Armenia’s two leading opposition groups have decided to take up their seats in the country’s new parliament despite rejecting as fraudulent the official results of the June 7 elections that gave victory to the ruling Civil Contract party.
The results showed billionaire Samvel Karapetian’s Strong Armenia alliance and the Hayastan bloc led by former President Robert Kocharian finishing second and third in the elections and winning 29 and 12 seats respectively. According to them, no other opposition force cleared the 4 percent vote threshold for entering the 105-member National Assembly.
Strong Armenia and Hayastan faced calls from many opposition supporters to boycott the parliament and thus further undermine its legitimacy. Their leaders opted against a boycott in widely anticipated decisions announced on Sunday and Monday.
“We believe that in the upcoming difficult struggle, we must use all possible means to combat the government’s anti-state programs. The parliament seat is a weapon, and voluntarily giving it up would be irresponsible towards our state and our voters,” read a statement released by Hayastan.
For his part, Karapetian’s nephew Narek, who coordinates Strong Armenia’s activities, argued that opposition presence in the parliament would facilitate antigovernment street protests which he said will be staged “when we see a possibility of change approaching.”
“For significant change to occur in Armenia, two important things are needed: street struggle and strong opposition involvement in the National Assembly,” he said. “This combination will bring about significant change.”
Narek Karapetian also stressed that Strong Armenia does not recognize the legitimacy of Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s election victory despite taking up its parliament seats.
Strong Armenia again alleged “mass vote irregularities” in a joint statement with Hayastan and three other opposition parties issued on Saturday a few hours after the Constitutional Court rejected opposition appeals against the official election results. It said that the ruling will only deepen the “profound political and constitutional crisis” in the country.
“This decision of the Constitutional Court is not the end of the struggle but the beginning of a new, more systematic, institutional and large-scale phase of political resistance,” added the joint statement.
Its five signatories agreed on the need to thwart Pashinian’s plans to enact a new Armenian constitution demanded by Azerbaijan, ensure the release of all “political prisoners” and remove him from power. They said they are continuing to negotiate on a plan of joint actions to that end.
Pashinian and his political allies deny the vote-rigging claims. They say that the main opposition election contenders themselves secured hundreds of thousands of votes through vote bribes.
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RFE/RL – Tsarukian Arrested After Raids On Home, Businesses
- Shoghik Galstian
Armenian law-enforcement authorities arrested opposition leader Gagik Tsarukian on Monday after searching his home and the offices of his key companies in mass raids linked by his aides to Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s pledges to “dispossess” his main political foes.
The Investigative Committee said more than 70 locations were raided simultaneously as part of over a dozen criminal cases opened by it.
Investigators, among them masked officers of the National Security Service (NSS) carrying assault rifles, began searching Tsarukian’s hilltop mansion just north of Yerevan early in the morning. Tsarukian was taken into custody and charged with fraud and money laundering after the search that lasted for almost 12 hours.
In a statement, the Investigative Committee claimed that Tsarukian led a “criminal group” that misappropriated $22 million worth of fuel, transport equipment and other goods supplied by his Iranian business partners from 2022-2024. One of his lawyers, Yerem Sargsian, dismissed the accusation as “ridiculous and absurd,” saying that his client himself was defrauded by the Iranians and alerted the law-enforcement authorities about that.
The committee did not give clear reasons for searches conducted by it jointly with the NSS, the police and the State Revenue Committee at the dozens of companies making up Tsarukian’s Multi Group conglomerate. The law-enforcement agencies sealed off the offices of the most important of those firms, meaning that their operations were indefinitely halted.
They included Armenia’s largest cement plant, a major brandy distillery, as well as sports and entertainment facilities. Thousands of their workers were reportedly sent home as a result. Those companies were audited by tax officials last month.
Artyom Poghosian, the acting director of the cement plant located in the southern town of Ararat, said that law-enforcement officers sealed off its office building despite not confiscating anything during the search.
“They have paralyzed the work of the plant employing more than 1,000 people,” he told Tsarukian’s Kentron TV channel.
Tsarukian’s spokeswoman, Iveta Tonoyan, said that the security forces also seized the offices of a nearby Multi Group quarry, the Ararat distillery and even the headquarters of the Armenian National Olympic Committee headed by Tsarukian.
