August 10, 2026
After nearly 1.5 years of intense negotiations between the Syrian Arab Republic and the Russian Federation, the parties signed a memorandum of understanding that regulates the future of the Russian military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim.
According to it, civilian facilities will be under Syrian control, and Russian military bases will become joint training centers.
The memorandum sets a maximum period of three months to complete the transition period, after which the new arrangements will enter into force.
It should be noted that in January 2026, Russian President Vladimir Putin met with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa in the Kremlin. During the negotiations, the parties discussed the issue of the presence of the Russian military in Syria or the fate of the Russian military bases.
What does the Damascus-Moscow new format cooperation entail, or what is its strategic significance?
Syria regains full sovereignty over its own territory and civil infrastructure, while maintaining important military-technical support. And Russia maintains its geopolitical presence in the Middle East and the Mediterranean Sea, but reduces military spending and direct military risks.
Here we cannot fail to notice the visible and invisible factor of Turkey, especially if we remember the visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan to Russia in June, the content of the negotiations with the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and the statements made after that. In particular, Lavrov announced.
“We have agreed to closely cooperate in matters of security in the Black Sea region, as well as in the Transcaucasia, the Middle East, and North Africa. We have good relations with Turkish partners everywhere. We work on the principle or basis of complementarity.”
In other words, essentially, the transformation of the Russian military presence in Syria (the transformation of military bases into joint training centers) takes place within the framework of pre-agreed and mutual agreements with Ankara, if we do not say that the Damascus-Moscow memorandum is the result of broader Moscow-Ankara strategic negotiations and redistribution of regional influence zones.
It should be noted that about two years ago, Turkey actively began to support the formation and development of a new regular army in Syria, involving Turkish military specialists and consultants. And now Turkey declares that it wants to develop economic relations with Syria in accordance with the requirements of the modern world, which, in particular, implies the harmonization of transport infrastructures in order to increase the volume of bilateral trade.
Now, slightly deviating from the topic, we consider it necessary to draw attention to an episode. A few days ago, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan signed the “Joint Defense of Mecca” agreement, to which, as Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said, they hope that “Egypt will join in the next phase”. At the same time, he noted, without naming names, that there are also other states that want to join this agreement. But the remarkable episode concerns another statement of Fidan.
“For example, Azerbaijan and Armenia are moving towards concluding a final peace agreement, and Ankara supports that process. In that case, prospects appear in the field of security and economy. And over time, the need for a similar agreement – the creation of a defense alliance – may arise in the Caucasus as well.”,- stated the Foreign Minister of Turkey.
According to Fidan, it is important to strengthen the commitment to the region, because the external hegemons do not solve the problems of the region, but only aggravate them, and the price is very high.
“The countries of the region need to move in the direction of creating more institutional mechanisms, which will allow to guarantee their own security, economic stability, development and prosperity”– he emphasized he
Basically, not excluding the possibility of a defense pact in the South Caucasus, Fidan “declassifies” one of the most ambitious strategic plans of Ankara.
Although this is still at the level of a statement, can we consider the creation of a Caucasian alliance parallel to CSTO or replacing it as an attempt to push Russia out of the South Caucasus? In other words, a “new security system” is offered to Armenia, where Turkey becomes a guarantor. We are not yet talking about the increasing influence of Turkey as a serious threat to Tehran.
What happens? on the one hand, Russia goes to “military” restrictions in Syria, trying to maintain its presence in the form of training centers, instead, Turkey raises the issue of creating a defense alliance in the Caucasus, according to the need of the moment.
And in this case, how should Lavrov’s thought be understood? “Russia closely cooperates with the Turkish side also in matters of security in the Transcaucasia”. for now let’s leave it to the test of time.
Anyway, let’s make a few reminders. First, In November, CSTO members will discuss the issue of depriving Armenia of voting rights in the organization’s bodies due to non-payment of membership fees. And in recent years, the need for an Iran-Russia-Armenia or Iran-Armenia military alliance was discussed from time to time at different levels, especially when there is a Turkey-Azerbaijan Shushi declaration.
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Dictators do evil with the consent of an aggressive minority of the people
August 10, 2026
One question is haunting me: what will happen if the regime manages to establish control over the internal life of the Armenian Church in the atmosphere of indolence and indifference of a significant part of the people?
This is important, because the Armenian Apostolic Church (HACE) is not just another religious organization born in recent decades, but has been and remains the main institution of preserving our national identity, culture, and memory for centuries. In other words, the attitude shown on behalf of the state towards HASE cannot be considered as an ordinary so-called orientation dispute between the government and individual clergy.
In its public confrontation with HASE, the CP considers the legality of His Holiness the Pope’s office questionable, demands his removal, and in 2026. in the pre-election program, he announced a political agenda for the “reform” of the Church, simultaneously subjecting many high-ranking clergymen to criminal prosecutions, and the other day he tried to start the trial against Vehi and 6 bishops.
It is clear that such behavior of the regime becomes a reality not only due to the administrative and legal levers of the government, but also due to the indifference of the majority of the people. The government can limit the rights of members of an organization (say, a religious, national, or sexual minority) that the majority of society considers to be outsiders.
Moreover, the government can even get the approval of the majority of the parliament through democratic mechanisms. This means that democracy does not automatically guarantee a fair, well, at least tolerant attitude of the majority of people towards a minority or an important public institution.
It is always necessary to fight, to put pressure on the government, because the will of the majority and justice are not always the same.
We have a similar picture in the case of Armenia․ administrationthe is discrediting Churchand authority, throws clergymen into prison, claims to reshape the Church’s internal management system, and most people are indifferent to it. So let’s record not only the illegal behavior of the regime, but also the political consequences of the indifference of the majority of the people.
Silence is not always a sign of agreement. Prolonged silence, especially when the boundaries of the autonomy of the national institution are violated, creates an illusion at the “above” that there is no serious danger of public resistance.
In this case, the next, no less important question arises․ is it CP:–in: of the head anti-church the campaign only her the initiative is, or it also society in formed anti-church and anti-clerical sentiments is the reflection.
If the citizen does not perceive the state pressure against the Church as a threat to his freedoms and social balance, then it becomes politically safe for the government to target the Church, and it can go further, receiving a new letter of indulgence (indulgentia) for each subsequent step.
This is a ringing of bells for all of us. Administration “omnipotence” only the police, judicial the system or administrative resources do not provide, his the power also society drawn and not controlled by him permissible the frame is, and ethat the people do not limit the limits of the authority of the government, the government becomes unrestrained and unmanageable and expands its “domains” more and more.
Therefore, the current situation around the Church in Armenia is not at all the problem of the “parties of the conflict”, it is a test of political maturity for the society.։ It is possible to disagree with any clergyman, criticize his behavior, the course of his service, demand an explanation, correction of a mistake, atonement, even internal reforms, while maintaining the boundary between the powers of secular and spiritual authorities.․ Church the problems need is be resolved his own canonical and: legal settings within, no թե՝ imposed by the parliamentary majority (= government). political and ideological goals.
After all, today the other branches of government, independent state bodies, are under the dictates of the ruling majority, tomorrow they may do the same with trade unions, parties and non-governmental organizations in general. And then many will wonder, why did we let this happen?․
And the rest of the people to each other
They asked in horror,
Where did it come from?
This general disaster is great.
Hovhannes Tumanyan
ARA SAHAKYAN
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New plot of land and 14,448,150 AMD income. how did 2025 close CP faction?
August 10, 2026
Around 15 million drams and 4 real estates. as we learn from the declaration of the official submitted to the Corruption Prevention Commission, Arusyak Manavazyan of the CP closed the year 2025 with these and other achievements, who, by the way, assumed the position of the head of the CP faction in the post-election parliament.
Other details of the announcement are below.
Thus, the official started the year with 3 jointly owned real estates: two plots of land bought in Armavir in 2000 and an apartment bought in Ajapnyak in 2020.
And during the year, Manavazyan already buys a plot of land for 2.8 million drams in the Vanadzor community of Lori region, which he manages as a sole proprietorship.
The CP also declared a 2017 Mercedes car, which was donated in 2024.
