Moscow Concerned About Armenia’s Wavering EAEU Membership

Toneyan Mark

Moscow Concerned About Armenia’s Wavering EAEU Membership

Foreign Policy Publication  Eurasia Daily Monitor  Armenia 

06.16.2026

Luke Rodeheffer

Moscow Concerned About Armenia’s Wavering EAEU Membership

Executive Summary:

  • The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) is continuing to pursue free trade across member-states, but Armenia’s membership is in doubt following the Armenian Prime Minister’s pro-Western Civil Contract party’s victory in the country’s June 7 parliamentary elections.
  • Trade volume among member states remains low for a free trade bloc, and the economic effects of Armenia’s potential exit would likely be negligible for the EAEU as a whole.
  • Moscow’s and other member states’ responses to the possibility of Armenia leaving the bloc have highlighted that the EAEU is as much a political project as an economic one.

The Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, the governing body of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), held a meeting in Astana on May 26–28 (24.kz, May 28). [1] The topics of discussion included how to leverage artificial intelligence to accelerate trade movement and digitize the trade bloc’s economies. The latest changes unveiled by the trade bloc include a digitized system for the transit of goods across the free trade zone (Orda.kz, May 28). The results of Armenia’s June 7 parliamentary elections, however, undermined this news. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s pro-Western Civil Contract party won the parliamentary elections, meaning Armenia will likely continue pursuing negotiations for rapprochement with the European Union, and discussions about possibly leaving the EAEU remain on the table (see EDM, June 5). The country’s parliament approved legislation initiating the EU accession process in March 2025 and continues to cooperate with the bloc (see EDM, May 11). Russian President Vladimir Putin has pushed for a referendum in Armenia to decide decisively between the EAEU and the European Union (RITM Eurasia, June 5).

The chairman of Russia’s Duma, Vyacheslav Volodin, stated that if Armenia exits the EAEU, “the cost of gas will increase by a factor of four, the remittance payments that are worth $4 billion/year will be radically reduced” before threatening to halt the import of goods from Armenia into Russia (Interfax, June 2). He further noted that such punitive measures were imposed on Ukraine following Kyiv’s decision to pursue rapprochement with the European Union (Telegram/@vv_volodin; RTVI, June 2).

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksei Overchuk announced that Russia and other EAEU member states were studying ways to end Armenia’s membership in the trade bloc (Interfax, June 4). He also threatened further actions to block Armenian imports in the name of “protecting the Russian market.” Import bans on a variety of different Armenian exports, from alcohol to mineral water and vegetables, have already been introduced (Rosbalt, June 2; see EDM, June 5).

Russian media has trumpeted that the volume of trade between EAEU member states reached a record of nearly $100 billion in 2025. This number, however, is a small fraction of the bloc’s total combined gross-domestic product (GDP) of $3 trillion (TKS.RU, April 10). This is far lower than the levels of intra-EU trade, which reached 61.8 percent in 2024 (European Parliament, October 12, 2024). 

Beyond facilitating commodity corridors across the post-Soviet space, the EAEU has struggled to develop industrial cooperation among its member blocs, as a recent event between Kyrgyz and Belarusian business leaders demonstrated. Despite Belarus’s expertise in agricultural machinery and free trade among EAEU member states, very few manufactured goods are purchased in Kyrgyzstan due to competition from the People’s Republic of China (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, June 3). Armenia’s trade volume with the EAEU was $1.41 billion in the first quarter of 2026, a decline of 15.6 percent, while its volume with the European Union was $763.2 million, an increase of 54.3 percent (Novosti Armenia, May 29). Kazakhstan’s business press has noted that trade between Kazakhstan and Armenia is very low, so any effect of Armenia’s exit would be negligible for the country’s economy. Trade volume between the two states was only 0.3 percent of Kazakhstan’s total trade with other EAEU members in the first quarter of 2026 (InBusiness.kz, June 8). Kyrgyzstan’s business press also noted similar trends of very low trade volumes with Armenia (Economist.kg, June 4).