“This is an international disgrace,” she told journalists. “It will damage Armenia’s international reputation because there has been no precedent in the civilized world for the suspension of the activities of a national Olympic committee and the sealing of its administrative building.”
Pashinian pledged to nationalize the cement plant when he campaigned for the June 7 parliamentary elections in which Tsarukian’s Prosperous Armenia Party (BHK) was one of the main opposition contenders. He has since repeatedly pledged to imprison and “dispossess” Tsarukian as well as the leaders of two other key opposition groups.
Tsarukian was charged with “larges-scale” tax evasion and banned from leaving the country on June 9 just as the BHK accused the Central Election Commission (CEC) of illegally barring it from the new Armenian parliament. Two weeks later, prosecutors asked the CEC for permission to bring another criminal charge against the tycoon. They did not disclose it until Monday.
Tonoyan condemned the latest raids as politically motivated. She said security forces are acting on Pashinian’s illegal orders.
“We all understand that this process, the threats of physical, economic and political reprisals intensified active during the pre-election period,” added the BHK leader’s spokeswoman.
The clearly demonstrative searches coincided with Pashinian’s visit to the Russian city of Yekaterinburg where he attended an economic forum and also met with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin. Russia’s de facto ban on agricultural imports from Armenia imposed in the run-up to the elections was expected to be a key focus of the talks.
Tsarukian blamed Pashinian for the sanctions during the election campaign, saying that they are the result of Yerevan’s pro-Western foreign policy seen by the BHK and other opposition forces as reckless. Moscow has criticized the ensuing crackdown on the tycoon known for his pro-Russian views.
Dmitry Medvedev, a former Russian president heading the ruling United Russia party, deplored on June 28 the new criminal proceedings launched against him. Medvedev they herald a “new round of repression against opposition representatives at odds with the ruling elite.”
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Unmanned Arms Race: The Integration Of Drone Warfare In The South Caucasus – A
By Geopolitical Monitor
By Turan Darishov
Key Takeaways
- Drones Transformed Regional Warfare — The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War marked the first major conflict where drones played a decisive role. Azerbaijan’s use of Turkish and Israeli UAVs demonstrated their effectiveness against conventional forces, setting a precedent for modern drone warfare.
- Azerbaijan Leads, Armenia Catches Up, Georgia Lags — Azerbaijan is the clear frontrunner with domestic production, dedicated Unmanned Systems Troops, and diversified procurement. Armenia is rapidly modernizing its drone capabilities after its 2020 defeat. Georgia is falling significantly behind despite limited local initiatives.
- Ongoing Military Modernization — All three South Caucasus states are investing more in unmanned systems (aerial and ground), reflecting lessons from Ukraine and the 2020 war. Azerbaijan and Armenia have substantially increased defense spending, while Georgia’s efforts remain modest.
Analysis
The military use of unmanned aerial vehicles dates back decades, with early reconnaissance drones already appearing during the Vietnam War and later conflicts. However, drones only began being used widely during the war in Afghanistan, where the United States relied heavily on UAVs for surveillance, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and targeted strikes against enemy targets. The conflict demonstrated the value of persistent aerial monitoring and precision remote strikes, gradually normalizing the use of unmanned systems in modern warfare. In Afghanistan, drones were also increasingly used for logistics support, infrastructure monitoring, and broader military coordination, further expanding their battlefield role.
The use of drones leaped even further during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which became the first major interstate conflict where unmanned systems played a central battlefield role. Azerbaijan’s extensive use of Turkish Bayraktar TB-2 drones, Israeli loitering munitions, and reconnaissance UAVs demonstrated how deadly drones can be against armored vehicles, artillery systems, and air defenses. This conflict sealed UAVs as a vital part of the modern battlefield rather than supplementary assets.
In the Ukraine war, both sides increasingly relied on drones for reconnaissance, artillery adjustment, long-range strikes, logistics disruption, and direct attacks against armored vehicles and personnel. The conflict eventually accelerated the rapid evolution of FPV drones, loitering munitions, naval drones, and AI-assisted systems. The scale of drone usage and the unprecedented damage inflicted by relatively cheap unmanned systems fundamentally changed global military discussions about the future of warfare itself.