The balances of Arusyak Manavazyan’s bank accounts fluctuated within the range of 4-5.7 million drams during the year. At the beginning of the official reporting year, 2025, he had 400 thousand drams and 19,000 dollars in cash, and at the end of the year – 550 thousand drams and 19,000 dollars.
His reporting year’s income of 14,448,150 drams was generated from the salary of 12,848,150 drams received from the National Assembly staff and/or other payments equal to it, as well as 1.6 million drams from the rental fee.
The total volume of the balance of the principal amount of several loans of the deputy was 16,618,941, of which the apartment was mortgaged against the loan of 14,161,135 drams.
Arusyak Manavazyan also informed in the declaration that from 2021 he is a 100 percent shareholder of “ALFA FIN” commercial organization.
And Arusyak Manavazyan started his career from Pashinyan’s family newspaper “Haykakan Zhamanak”. worked at “Dareskizb” LLC as an accountant and then as a director.
He was also the chief accountant of “Mer Tiparan” LLC, by the way, Anna Hakobyan owns 50 percent of that LLC.
In 2018-2021, he was the accountant of the “Civil Contract” return fund, in 2019-2020 he was the chief accountant of the “Kondi Private Houses Economy” SNOC, then for one year in 2020-2021, he was acting as the director of the “Kondi Private Houses Economy” SNOC.
Since 2016, he has been a member of the “Civil Agreement” party. 2021 On June 20, he was elected a member of the National Assembly on the nationwide electoral list of the “Civil Agreement” party.
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Reinterpreting Hormuz (Part 2)
August 10, 2026
Limitations and external challenges of Iran’s new strategy
If Iran aspires to form the position of an irreplaceable actor in the security system of Hormuz, it is equally important to assess what limitations and external challenges this strategy may face. Any geopolitical concept is not viable just because it is based on a favorable geographical location. Its effectiveness is determined not only by its own capabilities, but also by the external environment, the international legal system, and the strategic calculations of other actors.
The first limitation stems from Iran’s strategic dilemma. On the one hand, Tehran is interested in maintaining such a security environment that increases and strengthens its geopolitical influence. On the other hand, an excessively high level of tension hurts one’s own economy, stimulates the increase in military involvement of extra-regional powers and increases the likelihood of international backlash. For this reason, it is more likely that Iran will strive not to maintain a permanent crisis, but to keep the initiative of its management, without letting the situation go out of control.
The second limitation is the international legal system. Although the Strait of Hormuz is one of the key routes of maritime communication of international importance, its legal status does not eliminate the sovereign rights of the coastal states. International maritime law simultaneously ensures freedom of transit navigation and recognizes certain jurisdictions of coastal states. Therefore, the issue is not whether Iran can have legal influence in Hormuz, but where these rights end and where the guarantees of international freedom of navigation begin.
For this reason, any strategy of Iran has to act not with the logic of changing the international legal order, but with the logic of expanding the political influence within it. The experience of international relations shows that legal norms and political behavior do not always completely coincide. States, ship owners, insurance companies and energy markets are often guided not only by legal regulations, but also by practical risk assessment. If Iran’s possible reaction turns into a permanent factor in those assessments, then the legal status can be preserved, while the political behavior can be gradually adapted to the new reality.
The third limitation is formed in the external power environment. The security of Hormuz has long gone beyond the scope of regional importance, turning into a problem of global strategic importance. Therefore, any attempt by Iran to expand its influence in the security system of the strait will inevitably affect the interests of other major actors.
The United States has a key role in this picture. For Washington, Hormuz is one of the most important junctions not only of the Persian Gulf, but also of global maritime communication, whose security is considered a fundamental component of the current international order. At the same time, recent military developments have shown that even the US military presence does not eliminate Iran’s ability to influence the security environment around the strait. That circumstance has formed a new strategic reality, which Washington can try to change, but cannot ignore in its strategic calculations.
Therefore, the policy of the United States, logically, will continue to pursue two interrelated goals at the same time. On the one hand, to try to limit as much as possible Iran’s ability to turn its influence around the security of Hormuz into a long-term political lever, and on the other hand, to build its strategy, taking into account that the Iranian factor in the security environment of the strait has become a reality that cannot be simply avoided. For this reason, Washington will likely continue to combine military deterrence, coordination with allies, and crisis management in an effort to preserve free navigation while preventing a situation where the security of Hormuz becomes virtually solely dependent on Iran’s political decisions.
The Israel-Iran conflict is also an important component of this new strategic environment around Hormuz. This conflict is not just an external security background for Hormuz. It is one of the key components of the strategic environment, within the framework of which Tehran evaluates the value of the geographical position of the strait, forms its deterrence capabilities and determines the priorities for expanding its influence in the region.
Under these circumstances, Israel’s strategic calculations are also unlikely to be limited to the assessment of Iran’s direct military capabilities. If Iran’s influence around Hormuz turns into a more stable geopolitical factor, it can expand Tehran’s strategic maneuver area and complicate such approaches of pressure on Iran that are based solely on military superiority or external power pressure.
At the same time, the external power environment is not limited to the US-Iran and Iran-Israel conflicts. Those states whose economic and energy security directly depend on the stability of the Persian Gulf are also interested in Hormuz. China, India, Japan and South Korea occupy a special place in this group. Their common priority is the predictability of energy carriers and maritime communications, but that common interest does not mean identical strategic calculations.
China’s position is distinguished by its dual logic. On the one hand, Beijing has a strong interest in the uninterrupted flow of energy from the Persian Gulf and cannot support such developments that would turn Hormuz into a zone of prolonged instability. On the other hand, it is also in China’s long-term strategic interests to limit the unilateral influence of the United States in key regions and to create a more multipolar power environment. From that point of view, the strengthening of Iran’s influence does not in itself contradict Beijing’s interests, as long as it does not turn into instability that would endanger energy and trade communications. Therefore, the most acceptable for China may not be the isolation of Iran, but the formation of such a balance, where the level of Iran’s role increases, but does not turn into exclusive control over Hormuz.
India’s calculation is more cautious. Although New Delhi is also interested in maintaining relations with Iran and expanding its strategic independence in the region, energy security and predictability of maritime communications are paramount for it. Therefore, India is likely to avoid such developments that could deepen the security uncertainty around Hormuz, while trying to maintain a satisfactory level of relations with Iran.
The positions of Japan and South Korea are also conditioned by a double limitation. Both states are highly dependent on stable supplies of energy from the Persian Gulf, but at the same time are closely tied to the US in the field of security. For this reason, they are unlikely to be interested in the uncontrolled expansion of Iran’s influence, but they are also not interested in a military escalation around Hormuz that could disrupt energy and trade flows. For them, it would be more preferable to maintain stability without large-scale military involvement.
The calculations of the European Union are also based on such duality. For Europe, the stability of Hormuz is related not only to energy security, but also to the predictability of global trade and international maritime communications. At the same time, European states have limited interest in directly engaging in large-scale military operations against Iran. Therefore, the most acceptable approach for the EU may be a combination of diplomatic pressure, international legal mechanisms and crisis management tools, while maintaining freedom of navigation.
Russia’s position is formed by another strategic logic. Unlike the large economies of Asia and Europe, Russia does not directly depend on the energy carriers of the Persian Gulf, and the instability of Hormuz does not create the same economic danger for it. Instead, Moscow is interested in limiting the unilateral influence of the United States, strengthening the multipolar international system, and maintaining Iran’s position as an influential regional actor.
For this reason, Russia can more willingly accept the expansion of Iran’s influence around Hormuz, if it contributes to limiting the dominance of the USA in the region. However, uncontrolled instability, which could turn into a wide regional war, is not in Moscow’s interests either.
The logic of restrictions at the regional level is more complicated. At the same time, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf are interested in safe shipping, reducing regional tensions and maintaining their own security. The last war, however, showed that they can get involved in a military conflict even when they are not directly interested in its expansion. The use of American military infrastructures located in the region in operations against Iran, as well as Iran’s attacks on them, turned those states into direct bearers of the risks of the conflict.
This experience can significantly affect their future calculations. On the one hand, they do not want uncontrolled expansion of Iran’s influence around Hormuz and continue to rely on external security guarantees. On the other hand, they are not interested in getting involved again in a full-scale war that could threaten their economic and energy infrastructure, disrupt shipping and directly affect the economic stability of the region. Therefore, it may become more acceptable for them to create such a security balance that will simultaneously limit the expansion of Iran’s geopolitical influence and reduce the probability of a new large-scale escalation.
