Six candidates from the pro-Russian Strong Armenia party were arrested before the elections, spotlighting Armenia’s complex relations with Russia. The arrests reflect internal tensions as the nation navigates its foreign alliances, with the ruling party leading in polls. The election tests peace initiatives with Azerbaijan and highlights Russian influence claims.

Armenia’s parliamentary elections Sunday will be a vote on its geopolitical future as incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan seeks closer relations with the European Union and the United States despite longstanding ties with Russia that have been championed by his critics.

Many analysts favor Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party to retain control of the parliament, but with many opposition parties running on pro-Russia platforms, the Caucasus nation’s place on the international stage has been thrown into the spotlight.

In the months ahead of the election, Russian President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials have warned Armenia that joining the EU could come at the expense of massive economic damage by disrupting Armenian trade ties with Moscow and its allies.

Copyright 2026 The Associated Press. All rights reserved. This material may not be published, broadcast, rewritten or redistributed without permission.

Vali Kaleji for The Craddle

On the eve of Armenia’s crucial parliamentary elections on 7 June, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, during a brief visit to Yerevan on 26 May, signed three highly significant agreements in a meeting with Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan.

These included the “Framework Agreement between the Republic of Armenia and the United States of America on Strategic Cooperation Concerning the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP),” the “Charter on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Armenia and the United States,” and the “Republic of Armenia–United States of America Framework For Securing of Supply in the Mining and Processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths.”

Washington’s election-season endorsement

Rubio’s brief visit, which lasted only about an hour at Yerevan Airport, was a clear signal of US support for Nikol Pashinyan’s government ahead of Armenia’s pivotal parliamentary elections on 7 June. 

Over the past several years, Pashinyan’s administration has gradually distanced itself from the Russian Federation and Moscow-led regional institutions, including the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and, more recently, the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), while seeking closer ties with the EU, NATO, and the US.

In this context, the US secretary of state, who traveled to Yerevan two weeks before the elections, expressed strong support for Pashinyan and his team, stating: “You (Ararat Mirzoyan), the prime minister, and your team are paving the way to a brighter, more independent future for Armenia.”

US President Donald Trump also wrote in a post on Truth Social: 

“Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, of Armenia, a great friend and Leader, is making his Country strong, wealthy, and very secure! Nikol completely shares my vision of PEACE and PROSPERITY for Armenia and the entire South Caucasus region…. Nikol has my COMPLETE and TOTAL Endorsement for Re-Election on June 7, 2026.”

Armenia also hosted the Eighth Summit of the European Political Community on 23 May, which constituted another indication of western support for Pashinyan’s government. 

Nevertheless, it remains unclear whether such support will ultimately translate into an electoral victory for Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party over its nationalist and conservative opponents. A recent example is Hungary, where the visit of US Vice President J.D. Vance to Budapest and his participation in an election rally alongside Prime Minister Viktor Orban failed to prevent Orban’s defeat in the parliamentary elections after 16 years in power.

 The Trump Route takes shape

The three agreements signed during Rubio’s visit to Yerevan – particularly the TRIPP Agreement  – should be viewed as a continuation and complement to the peace agreement signed by Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Pashinyan at the White House on 8 August, 2025, under the mediation of Trump. 

Under that agreement, direct connectivity between Azerbaijan and its Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic through Armenian territory was endorsed not under Baku’s preferred designation of the “Zangezur Corridor,” nor under Yerevan’s preferred concept of the “Crossroads of Peace,” but rather under a new title: the “Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity” (TRIPP), or simply the “Trump Route.” 

The TRIPP Agreement, consisting of 11 articles, sets out the legal and operational framework governing this transit route. Pursuant to Articles 1 through 4, a joint venture known as the TRIPP Development Company (TDC) is to be established. 

Under the agreement, 74 percent of the shares and controlling interest in the company will be held by US entities operating under the United States International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), while Armenia will retain a 26 percent ownership stake.

Furthermore, under Article 6, Armenia commits to granting the joint venture exclusive land-use and development rights along the designated TRIPP implementation areas for an initial period of 49 years. The agreement also provides for a possible extension of an additional 50 years by mutual consent, in which case Armenia’s ownership stake in the TDC would increase to 49 percent. 

Armenia has further undertaken to bear all financial costs associated with land acquisition and the removal of any encumbrances or third-party claims affecting the project areas. At the same time, the agreement explicitly affirms that the Republic of Armenia retains full sovereignty, territorial integrity, and legal and executive jurisdiction over all areas and projects associated with TRIPP within its sovereign territory.

