Itera holding negotiations on selling 10% in Armenian gas
distributing company
RosBusinessConsulting Database
October 11, 2004 Monday
Itera is holding negotiations on selling 10 percent in Armrosgazprom,
a source close to the company said. A large European investment
holding is among the potential buyers of a 10-percent stake in the
Armenian-based company, the source reported. The 10-percent stake
is valued at $28m, the source said. The press department of Itera
confirmed information about negotiations and declined to disclose
probable participants of the proposed deal.
Gazprom and the Armenian government both have 45-percent stakes in
Armrosgazprom. As Itera does not deliver gas to Armenia, the company
considers the possibility of disposing of this non-core asset, Itera
representatives said. Analysts believe that Gazprom may be interested
in acquiring Itera gas assets. Armrosgazprom controls Armenian gas
distributing networks.

Armenia’s govt wants ArmenTel to vacate some GSM 900 channels
Prime-Tass English-language Business Newswire
October 11, 2004
EREVAN, Oct 11 (Prime-Tass) — Armenia’s national telecommunications
company ArmenTel might have to vacate some of its GSM 900 channels for
the use of a new second mobile operator and allow it to use ArmenTel’s
fiber-optic communications line, Armenia’s Justice Minister David
Arutyunyan told a press conference on Monday.
The government and ArmenTel have been discussing these and other
proposed measures aimed at depriving the company of its ‘exclusive
rights’ rather than stripping it of its monopolistic status, Arutyunyan
said. The talks are expected to be completed by October 28.
Arutyunyan said that ArmenTel’s giving up some of its GSM 900
frequencies for the use of the second mobile operator was meant to
create conditions for effective competition. He added that ArmenTel
currently occupies most of the GSM 900 frequencies, and given the
current situation the second operator would not have enough frequencies
to provide services.
Neither would it be able to operate without using the fiber-optic
communications line to which ArmenTel has exclusive rights, Arutyunyan
said.
There are also dozens of other issues that the government and the
company still have to agree on, Arutyunyan said.
Arutyunyan said the government and ArmenTel have agreed that two
mobile operators are enough for Armenia’s telecom market. A larger
number of operators might lead to a slowdown in the development of
the market, since smaller companies might not have enough funds to
invest in networks.
While the coming of the second operator should lead to a decrease in
tariffs, the government is to ensure that operators do not engage in
price dumping to squeeze out competitors, Arutyunyan said. This does
not mean, however, that telecom tariffs will be fixed, he added.
The Armenian government decided last year to amend ArmenTel’s license,
which stipulates the company’s right to a monopoly for 15 years, but
postponed introducing the amendment from October 12 to October 28,
according to the government press service’s report on October 7. End

Agency WPS
What the Papers Say. Part A (Russia)
October 11, 2004, Monday
WHO IS TO BLAME? WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?
SOURCE: Novoye Vremya, No. 33, October 3, 2004, p. 16
by: Nikolai Popov
The Beslan tragedy continues to stir up public opinion. People
wish to know who was behind this terrorist attack, who ordered and
organized it, and where the next blow might be expected. According
to the latest polls, most respondents are inclined to agree with
the official version of the story: that behind the latest terrorist
attacks, including the slaughter in Beslan and explosions aboard two
airplanes, are “international terrorists, Al Qaeda and so on” – 43%
of respondents agree. Along with this, a significant number of people
(32%) hold a more traditional point of view: this is the matter of
“Chechen separatists.” A further 18% say that whether they are local or
international, they are “Muslim fanatics and Wahhabi fundamentalists.”
According to the poll, 20% of respondents have more politicized
opinion: 13% of respondents that there are “oligarchs” standing
behind the latest terrorist attacks and 7% say that these are Western
countries. Although it may seem strange, people in the Southern
federal district are inclined to blame international terrorism than
the neighbors-separatists from Chechnya for the terrorist attacks
more than anywhere in the country (50%). Rural residents are more
inclined than others to see a “Chechen link.”