Under these conditions, the future security system of Hormuz may include elements not only of competition, but also of limited practical cooperation. For the states of the region, such cooperation may not be an expression of strategic solidarity with Iran, but a practical necessity to not turn their own territory and infrastructure into a scene of a large-scale conflict again.
Oman can play a special role in this picture. Its geographical position and long-standing balanced diplomacy enable Muscat to maintain diplomatic communication channels both with Iran and with Western and regional actors. However, the possible role of Oman is not limited to the mediating function. Deepening its involvement in the security system of Hormuz can also serve to increase its own geopolitical weight, especially if new regional security mechanisms are formed around the strait.
From this point of view, Oman may be interested not only in limiting the escalation of hostilities, but also in creating conditions in which the security of Hormuz will be built on the greater participation of regional actors. Such an approach can also create certain common grounds for cooperation with Iran, especially if it concerns the formation of new practical or legal mechanisms for the security of the strait. If in the future, new negotiation formats regarding the status or security of Hormuz are formed, then Oman can not only take on a mediating role again, but also strive to become an important participant in the formation and operation of this new system.
Thus, Iran’s new strategy will not develop in a political vacuum and will not face a single external front. In front of it, a complex system of actors with different, sometimes opposing interests is formed. The United States will seek to limit the strategic consequences of Iran’s influence, China may be more willing to accept Iran’s enhanced role, provided it does not undermine regional stability, major economies in Asia and Europe will prioritize energy and trade predictability, Russia will be interested in limiting US influence, and regional states in maintaining a stable, manageable situation.
Therefore, the viability of Iran’s strategy will depend not only on how effectively Tehran will be able to use its geographical and security capabilities, but also on how successfully it will be able to place them in this multi-layered external environment. The most difficult problem for Iran is here. to increase influence without causing a backlash that would neutralize the strategic value of that influence.
In this sense, the main limitation of Iran’s new strategy may not be military or geographical, but political. Tehran may strive to become an indispensable and decisive participant in the security system of Hormuz, but the more visible and systemic this role becomes, the greater will be the interest of other powers to balance or limit it. It is this interaction that will determine whether Iran’s geographical advantage will turn into a long-term strategic influence, or whether external opposition will limit that possibility.
Strategic scenarios for the future of Hormuz
The post-war future of Hormuz is difficult to assess with one possible development. The war has changed not only the security environment of the region, but also the framework of calculations by which the main actors assess the importance of the strait. For this reason, the upcoming developments may go in different directions, depending on how the interests of Iran, regional states and extra-regional powers will be rearranged.
Here, the scenarios should be considered not as predictions of the near future, but as strategic opportunities, each of which has its own preconditions, limitations and consequences of formation. The difference between them will mainly be determined by one question: will the security of Hormuz remain a matter of competition or will it gradually turn into a system where Iran’s participation will become a decisive structural component of its stability.
First scenario. Hormuz’s de facto new strategic balance
The simplest but at the same time the most realistic theoretical scenario can be the formation of such a situation where the legal status of Hormuz does not change, shipping continues, but the security perceptions formed during the war are preserved.
In this case, Iran does not get a new legal status and does not establish official control over the strait. Something else is changing: Iran’s possible response becomes a constant factor in the calculations of international actors. Shipping security assessments, insurance decisions, the behavior of energy markets, and regional military planning may gradually include greater weight in Tehran’s potential actions.
In such a situation, the growth of Iran’s influence does not require legal change. It can be shaped by actual behavior through a combination of strategic uncertainty, military capabilities, information involvement, and regional political influence.
However, the main limitation of this scenario is that it does not provide an exceptional position for Iran. The United States and other external actors will continue to seek to maintain freedom of navigation and their strategic presence, and the Gulf states will try to avoid a situation where their security depends on the decisions of a single state.
Therefore, the balance formed here may not be a result of a stable agreement, but a result of mutual restraint and adaptation. Iran’s influence will grow to the extent that other actors will have to take it into account, but without a full systemic fixation of that influence.
In this scenario, the main change in the strategic reality of Hormuz will be that difference: the legal order will remain the same, while the political calculations formed around it will become different.
Second scenario. a new regional security architecture
A deeper scenario can be formed in the event that the common interests of Iran and other Persian Gulf states begin to dominate the existing contradictions between them in some issues.
Such an approach can be based on a simple strategic calculation. No state in the region is interested in prolonged military instability around Hormuz, as its consequences directly affect energy infrastructure, trade, investment and their own security. The recent war can give additional weight to that calculation, showing that regional states can find themselves at the center of the immediate consequences of a great power conflict even if they do not want to become a party to that conflict.
Under these conditions, an ideological and political basis may emerge, around which Tehran has built its regional security approach for a long time: the security of the Persian Gulf should be ensured as much as possible with the participation of the states of the region, limiting the decisive role of extra-regional forces.
If this approach takes a practical form, then the security system of Hormuz can gradually turn into a wider mechanism of regional cooperation. It can be based on the exchange of information on the maritime situation, crisis communication channels, incident prevention mechanisms, navigation safety coordination and the gradual formation of mutual trust.
In this scenario, Iran’s interests also change. Tehran is no longer necessarily seeking to maximize its unilateral influence. It may be more beneficial to create such a system where Iran’s participation becomes necessary and decisive for the effectiveness of regional cooperation.
This does not mean that the states of the region will give up external guarantees of their security or cut ties with the US and other powers. The formation of a multi-layered system is more likely, where the functions of extra-regional and regional actors will be divided, and the role of regional states in the main security mechanisms of Hormuz will increase.
In the more advanced version of this scenario, the issue of new legal or systemic regulation may also arise. If practical cooperation turns into a stable system, the need for its long-term fixation can become a separate political agenda.
Thus, the more prospective version of the second scenario may lead to the formation of such a system around Hormuz, where regional cooperation will become the main pillar of security, and Iran’s participation will be a key and decisive, but not exclusive, component of that system.
Third scenario. The new geopolitical structure of Hormuz
A more complex and theoretical scenario can be formed in the event that the new security reality created around Hormuz goes not only to the regional, but also to a wider geopolitical level.
Here, Iran can try to connect its strategic calculations with the interests of China and Russia, seeking to form such political, economic and security connections that will increase its resistance to external pressure and limit the possibility of another power forming a dominant position around Hormuz.
This approach does not imply that China and Russia will simply accept Iran’s agenda. Both states have their own strategic priorities and will try to maintain freedom of action. However, if the security of Hormuz begins to be considered as a matter directly related to their economic, energy or geopolitical interests, such an overlap of interests can be formed that will strengthen Iran’s position.
For China, such involvement can be linked to the stability of energy supplies, limiting US influence in the region, and expanding its own economic presence. For Russia, it can be combined with the interests of maintaining its political influence in the region, counterbalancing Western pressure and deepening strategic relations with Iran.
If these interests are combined with regional cooperation at a certain stage, then a multi-layered system can be formed around Hormuz, the participants of which will have different but complementary interests.
In the most developed version of such a system, the question of revising the legal and systemic status of Hormuz may also arise. This can happen not through a unilateral change by one state, but as a result of long-term negotiations, in which Iran, Oman and other Persian Gulf states can play a key role.
In this case, the possible change will fundamentally differ from the classical logic of control over the strait. The problem may not be who controls Hormuz, but who participates in the formation of the rules for its security and normal operation.
However, this is also the most complicated scenario. For its implementation, it will be necessary not only a high level of mutual trust between Iran and the states of the region, but also such a combination of the interests of China, Russia and other actors that will allow forming a generally acceptable system. The US and its partners will naturally react to any process that can limit their strategic presence in Hormuz.
Therefore, this scenario should be considered not as a possible development in the near future, but as a borderline option of such a strategic possibility, in the event of its implementation, the issue of Hormuz can be transferred from a regional security issue to the level of a wider geopolitical realignment.
The strategic importance of scenarios
These three scenarios are not mutually exclusive predictions. In fact, theoretically, they can also be consecutive stages.