The implementation of this agreement – much like the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement and the ongoing process of Armenia–Turkiye normalization – will depend heavily on the re-election of Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party in the 7 June parliamentary elections. Should Armenia’s nationalist and conservative political forces emerge victorious, the political terrain could change significantly.

Strongly critical of Pashinyan’s policies regarding Nagorno-Karabakh, these nationalist and conservative groups maintain hardline positions toward both Azerbaijan and Turkiye. They have traditionally enjoyed closer relations with Iran and Russia while maintaining a cautious and carefully calibrated distance from the west. 

Consequently, a change in government could have profound implications for the future of the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace process, Armenia–Turkiye normalization, and the implementation of TRIPP.

Tehran Sees More Than a Corridor

It was therefore hardly surprising that, amid Armenia’s highly polarized and politically charged atmosphere in the run-up to the crucial parliamentary elections, Rubio’s unexpected and brief visit to Yerevan was met with strong criticism from opposition forces. 

Opposition parties and political groups in Armenia argue that the large-scale “Trump Route” project is, in essence, the same transit corridor long sought by Azerbaijan under the name of the “Zangezur Corridor” and strongly supported by Ankara. 

Former Armenian President Robert Kocharyan, leader of the influential Armenia Alliance, expressed deep concern over the strategic implications of the agreement, stating: 

“I think that the ‘TRIPP’ project is a very strong propaganda move by the US, the aim of which is to create tension between Iran and Armenia, because after that, Tehran will definitely have distrust…This is also a ‘blow’ to Russia.”

 In Iran, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hamid Baghaei also reacted to Rubio’s visit and the signing of the Trump Agreement, stating: 

“The Islamic Republic of Iran’s position regarding security in the South Caucasus is clear and leaves no room for ambiguity. Iran welcomes the expansion of economic exchanges and the reopening of transportation and transit routes. However, given the United States’ long record of hostile conduct and intervention in various regions of the world, Iran harbors serious suspicions regarding Washington’s intentions and has explicitly expressed its opposition to any such destabilizing presence in the region.” 

Although Iranian officials appear to have refrained from adopting a more explicit position at this stage – likely due to their understanding of Armenia’s sensitive electoral environment and a desire to avoid becoming directly involved in the country’s internal political rivalries – Iran, in strategic terms, sees little difference between the “Trump Route” and the “Zangezur Corridor” advocated by Azerbaijan and supported by Turkiye. 

From Tehran’s perspective, both initiatives pursue objectives that extend well beyond the establishment of a mere transportation and transit link between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan through Armenian territory adjacent to Iran’s border.

Iranian policymakers believe that such projects could generate a number of significant security and geopolitical challenges, including potential risks to the 40-kilometer Iran–Armenia border, the Norduz (Iran) and Meghri (Armenia) border crossings and customs facilities, as well as the bilateral trade and transit network through which more than 80,000 trucks pass annually. 

Moreover, there is little doubt that the implementation of the Trump Route, as part of the broader Middle Corridor and an emerging energy and transportation route linking Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, and the South Caucasus to Europe, would further accelerate Yerevan’s westward orientation. 

Such a development could have far-reaching consequences, including Armenia’s eventual withdrawal from the CSTO and the EAEU. The cumulative effect of these developments could be a more profound shift in the geopolitical balance of the South Caucasus to the detriment of both Iran and Russia – a process that, in many respects, began with the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020.

The 12-day US-Israeli war on Iran in June 2025 and the more recent 40-day war involving Israel and the US against Iran, from 28 February to 7 April 2026, have heightened Tehran’s sensitivity toward the Trump Route project and the prospective presence of US companies close to Iran’s northern border.

This concern is particularly pronounced given that, under the recently signed agreement, such a presence is not intended to be temporary. Rather, the arrangement envisages an initial concession period of 49 years, with the possibility of a further 50-year extension by mutual agreement, potentially resulting in a total duration of 99 years. 

From Iran’s perspective, this would amount not merely to a transportation or infrastructure project, but to the establishment of a long-term American economic and strategic footprint in a highly sensitive geopolitical area adjacent to its borders.

For this reason, Kocharyan stated during his election campaign:

“Today, the United States is in a state of confrontation with Iran. Under such circumstances, how can anyone reasonably believe that handing control over the sensitive Armenia–Iran border area to an American company is a rational decision? Do you truly consider such a step normal and acceptable? How is Tehran expected to perceive and tolerate such an arrangement? I urge the authorities in Yerevan to place themselves, even for a moment, in Iran’s position and to view this security challenge from Tehran’s perspective.”

