenian political forces should, after the election, recommit to the serious work that has already been done toward building normal relations with Azerbaijan and Türkiye. The opposition should avoid inflaming regional tensions for the sake of short-term domestic political advantage. In the event that opposition parties wield a degree of power after the election, they should work with Pashinyan to advance normalisation for the good of Armenia. In turn, Pashinyan and his allies, in the likely event they return to office, should work to convince the country’s entire population, including those who support their political adversaries, of the value of peace with Armenia’s neighbours.

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