In the first phase, Iran’s influence can be strengthened through actual behavior and adaptation of international actors. In the second stage, that influence can turn into a more systematic form of regional cooperation. And in more favorable and at the same time more difficult conditions, this process can be involved in the wider geopolitical system with the participation of China, Russia and other actors.
The general logic of these developments shows that the main issue for the future of Hormuz may not be the control of the strait. The nature of the security system within which the strait will operate may become more important.
If that system continues to be based solely on the mutual logic of external deterrence and Iranian countermeasures, then Hormuz will remain a zone of constant strategic competition. If, however, regional cooperation mechanisms are formed, it will be possible to make a transition from competition to controlled interdependence. And if broader geopolitical interests join that system, then Hormuz can turn into an important hub of the new international security structure.
Thus, the possible future developments of Hormuz are not limited to one predictable direction. They can vary between the actual maintenance of a new balance, the formation of a new security structure based on regional cooperation, and the deepening of competition. The choice between those options, however, will not be determined solely by the political will of Iran or any individual actor. It will depend on a combination of mutual interests, risk perception, power capabilities and willingness to cooperate.
In this sense, the long-term significance of the war may be manifested not by an immediately visible change, but by the process during which the new relations formed around Hormuz will acquire a more stable and predictable character. If that process leads to the formation of a new balance or cooperation mechanisms between regional actors, then Hormuz can gradually turn into not only a competition, but also a key platform for the formation of a new regional security architecture.
Conclusion
Today, the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz can no longer be assessed only by its geographical location, international legal status or its role in global energy communications. Recent military developments have shown that the true significance of the strait is formed in such a geopolitical environment, within which it turns into a key platform for regional security and global power competition. For this reason, the assessment of the ongoing processes around Hormuz requires leaving the traditional naval or energy perceptions of the strait and considering it as a component of a wider geopolitical system.
The war of 2025 did not change the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz and did not resolve the competition around it. However, it changed the strategic reality under which new logics of security, influence and power balance of the strait will be formed in the future. For this reason, the real significance of the war should be assessed not so much by its direct military results, but by the political change that took place in the perception of the strategic significance of Hormuz.
In this context, it is necessary to consider Iran’s policy not as an effort to establish exclusive control over the strait, but as an attempt to turn its geographical position into a long-term geopolitical influence. If this process is successful, the importance of Hormuz for Iran will no longer be limited to the function of crisis containment. It can turn into such a strategic platform, where regional security, stability of sea communications and issues of balance of power will practically no longer be possible to consider, ignoring the role of Iran.
However, the significance of this process is much wider than the strategic achievement of any individual state. It reflects a deeper trend in modern international relations, in which geographical location itself is no longer sufficient to ensure strategic influence. The ability of the state to turn its own geographical opportunities into an interconnected system of political, security and diplomatic influence becomes decisive. It is this ability that shapes not only the limits of influence of individual actors, but also the future of the entire regional security architecture.
In this sense, the war of 2025 should be considered not as another military crisis over Hormuz, but as a stage of geopolitical transition. It did not decide who controls the strait, but it changed the strategic environment under which new regional security principles and power relations will be formed in the future. If in the past Hormuz was mainly perceived as a vital route of world trade and energy communications, today it is mostly becoming the geopolitical space around which regional security principles and new power balances are being reshaped.
Therefore, the real legacy of the 2025 war is not a short-term change in the balance of power, but a reinterpretation of the geopolitical significance of Hormuz. The strait can no longer be considered only as a strategic route for the transit of world trade and energy carriers or as a theater of possible military confrontation.
It turns into an independent geopolitical factor of international politics, around which the principles of regional security, new ratios of power balance and strategic calculations of external actors are reshaped. In that sense, the ongoing competition over the future of Hormuz is no longer just a matter of influence over the strait, but an integral component of the formation of a new geopolitical order in the Middle East.
Note:This article is the first part of a three-part analytical article series on Middle East strategic communications and their geopolitical significance.
The next article will discuss the strategic interconnection of the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb and their role in the deep picture of modern geopolitical realignments, and the final part of the article series will look at the geographical position and geopolitical commonalities of Hormuz and Syunik, analyzing how strategic communications reshape the regional power balance and what is the significance of Syunik from the point of view of ensuring Armenia’s state security.
Aram Shahnazaryan
Political analyst-expert on Iran issues
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168: “The situation is tense. The issue of Armenia’s membership in the CSTO will be raised…”
August 10, 2026
The guest of the program “Trigger” is Andrey Rusakov, director of the Center for Eurasian Studies.
During the conversation, the consequences of the NATO summit held in Ankara, the further transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance and its role in the modern system of international relations were discussed.
In this context, the historical role of NATO and the approach of the first secretary general of the alliance, British General Hastings Lionel Ismay, who formulated the main goals of NATO as follows: “to prevent the entry of the USSR into Europe, to ensure the American presence there and to contain Germany”.
Reference was made to the military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and Turkey, in particular, the news about possible purchases from Ankara to Kiev. It concerns the possible supply of 70 American ATACMS ballistic missiles, 12 M270 type launchers and cluster munitions, as well as their possible consequences on regional security.
During the conversation, the relations between the European Union and the Eurasian Economic Union, the perspectives of cooperation, as well as the possible consequences arising from the change in Armenia’s economic relations in European and Eurasian directions were also touched upon.
In addition, the current state and prospects of Armenian-Russian relations, the economic risks arising for Armenia in case of changing the foreign political and economic trajectory, as well as the topic of Armenia’s possible exit from the CSTO were discussed.
Hayk Derzyan
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RFE/RL – Trump Talks To Armenian, Azeri Leaders On Summit Anniversary
U.S. President Donald Trump spoke with the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan by phone on Saturday one year after hosting landmark peace talks between them at the White House.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev initialed a bilateral peace treaty during that summit. Pashinian also committed himself to opening a U.S.-administered transit corridor for Azerbaijan that will be named after Trump.
“The United States remains fully committed to working with Armenia and Azerbaijan as they build on this foundation,” U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said in a statement on the first anniversary of the summit.
The White House did not issue readouts of Trump’s calls with Aliyev and Pashinian. Nor did Trump comment on the conversations on his online Truth Social platform.
Both Aliyev and Pashinian were cited by their offices as praising the U.S. president for brokering the August 2025 agreements. An Armenian government statement said Pashinian and Trump “happily noted that the Washington Peace Summit led to real peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”
Baku continues to make the signing of the peace treaty conditional on a change of Armenia’s constitution. While rejecting this condition in public, Pashinian has pledged to enact a new constitution. In parliamentary elections held in June, his party fell short of a two-third majority in the Armenian parliament necessary for doing that.
According to the Armenian readout, Pashinian also discussed with Trump the planned opening of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). It said the two leaders “reaffirmed their determination to begin work on the TRIPP in the near future.” A senior adviser to U.S. envoy Steve Witkoff visited Yerevan and met with Pashinian and other Armenian leaders for that purpose last week.
Rubio mentioned the TRIPP in his statement. He said the project is “on its way to becoming a reality with engineering surveys for the railway in Armenia already underway and Azerbaijan’s near completion of a highway and railroad to connect into Armenia.”
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Armenian Oppositionist Elected Parliament Vice-Speaker
- Shoghik Galstian
A senior member of the main opposition Strong Armenia alliance, Aram Vartevanian, was elected a deputy speaker of the Armenian parliament on Monday, taking up a position legally reserved for the opposition minority.
The ruling Civil Contract party, which holds 64 seats in the 105-member National Assembly, did not say until the last minute whether it will enable Vartevanian’s election. Dozens of its deputies grilled him on Friday about his political views and past and present political activities. The party’s parliamentary leader, Arusyak Manavazian, said shortly before the vote that it will give him enough votes to become vice-speaker.
Vartevanian’s candidacy for the post was swiftly backed by former President Robert Kocharian’s Hayastan alliance, the other opposition group represented in the new parliament. The 36-year-old lawyer had been elected to the country’s former parliament on the Hayastan ticket in 2021. He subsequently resigned his seat and returned to legal practice.