While the supreme authorities are thinking whom they need to punish
and whom to award for Beslan, the public has formed its own notion
about “who bears the biggest responsibility for allowing the terrorist
attack to happen in Beslan.” The major part (32%) of respondents says
that the biggest responsibility lies with “the security agencies
of North Ossetia.” President Putin unexpectedly took second place
(15%). The next culprits are Federal Security Service (FSB) Director
Nikolai Patrushev (15%), Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliev (9%) and
President Dzasokhov of North Ossetia (9%). According to the poll,
5% of respondents laid the blame for the terrorist attack in Beslan
on newly-elected President of Chechnya Alu Alkhanov.
The larger a city, the more residents are inclined to blame President
Putin for letting the terrorist attack happen. In cities with a
population over 1 million people, 21% of respondents blame Putin,
and 25% blame the security agencies of North Ossetia. People with a
higher education (18%) and high income (20%) are also more inclined
to blame the president.
In Russia respondents estimate the danger of terrorism much higher
than in the neighboring countries. Back in August, before the latest
series of terrorist attacks, 36% of respondents said that “danger of
terrorism is very high for our country” and 49% believed that this
danger “is fairly high.” The number of respondents with such opinion
in Kazakhstan amounted to 11% and 36%, in Lithuania to 3% and 21%
and in Armenia to 4% and 14% respectively.
Apprehensions have grown since then. Now 41% of respondents “are
very much afraid” that they or members of their families “may
become victims of terrorist attacks” and 40% are afraid of this
“to some extent.” This means that the overwhelming majority of the
population is afraid. Only 13% of respondents “are not very afraid”
of terrorist attacks and only 5% “are not afraid at all.” The lowest
level of fear is registered in Siberia and in the Russian Far East. The
highest level of fear of terrorist attacks is registered in cities of
over a million people. There, 50% of respondents “are very afraid”
of becoming victims of terrorists. The level of fear among women is
50%, in comparison to 31% among men. Young people are less afraid of
terrorism than elderly people; wealthy people and people with higher
education are afraid more often than poor and less educated people.
Unlike the international community, Russian citizens are inclined to
favor radical and harsh methods of combating terrorism, for example,
towards restoration of death penalty for terrorists: 72% of respondents
“fully support” the “introduction of the death penalty for terrorists
and their accomplices” and 18% “mostly support” this measure. Only
9% of respondents do not support introducing the death penalty
for terrorists. The number of supporters of the death penalty for
terrorists is highest in the Southern federal district and lowest
in Siberia.
Unexpectedly, we turned out to be among the most “advanced” countries
of the world according to the level of terrorism. This is a poor
achievement.
Along with this, it is impossible to say that the terrible
events changed the views of the people on order in the society and
reliability of the political system. Despite that a noticeable number
of respondents (15%) put the blame on the president for letting the
terrorist attack happen in Beslan, in general approval of Putin’s
activities on the post of the president and confidence in him did not
change significantly. There are still 73% of respondents who trust
Putin, as shown by a poll done between September 17 and 19. Along with
this, 21% of respondents “fully trust” him and 52% “rather trust than
distrust” – while only 6% of respondents “do not trust him at all.”
Translated by Pavel Pushkin

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
—————————————— —-
PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
375010 Telephone: +3741. 544041 ext 202
Fax: +3741. .562543
Email: [email protected]:
PRESS RELEASE
11 October 2004
Minister Oskanian Receives Members of Eurasia Foundation Board of Trustees
On 11 October, Minister Oskanian received Eurasia Foundation’s President
Charles Maynes and members of the Board of Trustees.
The Eurasia Foundation board members noted that a 10-year grants programme
in Armenia covers almost all aspects of civil society development. The
Foundation supported numerous pioneering initiatives including development
of university curriculum for business administration, the first large scale
municipal development program, the first small enterprise lending program,
the first public dialogue campaign and pioneering support for independent
print media.
Minister Oskanian welcomed the Foundation’s mission in Armenia and
acknowledged the importance of its operations in the context of Armenia’s
transition to market economy and democratic society.
