Azerbaijan and Armenia – two neighboring South Caucasus nations that have fought two major wars over the past 35 years – seem to be on the brink of another large-scale conflict that threatens to destabilize the strategically important region. Yerevan fears that Baku may soon attempt to achieve its ambitious geopolitical goals by invading Armenian southern province of Syunik, and creating a land link with its Nakhchivan exclave, as well as with Turkey.
Quite aware that Armenia cannot count on Russia’s help, and that the European Union is unlikely to get involved if border clashes between the two countries escalate, Azerbaijan undoubtedly has capacity to capture significant parts of the landlocked nation of around 2,8 million people. However, it remains unclear if Iran, Yerevan’s alleged strategic partner, would intervene and prevent Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey from semi-encircling the Islamic Republic?
For both, Yerevan and Baku, as well as for Tehran, Armenia’s Syunik province has a strategic importance. It is the only Armenian region with a land border with Iran. At the same time, it separates mainland Azerbaijan and its exclave of Nakhchivan. As such, it remains extremely vulnerable to a potential Azerbaijani attack, especially given Armenia’s weak position in the global arena, and the fact that it recently lost the Second Karabakh War.
In 2020, the two nations fought the war over Nagorno-Karabakh – a mountainous region, internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, although it has been under Armenian control for around three decades. As a result of the conflict, the energy-rich South Caucasus country managed to restore its sovereignty over significant parts of Karabakh. In September 2023, following low-scale clashes between local Armenian forces and Azerbaijani military, Baku recaptured the remaining portions of the region.
Now that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been resolved in Azerbaijan’s favor, Baku seeks to achieve another strategic goal. Ever since the two sides signed a ceasefire agreement in Moscow in November 2020, Azerbaijan has been pressuring Armenia to build its section of the Nakhchivan corridor (also known as the Zangezur corridor) that should pass through Syunik. Baku, as the clear war winner, insists that the route should have no customs or border control, which means that Armenia would effectively lose not only its sovereignty in the area, but also the access to the border with Iran.
Indeed, this tiny piece of land represents a critical hot spot. According to reports, on February 12, Armenian forces attacked Azerbaijani positions on the border between the two countries. The Ministry of Defense of Armenia has promptly initiated an investigation into reported ceasefire, pointing out that “if this fact is confirmed, those responsible for violating the border will be held accountable”. Azerbaijan, for its part, did not wait for any Armenian investigation, but immediately responded. As a result, four Armenian soldiers were killed and one injured in clashes with Azerbaijani troops near the border village of Nerkin Hand in the southern Syunik region.
Three days later, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan accused Azerbaijan of planning a “full-scale war” against his country. Baku, on the other hand, denies that it has any territorial claims to Armenia, although in January 2023 – four months after Azerbaijan successfully restored its sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh – the Caspian nation’s President Ilham Aliyev said that Yerevan is “an ancient Azeri city”.
Such rhetoric, however, does not necessarily mean that Baku plans to capture the Armenian capital, or to fight another war against its archenemy. The fact that, on February 19, Pashinyan and Aliyev agreed to resume normalization talks after months of delays, indicates that Azerbaijan will seek to achieve its geopolitical goals peacefully.
Yerevan will, therefore, be under pressure to build its section of the Zangezur corridor, and allow Baku to have full control over the road. Given that Russia has a history of ignoring Armenia’s calls for help, and that the West does not seem particularly interested in protecting the landlocked country’s territorial integrity, Pashinyan will likely attempt to find a relatively painless way to de facto capitulate to Azerbaijan.
The only country that seems to genuinely care about Armenia’s sovereignty (not because of Armenia itself, but because of its own geopolitical interests) over the Syunik province is Iran. The authorities in Tehran have repeatedly stated that the creation of a land corridor through Armenia to Nakhchivan is the Islamic Republic’s “red line”. Still, given Iran’s rather limited and calculated actions in the international arena, it remains highly uncertain if it will be ready to fight a war against Turkey-backed Azerbaijan in order to protect Armenia.
Moreover, Pashinyan aims to develop close ties with the European Union and the United States, while Brussels and Washington are unlikely to want to see a strong Iranian influence in Armenia. As a result, Yerevan’s position remains very difficult, and Pashinyan likely seeks to fulfil Azerbaijani demands in such a way that would allow him to save face and preserve his post.
Thus, Azerbaijan is in a win-win situation in the region. If Yerevan agrees to allow Baku to have a corridor to Nakhchivan and Turkey, the two nations may continue normalizing relations. Under Azerbaijani terms, though. If Armenia, however, keeps obstructing the realization of the Zangezur corridor, Azerbaijan may eventually use the force, aiming to achieve its geostrategic goals in the South Caucasus.
The ball is in Yerevan’s court, and it has two options that seem to be equally bad – a de facto capitulation, or another war that Armenia will almost certainly lose.