Regional Insecurity and Unmanned Systems in the South Caucasus
The South Caucasus occupies a particularly important place in the evolution of modern drone warfare. The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War became the first conflict where unmanned systems were systematically integrated to overwhelm and defeat a capable conventional force.
Although the region has not witnessed large-scale armed conflict since Azerbaijan’s 2023 operation in Nagorno-Karabakh, the South Caucasus still retains a noticeable degree of geopolitical instability. More than 20% of Georgia’s territory remains occupied by Russia following the 2008 war, while relations between the two countries continue to be tense. Armenia’s relations with Russia have also become increasingly strained in recent years as Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan gradually expanded cooperation with the European Union and the United States. In addition, the Iran war introduced another layer of regional tension, with Azerbaijan briefly becoming involved after an alleged Iranian drone hit an Azerbaijani airport in Nakhchivan. Even though direct military confrontation remains unlikely in the near future, these security concerns continue to encourage South Caucasus states to modernize their armed forces and further explore the military potential of unmanned systems.
Azerbaijan: Drone Pioneer and Expanding Military Hegemon
Azerbaijan remains the most advanced and institutionally developed drone operator in the South Caucasus. The country continues actively expanding its unmanned warfare capabilities through both procurement and domestic development efforts. In recent years, Azerbaijan adopted several new drone systems into service, including domestically produced UAVs such as the “İti Qovan.” Azerbaijan’s leading defense producer “Azersilah” is also actively involved in UAV design and production efforts. Alongside local production initiatives, Azerbaijan continues operating a diverse fleet of Turkish and Israeli unmanned systems, including Bayraktar TB-2 and Akıncı drones, while also showing interest in acquiring additional advanced UAV platforms in the future. The country also established dedicated training and maintenance facilities for Akıncı drones. The military cooperation framework established with Türkiye under the 2021 Shusha Declaration further strengthened cooperation in defense technologies, training, and military-industrial development.
Azerbaijan also increasingly seeks to deepen cooperation with Turkish defense companies beyond simple procurement by exploring possibilities for joint drone production and broader defense-industrial collaboration with Baykar. In recent years, both sides signed cooperation agreements and memorandums regarding technology exchange, industrial cooperation, and potential localized production of Baykar systems in Azerbaijan, signaling Baku’s long-term interest in developing more sustainable domestic unmanned systems production.
One of the most important developments, which received little international attention, was the formal establishment of dedicated Unmanned Systems Troops within the Azerbaijani Armed Forces. The experience of Ukraine demonstrated that such an institutionalization of unmanned forces allows for better coordination and battlefield results. The commander of the newly established forces, Colonel Adam Huseynov, is known to have received high-level military decorations following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War. Although Azerbaijani authorities have not officially clarified the exact location of the Unmanned Systems Troops within the broader military structure, the sequence of units presented during the 2025 military parade suggests that the new forces are likely integrated into the Azerbaijani Air Force structure.
Azerbaijan’s expanding drone capabilities are also supported by steadily increasing military expenditure. The country’s defense budget grew from approximately $2.24 billion in 2020 to a planned $5.1 billion in 2026, reflecting Baku’s continued emphasis on military modernization and technological development.
Armenia: Adapting to the Lessons of Defeat
Armenia’s approach to drone warfare and unmanned systems modernization is heavily shaped by the lessons of its military defeat during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, where Azerbaijani drones inflicted devastating damage on Armenian units and exposed major weaknesses in Armenia’s armed force structure. Since then, Yerevan has accelerated military modernization efforts with a strong emphasis on unmanned systems. This shift was clearly visible during the 28 May 2026 military parade, where Armenia showcased a wide variety of modern UAVs and unmanned systems ranging from small reconnaissance drones to larger strike-capable platforms. Among the systems displayed were reconnaissance and attack drones such as the UL350 and Storm-320. Armenia also showcased Chinese-made CH-4 strike drones equipped with precision-guided munitions, Iranian AD-08 Majid short-range air defense systems, and domestically produced drones such as the AW5R and Krunk-25.
