Armenia Says It Sees No Reason to Resume Active Participation in the CSTO

Mil.ru, CC BY 4.0, via Wikimedia Commons
Author: Sergey Komarin
01:00 12-08-2026

Armenia sees no reason to resume active participation in the CSTO while remaining a full EAEU member, according to ruling-party lawmaker Sargis Khandanyan.

Sargis Khandanyan, a member of the Armenian parliament from the ruling Civil Contract party, said Yerevan does not intend to return to its previous level of participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

According to Khandanyan, Armenia froze its involvement in the CSTO several years ago and currently sees no reason to reverse that course. He said there was no circumstance that, in his view, would push Yerevan to reactivate its participation in the alliance.

At the same time, Khandanyan stressed that Armenia is not considering leaving the Eurasian Economic Union in the near future. He said the country remains a full member of the EAEU and will continue to participate in the bloc both politically and through its financial commitments.

In September 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan said Yerevan had frozen its participation in the CSTO, arguing that the organisation had created threats to the country’s sovereignty. In December of the same year, he said relations between Armenia and the CSTO had passed the point of no return.

On August 11, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Galuzin said the issue of potentially stripping Armenia of its voting rights in the CSTO could be considered at the organisation’s summit on November 11.

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Normalization is the new threshold in South Caucasus

by Nazif Murat Ersavcı

 Aug 11, 2026 – 7:38 am GMT+3
Mount Ağrı, as seen from the Armenian side of the border with Türkiye, Armenia, Oct. 20, 2026. (Getty Images Photo)

Türkiye and Armenia have a rare window to move beyond normalization and establish lasting diplomatic, economic and regional ties

Relations between Türkiye and Armenia have long been constrained by historical legacies, unresolved conflicts and regional rivalries. Yet developments in the South Caucasus over the past several years have created a genuine opportunity to overcome this long-standing impasse. In an article I wrote for Daily Sabah in February 2026, I described this moment as a “window of opportunity.” The steps taken since then suggest that this window is widening.

The transformation began with Azerbaijan’s victory in the Second Karabakh War in 2020 and the new regional balance that emerged after 2023. The end of the old status quo created an opportunity to rethink the South Caucasus not through the lens of frozen conflicts, but based on sovereignty, mutual recognition, connectivity and regional cooperation.

The agreement reached between Azerbaijan and Armenia in Washington on Aug. 8, 2025, together with the initialing of the draft peace agreement, marked a historic milestone. By recognizing each other’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, renouncing territorial claims and committing to the principle of non-use of force, the two sides laid the foundations for a fundamentally different regional order. Important issues remain before peace is fully institutionalized. Nevertheless, the region has crossed an important threshold from conflict toward cooperation. This changing environment has also created new possibilities for Türkiye-Armenia relations.

The normalization process between Ankara and Yerevan is no longer confined to exploratory diplomatic contacts. Talks launched through special representatives in 2022 initially proceeded cautiously. Since then, the two sides have maintained regular political dialogue while taking practical steps on air connectivity, visa facilitation, trade, border arrangements and transportation.

The year 2026 has brought a more significant shift. On May 11, Türkiye announced that the necessary bureaucratic preparations had been completed to facilitate direct trade with Armenia. Yerevan welcomed the decision and expressed its hope that it would contribute to reopening the border and establishing diplomatic relations. The latter should now become the central objective.

What must be on agenda?

Türkiye and Armenia remain neighboring states without formal diplomatic relations. Whatever the historical reasons for this exceptional situation, the regional circumstances that sustained it have fundamentally changed. Establishing diplomatic relations would acknowledge that reality and provide an institutional framework for managing both cooperation and disagreement.

Diplomatic relations do not require the resolution of every historical or political dispute. Indeed, diplomacy exists precisely because states need permanent mechanisms through which to address disagreements. Embassies in Ankara and Yerevan would provide channels for sustained political communication, crisis management, economic cooperation and cultural exchange. They would also make normalization less dependent on temporary regional circumstances.

Economic relations can reinforce this process. Countries that trade, invest and develop shared interests have more to lose from renewed confrontation. Türkiye’s move toward facilitating direct trade with Armenia is therefore more than a commercial measure. It can help give political normalization a more durable foundation.