Vartevanian has been a member of Strong Armenia leader Samvel Karapetian’s legal team for the past year. He has also represented other opposition figures prosecuted by the Armenian authorities. He spoke on Friday of an “unprecedented” number of political prisoners in the country.
Vartevanian told reporters following his election that he is mindful of “difficulties” awaiting him in the new capacity. He suggested that speaker Ruben Rubinian will not let him chair parliament sessions.
Rubinian and his two other deputies are senior members of Civil Contract. No lawmakers representing Strong Armenia or Hayastan voted for them.
Both opposition groups rejected as fraudulent the official results of the June 7 parliamentary elections that gave victory to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s party. They faced calls from many supporters to refuse to take up their seats in order to further undermine the parliament’s legitimacy. Their leaders opted against a boycott, saying that their presence in the parliament will not prevent them from attempting to topple Pashinian through street protests.
Strong Armenia and Hayastan also decided to nominate the chairpersons of four of the parliament’s 12 standing committees. Under Armenian law, these positions are also reserved for their representatives. Civil Contract indicated on Monday that it will not block their election. The ruling party will install the heads of the most important parliament committees.
—
RFE/RL – World Churches Again Deplore Crackdown On Armenian Clergy
A worldwide coalition of Christian churches has reaffirmed support for the Armenian Apostolic Church and deplored “undue interference” in its internal affairs following the start of Catholicos Garegin II’s trial.
Rev. Jerry Pillay, the general secretary of the World Council of Churches (WCC), and Bishop Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, the WCC central committee moderator, expressed “deep concern regarding the current situation affecting the Armenian Apostolic Church” in a joint statement issued over the weekend.
The statement came after Garegin and six Armenian archbishops and bishops went on trial amid Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s continuing efforts to depose the supreme head of the ancient church to which the vast majority of Armenians belong. The accusations levelled against them stem from the defrocking in January this year of a pro-government bishop involved in Pashinian’s controversial campaign. Their lawyers maintain that Armenian courts and law-enforcement bodies have no jurisdiction over internal church affairs.
“WCC, as a global fellowship of churches, affirms the vital role of the Armenian Apostolic Church in the spiritual, cultural, and historical life of the Armenian people and in the wider Christian family. As WCC, we express our concern about undue interference in inner church matters,” Pillay and Bedford-Strohm said in a clear reference to the unprecedented trial.
“We uphold the Armenian Church and its people in prayer and support during this time,” added their statement.
WCC already warned the authorities in Yerevan against undermining “the principles of religious freedom, due process, and the peaceful exercise of faith” at the start of Pashinian’s controversial campaign in July last year. The Switzerland-based organization uniting 352 Orthodox and Protestant churches from around the world decried the arrests of two Armenian archbishops critical of the government.
Pashinian began pressuring Garegin to step down shortly after WCC hosted in May 2025 an international conference in Switzerland on the preservation of Nagorno-Karabakh’s Armenian religious and cultural heritage. Addressing the conference, Garegin accused Azerbaijan of committing ethnic cleansing in Karabakh and illegally occupying Armenian border areas. He also denounced the “sham trials” of eight former Karabakh leaders captured during Azerbaijan’s September 2023 offensive.
In a June 2025 letter to WCC, Azerbaijan’s top Shia Muslim cleric closely linked to the government accused the Catholicos of spreading “provocative, revanchist propaganda.” Pashinian’s domestic detractors see a direct connection between Baku’s reaction and the crackdown on the Armenian Church.
—
California Courier Online, Aug. 10, 2026
Courier Online, Aug. 10, 2026
Sassounian
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1- Erdogan’s Denial of Genocide Attracts
Despite their diplomatic cunning, one thing Turkish leaders have never learned is to keep their mouths shut when accused of genocide. They fail to realize that every time they deny committing mass crimes, they inadvertently draw more attention to their long criminal history.
Turkey’s Pres. Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a major blunder during a speech he delivered on June 30, denying the long history of Turkish crimes. He falsely claimed: “Our history contains no genocide, no massacres, no oppression, and no colonialism. Throughout our thousands of years of glorious history, there has been only justice and compassion.” The video of his remarks was viewed by almost 100,000 times on X.
Let us now turn to the most outrageous lie in Erdogan’s remarks: “Our history contains no genocide, no massacres, no oppression, and no colonialism.” In fact, the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey have repeatedly committed every one of these massive crimes.
The Hellenic Canadian Research Institute has published an extensive list of crimes committed by the Ottoman Empire and the Republic of Turkey throughout their history. Here is a shortened version of that report:
The Historical Record of Mass Atrocities: The Late Ottoman Period Massacres and Genocides (1821 to 1923)
— The Constantinople Massacre (1821): Thousands of Greek civilians were slaughtered throughout the Empire. In April, Ottoman authorities executed the spiritual leader of Orthodox Christianity, Ecumenical Patriarch Gregory V, by hanging him from the gates of the Patriarchate.
— The Chios Massacre (1822): Ottoman troops systematically killed, enslaved, or exiled approximately four-fifths of the Greek population on the island of Chios. Up to 100,000 Greeks were slaughtered or forced into slave markets in North Africa and the Middle East.
— The Destruction of Psara (1824): Ottoman forces completely destroyed the rebel Greek island of Psara. In two days, an estimated 18,000 Greeks were killed or taken as slaves.
— The Third Siege of Missolonghi (1825–1826): Following a brutal, year-long starvation blockade by combined Ottoman and Egyptian forces, the city was overrun, resulting in the slaughter of thousands of Greek civilians and the enslavement of up to 4,000 women and children.
— The Damascus Events (1860): Following sectarian unrest in Lebanon, violent mobs and militias targeted the historic Christian quarter of Damascus. While Maronites were targeted in the mountains, the victims in Damascus were predominantly Greek Orthodox. Local Ottoman garrison forces actively colluded with the rioters, who torched the historic Greek Orthodox Mariamite Cathedral and slaughtered 3,000-10,000 Christians.
— The Hamidian Massacres (1894–1896): Sultan Abdul Hamid II targeted primarily Ottoman Armenians across Anatolia. Assyrians and, to a lesser degree, Greeks were also targeted. An estimated 300,000 Armenians and 25,000 Assyrians were killed, and hundreds of thousands were displaced or forcibly converted to Islam.
— The Adana Massacre (1909): 20,000-30,000 Armenian civilians were slaughtered in the province of Adana.
— The Massacres of Unarmed Greeks in Eastern Thrace (1912-1913): During the Balkan Wars, 15,690 unarmed Greeks were massacred in Eastern Thrace by Ottoman forces.
— The Greek Genocide (1914-1923): The systematic extermination of the native Greek subjects of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the slaughter of over 1 million Greeks.
— The Great Famine of Mount Lebanon (1915–1918): A weaponized food blockade and crop requisitioning policy overseen by Ottoman military governor Djemal Pasha starved 200,000-300,000 Maronite and other Christians.
— The Assyrian Genocide (1915-1923): The systematic extermination of the native Assyrian subjects of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the slaughter of 300,000-750,000 Assyrians.
— The Armenian Genocide (1915-1923): The systematic extermination of the native Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire resulted in the slaughter of 1.5 million Armenians.
Early Republican-Era State Violence (1930 to 1938)
— The Zilan Massacre (1930): The slaughter of 5,000-47,000 Kurdish civilians in the Zilan Valley during the military suppression of the Ararat rebellion.
— The Dersim Massacre (1937–1938): A massive military campaign used aerial bombardments (including chemical weapons) and widespread executions against the Alevi Kurds of Dersim (renamed Tunceli). It resulted in the deaths of up to 70,000 civilians, including Armenians.
20th-Century Sectarian Pogroms
— The Istanbul Pogrom (1955): State-organized mob attacks targeting Istanbul’s remaining Greek, Armenian, and Jewish citizens, causing massive property destruction and triggering the final mass emigration of Greeks from Turkey. It is estimated that during the two-day pogrom, 37 people were killed, over a thousand were injured, and hundreds of women and children were raped. It was widely reported that Greek men were subjected to forced circumcision. Damage was estimated at around $500 million.
— The Marash Massacre (1978): A week-long killing spree targeting leftists, Kurds, and the Alevi religious minority in Kahramanmarash, Turkey, December 19-26, 1978. Orchestrated primarily by the neo-fascist Grey Wolves and local right-wing groups with the support of Turkey’s national intelligence service, the violence resulted in the deaths of hundreds of people.
