At a campaign rally in Armenia’s capital, Yerevan, on Saturday, one day before Armenia’s election, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, outfitted in a white button-up shirt and a red-brimmed baseball cap, held a look of determination.

Flanked by supporters waving their arms and flashing his campaign’s signature heart-shaped hand gesture, Pashinyan was perched centre stage, pounding away on a drum kit for the crowds – literally drumming up support.

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By election day, his governing Civil Contract party appeared to have drummed up something more consequential: public backing for his vision of Armenia’s future following the loss of the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh to a crushing military defeat by Azerbaijan in 2023. 

Pashinyan, who formed a band earlier this year and campaigned with a series of concerts around the country, secured 49.8 percent of the vote in Sunday’s ballot, enough to retain a parliamentary majority.

His victory is seen as a test of his handling of the loss of the Nagorno-Karabakh region and his ability to steer the country away from Russian influence.

He has ultimately prevailed despite Russian meddling in Armenian politics, and the country now looks set to reorient itself away from its former ruler – signalling Armenians’ willingness to embrace a new direction, analysts say.

“Many Armenians are prepared to give his new vision a chance: an Armenia less defined by conflict, more open to normalising relations with Azerbaijan and Turkiye, and increasingly focused on building its future within its internationally recognised borders,” Zaur Shiriyev, an analyst at the Carnegie ⁠Russia Eurasia Center, told Al Jazeera.

‘Tired of conflict and war’

The loss of Nagorno-Karabakh could have spelled political doom for Pashinyan. By handing him a second term, Armenians have signalled that they are ready to put the conflict that has intermittently reared its head for decades behind them, analysts say.

“Nationalism no longer resonates among the public, which is demonstrably tired of conflict and war,” Richard Giragosian, director of the Yerevan-based Regional Studies Center, told Al Jazeera, even if the loss of the region remains an “open wound”, he said.

Nagorno-Karabakh, meanwhile, no longer features at all in the Armenian government’s defence reform, nor in its national security strategy, “a final confirmation of the new strategy of diversification”, Giragosian explained.

Peace efforts instead took centre stage in Pashinyan’s campaign, including the agreement he signed at the White House last August with Azerbaijan, finally ending the on-again-off-again war that had raged since the late 1980s.

Unlike in 2021, when Pashinyan’s campaign was shaped by the immediate aftermath of war and questions of political survival, Sunday’s vote became a clearer test of public support for his peace agenda, Shiriyev said.

Peace over nationalism

The result also demonstrates that the nationalist mantras peddled by opposition leaders have not been able to sway the majority of Armenians, said Svante Cornell, director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy and its Central Asia-Caucasus programme.

“The opposition represented a return to oligarchy, nationalism and forever conflict,” Cornell told Al Jazeera.

“While the Pashinyan government has its flaws, it represents something different than the past.”

The election saw the two main opposition forces – Strong Armenia and Armenia Alliance – win 41 seats combined in the new parliament, against the 64 seats the government holds, out of a total 105.

But Giragosian cautioned against overstating the opposition’s strength as, he said, the two opposition parties are unlikely to cooperate given the friction between their leaders – Russian-Armenian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan, whose Strong Armenia took 29 seats, and former President Robert Kocharian, whose Armenia Alliance won just 12.

“The division and dissent within the opposition will present a profound obstacle,” he said.

Although united in their shared pro-Russian leanings, Karapetyan is seen by Kocharian as an “interfering interloper”, with Kocharian himself resenting his third-place position behind Karapetyan, the analyst said.

“This is further exacerbated by Kocharian’s sense of entitlement, and his frustration of being rebuffed by Moscow in his prior attempts to gain direct Russian backing and support,” Giragosian added.

Still, Cornell said, the persistence of pro-Russian, nationalist sentiment in Armenia generally should not be taken lightly.

Until 2020, Armenia was governed by successive administrations that spent three decades pushing a nationalist identity, he said.

“To expect such views, such sentiments would just disappear – would be unrealistic,” Cornell noted.

Supporters of Armenia’s ruling Civil Contract party led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan gather in Republic Square in Yerevan, Armenia, Friday, June 5, 2026, for the party’s final campaign rally [Anthony Pizzoferrato/AP]

Russian influence weakened – but not gone

In the lead-up to Sunday’s election, international observers had accused Russia of attempting to interfere – but its inability to change the result reflects Moscow’s limited reach in the country today, analysts say.

“Moscow still has tools in Armenia, but it no longer has the authority it once had,” Shiriyev said.

“In today’s Armenia, being seen as Russia’s preferred candidate can mobilise voters against you as much as for you.”

As Armenia strives to resist what Shiriyev refers to as the “gravitational pull” of the “Russian orbit”, a window of opportunity has been created by Moscow’s preoccupation with its invasion of Ukraine and a new openness from Western partners.

“The larger risk is from not altering strategy, and the benefits of a pivot to the West are both demonstrable and popular in Armenia today,” Giragosian said.

Russia, he added, is now increasingly viewed in Armenia as a “dangerously undependable so-called partner”.

Benyamin Poghosyan, an Armenia analyst at the Italian Institute for International Political Studies, argues that the primary foreign policy drivers of the election, however, were regional actors – not Russia or the West.

“The reality on the ground is far more nuanced,” Poghosyan told Al Jazeera. Armenia’s future relations with Azerbaijan and Turkiye, as well as the regional fallout from the conflict in Iran, are far greater influences, he said.

There are good reasons not to count Moscow out completely, however. While pro-Russian forces did not prevail this time, they will continue to assert their influence, Cornell said. He referred to the cautionary tale of another Caucasus country.

“In Georgia, the work of undermining a reformist and pro-Western government and turning the country around to a more pro-Russian line took over 15 years,” he said.

At the same time, Moscow still holds massive economic leverage over Yerevan, said the analysts.

Russia remains the primary export destination for Armenian agriculture and wine, is the main source of critical imports like wheat, and supplies the country with heavily discounted gas, Poghosyan noted.

“Because Russia has the capacity to inflict severe economic pain, Yerevan must tread carefully to protect its core interests without completely rupturing its relationship with Moscow,” he said.

Shiriyev added that many Armenians work in Russia, with families depending on remittances, and business ties running deep.

“By contrast, Western integration can still feel abstract and uncertain to many voters. That is why pro-Russian forces can still gain traction, even as Russia’s political image in Armenia has weakened,” he said.

A constitutional hurdle

But while Pashinyan’s re-election has strengthened his hand in the country’s peace process, it has not resolved one key sticking point for constitutional change to ensure it, said Shiriyev.

Azerbaijan has demanded a change to Yerevan’s constitution as a means of guaranteeing that no future Armenian government might revive claims related to Nagorno-Karabakh or Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.

“But Pashinyan lacks the two-thirds majority needed to move easily toward a referendum, and even a referendum would be politically uncertain,” said Shiriyev.

This election, Cornell said, was “a necessary but not sufficient condition for the peace process to advance”.

Poghosyan warned that if Baku refuses to drop these preconditions, “the peace agreement will remain stalled, leaving both nations trapped in a volatile state of ‘no war, no peace’”.

On the question of regional normalisation, however, the outlook has shifted.

Since the bilateral peace treaty was signed at the White House last August, Azerbaijan has lifted restrictions on trade and transit with Armenia and restarted talks on border demarcation – moves that Giragosian said have also accelerated the opening for Armenia-Turkiye normalisation.

“For Armenia,” said Shiriyev, “the West may offer the road, Russia increasingly acts as the roadblock, and normalisation with Azerbaijan and Turkiye is the real prize.”

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