Moscow raises the cost

Russia’s response toward Armenia, however, has been noticeably sharper – at least at the present stage. Only a few days after Rubio’s visit, Moscow recalled its ambassador from Yerevan for consultations, citing the increasingly pro-western policies of the Pashinyan government. 

In recent weeks, Russian officials have openly warned Armenia, particularly in connection with the possibility of its withdrawal from the EAEU, about potential consequences, including higher gas prices or the suspension of preferential energy arrangements, restrictions on imports of Armenian goods, limitations on the diamond and energy trade, and even a reassessment of certain areas of economic cooperation.

In essence, Moscow is concerned that its ongoing involvement in the war in Ukraine may encourage Armenia – the only South Caucasus state that remains a member of both the EAEU and the CSTO – to leave these Russian-led institutions. 

Given that neither Georgia nor Azerbaijan is a member of either organization, such a development would significantly diminish Russia’s economic, geopolitical, and military influence in the South Caucasus.

The implementation of the TRIPP Agreement and the construction of the Trump Route between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan face substantial political obstacles and will depend heavily on the outcome of Armenia’s 7 June parliamentary elections. 

Should Armenia’s nationalist and conservative political forces prevail, the likelihood of the project being suspended or abandoned would be considerable.

Even if Pashinyan secures re-election, the implementation of the project is likely to provoke strong opposition from Iran and expose Armenia to potential retaliatory measures from Russia, particularly in the areas of natural gas exports and restrictions on Armenian imports.

Vali Kaleji is based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asia and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues and Iran’ foreign policy for Oxford Analytica in the UK, Eurasia Daily Monitor of Jamestown Foundation, Institute of Central Asia and the Caucasus (American Foreign Policy Council), the National Interest and the Middle East Institute in the United States, TRENDS Research & Advisory in the UAE, Middle East Council on Global Affairs in Doha, Qatar, and also Nikkei Asia.

Tomorrow, Armenians will elect their next parliament. The vote arrives at one of the most consequential moments in the country’s post-independence history. Not because it is unprecedented in its drama, but because the stakes behind it are unusually concrete: an unsigned peace treaty, a constitutional referendum in the making, a shattered community of displaced persons looking for political voice, and a regional order still adjusting to the shockwaves of 2023. To read 7 June simply as a referendum on Nikol Pashinyan would be to miss the real architecture of what is being decided.

Two events above all have reshaped the country’s political landscape in the past few years: in September 2023, Azerbaijan launched a 24-hour operation that ended the de facto existence of Nagorno Karabakh as an Armenian space. Virtually the entire population fled to Armenia within days. Then, in August 2025, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders gathered at the White House and, in Donald Trump‘s presence, initialled a peace framework based on the draft peace deal they both agreed to a few months earlier. They did not sign it. The distinction is crucial. One obstacle remains between the initialled text and a binding treaty: Azerbaijan refuses to append its formal signature until Armenia amends its constitution, which contains a vestigial reference to the 1990 Declaration of Independence — language Baku reads as an indirect territorial claim to Nagorno Karabakh. As Aliyev said flatly at the Munich Security Conference in February: “Once the amendment to Armenia’s constitution is made, we can sign the peace agreement the very next day.” Pashinyan has promised a constitutional referendum, likely in 2027. 7 June is the political precondition.

A turbulent race

The electoral landscape presents a paradox: a weakened frontrunner facing a fragmented opposition too divided to capitalise on his weakness.

Opinion polls do not look good for Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party. Roughly 32% of respondents intend to vote for the party, rising to around 38% among likely voters. This is a steep decline from the commanding majorities of 2018 and 2021, and a figure that reflects deep public dissatisfaction. The Civil Contract party failed to secure a governing majority in the March 2025 municipal elections in Gyumri, Armenia’s second city — an early warning of eroding support. The Washington peace agreement, which should be Civil Contract’s signature achievement, remains divisive: polling shows public opinion almost evenly split, with 44% in support and 41% opposed.

The economy has grown under Pashinyan, but residents of Yerevan continue to struggle with rising inflation and a severe real estate crisis, both worsened by the large influx of Russian and Ukrainian nationals since 2022. Nevertheless, the 2021 election results serve as a reminder that polling data can miss the mark entirely.

In any case, Pashinyan remains the frontrunner. The reason is the state of the opposition.

