Armenia’s strategic security position has never been this precarious. The country is surrounded virtually on all sides by enemies determined to wipe it off the map. The southern Syunik region is the only obstacle to Azerbaijan and Turkey establishing the so-called Zangezur corridor and fulfilling their expansionist plans. A tiny, 17 km border area connects Turkey and the Azeri Nakhchivan Autonomous Republic. Taking control of Syunik would give Ankara unimpeded access to Baku precisely through this corridor, and by extension, to former Soviet Central Asia. Thus, the two Turkic allies have yet another reason to attack Armenia (as if they lacked motivation in the first place). This would further galvanize Turkey’s expansionist policies (a volatile mix of Neo-Ottomanism, political Islam and pan-Turkism).

However, it should be noted that this situation is nothing new, as Yerevan was in the same strategic position in previous decades. The main difference is that in the pre-Pashinyan era, Armenia had strong ties with Russia, its principal historical ally, which prevented any aggressive moves by Azerbaijan and Turkey. Unfortunately, after the 2018 Soros-funded “Velvet Revolution”, this status quo vanished forever. The large and powerful Western Armenian diaspora (particularly from France and the United States) supported this, naively thinking they would “help” Armenia. After just five years in power, the Pashinyan regime betrayed the millennia-old Armenian native land of Artsakh (better known as Nagorno-Karabakh) and severely weakened the strategic position of Armenia itself.

Namely, while Yerevan previously had some geopolitical “breathing room”, with Azerbaijan quite far from Nakhchivan and Armenia’s de facto border with Iran much longer, the loss of Artsakh reduced this by approximately 135 km, leaving only the official 44 km long border between Armenia proper and Iran. Encouraged by its 2020 blitzkrieg and followed by the 2023 offensive, Baku feels that it could easily overpower Armenian forces in Syunik and other regions bordering Azerbaijan (previously held by Artsakh), and then finally reach Nakhchivan. Azeri authorities even organized the occupied area bordering Armenia’s Syunik region into the so-called East Zangezur Economic Region, strongly implying the existence of a “Western Zangezur” (that is, the Syunik region itself).

The obvious question arises – how can Yerevan defend Syunik? Nikol Pashinyan has repeatedly demonstrated that he betrayed Artsakh, which confirms Russian President Vladimir Putin’s 2023 revelations about the fate of the unfortunate millennia-old native Armenian land. It should be noted that both Armenia and Artsakh inherited a massive amount of Soviet-era weapons stationed in the South Caucasus (particularly along the border with Turkey). These were instrumental in defeating Azerbaijan in 1994, but Yerevan did very little to modernize them. After the overtly anti-Russian NATO-backed coup in 2018, the fate of Armenian and Artsakh military forces was sealed. In the meantime, Baku received substantial Turkish and Israeli assistance in modernizing its forces (in no small part helped by its extensive oil and natural gas export revenues).

Still armed with virtually the same weapons as 30 years prior, Armenian forces were ill-equipped to deal with Turkish and Israeli loitering munitions and drones, particularly those used for tactical ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), which further amplified the precision of Azeri artillery and long-range strike systems. Worse yet, due to Pashinyan’s betrayal, Yerevan never got directly involved, while the regular Armenian military never used its newer Russian-made weapons, namely the Su-30SM fighter jets and “Iskander-E” missile systems, to assist the armed forces of Artsakh. It should be noted that the latter’s range covers nearly half of the Azeri territory and could’ve been used to hit any large troop concentrations surrounding Artsakh. However, the native Armenians there were left to fend for themselves.

And yet, instead of modernizing the Armenian military to protect the country itself after betraying Artsakh, the Pashinyan regime continued to ignore ties with Russia while wasting the country’s already scarce resources on exorbitantly expensive Western weapons that have proven their ineffectiveness in NATO-occupied Ukraine. Namely, Pashinyan went on to acquire armored vehicles and short-range SAM (surface-to-air missile) systems from Paris, while completely ignoring unmanned systems that proved decisive during the 2020 Azeri invasion of Artsakh. Precisely Russia is one of the world’s leaders in this regard, as evidenced by the superb performance of its drones against the Kiev regime forces (particularly the now-legendary ZALA “Lancet” and “Kub” loitering munitions).