Upon request of Eurasia Foundation Board members, Minister Oskanian briefed
them on the current situation in the region focusing on the status of the
Nagorno Karabagh conflict settlement and regulation of Armenia – Turkey
relations.
Eurasia Foundation (with headquarters in Washington) operates in Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Moldova, Russia and
Tajikistan. The Foundation started its program in Armenia in 1995. The key
programs implemented by the Foundation include Izmirlyan – Eurasia Small
Business Loan Program, Public Dialogue, Media Strengthening Program, South
Caucasus Cooperation Program and Caucasus Research Resource Centers.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
—————————————— —-
PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
375010 Telephone: +3741. 544041 ext 202
Fax: +3741. .562543
Email: [email protected]:
PRESS RELEASE
10 October 2004
Minister Oskanian Receives Norway’s Jan Petersen
On 10 October, Foreign Minister Oskanian received Foreign Minister
of the Kingdom of Norway, Chairman of the Committee of Ministers of
the Council of Europe Jan Petersen who is on a regional visit to the
countries of the South Caucasus.
At the meeting, the parties explored issues of bilateral relations
and common interest emphasizing development of economic cooperation
and creation of a contractual outline to this end. Minister Oskanian
proposed to explore the possibility of conducting a business forum
and amplifying cultural cooperation between the two countries.
In the context of European integration, the parties discussed the
progress of democratic reforms in Armenia. The Minister briefed his
counterpart on Armenia’s steps towards fulfillment of its commitments
vis-a-vis the Council of Europe highlighting, particularly, the
constitutional reform and a new electoral code.
During the meeting, the parties exchanged views on the regional
issues. Upon Minister Petersen’s request, Minister Oskanian provided
a detailed briefing on the current stage of Nagorno Karabagh conflict
settlement process and Armenia’s position on the issue.
The parties also discussed prospects of normalizing Armenia – Turkey
relations and stressed the importance of EU’s positive contribution
to this end.
At the end of the meeting, Minister Oskanian expressed is deep
appreciation for the importance of Minister Petersen’s visit both in
the context of the European extent of Armenia’s foreign policy and in
terms of development of bilateral, political, and economic relations.
The agenda of the two-day visit includes meetings with several
high-ranking officials of Armenia. The Minister will also visit the
Holy See of St. Etchmiadzin and Yerevan’s Cilicia district with its
new houses built for the refugees. The Minister also plans to meet
with representatives of Armenia’s political parties.

“Double Standards” Line Towards Russia Harmful
by Jaba Devdariani
Civil Georgia, Georgia
Oct 11 2004
On October 7, when discussing the Russo-Georgian relations at PACE,
the Georgian delegation has pushed its usual trump-card – that
Russia is using “double standards” when dealing with separatism
and terrorism. While easy to grasp at first, the “double standards”
line obscures the key question: what kind of policy Russia should,
in Georgia’s opinion, pursue. More than that – the intuitive response
suggested by repeated use of the “double standards” line is very
wrong and harmful for Georgia’s interests in Europe.
This concept widely referred to in Georgia as a line of “double
standards” has long been arming the Georgian politicians in various
skirmishes against Russia. It dates back to the Abkhazia conflict
and then President Eduard Shevardnadze’s concept of “two Russias”
– one democratic, willing to support Georgian independence, and one
totalitarian, neo-imperialist, arming and backing the secessionist
movements. The concept became so entrenched in the vocabulary and
thinking of the Georgian politicians that they accept and repeat it
almost automatically. But maybe the new Georgian authorities need to
take a closer look.
The key element of the “double standards” policy was aptly put
by Chairperson Nino Burjanadze at the Parliamentary Assembly,
“one can not suppress separatism in Grozny [capital of Chechnya]
and support it [separatism] a few kilometres away in Georgia.” Simply
put, Russia is acting inconsistently – punishing own secessionists,
whilst helping them in Georgia. The conclusion seems evident – Russia
is bullying Georgia for trying to unite own country, but clings to
its own territorial integrity. Supposedly, what Georgia wants to say,
is that it also has the right to territorial integrity.