One of the most interesting developments was Armenia’s demonstration of ground-based robots known as “Gail” (“wolf”). Similar unmanned ground systems have increasingly attracted attention following their use in Ukraine, where they were employed for logistics, reconnaissance, casualty evacuation, and even direct combat support missions. However, effective use of such systems requires strong communications infrastructure, coordination capabilities, maintenance networks, and institutional adaptation — areas where Armenia still faces important challenges. Nevertheless, the decision to integrate UGVs into military modernization efforts demonstrates Armenia’s growing awareness of broader unmanned warfare trends extending beyond aerial drones alone.
Another major post-2020 development was the establishment of the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Directorate within the Armenian Armed Forces in 2024. The creation of a specialized UAV command structure demonstrates that Armenia increasingly views unmanned warfare as a strategically crucial military sphere. Armenian officials have repeatedly referenced the lessons of Ukraine as highly important for Armenia’s future military development, while simultaneously continuing active drone-related cooperation with a variety of foreign partners.
Armenia’s military procurement strategy also underwent significant diversification following 2020. While Russia previously dominated Armenian arms imports, Yerevan increasingly expanded defense cooperation with countries such as India, France, China, Iran, and the United States, while still maintaining certain Russian military ties. The purchase of Chinese strike drones and American-made V-BAT reconnaissance UAV’s reflects Armenia’s broader attempt to avoid overdependence on a single supplier.
Armenia’s military modernization is also reflected in rapidly increasing defense expenditure. The country’s military budget increased from approximately $634 million in 2020 to around $1.44 billion in 2026, demonstrating the importance Yerevan places on rebuilding and modernizing its armed forces following the 2020 war.
Georgia: Falling Behind in Drone Warfare
Compared to Azerbaijan and Armenia, Georgia appears significantly less advanced in the integration of unmanned systems within its armed forces and is increasingly falling behind in this field. The country’s arguably only significant drone-related project is the cooperation between the Georgian defense company Delta and the Polish firm WB Technologies under the Delta WB initiative. The partnership focuses on local production of systems such as the FlyEye reconnaissance drone and the Warmate loitering munition. Georgian authorities announced plans for serial production of these systems in summer 2023, and the initiative initially attracted considerable attention as a potential step toward strengthening Georgia’s domestic military-industrial capabilities.
However, despite the ambitious plans, there have been no follow-up announcements regarding successful large-scale production or operational deployment. Unlike Azerbaijan and Armenia, Georgia also has not established dedicated unmanned systems forces or specialized drone branches within its military structure. The relatively modest scale of Georgia’s recent military parade raises further questions regarding the current pace of military modernization. During the 26 May 2026 Independence Day Parade, Georgia showcased very limited military equipment and did not publicly demonstrate drone systems, in contrast to Armenia and Azerbaijan where unmanned systems occupied a visible place in military presentations.
Recently, professor and political analyst Lasha Dzebisashvili sharply criticized the government for insufficient military funding, procurement problems, and the lack of meaningful development of domestic military production capabilities. Georgia’s prolonged political instability and polarization may also partially explain the weak pace of military reform and modernization in recent years. This situation is particularly important given Georgia’s geopolitical environment, where Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain occupied by Russia following the 2008 war, creating a long-term security challenge for the Georgian state.
Georgia’s military spending reflects a similarly cautious trajectory. While the defense budget increased from approximately $288 million in 2020 to around $662 million in 2026, military expenditure as a percentage of GDP declined during the same period. This differs noticeably from Armenia and Azerbaijan, both of which significantly expanded military spending and modernization efforts following the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War.
Looking Ahead
The South Caucasus remains one of the regions where the importance of unmanned systems is most visible. The experience of the Nagorno-Karabakh wars, followed by the lessons emerging from Ukraine, demonstrated to regional actors that drones are a crucial weapon in 21st century warfare. As a result, all three South Caucasus states show at least some level of interest in developing unmanned warfare capabilities, although the scale of implementation varies significantly.
Azerbaijan currently stands out as the clear regional leader in drone warfare integration due to its domestic production, diversified procurement, and creation of dedicated unmanned systems structures. Armenia, largely motivated by the lessons of defeat in 2020, is rapidly attempting to modernize and diversify its military capabilities with increased emphasis on drones. Georgia, despite possessing some domestic production initiatives, lags significantly in practical adaptation. Overall, it appears that drone adaptation will remain one of the most important military modernization trends in the South Caucasus in the coming years.