Kazakhstani economist Meruert Makhmutova, from the country’s Public Policy Research Center, stated that the EAEU has played a key role in Russia’s ability to subvert Western sanctions. The bloc may repeat the fate of the Soviet Union, however, if Russia’s economy deteriorates because of its war against Ukraine and drags the rest of the member states with it. Kazakhstan, which was instrumental in the creation of the free trade zone, may be the last to leave it (Exclusive.kz, May 26). She also noted that the trade zone has enabled Russian businesses to compete in Kazakhstani state tenders, but has made it much more difficult for Kazakhstani firms to access Russian tenders. Her criticisms echo those that have been leveled at the bloc by Central Asian economists and business leaders in the past, particularly in the aftermath of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine (see EDM, March 4, 2024).

Deputy Belarusian Prime Minister Natalya Petkevich admitted in a press conference that “the situation with Armenia and Moldova demonstrates that we need new levers for the union to function comprehensively” (NewsAM, May 31). The language Petkevich chose is revealing, as the term lever is often used in the sense of control. The response to Armenia’s wavering in EAEU membership has revealed the extent to which the trade bloc remains as much a political project as a trade bloc. Russia has struggled to attract other post-Soviet states into the bloc, notably Uzbekistan, the most populous country in Central Asia, whose parliament rejected membership for the time being in October 2024 (see EDM, February 26, 2025). The EAEU remains a key element of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy vision, and Moscow will likely take the idea that the bloc is not only not expanding but potentially contracting as a serious blow to the country’s prestige.

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What Does Pashinyan’s Parliamentary Victory Mean for Armenia’s Future?

Emil Lazarian

What Does Pashinyan’s Parliamentary Victory Mean for Armenia’s Future?

Pashinyan’s pro-European party has been re-elected with a decisive victory. But the pro-Russian opposition could still slow Armenia’s progress toward peace with Azerbaijan and rapprochement with Europe.

By Mikayel Zolyan
Published on Jun 16, 2026


The solid victory of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party in Armenia’s recent parliamentary elections has left observers with many questions. How did Pashinyan manage to win again after Armenia’s crushing defeat in the war with Azerbaijan and the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh, which caused deep disappointment and polarization in Armenian society? And why did the Kremlin’s political machinations, which intimidate even advanced democracies, fail to work in a country with nascent institutions, where Moscow retains powerful levers of influence?

According to the election results, Pashinyan’s party won a convincing 49.7 percent of the vote, with its share reaching as high as 60 percent in rural areas. Strong Armenia, led by the pro-Russian oligarch Samvel Karapetyan (23.3 percent), and the Armenia Alliance led by former president Robert Kocharyan (9.9 percent) also cleared the 4 percent threshold for parliamentary representation. 

What’s striking about the results is that the pro-European party gained more votes in the provinces, while pro-Russian nationalists performed better in large cities. This paradox might have been due to Armenians with dual Russian citizenship visiting to vote for Karapetyan (voter turnout was a full 10 percent higher than usual), but there are other persuasive explanations.

One is that a pro-Pashinyan “silent majority” has formed in regions that benefited from infrastructure projects after the 2018 Velvet Revolution and border villages grateful for the winding down of the armed conflict with Azerbaijan. The silent majority was willing to do anything to prevent the pre-revolutionary “old guard” and their pro-Russian networks from returning to power. Joined by supporters of EU integration and those annoyed by Kremlin interference, they made waves in the parliamentary election.

In large cities, on the other hand, a vocal segment of the Armenian middle class and intelligentsia— who one might think would be EU integration’s biggest supporters—remain unable to forgive Pashinyan for the loss of Karabakh and for abandoning the pursuit of international recognition of the Armenian genocide.

Most likely, Moscow’s threats of a trade war and import bans on Armenian products were meant to scare the silent majority away from supporting Pashinyan. However, the measures appear to have backfired. Armenian society cannot forgive Russia—its official Collective Security Treaty Organization ally—for abandoning Armenia just when it most needed its assistance during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War with Azerbaijan in 2020, which ended in Armenia’s defeat and the subsequent flight of ethnic Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh. Indeed, Russian officials’ justification for the import ban (“phytosanitary standards”) seemed so mocking that it spurred even some of Pashinyan’s critics to vote for him.

Nevertheless, pro-Russian parties hardly performed poorly. They owe their parliamentary gains to the segment of Armenian society that’s still willing to believe Moscow and blames Pashinyan for the loss of Karabakh.