But let’s take the analysis one step deeper. If Georgia says Russia
applying “double standards” is bad, then, logically, it should be
applying a “single standard” out of the present two. Hence, either
support secessionism in Chechnya (an impossibility) or doing the same
in Abkhazia/South Ossetia as in Chechnya. What has been the Russian
“standard” in Chechnya? Chronic disregard to the human life, systematic
abuse of human rights, levelling of the towns and heavy-handed handling
of the civilian population, as well as the election farce to appoint
puppet presidents. Russia got slammed for this very “standard” at
the Council of Europe. Does Georgian delegation claim the right to
the same treatment of its own secessionist provinces?
The Russian delegation sees this logical inconsistency. Russian MP
Konstantin Kosachev, opposite number to the Georgian spokesperson
said “we fear that by pushing this debate on the agenda, Georgia
prepares public opinion on the eve of [Georgia’s] attempts to repeat
measures similar to those that were undertaken this summer – attempts
to forcefully resolve the Abkhazian and South Ossetian conflicts.”
The trouble is, the European MPs may start to see the picture the same
way, unless Georgia modifies and qualifies, its “double standards”
line or abandons it altogether.
The European MPs, apart from those intimately involved in Russian
affairs, do not know much about relations between Russia and Georgia.
The European mindset is very clear when it comes to use of force – it
is not tolerated under any pretext. This is echoed by the sociological
research: most US citizens think the country may use force to solve
the disputes if necessary, while most of the Europeans reject the idea.
So, if the Georgian policy was to become clearer and more honest,
the issues of Chechnya and Abkhazia/South Ossetia should once and
forever be divorced.
In an effort to pacify Russia, Georgia has muted criticism of the
Chechen policy. This may be in country’s pragmatic interest. But
the European position of the Georgian delegation should by no means
be interpreted as acquiescing with the human rights violations in
Chechnya.
Russia is wrong in its actions in Georgia’s rebel provinces because
this violates the principle of territorial integrity of Georgia
and supports rebels. There is no “double standard.” In fact,
Russia’s policy is rather consistent in supporting secessionism
in Transdniestria, in Nagorno Karabakh, in South Ossetia and in
Abkhazia. Only in Tajikistan Russia helped to root out an Islamic
movement, which was imported from Afghanistan.
True, Russia’s internal policies toward secessionism are not consistent
with its external ones. But this is a fact of life: the countries
are in habit of differentiating internal policies from external ones
on number of issues. Russia has the sovereign right to set Chechnya
policy, just as much as Georgia has the right to set the policy
towards Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
What Georgian politicians have to make clear is that Georgia fully
endorses the European principles of conflict settlement and vows to
affirm the principles of Human Rights in its conflict-settlement
efforts. At the same time Georgia should be against violation of
these European principles by Russia in Chechnya or elsewhere, if only
because they represent an immediate security threat to Georgia.
There should be a single standard Georgia advocates for: affirming
the territorial integrity of the states, and affirming the human
rights for each person within these states.
Jaba Devdariani is one of the founders of Civil Georgia, currently
serving as contributing editor.

COULD THE ‘DEAL OF THE CENTURY’ STILL LIVE UP TO ITS NAME?
CENTRAL ASIA – CAUCASUS ANALYST
Wednesday / October 06, 2004
By Pavel K. Baev
On 20 September 2004, Baku staged major celebrations, with Turkish
President Ahmet Necdet Sezer and Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
and Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvily present among the guests
of honor. The cause for the festivities was the tenth anniversary
of the first contract on delivering the Azerbaijani oil to the world
market, dubbed ‘the deal of the century’ by the late president Heydar
Aliyev. Many expectations were frustrated during this decade but
the fast-approaching inauguration of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
pipeline could make good on many of the old promises.