— The Sivas Massacre (1993): A massacre committed by an angry mob of radical Islamists who set fire to the Madimak Hotel in Sivas, Turkey, killing 35 people. The victims were predominantly Alevi intellectuals, writers, and artists who had gathered for a cultural festival.
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Haberler, Turkey
Not politics, but Turkish cuisine was the talk on the podium of the Armenian Parliament. Armenian Deputy Parliament Speaker Ruben Rubinyan made a confession about ‘Adana kebab’. Lawmakers could not hide their astonishment at the deputy speaker’s words.
Turkish cuisine, which attracts interest worldwide, is this time on the agenda of the Armenian Parliament. Deputy Speaker of Parliament Ruben Rubinyan touched upon the Turkish flavors he tasted during his visit to Turkey from the Parliament podium.
Speaking from the podium, Rubinyan spoke with praise about the dishes he tasted during his visit to Turkey, stating that he was particularly impressed by the taste of Adana kebab.
ADMIRED ADANA KEBAB
Rubinyan, noting that he had the opportunity to experience Turkish cuisine during his visit to Turkey, said, “I ate kebab in Turkey, Adana kebab. I liked it very much. It had a delicious taste.”
Rubinyan, stating that Adana kebab, one of the world-famous flavors of Turkish cuisine, left an impression on him, also mentioned another classic flavor in his speech. During Rubinyan’s speech, other deputies were seen listening in astonishment.
“IT BECOMES COMPLETELY DIFFERENT”
Rubinyan, stating that he also liked İskender kebab, said, “As for İskender, if sauce comes with it, it becomes completely different. I would go there often for delicious things.”
In his speech, Rubinyan also touched upon his visits to Turkey, stating that he frequently visited the patriarchate, saying, “I would go to the patriarchate often because it interested me.”
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Haberler, Turkey
Scandalous remarks by Tim Vollert, a member of the Social Democratic Party and well-known content producer in Germany, targeting the ancestry of the Turkish nation have caused outrage. In a video post targeting the genetic map of Turks, the SPD politician made provocative claims, saying, ‘Most of those in Turkey actually have Greek, Azerbaijani, and Armenian DNA.’
Tim Vollert, a member of Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) and a science communicator known for the channel “3minutenwissen,” made scandalous statements in a published video about the genetic makeup of the Turkish nation. Vollert claimed that a large portion of people living in Turkey have “Greek, Azerbaijani, and Armenian DNA.”
Tim Vollert, who studied physics and biology and is known for the content he produces on social media, drew significant backlash with a video he released. Starting his speech by asserting that he has no animosity towards citizens coming from Turkey, Vollert made provocative claims lacking scientific basis about the genetic structure of Turks.
“THE MOST EXTERNALLY MIXED NATION”
Arguing that Turkey has historically received intense immigration, Vollert described Turkey as the world’s “most externally mixed nation.” Linking his claim to genetic factors, the SPD member stated, “The reason for this is simply that an incredibly large portion of people in Turkey actually have Greek, Azerbaijani, and Armenian DNA.”
“EVERYTHING SHOWS UP EXCEPT TURKEY”
Continuing his speech, Vollert shared what he claimed was a “joke” among geneticists, saying, “When a Turk takes a DNA test, everything shows up in the results except Turkey. Because over the last 2,000 years, there have been so many tribal and population movements in that region.”
Vollert’s statements, which stand out for his political identity and social media popularity, sparked widespread backlash on social media.
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Armenpress — Artyom Chernamoryan, president of the Nairi
Union of Israeli Armenians in Petah Tikva, says this is not the first time that
members of the Armenian community, Armenian priests and Armenian churches in
Israel have been targeted by acts of hooliganism. Moreover, he says such
incidents are now occurring almost daily.
Speaking to Armenpress, Chernamoryan commented on the
latest act of hooliganism committed a few days ago by a group of Orthodox
Jewish youths, who once again targeted one of the Armenian monasteries.
“This is happening not only to Armenians but also to Christians
of other nationalities. Unfortunately, spitting at people and shouting insults
at them has become common behavior among Orthodox Jews. Just look at how they
treat their own state, army, and police. In that case, what expectations can we
have that they would behave normally towards Armenians in particular?”
Chernamoryan said.
He added that the Armenian Quarter of Jerusalem is
located on Mount Zion, and that every extremist dreams of getting rid not only
of Armenians but of all Christians as soon as possible in order to establish
complete control over the Old City.
“In general, Jerusalem’s Old City consists of four
quarters: the Jewish, Christian, Arab and Armenian quarters. The policies
pursued by National Security Minister Moshe Arbel and Interior Minister Itamar
Ben-Gvir are generally aimed at taking as much as possible away from the
Armenian community. Everything possible is being done to weaken the Armenian
community. Unfortunately, this policy has been pursued quite extensively in
recent years. This is precisely what lies behind the controversial deal
involving one of the Armenian properties known as the Cows’ Garden. In fact,
there are two such projects, one of which even envisages the appropriation of
part of the Armenian Theological Seminary building,” he said.
According to Chernamoryan, Orthodox Jewish youths display
pronounced intolerance towards all Christians and frequently resort to
provocations and acts of hooliganism against Armenians, Greeks, and Catholics
alike.
Because the Armenian Quarter lies on the route to one of
their holy sites, the Western Wall, Armenians are targeted more frequently by
extremists and have become victims of repeated attacks.
“Nevertheless, unlike other Christian communities,
Armenians can defend themselves and, if necessary, even engage in physical
confrontations to restrain the hooligans. Following the latest incident, the
Armenian side called the police, who, unlike in previous cases, responded more
promptly. There are also Christian police officers in Israel who defend the
rights of fellow Christians, even using force against offenders and hooligans.
The perpetrators were handcuffed and taken to the police station. It is
commendable that, at least this time, law enforcement reacted very quickly. On
the other hand, National Security Minister Moshe Arbel and Interior Minister
Itamar Ben-Gvir, whom he described as Orthodox, try in every possible way to
protect members of their own religious community by turning a blind eye to acts
of hooliganism,” Chernamoryan said.
In his view, when representatives of this segment of
society occupy senior government positions and head law enforcement agencies,
many provocateurs receive very lenient punishments. For example, they may
simply be instructed not to visit or pray at the Western Wall for ten days.
Even those placed under house arrest are sometimes released shortly afterwards.
“Israel has a Ministry of Religious Affairs as well as a
council representing different faiths and religions. The latest incident has
come under the attention of these bodies. I do not believe it is in Israel’s
interest, particularly at a time when the country is already facing war, to
damage relations with Christian states, especially its principal ally, the
United States. This is even more significant because the President of the
United States recently stressed the need to preserve Christian cultural
heritage in the Middle East. Donald Trump generally presents himself as a
defender of Christians, specifically highlighting the role of Armenians in the
region. Therefore, attacks on Armenians in full view of the Christian world are
intolerable. Moreover, because of Israel’s military operations in the Middle
East, antisemitism has once again been on the rise in European countries,” he
said.
According to Chernamoryan, the Israeli media gave
extensive coverage to the latest incident involving Armenians and strongly
criticized the hooligan behavior of the Orthodox youths.
He added that most of the Israeli society also rejects
such behavior because many Christians, including people of Jewish background,
live in the country and condemn violence and the incitement of ethnic hatred.
“To prevent such incidents, educational work among
Orthodox youth should be promoted at the state level. They should not be
indoctrinated, and yeshivas (Jewish religious schools) should teach tolerance
towards other religions. In other words, the education system needs reform.
They have become so emboldened by the atmosphere of impunity that they now even
assault police officers. Recently, for example, a policewoman was subjected to
mob violence after delivering them a notice to serve in the Israeli army. If
this is how they treat members of their own nation, is it not obvious how they
will treat foreigners or followers of other religions?” Chernamoryan concluded.
Armenpress also contacted the Armenian Patriarchate of
Jerusalem. Chancellor Fr. Aghan Gogchyan said the Patriarchate is preparing an
official statement on the latest incident, which will be released soon.