Nineteen parties and alliances are registered. Three main opposition forces are worth examining. The first is the Armenia alliance, led by former president Robert Kocharyan, the dominant parliamentary opposition since 2021. Kocharyan campaigns on restoring ties with Russia, renegotiating the peace terms, and challenging what he calls Pashinyan’s capitulations. Kocharyan’s problem is that many Armenians still associate his presidency (1998–2008) with corruption, oligarchic patronage, and the violent suppression of post-election protests in 2008. His brand of nationalism energises a core but repels the median voter.

The second is the Prosperous Armenia party of wealthy businessman Gagik Tsarukyan, a pro-Russian force with deep patronage networks, whose politics are more transactional than ideological.

The third, and most dynamic new entrant, is Strong Armenia. Its backer is Samvel Karapetyan, a Russian-Armenian billionaire. Karapetyan entered politics in mid-2025 after being detained on charges related to alleged attempts to destabilise the government, charges the opposition calls politically motivated. He was nominated as Strong Armenia’s prime ministerial candidate in early 2026 but was subsequently ruled ineligible: Armenia’s constitution bars dual citizens from parliamentary office, and Karapetyan holds Russian and Cypriot passports alongside his Armenian one. The Parliament then amended the electoral code in ways that further restricted Strong Armenia’s ability to campaign, and in late May, Karapetyan’s nephew and leading party candidate faced a new investigation on unspecified charges. Opponents see a systematic effort to neutralise the one opposition figure with the resources to mount a serious challenge. Government supporters see confirmation of oligarchic interference backed by Moscow.

Despite this fractured opposition, the decisive question for Civil Contract is not whether it wins but by how much. Armenia’s constitution contains a “stable majority” clause: if no party secures an absolute majority, the system triggers bonus mechanisms to give the leading force more than 54% of parliamentary seats. The deeper issue is whether Civil Contract can obtain the political capital — and potentially a supermajority — to drive through the constitutional referendum that the peace process requires. That threshold may prove elusive even in victory.

A polarised society

Armenian society is polarised not merely along the axis of government versus opposition, but along two deeper fissures that the campaign has exposed with unusual brutality.

The first is the question of the Karabakh Armenians. Some 100,000 displaced persons now live in Armenia, stateless in all but name, their citizenship applications largely unprocessed. Many have gravitated towards Strong Armenia, drawn by Karapetyan’s social welfare promises and his outreach. The government’s treatment of this community has become a flashpoint.

In a now-infamous incident in March 2026, a video circulated showing Pashinyan on the Yerevan metro berating a displaced woman — the daughter of a fallen soldier — offering her son a badge bearing a map of Armenia without Artsakh, and declaring that those who fled should not claim he surrendered Karabakh. In a separate campaign episode, he asked a Karabakh Armenian refugee why he was still alive, implying he should have stayed and died defending the enclave.

The reactions were immediate and furious. Critics accused the prime minister of using hate speech against people who had already lost everything. Government supporters argued that the opposition was cynically weaponising displaced persons to block a peace that Armenia cannot afford to refuse.

This fault line is not political in the conventional sense. It cuts through families, communities, and the diaspora. It asks what obligations a state owes to those displaced in its name, and whether accepting peace means accepting amnesia.

The second fissure concerns the Armenian Apostolic Church. The confrontation between Pashinyan and Catholicos Karekin II has been simmering since 2020, when the Church called on the prime minister to resign over the Karabakh defeat. Pashinyan accuses the Church of functioning as a pro-Russian political actor and has alleged that Church figures participated in coup-plotting. The Church, for its part, represents a vision of Armenia as a civilisational and historical nation, with deep attachments to its territorial and cultural memory. For many conservative Armenians, Pashinyan’s “Fourth Republic” agenda looks less like modernisation than like an ideological assault on the foundations of national identity. The ongoing constitutional confrontation is part of this broader cultural war.

Russia, interference, and the stakes for Moscow

No outside power has more to lose from a Pashinyan victory than Russia. Armenia’s foreign policy reorientation since 2020 has been sweeping: Yerevan has frozen its participation in the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), declared its aspiration to join the European Union, hosted an EU civilian monitoring mission along its borders, and deepened engagement with the United States. Even Secretary of State Marco Rubio has stated publicly that Russia wants Pashinyan to lose.