Support from the West also helped counter Russian pressure. For all their disagreements, Washington and Brussels are on the same page with regard to Armenia. In a Truth Social post, U.S. President Donald Trump expressed support for Pashinyan and called for “Making Armenia Great Again.” A few days before the election, Secretary of State Marco Rubio flew to Yerevan and, without leaving the airport, signed several agreements with his Armenian counterpart regarding the implementation of the TRIPP transit route and rare earth metals.

The Europeans offered even greater support. The May summit of the European Political Community in Yerevan was unprecedented in terms of the number of high-ranking guests. Nor was it all for show. The EU allocated grants to Armenia for various EU integration programs, sent a “partnership mission” to counter hybrid threats, provided financial assistance, and temporarily opened its market to Armenian products barred from Russian markets.

The neutrality of Armenia’s neighbors also alleviated some of the pressure. Despite their ties to Moscow and strained relations with the West, Georgia and Iran reacted calmly to Pashinyan’s victory.

There were greater concerns over Azerbaijan and Turkey. Armenians’ distrust of these countries risks undermining Pashinyan’s biggest projects: the peace agenda and open borders. Many in Armenia do not believe long-term peace with Azerbaijan and Turkey is possible and view these neighbors as an existential threat—a sentiment that the pro-Russian opposition actively exploited. Armenia’s pre-election infospace was haunted by the claim that if Pashinyan won, 300,000 Azerbaijanis would move to Armenia—despite the 2025 Washington Agreement having settled the issue of returning Azerbaijanis.

Under such circumstances, any actions or even statements from Baku or Ankara that could be interpreted as confirming the fears of Armenian society could have brought Pashinyan’s approval ratings crashing down. This is precisely why Azerbaijan and Turkey’s “benevolent neutrality” proved so important.

True, at the beginning of the year, many in Yerevan expected more from both Baku and, especially, Ankara. Some hoped that the Armenian–Turkish border would be opened to third-country nationals before the elections, a move that has been discussed for several years. However, Ankara decided to follow Azerbaijan’s lead, and Baku preferred to wait until the election results were in.

At the very least, both countries refrained from aggressive rhetoric. Various cargoes continued to flow into Armenia via Azerbaijani territory, and Ankara allowed Armenia to use the Gyumri–Akhalqalaki–Kars railway, essentially linking the country to Europe by rail. The conflict persists, in some ways: The destruction of the Cathedral of the Holy Mother of God in Nagorno-Karabakh in late April is proof. However, the situation as a whole remains stable.

The road ahead remains rocky for Pashinyan. He secured the silent majority’s support but lost part of the middle class, while his political enemies are emboldened. The pro-Russian opposition, with its new seats in parliament, is bound to create problems for Pashinyan. His personal feud with Kocharyan and his equally toxic rivalry with Karapetyan will add fuel to the fire.

Pashinyan’s victory was decisive, but not a landslide. It’s enough to form a single-party government and pass laws independently, but not enough to secure a constitutional majority—which could cause problems in the peace process with Azerbaijan. Baku is currently insisting that before a peace treaty can be signed, Armenia must amend its constitution to remove indirect references to Nargorno-Karabakh: something that would require a referendum. It’s also possible that the parties will find other ways to make progress—like signing but not ratifying a treaty or opening Armenia’s borders without one.

The pro-Russian opposition won’t be able to halt the peace process, but it could slow down Armenia’s rapprochement with the EU. Its strong showing in the parliamentary election could also give Moscow the impression that Pashinyan is less secure than he seems, motivating it to ramp up hybrid pressure on Yerevan.

Still, Armenia’s rapprochement with the West will persist—as will the cycle of tension and normalization in its relations with Russia. Pashinyan has already announced an upcoming visit to Moscow, while Russia has banned even more Armenian imports. Yet increasing the pressure too far now that the election is over could backfire for Russia, jeopardizing its remaining assets in Armenia, from companies such as Gazprom Armenia and South Caucasus Railways to the military base at Gyumri.


