Large-scale geopolitical shifts and the war in Iran call into question the implementation of key infrastructure initiatives in the South Caucasus. The center of attention is the Armenian-American TRIPP logistics project, the prospects of which may change significantly against the background of the potential conflict in Iran and the hardening of the positions of Moscow and Tehran. Under these conditions, is it possible to redirect transit flows to the north of Armenia along the Ijevan-Gazakh route, and how do other regional players look at such prospects?
VERELQ talked with a political scientist, senior researcher of the APRI Armenia Post-Soviet Center about these complex logistics nodes, US strategic interests and the future of the region’s transportation de-blocking process. Benjamin Poghosyan with
Benyamin Poghosyan is in the photo, the source is Sputnik
VERELQ. Will the war in Iran be able to paralyze the Armenian-American TRIPP logistics project (mainly with American participation and investment) in southern Armenia, given its proximity to the Iranian border?
Benjamin Poghosyan. I believe that the war in Iran poses significant risks to the implementation of the TRIPP project. As far as can be judged, the outcome of the conflict will only strengthen the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the strategic decision-making process in Iran. We know that, since August 2025, the IRPC has shown a very negative attitude towards the TRIPP project, while, for example, the presidential administration has taken a more or less neutral position. It can be predicted with confidence that Iran’s attitude towards the project will only harden, and it will become a serious problem for its implementation.
In addition, we see Russia changing its neutral-positive rating from just after August 2025 to a more negative one. As Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk announced on April 2, 2026, the Washington Declaration of 2025 violated the two-century balance of power in the South Caucasus. Most likely, we will now face a situation where both Iran and Russia will take a tougher stance on the TRIPP project. Yes, it does create serious obstacles and risks.
VERELQ. With Iran openly attacking US facilities in the Persian Gulf, will this force Washington to freeze the Armenian project due to security risks?
Benjamin Poghosyan. It is now difficult to assess possible US actions. It is clear that even an interim peace agreement between the US and Iran will not resolve all the fundamental differences between them, and above all between Israel and Iran. It means that any peace treaty signing will be only a big pause before the next war.
As I already mentioned, Iran will adopt a tougher stance towards TRIPP. Finally, Tehran may start putting pressure not on the US, but on the Armenian government, announcing the inadmissibility of the project. If the implementation continues, Iran may take various actions against it. Whether or not that will stop the Americans is hard to say, but it does, again, pose significant risks to the project. In addition, Russia will also come out tougher against it. So the situation around TRIPP remains rather unclear.
VERELQ. If the southern corridor loses its relevance due to its dangerous proximity to the theater of hostilities in Iran, will the northern Ijevan-Gazakh route become a major transport project in the process of unblocking communications with Azerbaijan?
Benjamin Poghosyan. I practically exclude that Azerbaijan will agree to this. First of all, we need to understand. Baku’s main goal is to get a “corridor” to Nakhichevan and then to Turkey. Unblocking other transport routes (including sections of the Armenian-Azerbaijani, Armenian-Nakhjevan and Armenian-Turkish borders) is not part of Azerbaijan’s plans. Even if the TRIPP project is implemented, I am not sure that Azerbaijan will open the border between Armenia and Nakhichevan for direct rail communication with Iran, or that Turkey will completely block the borders, giving Armenia rail access to its Black Sea and Mediterranean ports. That is, even after a successful project launch, I am not sure that all other communications will be opened.
The main goal of Azerbaijan and Turkey is to create the shortest route from Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan and Turkey with a length of only 43 kilometers. It should become an alternative to the current route through Georgia and the potential route through Iran (meaning the Araksian Corridor). This is what is fundamental for Azerbaijan. I completely exclude the scenario in which Azerbaijan, not getting a road to Nakhichevan via Syunik, will agree to open other parts of the border, including the Kazakh-Ijevan rail connection, just to allow Armenia to connect its territory to Russia or the Caspian Sea by rail.
VERELQ. Is it worthwhile to redirect transit flows to Yerevan from the unstable south to the north, given that the Ijevan-Gazakh route would potentially integrate the central and northern regions of the country into international trade more quickly?
Benjamin Poghosyan. From Armenia’s point of view, the opening of the Kazakh-Ijevan railway corridor is certainly a more acceptable option. This route does not pass through the south of the country and has nothing to do with the so-called “Zangezur Corridor”. It is clear that it is beneficial to Yerevan. Russian products will be able to reach Ijevan directly by rail through the territory of Azerbaijan. Large logistics centers can be built there for further distribution of goods by road transport. A similar scheme is also applicable in the opposite direction. cargo delivery by car to Ijevan, and from there by rail to Russia.
It is quite obvious that this is beneficial for Yerevan, because it removes the issue of Syunik. There are risks that Azerbaijan could use the TRIPP project to increase its economic presence in the Syunik region with the long-term intention of taking it under de facto control, according to statements by Azerbaijani officials and experts. With the opening of the Kazakh-Ijevan railway, these risks are completely neutralized.
VERELQ. If the implementation of TRIPP stops in the South, will American capital try to shift its political and financial support to the Northern transport projects in order to maintain the status of the main moderator in the South Caucasus?
Benjamin Poghosyan. Frankly, I doubt that the Americans will be interested in the opening of the Kazakh-Ijevan railway branch. In that case, Ijevan will become a terminus, and this route will exclusively serve the interests of Armenia, an opportunity to import goods by rail, not only through Georgia.
If we consider the theoretical possibility of connecting Ijevan with the Meghradzor-Hrazdan route, and then with Yerevan, Yeraskh and Nakhichevan, the Americans could agree that this would form a corridor between Azerbaijan and Nakhichevan. However, the section from Ijevan to Meghradzor is distinguished by extremely difficult terrain. Compared to the construction of 43 kilometers with Meghri, much larger investments will be required there. If the southern railway can be built in one and a half to two years, connecting Ijevan to Meghradzor, Hrazdan and Yerevan will require huge capital investments and three to five years of work. Will American investors be interested in that is the big question.
But, as I already emphasized, Azerbaijanis are not interested in this at all. They need direct access to Nakhichevan and Turkey exclusively through Syunik. Neither Azerbaijan nor, as far as I understand, Turkey is interested in any other option. Therefore, I do not see forces that will be able to force Baku to agree to the opening of the Kazakh-Ijevan road, to abandon the “Zangezur Corridor” project and to wait 5-6 years to enter Nakhichevan through the north of Armenia.
We must understand that both the paragraph 9 of the trilateral declaration of November 2020 on the opening of communications and the Washington declaration of August 2025 are considered by Azerbaijan as documents for the implementation of the so-called “Zangezur Corridor” project, albeit in a modified form. The main and only goal for Baku and Ankara is to connect Azerbaijan with Nakhichevan and Turkey through Syunik. Therefore, it is completely unclear to me who and how can force Azerbaijan to agree to the northern railway branch.
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