Moscow’s response has combined pressure with interference. In late May 2026, Russia’s consumer protection agency temporarily suspended imports of Jermuk mineral water — a significant Armenian export. Days later, its agricultural authority restricted Armenian flower imports to Russia. These moves, perfectly timed for the electoral campaign, recalled the economic pressure Russia applied to Moldova and Georgia when those countries pursued European integration. Analysts have documented FIMI (foreign information manipulation and interference) campaigns targeting Armenian social media, employing coordinated inauthentic behaviour and disinformation narratives familiar from earlier Russian operations in the post-Soviet space.

The most dramatic dimension of Russian interference concerns voters, not messages. Between 1st and 17 May, some 10,000 more Armenian citizens entered Armenia from Russia than during the same period the previous year. Western intelligence sources alleged that Moscow intended to bus up to 100,000 Russian-resident Armenian citizens into the country to vote against Pashinyan — though observers noted the figure appeared inflated and that those arriving did not necessarily back the pro-Russian opposition. Armenian military police reportedly began handing out draft summonses to young men arriving from Russia at Yerevan’s airport, a development that added a sharp edge to an already tense atmosphere.

The diaspora’s role cuts both ways. Armenians in the traditional diaspora, particularly in France and the United States — most of whom maintain ties to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) — largely oppose Pashinyan and have consistently accused his government of abandoning Nagorno Karabakh, capitulating to Azerbaijan, and sidelining Genocide recognition. But the “Russian diaspora” Armenians represent a different constituency, and the interaction between these communities and domestic Armenian politics has introduced new variables into an already volatile mix.

Elections and foreign policy

Armenia’s diplomatic reorientation represents the most consequential shift in the country’s strategic posture since independence. Yerevan has received substantial EU financial and political support, expanded its diplomatic network to include new bilateral agreements with the United States and China, established relations with Saudi Arabia, and secured recognition from Pakistan. The government has simultaneously sought to preserve trade with Russia and maintain ties with Iran — a multi-vector approach born of necessity as much as strategy.

The peace process with Turkey remains contingent on the unresolved Armenia-Azerbaijan treaty. Progress has been made: the two sides communicate, and there is an implicit understanding that normalisation follows finalisation. But the Turkish border remains closed, and the broader regional connectivity project — the so-called TRIPP (Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity) envisaged in the Washington framework — depends on a signed peace that Baku continues to hold hostage to Armenia’s constitutional calendar.

What the results will actually determine

A Civil Contract victory would consolidate the current diplomatic trajectory: a push for EU integration, a reduction of Russian dependence, and an attempt to ratify the peace framework through a constitutional referendum. But the quality of the victory matters as much as the fact of it. A thin majority, dependent on bonus-seat mechanisms, would leave Pashinyan without sufficient political capital to secure constitutional change through a referendum requiring broad popular legitimacy. A strong mandate — approaching the level of 2021 — would provide the authority to pursue the Fourth Republic agenda with some prospect of success.

An opposition victory, or a result so fragmented that Civil Contract cannot govern effectively, would open a period of genuine uncertainty. The peace process would stall; Baku’s preconditions would go unmet; and the question of whether the Washington text can survive a change of government in Yerevan would become urgent. Moscow would interpret such a result as a strategic reversal in a theatre where it has watched its influence erode steadily since 2020.

Nearly a third of voters remain undecided or silent as polls close. Their choice will determine not just who governs Armenia for the next five years, but whether a peace initiated in Washington and painfully negotiated over years of military defeat and mass displacement can become permanent — and at what cost to the memory and identity of a nation that has rarely had the luxury of an easy choice.

Current leader wants to join EU, while his 2 primary challengers have close ties to Russia

Thousands of people gathered in Armenia’s capital this week to decry the alleged traitorous path plotted by their current government, waving flags and warning that a vote to re-elect would mean “living here with Azerbaijanis” — the country’s longtime rival, with whom the present administration has reached a tenuous peace.

But a larger shadow looms over the upcoming vote: a historic break in the country’s relations with Russia. 

As such, when Armenians head to the polls on Sunday, it will be for one of the most important elections taking place in Europe this year.

The vote pits incumbent Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, in power since 2018, against an array of challengers from which two primary opponents have emerged. Both of them — former president Robert Kocharyan and Russian-Armenian billionaire Samvel Karapetyan, whose Strong Armenia party held the rally in Yerevan this week— are closely aligned with Russia. 

Kocharyan, who ruled from 1998 to 2008, sits on the board of directors of a major Russian financial corporation, while Karapetyan made his $4-billion US fortune in Russia, where he lived from the 1990s until recently.

While Pashinyan is expected to be re-elected, the election has taken on outsized geopolitical importance. 