About the Author

Mikayel Zolyan
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Former member of Armenian Parliament



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    Verelq: Prime Minister’s nephew returns to politics

    Talar Tumanian

    “Hraparak” newspaper writes:


    “In the Ijevan government circles, they are talking about that Nikol Pashinyan the son of his older brother Artak, a former deputy of the National Assembly Sipan Pashinyan, will be appointed governor of Tavush. He was a deputy of the previous convocation, after which he was engaged in business in Ukraine, but during the pre-election campaign he arrived in Armenia to support his uncle’s re-election.


    He even went to marzes, campaigning, and in one village, in one of the videos, one of the villagers told him that he will not apologize, you will not clean up the consequences of what you did. Pashinyan’s classmate, sponsor of his marriage Hayk Ghalumyan, let’s remind, the governor of Tavush is working in 2021. from April 8. He was on pre-election leave from May 8, campaigning for the CP.


    After June 8, on the website of the Tavush Governorate Hayk Ghalumyan there is no decision, no event with his participation, no information about the meeting. He is number 49 on the KP electoral list, and the KP gets 64 mandates.”

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    Iran’s positions are being strengthened in the South Caucasus

    Aram Torosian

    Ahead of the possible agreement between Iran and the USA, hypocritical statements are being made about what kind of progress diplomacy can provide.


    All of them are false, because the progress in the diplomatic dimension was ensured by the Iranian armed forces with their missiles, anti-aircraft missiles, military motorboats, and the military-political elite and people of that country with their unwavering will and spirit.


    The USA is too powerful a superpower to talk about the weakening of this country after failure in a specific conflict.


    However, it is obvious that Iran’s undoubted strategic success in the last war has noticeably reduced the projection of US power in the entire Middle Eastern region and, on the contrary, has strengthened Iran’s position and authority in an unprecedented way, and thus expanded the range of Iranian power projection, which will also become noticeable in the South Caucasus.


    Now there seems to be no doubt left that Iran really deserves the allegorical title of “Lion of the Middle East”.


    Iranologist Vardan Voskanyan




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    Azerbaijani officials already feel at home in Armenia

    Jirair Kafian

    Immediately after the elections, in the context of the rejoicing of the Azerbaijani official and officials who rushed to Armenia, the images of the Azerbaijani attack in 2022 are in my mind.


    After publicly shooting unarmed Armenian servicemen, desecrating the bodies of dead female servicemen, and occupying the sovereign territories of RA, Azerbaijani officials are coming to RA one by one.


    What happened to them? what did they think of what they did to our country, and now they are wrapping their own agenda around the necks of the capitulators.


    And in response to these, inside the country, he terrorizes from left to right, detains one, and threatens the other.


    Tigran Abrahamyan, secretary of “I have an honor” faction




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    Pashinyan provokes the opposition to take hasty steps

    Garo Vardanian

    Nikol Pashinyan is clearly speeding up the opposition.


    Nikol Pashinyan does not stop his harsh and aggressive rhetoric towards the leading forces of the opposition even after the election. This raises the question, was that rhetoric not just part of pre-election campaign logic, does Pashinyan really intend to go “to the end” this time?


    In practice, Nikol Pashinyan himself is worried about the end and is trying to speed up the opposition. His steps are aimed at pushing the opposition to action, keeping the influence of the emotional field active. Nikol Pashinyan perfectly understands that time is not in his favor, and even more so after the election, when you don’t have an absolute victory, but you also had to declare an absolute victory.


    In that case, he is looking for a chance for himself in the quick steps and decisions of the opposition. It is also with these circumstances in mind that immediately after the election voting, I spoke about the fact that everything is just beginning in terms of political confrontation and the main characteristic required from the opposition is strategic patience and the development of decisions based on it.


    Analyst Hakob Badalyan




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    “Wings of Unity” party will challenge the results of the elections to the CC

    Garnik Tadevosian
    Լուսանկարը՝ aravot.am

    We will stand by the 33,537 votes given to us. people trusted and believed in us, and we will legitimately go to the end in every way to protect those votes, Liparit Drmeyan, the representative of the “Unity Wings” party, said at the meeting with journalists.


    “We consider the decision of the Central Electoral Commission on June 14 illegal. We will go to the end in all ways not prohibited by law to protect the votes given to us, including we will appeal to the Constitutional Court,” said Drmeyan.


    He mentioned that the results of the elections do not express the real will of the voters.