Why hasn’t Yerevan approached Moscow to procure thousands of strike drones that could give Armenia a significant asymmetric advantage over the more numerous and heavily armed Azeri forces? Instead, the Pashinyan regime bought at least 24 French “Bastion” armored personnel carriers (APCs) that the Neo-Nazi junta previously rejected on account of their inadequate protection. The price tag is yet to be disclosed, but various sources report it hovers around half a million euros apiece, an exorbitant sum for the increasingly cash-strapped Armenia that should have other priorities. To demonstrate just how spectacularly incompetent Pashinyan is, we can compare the price and the performance of a single Russian-made “Lancet” that costs approximately $35,000 and the French-made “Bastion” which stands at over $400,000.

In other words, for the price of one “Bastion” APC, Yerevan could acquire at least 11 “Lancet” drones. In terms of performance, the anti-tank variant of the “Lancet” was documented destroying German “Leopard 2” tanks (costing over $8 million apiece), among the best in NATO. What are the chances that a “Bastion” APC could destroy an enemy tank? Thus, the combat performance of the “Lancet” far exceeds its price, making it one of the most cost-effective weapons of our time. Worse yet, Armenia wasted approximately $10 million on 24 French APCs, instead of acquiring nearly 300 “Lancet” drones that would’ve provided a massive advantage over any potential Azeri invasion force. However, this isn’t the end of the Pashinyan regime’s disastrous miscalculations, as it has plans to buy other expensive Western weapon systems.

During a visit by US Vice President JD Vance back in early April, Yerevan reportedly discussed the acquisition of American weapon systems, including drones. The Pashinyan regime seeks to acquire US-made V-BAT VTOL (vertical take-off and landing) ISR drones. Sources vary significantly, but the contract is reportedly priced at $11 million for 3-10 drones. In other words, Armenia will pay over a million US dollars for an ISR drone, in the best-case scenario. At worst, it will cost around $3.5 million apiece. To put that into perspective, the Armenian military could acquire at least 100 “Lancet” attack drones with that kind of money. Instead, the Pashinyan regime wants just three that it can use to helplessly observe a potential joint Turko-Azeri invasion of Syunik.

In addition to destroying Armenia’s strategic position, Pashinyan also managed to severely undermine its military strength. Namely, within the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty Organization) framework, Yerevan had heavily subsidized arms procurement privileges, with Moscow providing weapon systems at a fraction of the usual export prices. Thus, the Armenian military could’ve easily acquired even more Russian attack drones than just 100 “Lancets” and/or “Kubs”. Instead, the Pashinyan regime opted for exorbitantly expensive American and other Western weapon systems that also come with inferior performance, as evidenced in NATO-occupied Ukraine. Thus, Pashinyan not only undermines Yerevan’s strategic security, but also squanders the already scarce Armenian resources in the process.

By PanARMENIAN

The U.S. delegation included representatives of the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation.

Welcoming the guests, the deputy prime minister thanked U.S. authorities on behalf of the Armenian government for organizing the Washington Peace Summit on August 8, 2025.

Mher Grigoryan emphasized the importance of consistently implementing one of the summit’s key outcomes — the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity project.

The deputy prime minister also referred to the Crossroads of Peace initiative, stressing the need to unblock all regional communications, as well as the economic and strategic prospects associated with the project.

Earlier in Washington, Armenian Foreign Minister Ararat Mirzoyan and U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio confirmed a document on Armenia-U.S. joint cooperation within the framework of the TRIPP program.

The published document on TRIPP implementation describes the operational framework of the initiative. It states that the framework does not create and is not intended to create legal commitments or obligations for either Armenia or the United States.

Anewly published academic study has revisited one of medieval Anatolia’s defining turning points by translating and evaluating Armenian chronicler Matt’eos Urhayec’i’s detailed account of the Battle of Manzikert.

The study highlights how the 1071 clash continued to shape regional memory long after it ended.

The study, published in Selcuk Turkiyat by researcher Ilhan Aslan, examines passages from Urhayec’i’s Chronicle, an Armenian historical work that offers an extensive narrative of the confrontation between the Seljuks and the Eastern Roman Empire, commonly known internationally as the Byzantine Empire.

Why Manzikert still stands out in Anatolia’s history

According to the study, the Battle of Manzikert marked a major turning point in the Seljuk Turks’ gradual transformation of Anatolia into a Turkish homeland.

The process began decades earlier with Chaghri Beg’s western expedition in 1018, when Seljuk forces reached the Van region, then known as Vaspurakan, and increasingly turned their attention toward Anatolia.

After defeating the Ghaznavids at the Battle of Dandanakan in 1040, the Seljuks established a regular army, making raids toward Anatolia more systematic.