A few days ago, a group of Orthodox Jewish youths struck
the gates of an Armenian monastery in Jerusalem during the night, spat, shouted
insults and threw stones at its windows. One of the Armenians called the
police. The police arrested the hooligans and took them to a police station.
In 1958, Soviet and American military aircraft clashed twice in the skies over Armenia. The first incident occurred on June 27, the second on September 2.
As we have already written, on June 27, the American C-118A Liftmaster transport aircraft, which violated the Armenian-Turkish border and was shot down by Soviet MiG-17 fighters, managed to make an emergency landing in the Martakert region of Nagorno-Karabakh, near the village of Levonarkh. Although the plane burned completely, the nine Americans on board, six of whom were air force servicemen and the other three CIA agents, were saved. The crew members were arrested by the Soviet military. Local residents beat several of the Americans, and one of the CIA agents was to be hanged by them, but the Soviet military prevented this. After being interrogated, they were handed over to the American side.
The September 2, 1958 ended tragically for seventeen Americans.
The C-130 Reconnaissance Aircraft and its Mission
On September 2, 1958, a U.S. C-130A-II aircraft, a modification of the famous Lockheed C-130 Hercules military transport aircraft designed for radio-electronic reconnaissance, took off from Incirlik Air Base in Turkey. This base, located near the city of Adana, is still used jointly by the Turkish and U.S. air forces.
The C-130A-II, registration number 56-0528, was manufactured in 1957 and operated by the United States Air Force in Europe (USAFE), specifically by the 7406th Support Squadron based at Rhein-Main Air Base in West Germany (the base operated from 1945 to 2005 and occupied part of Frankfurt Airport). The latter’s mission was aerial reconnaissance. The unit was engaged in the operation and maintenance of military aircraft carrying out such reconnaissance. There was also a separate unit, the United States Air Force Security Service (USAFSS) Squadron, whose personnel were engaged in collecting intelligence information on aircraft. In other words, the task of the servicemen of the 7406th Squadron was the operation and maintenance of the aircraft, and the servicemen of the USAFSS squadron were responsible for radio-electronic reconnaissance on those aircraft.
On the September 2 flight, the C-130 was carrying seventeen people – six crew members and eleven USAFSS representatives (the first detachment of the 6911 Radio Group Mobile ).
The main flight missions of the 7406th Squadron aircraft were two, codenamed “Flight A” or Half-Track and “Flight B” or Dreamboat. Half-Track flights were carried out in June-August 1956 on the border between West and East Germany. This reconnaissance program was stopped after the publication of the magazine Aviation Week.
Dreamboat flights began in January 1957. American RB-50E and RB-50G aircraft carried out photo and radio electronic reconnaissance mainly at an altitude of 7,300 meters. The flight lasted 12-14 hours. There were five main routes: 1 – From the Rhine-Main (Frankfurt am Main) air base to the Baltic Sea. 2 – A triangular route in the skies of Germany. 3 – From the Rhine-Main air base to the Adriatic Sea, from there to the Turkish Incirlik Air Base, then back to the Rhine-Main. 4 – From Adana to the Black Sea, circling along the coastline. 5 – From Adana to Trabzon and then circling between Trabzon and Lake Van (in this case, the target was the USSR-Turkey, in particular the Armenian-Turkish border).
In 1958, the RB-50s of the 7406th squadron were replaced by C-130A-II aircraft specially equipped for radio-electronic reconnaissance. Their flights were carried out at an altitude of 8,500 meters, but since they were heavier, the flight duration was 7 hours.
As mentioned, the squadron’s aircraft were based at the Rhein-Main air base, but until 1965 they were periodically sent to Turkey for two weeks. From Incirlik, C-130A-IIs carried out reconnaissance flights in the direction of socialist countries: Romania and Bulgaria, Crimea (USSR), Sochi (USSR), Armenia (USSR) and the Caspian Sea (in 1963-1965 reconnaissance was carried out from the territory of Iran, which at that time was a secular country headed by the Shah and had good relations with the West).
Reconnaissance flights to Armenia were carried out as follows: the C-130 flew north from Adana (Incirlik) to Kayseri (Kesaria), from there they turned east to Lake Van, from where it turned north and circled along the Armenian-Turkish border, then returned to Incirlik.
The Fateful Flight
U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) files report that on September 2, 1958, the American C-130 was supposed to depart from Incirlik for Trabzon, then turn right and make circles (orbit) between Trabzon and Van, parallel to the Turkish-USSR border. However, the plane was supposed to maintain a distance of at least 100 miles or 160 km from the interstate border.
(The NSA is a body subordinate to the US Department of Defense that specializes in the field of radio-electronic intelligence and collects/processes information and data for intelligence and counterintelligence purposes, as well as is engaged in the protection of electronic communication networks of U.S. government agencies)
At 15:42 Yerevan time, at an altitude of 7,800 meters, the C-130 crew reported that they were passing over Trabzon and received a weather report from there. This was the last communication with the crew of the aircraft. As mentioned, there were seventeen people on board the aircraft, six of whom were flight crew members (from the 7406th Squadron), and the other eleven were Russian language specialists-linguists and data collection operators (from the 6911th Radio Group Mobile). The aircraft commander was Captain Rudy J. Swiestra.
The Cryptologic Quarterly of the U.S. National Security Agency reports that Soviet radars had detected the C-130 in the air thirty-two minutes before it was shot down.
After the reconnaissance aircraft was detected, the first group of Soviet fighters, consisting of two MiG-17s, took off from the Leninakan (Gyumri) airport to patrol the Armenian-Turkish border (pilots: Senior Lieutenant Kucheryaev, call sign “201”, and Senior Lieutenant Ivanov, call sign “218”). However, according to some sources, due to a dust storm, these fighters were unable to take off immediately, and their flight was delayed for seven minutes. Because of this, the second group of MiG-17 fighters took off from Yerevan’s South (now Erebuni) airport (pilots: Senior Lieutenant Lopatkov, call sign “582”, and Senior Lieutenant Gavrilov, call sign “583”). Fighter operations were supported by Captain Romanyuta and his team from the Leninakan airport.
American intelligence suggests that the C-130 crew may have been misled by navigational beacons in Armenia and Georgia that operated on frequencies similar to the Trabzon and Van beacons. One signal from Georgia was reportedly stronger than the Trabzon signal. Meanwhile, U.S. radio-electronic intelligence, which was monitoring Soviet communications, indicated that when the C-130 crossed the Armenian-Turkish border, Soviet systems identified it from “hostile/unidentified” to “intruder.” As the tracking of the second group of MiG-17s merged with the C-130’s track, the fighters were marked as “engaged in combat,” while the C-130 was marked as “hostile/unidentified in combat.” After the attack, Soviet air warning systems transmitted the message: “target destroyed.”
According to some reports, Soviet fighters detected the trespassing C-130 at 16:10 Yerevan time at an altitude of 9,000-10,000 meters and tried to force it to land, but the American plane did not obey.
At 16:13, the fighters reported that the C-130 was at 10,000 meters. Senior Lieutenants Lopatkov and Gavrilov, who flew from Yerevan, each made firing passes, and Gavrilov reported that he fired three bursts. Kucheryaev and Ivanov, who flew from Leninakan, then attacked the American plane.
Kucheryaev reported that after his third burst, the C-130 caught fire. After that, the Lopatkov-Gavrilov duo attacked the intruder again.
The NSA quarterly presents the conversation of the fighter pilots (incomplete) in the battle against the C-130: “I see the target, a large one… I am attacking the target… The target is a transport, four engine… The target is burning… There’s a hit… The target is banking… I am opening fire…The tail assembly is falling off… Look at him, he will not get away, he is already falling… He is falling… The target has lost control, it is going down… The target has turned over… The target is falling…”
The American C-130 was shot down by Soviet MiG-17 gun fire at 16:14 Yerevan time and fell 48 km northwest of the capital in the immediate vicinity of the village of Nerkin Sasnashen in the Talin region. All seventeen Americans on board were killed. All MiG-17s safely landed in Leninakan.
After the Disaster
For several days, the United States did not know the fate of the C-130 or its 17-man crew, even though U.S. intelligence had intercepted Soviet military communications and monitored the aerial combat against the aircraft.