- This article was published by Geopolitical Monitor.com
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Armenian authorities raid residence and businesses of opposition figure Tsaruk
The Armenian authorities have launched searches in over 70 addresses associated with Gagik Tsarukyan, a tycoon and leader of the opposition Prosperous Armenia party.
Prosperous Armenia spokesperson Iveta Tonoyan has told reporters that the raids took place early Monday morning.
‘We are talking about more than a dozen enterprises, including the Ararat Cement plant [and] the Yerevan brandy-Wine-Vodka plant’, Tonoyan said, according to independent media outlet Civilnet. RFE/RL has cited Tonoyan as saying that over 70 addresses were raided.
The outlet has also reported that law enforcement also began searching Tsarukyan’s Multi Wellness Centre in Yerevan in the morning, and had asked customers to leave the gym.
According to RFE/RL, the Investigative Committee said the raids were being conducted in relation to ‘more than a dozen criminal proceedings’, and that they would issue an official statement on the matter at a later time.
Tsarukyan’s lawyer, Emin Khachatryan, told RFE/RL that the authorities attempted to bar Tsarukyan from entering his house, but that the tycoon was allowed inside after some time.
Tonoyan has also issued a statement saying the police were ‘acting on the instructions of [Prime Minister] Nikol Pashinyan’.
In late June, the authorities asked the Central Election Commission (CEC) to lift Tsarukyan’s parliamentary immunity, less than a month after running in the 7 June parliamentary elections.
Prosperous Armenia failed to enter parliament, falling just shy of reaching the 4% threshold needed to secure seats.
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“Like Freedom”: How Armenia Became Safe Haven For Russians Fleeing Putin
Since 2022, Armenia’s capital, Yerevan, has become a safe place for tens of thousands of Russians who left their country to avoid the war in Ukraine.
- Edited by:Kritika Bobal
A former Russian police surveillance officer who fled the country after participating in anti-Kremlin protests has described Armenia as his last refuge after fearing arrest by Russian authorities.
The 31-year-old, identified as Egor, told The iPaper that he resigned from his surveillance job with the St Petersburg police force and left Russia before authorities could detain him. He said he feared the police would “quickly find” him because of his involvement in protests against the Kremlin.
“I was afraid because [police] could quickly find me and I would have problems. It made me feel like I was a coward,” he said.
Egor first attempted to enter Georgia but was denied entry at the border. He then flew to Armenia, calling it his final opportunity to escape. He said he only felt safe after his plane landed at Zvartnots International Airport in Yerevan, around 24 hours after leaving his job.
Four years after leaving Russia, Egor says the toughest part was not escaping the country but accepting that he might never be able to return home. “I took all the money I had… and left. I did not think about what will happen in Russia, but about what will happen in Ukraine,” he said.
Egor said his life has changed completely since leaving Russia. Before fleeing, he worked as a police surveillance officer, but today he is trying to build a new life in Armenia. Although he does not regret leaving Russia, he admits he misses having a country he can truly call home.
Egor mentioned that the political situation in Russia is unlikely to improve anytime soon, even after President Vladimir Putin dies. “My planning horizon is half a year to a year. Now, I’m in Armenia and I would like to become a citizen of the country,” he added.
Since 2022, Armenia’s capital, Yerevan, has become a safe place for tens of thousands of Russians who left their country to avoid the war in Ukraine.
According to the Armenian government, more than 60,000 Russians have moved to Armenia since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Many Russians have opened cafes, bars, restaurants and co-working spaces.
One of the Russians who left for Yerevan when the war happened told the iPaper, “Many of my friends were jailed because they were anarchists. Some were arrested during protests; others afterwards. I know people who were tortured in prison because they were anarchists and were anti-Putin.”
Yaroslav, another Russian who left the country after opposing the government, said he felt a sense of freedom the moment he crossed the border. “When I left Russia… I remember standing [on the border] with the wind on my face. It felt like freedom. Finally, I could breathe,” he told the outlet.
“For the first time in a long while, I didn’t feel threatened by the police or by the state,” he added.
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Armenian PM Makes First Trip to Russia Since Re-Election, Food Import Ban
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan arrived in Russia on Monday for his first visit to the country since winning re-election last month.