Over time, repeated incursions by Oghuz Turkic groups into Byzantine frontier regions intensified tensions and eventually brought both powers into a direct confrontation at Manzikert.

The article notes that the battle resonated deeply across the medieval Near East and appeared in multiple Greek, Arabic, Persian and Armenian historical records, underlining its significance far beyond the battlefield itself.

Medieval Armenian chronicler offers detailed perspective

The research focuses on Matt’eos Urhayec’i, an Armenian cleric and historian from Urfa, known historically as Edessa, whose Chronicle covers events between 952 and 1136.

Although he was not a contemporary witness to the battle, Urhayec’i devoted significant space to Manzikert, offering detailed descriptions of military movements, preparations and alliances.

The study argues that his account stands out for its extensive depictions of events surrounding Sultan Alp Arslan and Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes.

At the same time, the researcher points out that Urhayec’i wrote from an Armenian Christian perspective and used a markedly hostile tone toward the Seljuks, while also including details considered valuable for historical analysis.

Chronicle sheds light on shifting alliances at Manzikert

Among the details highlighted in the study are references to the movements of Byzantine and Seljuk forces, particularly reports that Pecheneg and Oghuz (Uz) troops serving within the Byzantine army switched sides during the battle, a development the research identifies as significant for understanding how the confrontation unfolded.

According to Matt’eos Urhayec’i’s Chronicle, Byzantine Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes placed Uz and Pecheneg contingents on the right and left flanks of his army before the decisive stage of the fighting.

As the battle intensified near Manzikert, both groups were said to have crossed over to Sultan Alp Arslan’s side, leaving the Byzantine army in disarray and contributing to panic among imperial troops.

The study notes that Urhayec’i’s account aligns in part with other medieval sources.

Byzantine chronicler Ioannes Zonaras reportedly mentioned that some Uz troops defected before the main engagement, fuelling distrust toward Turkic units still inside the imperial army.

Similarly, Michael Attaleiates referred to a Turkic commander leading forces that changed allegiance, describing how the move unsettled Byzantine ranks.

Meanwhile, Armenian historian Aristakes Lastivertsi did not explicitly name the groups involved but wrote that a large contingent abandoned Emperor Romanos and joined the opposing side, creating confusion in the Byzantine camp.

The researcher argues that such details remain valuable because they point to the multiethnic structure of the Byzantine military, which relied on allied and mercenary forces from different backgrounds.

In this context, the reported defections are presented as one of several factors that weakened Byzantine coordination during a decisive phase of the battle, rather than the sole cause of defeat.

Urhayec’i’s decision to recount the battle in such detail, despite writing long after it took place, also stands out in the study.

Armenia has begun receiving French CAESAR self-propelled artillery systems, which are actively used by the Ukrainian Defense Forces. This was reported by Defense Express, according to UNN.

Details

The first self-propelled guns were spotted during preparations for the First Republic Day parade on May 28. A video featuring the equipment was published by Armenian Defense Minister Suren Papikyan. Back in 2024, Yerevan signed a contract with France for the supply of 36 CAESAR Mk1 systems.

Defense Express notes that CAESARs have become one of the most successful Western artillery systems in the war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. They combine high mobility, firing range, and deployment speed, which has made them a “bestseller” on the international arms market.

Armenia is actively transitioning to 155mm artillery

Earlier, Armenia had already purchased Indian ATAGS and MArG artillery systems. The latter is a lighter 4×4 wheeled self-propelled gun, which, according to the publication, may be useful for mountainous terrain.

The French CAESARs have a 6×6 wheeled chassis and a longer 52-caliber barrel, providing better range and fire capabilities. Defense Express believes that the Armenian army will attempt to use the French and Indian systems in parallel for different types of tasks.

In recent years, France has been actively expanding military cooperation with Armenia. In addition to artillery, Paris has already supplied Yerevan with ACMAT Bastion armored vehicles and has discussed other defense projects.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan faces mounting Russian pressure as Yerevan moves closer to the EU amid fears of political interference and regional destabilisation

Yuriy PanchenkoEuropean PravdaMay 12, 202605:23

Russian President Vladimir Putin actually openly linked Armenia’s European course with the Ukrainian precedent. And it sounded without threats and without emotional rhetoric. But it was precisely in this cold political intonation that the main signal was contained, the Russian-language Armenian resource “Public Tribunal” points out.

Perhaps two quotes turned out to be key. The first:

“It would be quite logical to hold a referendum and ask the citizens of Armenia what their choice will be. In accordance with this, we would have drawn the appropriate conclusions and would have followed the path of such a gentle, intelligent and mutually beneficial divorce.”