The same is true of railway connectivity. On April 28, a joint Turkish-Armenian working group met in Kars to discuss rehabilitating and reopening the Kars-Gyumri railway. A functioning connection could eventually become part of a wider transportation network linking Anatolia with the South Caucasus and onward to Central Asia. Combined with efforts by Azerbaijan and Armenia to reopen regional transportation routes, it could help transform the South Caucasus from a geography defined by conflict into one increasingly shaped by transit, trade and connectivity.

However, infrastructure works best when supported by predictable political relations. Railways, trade routes and border crossings should therefore be understood not as substitutes for diplomatic normalization, but as components of it.

Armenia’s parliamentary elections in June 2026 have added another important dimension. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract Party retained power with approximately half of the vote. The significance of the result goes beyond Pashinyan remaining in office. Despite the difficult post-Karabakh political environment, Armenian voters renewed his mandate to pursue peace with Azerbaijan, normalize relations with Türkiye and reduce Armenia’s regional isolation.

Opposition groups and parts of the diaspora will continue to challenge aspects of normalization, while constitutional questions remain unresolved. Yet Pashinyan now has greater political room to institutionalize peace with Azerbaijan and advance relations with Türkiye. This opportunity should not be wasted. For Ankara and Yerevan, the logical next step is therefore to move from a normalization process managed primarily through special representatives toward formal diplomatic relations.

The opening of the land border should form part of that process. The Alican-Margara crossing could initially operate under arrangements already discussed by the two sides, followed by reciprocal crossings for Turkish and Armenian citizens and commercial freight. But the border should not become the sole measure of progress.

The broader objective must be normal relations between two neighboring states. The economic benefits could be substantial, particularly for eastern Türkiye and Western Armenia. Kars, Iğdır and neighboring provinces could benefit from increased trade, logistics, tourism and services. Armenia would gain easier access through Türkiye to Mediterranean and European markets. Renewed interaction between Kars and Gyumri could gradually transform peripheral border regions into gateways for wider regional commerce.

People-to-people contacts matter as well. Easier travel would allow Armenians greater access to sites of historical and cultural heritage in Türkiye while creating more opportunities for Turkish citizens to visit Armenia. Places such as Ani could increasingly become spaces of interaction rather than symbols solely of contested historical memory.

Institutionalizing normalization

None of this means that the South Caucasus is free of risks. The Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process still needs to be fully institutionalized. Constitutional debates in Armenia continue, transportation arrangements remain sensitive, Iran has concerns about regional connectivity projects, and Russia’s evolving role creates additional uncertainty. But these challenges are not arguments for delaying normalization. They are reasons to institutionalize it. Formal diplomatic channels, stronger economic relations and greater social interaction can help insulate bilateral relations from future crises.

Türkiye’s approach has so far ensured that normalization with Armenia develops alongside the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process rather than at the expense of Azerbaijan’s security concerns. While this coordination initially appeared to slow progress, it also prevented Türkiye-Armenia rapprochement from becoming a source of tension.

Today, progress between Azerbaijan and Armenia creates room for Türkiye-Armenia normalization to become a complementary pillar of a broader regional peace architecture. Establishing diplomatic relations with Yerevan need not weaken Türkiye’s strategic partnership with Azerbaijan. If carefully coordinated with Baku, it could instead strengthen the emerging regional order and expand Ankara’s ability to contribute to its development.

The question, therefore, is whether Ankara and Yerevan are ready to transform normalization into normal interstate relations. The circumstances are unusually favorable. Progress in the Azerbaijan-Armenia peace process, Pashinyan’s renewed mandate, the easing of trade restrictions and preparations to restore the Kars-Gyumri railway have created a convergence of political and economic opportunities that may not last indefinitely.

Lasting peace in the South Caucasus cannot rest on agreements and diplomatic statements alone. It must eventually become visible in trains crossing borders, trucks carrying goods, tourists visiting neighboring countries and communities rebuilding economic ties after decades of separation. But these practical forms of cooperation need political institutions capable of sustaining them. For the first time in many years, political will, security conditions and economic interests are moving broadly in the same direction. Establishing diplomatic relations between Türkiye and Armenia would demonstrate that both countries are prepared to turn this moment into a lasting transformation.

For Turkish diplomacy, it would also mark the success of a patient and coordinated regional strategy. The next threshold in Türkiye-Armenia relations should therefore not be defined by the opening of a single border crossing. It should be the establishment of a normal diplomatic relationship, in which diplomacy provides the framework and trade, connectivity and people-to-people contact give it substance.