Pashinyan was in the city of Yekaterinburg to participate in the plenary session of the annual Innoprom industrial exhibition, his press service said. He is also scheduled to meet with Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, it added.
A video shared on Pashinyan’s official Telegram channel showed Yekaterinburg Mayor Alexei Orlov greeting him at the local airport with a traditional Russian bread-and-salt welcome.
In June, Russia accused Western countries of interfering in Armenia’s elections after Pashinyan’s ruling party won a parliamentary majority.
Before and after the vote, Russia imposed sweeping import bans on Armenian produce, beverages and other goods over alleged health and safety violations.
Armenia’s central bank estimates that the Russian import bans, widely seen as a pressure campaign over Yerevan’s pursuit of closer ties with the European Union, impact roughly 2% of the South Caucasus country’s gross domestic product.
The EU, which welcomed the results of Armenia’s parliamentary elections, has pledged economic support to Yerevan and vowed to remove tariffs from nearly 80% of Armenian imports in response to Russia’s restrictions.
On Monday, Pashinyan said Yerevan remains “committed to further developing relations with Russia, is interested in participating in the EAEU,” an economic and political bloc of former Soviet countries, including Armenia.
“Some problematic issues have emerged recently,” he was quoted as saying by Interfax. “I hope that following today’s talks, we will be able to resolve specific issues.”
Friction between traditional allies Russia and Armenia has grown since Azerbaijan regained control of the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Armenia accused Russia and its peacekeeping forces of failing to deter Baku’s military offensive and, in 2024, froze its participation in a Moscow-led regional security bloc.
Pashinyan has since skipped a number of summits and events hosted or attended by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2026/07/06/armenian-pm-makes-first-trip-to-russia-since-re-election-food-import-ban-a93174
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‘Israel crossed a red line’: Azerbaijan crisis deepens after Armenia genocide
Officials familiar with the ties say Baku feels Israel ignored years of Azerbaijani support during the Gaza war and failed to show sensitivity over a deeply charged issue in its conflict with Armenia
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Armenia hopes it can resolve ‘problematic issues’ with Russia, PM Pashinyan sa
July 6, 20269:17 AM EDT
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How EU opened a “window of opportunity” for Armenia and why Pashinyan will use
On 2 July, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen visited Yerevan.
This was already her second visit to the Armenian capital within a month.
Read more about the signal she brought to Yerevan and whether Armenia is truly moving closer to the EU in the article by Yurii Panchenko, European Pravda’s co-founder: A cautious Pashinyan: What the restrained reaction of Yerevan to unprecedented EU support means.
The President of the European Commission announced in Yerevan an unprecedented liberalisation of access for Armenian goods to EU markets.
“With this, we can re-route products that currently still rely heavily on the Russian market and send them to the European Union single market of 450 million consumers. The measures would cover almost all Armenian fresh fruits, vegetables and plants previously exported to Russia, and more than 90 percent of its beverages and spirits exports. This is only the beginning,” she said.
Armenian producers are expected to receive soon significantly easier access to European markets.
However, this is a unilateral opening of the EU market, not mutual liberalisation. Armenia remains a member of the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union, which means it cannot unilaterally change the terms of access for European goods to its own market.
EU assistance does not stop there. According to Ursula von der Leyen, the EU also plans to help protect Armenia from Russian energy threats.
In particular, European experts are expected to arrive in Armenia in the coming days to explore ways to diversify energy supplies.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan emphasised that “we have never set, do not set, and will not set the goal of creating a crisis in relations between the Republic of Armenia and the Russian Federation.”
According to Tigran Khzmalyan, head of the European Party of Armenia, this is not just tactlessness, but a sign that the Armenian leadership is not ready for real rapprochement with the EU.
However, government officials respond differently to such criticism.
As Armenian ruling-party politicians have repeatedly stated, Yerevan will openly speak about EU membership only after a peace agreement with Azerbaijan is signed and relations with Türkiye are unblocked.
Notably, in assessing the results of Armenia’s elections, many Russian political analysts pointed out that Pashinyan failed to secure a full victory. His party did not gain a constitutional majority and therefore cannot unilaterally amend the constitution in the way Baku demands, namely to remove all references to Nagorno-Karabakh. Relying on openly pro-Russian opposition votes is not realistic.