    “They do not express it on the basis that during the pre-election period, the CP and the government apparatus used such measures on the voters that they could not freely express their will. The freedom of choice protected by the constitution has been violated,” said Liparit Drmeyan.


    He stated that the elections were not free and equal.

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    About 146 billion drams were allocated to the support of displaced people from Karabakh

    Toneyan Mark

    In 2025, as in previous years, issues of improving the socio-economic integration environment of our compatriots displaced from Karabakh continued to remain among the main priorities of the RA government. RA Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Khachatryan announced this at the session of the National Assembly on June 16, referring to the support provided to our compatriots displaced from Karabakh during the implementation of the 2025 state budget.


    According to him, the programs implemented by the Government in this direction since September 2023 allowed not only to effectively manage the crisis, but also created reliable prerequisites for ensuring the transition from urgent support to socio-economic integration.


    “If in 2023-2024 the Government’s priority in the support formats financed by budget programs was the compensation of the living expenses of the displaced, including the rents, then in 2025 the implementation of housing solutions, as well as the implementation of programs that strengthen decent well-being through self-employment, was considered a priority,” said the Deputy Prime Minister.


    Khachatryan also informed that as of May 31, 2026, within the framework of the apartment purchase program, 6,444 families, including 26,432 people, have been issued certificates.


    “More than 2,970 of the families or 13,400 people have already bought their house or apartment. The value of the apartments bought by our displaced compatriots within the framework of government support is about 48 billion drams,” he said.


    The Deputy Prime Minister also informed that at the end of 2025, the Government also approved the measure of partial payment of rent for individual groups displaced from Karabakh, financial support programs will continue.


    “In general, in 2025, about 38 billion drams were spent in the direction of the above-mentioned support programs, and in the state budget of 2026, the amount of allocations in the same program directions is 55 billion,” he said, emphasizing that as of December 31, 2025, more than 31 thousand 300 displaced compatriots in Armenia have permanent jobs or are self-employed.


    “In general, 45 billion 700 million drams were actually spent from the state budget in 2025 for the implementation of support programs for our compatriots displaced from Karabakh, and from 2023, about 146 billion drams,” said the deputy prime minister.

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    Voters’ votes complicated the implementation of Baku’s plans

    Chakrian Hovsep

    Recently, a woman very upset asked me if it was really pointless to go to the elections, because it was not possible to remove the existing “Demolish the State” party. I answered that by going to the election, they prevented Aliyev’s toy political force from gaining a constitutional majority in the parliament and from holding the Aliyev referendum. The lady was very happy that her vote could be useful in preventing or at least significantly complicating the Azerbaijani plans towards our country.


    It is very important that the political forces can have a simple and honest conversation with the citizens who voted. It is important to explain to the citizen in the simplest possible, clear and understandable language that his vote is really valuable, maybe at the moment it is not possible to remove the ruling power, but without the active political participation of citizens, no issue can be solved in this country.


    The last elections proved that the RA citizen can change anything. Another thing is that the political forces that have assumed responsibility should be able to capitalize on that vote, not disappoint the citizens who voted for them, be able to show the significance and importance of all that, so that the citizen is motivated to participate in the political changes of his country and understand that the only real change maker is himself.


    Azerbaijanologist Tatev Hayrapetyan




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    The Central Bank predicts a decrease in revenues in the RA economy

    Aram Torosian

    Problems arising in individual export markets may lead to a decrease in income in the RA economy, as well as the formation of an excess supply of individual products, containing mainly deflationary risks. This is reported by the Central Bank of RA.


    In the conditions of current macroeconomic developments, RA financial market participants on average expect that the Central Bank will maintain the current level of the interest rate for a little longer, reducing the policy interest rate to 6.25% in the medium term horizon.


    In the conditions of the discussed risks and existing uncertainties, on the one hand, the CB Board considered type A scenarios related to the possible increase in global neutral interest rates, the formation of excess demand conditions in the domestic economy and the risks of acceleration of inflationary expectations, which require a higher policy interest rate path compared to market expectations.


    On the other hand, the Council discussed B-type scenarios related to the prospect of global economic growth slowdown, the formation of deflationary risks as a result of problems in individual export directions, and the fundamental reduction of the risk premium of the RA economy, which imply a lower policy interest rate path compared to market expectations.

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