On September 6, the United States contacted the governments of the USSR and Iran, asking if they had any information about the whereabouts of the C-130 and its crew. Despite initial claims that it knew nothing about the plane, the Soviet government informed the U.S. Embassy in Moscow on September 12 that “a USAF aircraft has been found 55 km northwest of Yerevan in Soviet Armenia (the actual distance from the city center is 48 km – ed.)… the remains of bodies were found, from which it is possible to assumed that six crew members perished.”
The next day, September 13, the U.S. Chargé d’affaires in the USSR requested information about the other eleven crew members, adding that the U.S. Air Force had information that the C-130 had been intercepted by three Soviet fighters, and that “following the interception the plane proceeded eastward under the control of the Soviet aircraft, and that shortly after this an explosion was heard and a large column of smoke was observed rising at a point within Soviet territory.”
On September 24, the USSR handed over the partial remains of six Americans to the U.S.. Of these, three were identified, and the identities of the other three were confirmed years later, in 1996-1997 (another source notes that initially the remains of four people were identified).
The men who had been identified previously were Airman 2nd Class Archie Bourg, Jr.; Captain Edward Jeruss; Airman 2nd Class Gerald Medeiros; Captain John Simpson; Captain Rudy Swiestra; and First Lieutenant Ricardo Villareal.
Further requests to the Soviet authorities as to the whereabouts of the eleven missing crew members were each rejected. Even the First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR (i.e., First Deputy Prime Minister) Anastas Mikoyan denied on January 16, 1959 that the C-130 had been shot down and claimed that his government was unaware of the 11 missing people.
Shortly thereafter, on February 6, the United States, seeking to obtain more information about the plane crash from the USSR, released at the UN session the intercepted recordings of conversations between Soviet pilots who had attacked the C-130, but the USSR continued to deny its involvement in the crash of the American plane.
As for the internal operations of the American side, after the disaster, on September 5, 1958, the US Air Force European Command (USAFE) removed all C-130s from the radio-electronic reconnaissance program “until further notice” and reduced the reconnaissance flight routes planned for this program. The U.S. Air Force Headquarters ordered a complete reassessment of the program. However, after October 15, the C-130s returned to their mission.
When notifying the victims’ families, however, U.S. authorities did not disclose that the flight’s true purpose was to spy on the USSR. Instead, they described it as a failed routine mission.
The Martin and Mitchell Revelations
In September 1960, two NSA cryptologists (the science of coding – encryption, and decoding – breaking codes and deciphering the hidden information), William Martin and Bernon Mitchell, fled the United States to the USSR. This was a serious blow to U.S. national security and especially to the NSA. At a Moscow press conference on September 6, they said that they were mainly dissatisfied with some of the methods used by the United States to collect intelligence information, particularly the deliberate violation of the airspace of other states, the capture and the decoding of secret communications of their own allies.
At the press conference, Martin and Mitchell gave a detailed account of the C-130’s flight over Soviet Armenia. They argued that the reconnaissance mission was intended to assess the Soviet defense system, suggesting it reflected U.S. interest in a possible attack on the USSR rather than defensive planning. Thus. according to the two American cryptologists, the C-130 deliberately entered Armenian airspace on September 2, 1958.
What was revealed after the collapse of the USSR
In 1992, the United States and Russia formed a commission to deal with the issues of missing persons and prisoners of war. The Russian side published several declassified reports on the September 2, 1958 plane crash. In a detailed investigative report compiled on September 4, 1958, a Soviet general reported to the Kremlin from Armenia how MiGs had intercepted and shot down a C-130. Soviet military personnel identified the downed plane by its registration number on its tail: 60528, and a plate on the aircraft indicated that it was assigned to the 7406th Support Squadron.
The field report described the air battle and the names of the Soviet pilots who participated in it. The report also included MiG gun-camera activated photos showing the C-130 in the MiGs’ gunsights, with smoke streaming from its engines immediately before the crash. Forensic examination confirmed that the human remains belonged to six people, and noted that there may be other remains, but intensity of the ensuing fire prevented identification of additional remains. No one was seen parachuting from the C-130. According to the conclusion, none of those on board could have survived. Soviet military personnel found at the crash site Temporary Duty orders of the 7406th squadron, a pistol, several ID cards, ID tags and banknotes (Deutschmark, Dutch guilders, Turkish lira and U.S. dollars).
The Search for Remains 35 Years Later
A U.S. Army excavation team visited independent Armenia in 1993. The team met with the pilot of one of the MiGs that attacked the C-130. The latter reported that he did not see a parachutist abandoning the downed plane. Other eyewitnesses also noted that they did not see anything of the sort. The Americans also interviewed General Sozinov, who was at the crash site minutes after the accident. The general noted that the C-130 burned for eight hours, and it was unlikely that there were any survivors.
The Americans visited Nerkin Sasnashen, the crash site in Armenia, where they found more than 2,000 bone and tooth remains, life support equipment, personal belongings and the remains of the plane. Using the human remains, they were able to identify two more crew members. The team concluded that others also died at the scene.
“Given the incomplete nature of the remains recovered from the crash site and those of the six men previously identified, a group remains identification was made for the entire crew. The remains will be interred as a group at Arlington,” the U.S. Air Force said.
What Does Freedom Have to do With Espionage?
It reads: “The people of Sasnashen and Martin Kakosyan (the name was later erased from the stone due to external interference – ed.) created this khachkar in 1993 in memoriam of seventeen U.S. Air Force airmen who died here in the line of duty on September 2, 1958.”
A plaque attached to the monument’s pedestal reads: “We must never forget that freedom is never really free. It is the most costly thing in the world. Freedom is never paid in a lump sum. Installments come due in every generation. All any of us can do is offer the generations that follow a chance for freedom.”
It is difficult to say how these words relate to Armenians or Armenia, given that the American plane was conducting surveillance from Turkish territory before crossing the border in September 1958. It is equally difficult to know what might have happened that day had the MiG-17s not stopped the C-130’s unauthorized flight over Armenian territory.
The climb was preceded by months of training with a specially developed climbing program. The children had successively completed similar hikes and climbs at various mountain trails in Armenia, gained the necessary experience, adapted to the altitude and even spent the night on the South Peak of Aragats mountain, taking an important step on the way to adapting to high-altitude conditions.
The ascent to Mt. Ararat was not without trials, Panorama.am wrote. The altitude, walking at night and fatigue were serious challenges, but they were completely surmountable thanks to proper organization, supervision of guides and parents, gradual acclimatization and the children’s exceptional will.
No health-threatening situations were recorded during the climb.
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Verelq: Russia denies official negotiations with Berlin on the issue of Ukraine
Moscow has officially denied the information about negotiations with Germany on the settlement of the Ukrainian crisis at the state level, at the same time confirming the maintenance of informal contacts between public institutions.
Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Mikhail Galuzin according to TASS news agency, there is no official communication between Russia and Germany regarding the settlement of the conflict in Ukraine. He noted that such cooperation is unlikely at the current stage, given the anti-Russian rhetoric and actions of the German leadership. At the same time, the diplomat emphasized that informal meetings between representatives of various public institutions are continuing.
Rumors about possible back-to-back contacts intensified after Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev announced during a press conference with German politician Friedrich Mertz that a secret meeting of former Russian and German officials took place in Baku in mid-July without the Republic’s knowledge.
According to the Tagesschau news service, high-ranking people participated in those negotiations, most of whom were previously involved in the “Petersburg Dialogue” forum. On the Russian side, Valery Fadeev, chairman of the IHC, Viktor Zubkov, chairman of the board of directors of Gazprom, and Alexei Gromyko, director of the RGA European Institute, were allegedly present. On the German side, former chief of staff of Angela Merkel, Ronald Pofala, former leader of the Social Democratic Party of Germany, Matthias Platzeck, and former Swiss ambassador to Berlin, Tim Guldimann.
Against the background of these events, The Times newspaper reported on the change of mood in Germany and the development of plans to restore communication channels with Moscow in Berlin. Commenting on these publications, the press secretary of the Russian President, Dmitry Peskov, reminded that Russia has never initiated a break in relations and is open to dialogue. However, he noted that similar press statements are not reflected in the real policy of Western countries.
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