Without constitutional amendments, Armenia will not be able to sign a peace agreement with Azerbaijan, which in turn remains a major obstacle to European integration.
However, this is not entirely accurate. Nikol Pashinyan does have a way to amend the constitution without a parliamentary supermajority.
This would be done through a nationwide referendum.
To initiate it, 300,000 signatures must be collected.
It is possible that preparations for such a scenario are already underway. For example, last week parliament voted to ban voting rights for citizens who do not permanently reside in Armenia.
The failure of pro-Russian parties in the recent elections, combined with the EU’s willingness to engage in the region, creates a real “window of opportunity” for Armenia.
The only question is whether Nikol Pashinyan actually wants to seize it.
His first foreign visit after being re-elected prime minister was to Yekaterinburg, Russia. This further deepens uncertainty about whether Armenia’s leadership is truly ready to take advantage of the opportunity currently offered by the EU.
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Armenia-Turkey. Border Opening Triggers Uncertainty
The border between Turkey and Armenia has been closed for over 30 years, but it may be opened in the coming months. On the Armenian side, people are in two minds: hopes for peace and economic development on the one hand, and fear of the historic enemy on the other.
- Translations:
- français
- English
Conflicts > Hugo Laulan > Valentin Chesneau-Daumas > 6 July 2026
The two countries face off along the Aras River to the south and the Akhuryan river to the west. Between them, kilometres of barbed wire, a buffer zone and watchtowers. The Christian monasteries of Armenia peer at the distant minarets of the Turkish mosques, in Khor Virap, Ani or Akhurik. On the Armenian side, it seems the muezzin’s call to prayer can sometimes be heard.
The land border between Turkey and Armenia has been sealed for decades, a legacy of past relations between the two peoples, marked by the Ottoman Empire’s genocide of the Armenian people in 1915. In 1993, Turkey imposed a blockade on its neighbour in support of its Azerbaijani ally, in the context of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh (which the Armenians call Artsakh). Since then, the border has remained totally closed. But today there is renewed hope.
“I would describe the present situation between the two countries as a positive development, even though the progress is very modest and symbolic. We observe advances, but they are small and easily reversible”, says Benyamin Poghosyan, research fellow with the Applied Political Research Institute of Armenia (Apri). “At any moment, Turkey can go back on everything it has done over the last two years.
Since the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and the flight of over 100,000 Armenians towards Yerevan, Nikol Pachinian’s government intends to normalise its relations with its Azerbaijani and Turkish neighbours. A peace agreement was signed with Baku in August 2025 under US auspices in Washington. At the beginning of May, Ankara and Yerevan signed another symbolic agreement for the joint reconstruction of the medieval Ani bridge, connecting the two countries across the Akhuryan river. That same month, they also resumed bilateral trade relations via a third country.
Russian border guards
The victory of the Civil Contract party in the legislative elections of 7 June and the re-election of Nikol Pashinyan as Prime Minister should allow for the continuation of this normalisation process, even if his lack of a constitutional majority1 might limit any rapid changes.
On the Armenian side of the border, opinion is somewhat divided over the question of a possible reopening of the border crossings. In the village of Akhurik, located a few kilometres from Gyumri, the second largest Armenian city, the Russians still guard the border, in a military base overlooking the town.
Despite several media articles announcing their departure in March 2026, the Russian army is still there2. Within 20 minutes of arriving there, we were having our ID checked by a patrol. This doesn’t go down well with the locals: “The Russians did everything wrong; it was Lenin who sold our land to Turkey, and it was they who gave Artsakh to Azerbaijan,” rails Seyran Hrghatyan, an inhabitant of Akhurik, surrounded by his cows. He can’t wait for the border to reopen : “There are good people on both sides. There was a time when we did business with Turks, there was a tourist trade. I hope it will come back.”
Karen Hovhannisyan, 16, agrees. He has never known an open border. “It’s a good thing, trade will develop,” he says, although, like some others, he admits he doesn’t feel very concerned by the issue.
Economic issues
The opening “will be a good thing for the local people, those who live around Gyumri in Armenia, and around Kars and Erzurum on the Turkish side; they’ll be able to do business and engage in trade,“says Bayram Balci, a research fellow with CERI Sciences Po and a Turkey specialist.”But more than that, the interest for Turkey is that this normalisation should go hand in hand with the opening of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), since then there will be a trade link between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and China,” he stresses.