The fracturing of Russian-Armenian relations

Pashinyan has pushed Armenia strongly westwards in recent years, signing deals with the U.S., making official aspirations to join the European Union and hosting a European Political Community summit last month. (The group was formed in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.)

Russia — the country’s traditional patron — appears to have had enough. 

On May 29, Vladimir Putin threatened the country with suspension from the Eurasian Economic Union, which would result in a massive hike in gas prices. Moscow has likewise blocked the import of a wide variety of Armenian goods, while reportedly activating disinformation networks aimed at unseating Pashinyan. 

On Thursday, Russia’s deputy prime minister stated that “if pro-European forces win [the election],” Russia would be forced to “take necessary measures.” He did not specify what those might be.

The Kremlin is also reportedly planning to dispatch some 100,000 Armenians living in Russia to vote against the prime minister. Armenian authorities have responded by handing out leaflets at the country’s airports and border crossings, informing arrivals that accepting money in exchange for a vote is punishable by prison time.

The fracture in Russian-Armenian relations has not been sudden, experts say, but rather the result of a years-long growing divide.

“Armenian-Russian relations have been in crisis for a long time, reflecting the fact that this is a relationship whose fundamentals are changing,” said Laurence Broers, an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in written comments to CBC News. 

“The main pillar of the old relationship, the ‘rescue fantasy’ that Armenia’s loyalty earns Russian security guarantees, has collapsed, and Moscow has lost its principal source of leverage over Armenia in the unresolved Karabakh conflict,” he wrote.

Nagorno-Karabakh region at heart of conflict

For more than three decades, Armenia and Azerbaijan were engaged in conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region, which lies within Azerbaijan’s borders but is dominated by ethnic Armenians.

A 1991-1994 war saw Armenian forces emerge victorious — a status quo that endured until Azerbaijan launched a second war in 2020, securing three-quarters of the territory before conquering the rest in 2023.

That entire time, Russia has been Armenia’s primary security partner. However, Armenia’s faith in Moscow’s willingness, or ability, to aid it against external threats was fatally shaken by a 2022 Azerbaijani offensive into Armenia itself, which saw Azerbaijani troops occupy territory in southern Armenia during two days of fighting. 

Armenia appealed to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a Russian-led analogue to NATO, invoking Article 4, which obliges Russia and other members to provide military aid to restore the country’s territorial integrity.

Moscow declined, offering only to send an “observation mission.” And less than a year later, Russian peacekeepers stood aside as Azerbaijan conquered the remainder of Nagorno-Karabakh, sending over 100,000 refugees into Armenia.

Since then, Yerevan — under Pashinyan’s leadership — has veered sharply away from Moscow, ordering the withdrawal of Russian border guards from parts of the country and effectively freezing its participation in the CSTO.

What will Russia and Armenia’s ‘new normal’ look like?

Russia has responded by backing Karapetyan in his bid to unseat Pashinyan, so far with limited success. Recent polling shows Pashinyan’s party in the lead with 32 per cent of prospective voters, compared to just six per cent for Karapetyan, albeit with 23 per cent still undecided and 21 per cent declining to say.

Opposition forces have struggled to attract new supporters since the last election in 2021, where Pashinyan defeated his leading challenger by a whopping 33 per cent. 

“The opposition is failing to mobilize groups of voters of significant size outside of its established base over the past five years,” said Narek Sukiasyan, a political scientist at Yerevan State University. 

“There is a certain overlap between Kocharyan’s and Karapetyan’s supporters, but the chances of either unseating the ruling party are quite low.”

Russia’s influence in the South Caucasus writ large has unraveled in recent years. While Moscow once dominated the region through political, economic and military levers, now only Georgia remains in its orbit. That’s underlined by the recent visit of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to both Armenia and Azerbaijan — an event that felt unthinkable just a few years ago.

While Russia and Armenia will retain some economic and political ties regardless of Sunday’s vote, the Kremlin is likely to be one of many players — a list that now includes the U.S., EU, Iran and Turkey — in the region going forward. It’s a state of affairs not seen since before the Russian Empire conquered the region in the early 1800s.

“The permanent damage is in the long-term temporality of Armenian-Russian relations: Russia’s hollowed-out hegemony, its declining power and the growing influence and power of numerous other actors in the South Caucasus,” Broers wrote. 

“I suspect Moscow and Yerevan may seek to find a ‘new normal’ after these elections, but this certainly won’t be the last crisis between them.”