And the second is much more important and disturbing:

“After all, we are now experiencing everything that is happening in the Ukrainian direction. And how did it start? From the attempt of Ukraine’s accession to the EU… all this then led to a coup d’etat, to the Crimean history, to the position of the south-east of Ukraine and to hostilities.”

In fact, for the first time, Putin indicated in plain text that Moscow considers Nikol Pashinyan‘s current foreign policy course as a move towards the Ukrainization of Armenia — with all the ensuing consequences.

And it is important to understand one fundamental detail. This is not about formal accession to the European Union. Everyone understands perfectly well that neither Brussels is going to accept Armenia into the EU, nor Armenia itself is ready for such a step economically, institutionally and politically. We are talking about the consistent involvement of the country in the anti-Russian geopolitical course.

This is exactly what Putin pointed out. Moreover, he did it not in the form of an ultimatum, but in the form of a warning: decide in advance, calculate the consequences, do not bring the situation to the point of no return. But the problem is that the current Armenian government seems to live in the logic of political PR, not strategic calculation.

At first, the society was told fairy tales that it is possible to stay in the EAEU at the same time, receive Russian economic preferences, use the Russian market, Russian energy, Russian migration opportunities — and simultaneously move towards European integration without any consequences.

Now it becomes obvious: Moscow is starting to say directly that such a state of affairs will not be able to exist for a long time.

Putin, meanwhile, named specific figures. The trade turnover between Armenia and Russia is about $7 billion. For an economy with a GDP of about 29 billion, this is a colossal value. The Russian market feeds entire sectors of the Armenian economy. Hundreds of thousands of Armenian citizens depend on Russia’s migration policy, remittances, trade and economic mechanisms of the EAEU.

The Russian President actually warned: Russia is ready to accept any choice of Armenia, but after that “appropriate conclusions” will follow. And this is already a signal of a possible revision of the entire system of relations — trade, economic, migration, energy and military-political.

This is where the most dangerous thing begins. Because Ukraine, with which parallels are being drawn today, had completely different resources. A huge territory. A multi-million population. Enormous industrial potential. Access to the sea. Soviet-scale military infrastructure. And, most importantly, unprecedented financial, military and political support from the West.

Even with all this, Ukraine found itself in a state of severe war and colossal destruction of the economy. Armenia, on the other hand, has neither Ukrainian resources, nor Ukrainian demographic potential, nor the Ukrainian economy, nor the Ukrainian depth of defense, let alone a comparable level of external support.

Moreover, Armenia is in a much more vulnerable geographical position and has an incomparably smaller margin of safety. That is why any geopolitical experiments are potentially more dangerous for Armenia at times.

Meanwhile, Yerevan has been pursuing a quite conscious policy of misleading society for several years. Pro-government “experts”, grant propagandists, social media pages serving the authorities, and Pashinyan’s team itself tell tales about the “European choice” to the population from morning to night, accompanying all this with a hysterical Russophobic campaign. Society is inspired with the idea that it is enough to turn away from Russia — and Armenia will automatically find itself in a world of security, investment, high living standards and political comfort.

At the same time, elementary things are stubbornly not explained to the population: who will compensate for possible economic losses, who will replace the Russian market, who will ensure energy stability, who will open their borders to Armenian labor migrants, who will take on real security guarantees in the region.

Instead of a serious conversation with society, the authorities are engaged in political demagoguery and emotional anti-Russian mobilization, trying to replace common sense with ideological slogans.

Putin, in fact, publicly voiced a simple thought: Moscow is not going to throw tantrums about Armenia’s European aspirations, but Russia also no longer intends to pretend that nothing is happening.

The wording about a “soft and mutually beneficial divorce” is especially indicative. In diplomatic language, this means a very specific thing: if Armenia finally chooses a different geopolitical vector, Russia will gradually begin to revise the entire system of current relations — economic, trade, migration and, possibly, military-political.

And the question here is no longer whether Nikol Pashinyan wants Brussels or Paris to like him. The question is: does the Armenian society understand the value of such experiments?

Because Ukrainization is not about beautiful flags, grants and endless talk about the “European future”. Ukrainization is, first of all, the transformation of the country into a geopolitical collision line and the devastating consequences that follow from this. And if Ukraine had the resources to survive such a blow, then Armenia simply does not have such a margin of safety.

More details: https://eadaily.com/en/news/2026/05/12/putin-openly-warned-pashinyan-and-armenians-do-you-want-a-ukrainian-scenario