“I think Ankara wants to have as many links as possible with Azerbaijan and Central Asia”, adds Benyamin Poghosyan of Apri. It’s an economic development which will also serve the interests of Armenia, providing it with a direct channel to the markets of Europe, Asia and the Midde East.
But not everybody here buys the economic argument. These new horizons also raise fears of a massive influx of cheap Turkish goods, undercutting local production. At the same time, historical and geopolitical tensions between the two countries also limit progress.
“We have learned the lessons of the past”
A bit further south along the border, the village of Anipemza also faces Turkey. At the entrance to the township, a huge Armenian flag in front of the Ererouk basilica seems to glower at the border fence. The historic city of Ani, capital of Armenia under the Bagratid dynasty in the 10th century, located today in Turkey, is only a few kilometres away.
In the empty village a mural depicts the flags of Russia and Armenia side by side as a reminder of the friendship between the two countries. Inside a dilapidated building, another image shows the flag of Soviet Armenia beside a portrait of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870-1924).
Henrikh and Gevorg are talking politics as they sit smoking on a bench. Henrikh, 27, works in a quarry. Gevorg, 62, has lost a leg and can no longer work. The two men agree on one thing: they don’t want to see the border with Turkey opened again. “It’s not that we’re afraid, but we’ve learned the lessons of the past. There is no way we can live with those people,” Gevorg explains, leaning on his crutches.
His friend adds: “If a direct connection between the two countries is re-established, we’ll become Turkish. Of course we want peace, but a dignified peace, a good peace. We just don’t trust the Turks”. The wounds of the conflict with Azerbaijan are still raw for Henrikh. He spent several weeks in Nagorno-Karabakh, where his brother was seriously wounded. A tattoo on his neck represents the silhouette of an Armenia with Artsakh still attached to it.
Whereas some people resent the Russians for abandoning Armenia in that war, Henrikh still trusts Moscow : “We’ve been allies for many years, Russia protects us and preserves peace.”
Baku sets the tone
Such anti-Turkish sentiment is still common in Armenian society, but the tendency is gradually turning around. In January 2022, the question “Which of these countries constitutes the biggest political threat to Armenia ?” was put to the population, and 90 % answered “Turkey”. In May 2026, only 58 % gave the same answer, according to the International Republican Institute (IRI). At the same time, the figures for Azerbaijan remained fairly stable at 77 % in 2022 and 73 % in 2026, while those rating the Russian threat greatest increased from 15 in 2022 to 32 % in 2026.
“The normalisation of relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan has made it possible to reduce considerably the danger of a new escalation in the region. Armenia is the weakest player in this threesome”, says analyst Benyamin Poghosyan. Because, over and above economic issues, this normalisation carries with it a plethora of geopolitical factors. And it’s Turkey that is likely to benefit from them.
Ankara might increase its influence in the southern Caucasus, in competition with Russia, whose regional influence is gradually waning, but also with the US which, pushed by President Donald Trump, is increasingly present. However, while opening this border is in the interest of all parties, it is hard to know for sure when the issue will be resolved. “The Turkish diplomatic agenda is very crowded what with Iran, Ukraine and Syria. At the same time, the main difficulty is with Azerbaijan”, says researcher Bayram Balci.
Turkey is dependent for energy resources on Azerbaijan, which invests tens of billions of dollars in its Turkish big brother. Behind the scenes, President Ilhan Aliyev’s regime sets the tone for the discussions and at each session raises new conditions in order to slow the process down. “Turkey will do nothing to move the talks with Armenia forward without the approval of Azerbaijan, even if President Recip Tayyip Erdoğan is deeply appalled by Aliyev’s behaviour,” Balci adds.
That situation was reaffirmed at the Antalya Diplomatic Forum in April, where Erdoğan promised that Ankara would pursue the process of normalisation with Armenia “step by step, in coordination with Azerbaijan.” In May, the Azerbaijani ambassador in Turkey, Rashad Mammadov, declared that the border between the two neighbours would be reopened “after the legislative elections and a referendum” in Yerevan, giving the impression that it was Azerbaijan itself that was dictating the calendar and setting the conditions.
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