BACKGROUND: Ten years ago, on 20 September 1994, the newly-forged
consortium of several international oil companies, called
the Azerbaijan International Operating Company (AIOC), signed the
agreement with the government of Azerbaijan on the development of three
oilfields: Azeri, Chirag, and Guneshli. It was BP that had worked
hardest and lobbied the smartest in preparation for this agreement,
but it had to cut in Amoco, Pennzoil, and Unocal from the U.S.,
Statoil from Norway and several minor operators (Exxon joined the
next year). What was more, seeking to secure a neutral or positive
attitude from Russia, Azerbaijan’s State Oil Company (SOCAR) invited
Lukoil to join with a decent 10% of the total package, explaining
the presence of a representative of Russia’s Ministry for Fuel and
Energy at the signing ceremony.
In those days, however, powerful bureaucrats in the Yeltsin government
were not accustomed to inform one another about their policies, so
Foreign Minister Evgeni Primakov was furious at being kept in the dark.
Three months later, the first Chechen War was unleashed and this
unfolding disaster made Moscow even more nervous and disagreeable about
Western plans for the Caspian. That started a chain of setbacks for the
AIOC: a sharp drop in oil prices, downwards re-evaluations of the oil
reserves in the Southern Caspian, disagreements about export routes,
and endless quarrels about maritime borders and even an incident
(fortunately, a single one) involving Iranian patrol crafts.
In retrospect, three key sources of troubles for the project, as well
as several other contracts signed in its wake, can be identified. The
first was the (sometimes unnecessarily rude) rejections of Iran’s
proposals to channel some of the prospective oil flows towards
the Gulf through its territory. The second was the failure to give
Russia a meaningful stake in the project, thus making a partner with
a clear interest in the success. The third and most complex Pandora
box of troubles was full of local conflicts, and the oil contracts,
excitingly promising as they were, failed to make any contribution
towards their resolution. All these shortcomings are still present
but at the start of the second decade of implementation, the situation
looks significantly more promising for AIOC and its local partners. It
is not only the unstoppable rise of oil prices that improves the
overall prospects, but also the completion in the coming months, after
many delays and complications, of the strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
pipeline that could deliver as much as one million barrels of Caspian
oil a day to meet steadily growing world demand.
IMPLICATIONS: The intensity of geopolitical competition for Caspian
oil has visibly subsided since the late 1990s when Russia and the US
appeared to be at loggerheads over the control of prospective Caspian
pipelines. The present-day relative calm, however, might be misleading
and the absence of any Russian guests at the celebrations in Baku (as
well as the total silence about them in the Russian media) is a warning
signal. While the technicalities of the ten-year-old deal are mostly
resolved, its implementation is still threatened by three regional
risks and three external challenges. The former are the uncertainties
about President Ilham Aliyev’s ability to control infighting among
interest groups in Azerbaijan’s ruling elite, the desperate efforts
of President Mikhail Saakashvili to keep Georgia mobilized around his
program of reforms, and the fragility of the ten years old cease-fire
in Nagorno-Karabakh with a perfectly deadlocked peace process.
The external challenges are the disgruntlement of Iran, which seeks
for means to reduce the international pressure focused on its nuclear
program; the overstretched U.S., which is stuck in the quagmire of
Iraq and seems to have few political resources left for the Caucasus;
and the confused Russia, which seeks to expand its regional influence
but remains unable to contain the war in Chechnya. Recent Russian
efforts at re-orienting its foreign and security policies towards
the ‘war on terrorism’, triggered by the horrible tragedy in Beslan,
are particularly worrisome. The doctrine of military prevention has
been made an integral part of these efforts, and there is a visible
desire to show the ability to deliver on the promises made by Minister
of Defense Ivanov and Chief of General Staff Baluevsky. The Pankisi
Gorge in Georgia has long been identified as the most probable area
for a Russian ‘counter-terrorist’ operation, but it is entirely
possible that targets for ‘surprise attacks’ could be found further
south in Georgia and in Azerbaijan. The military base in Akhalkalaki,
Georgia, would then prove its value and the radar station in Qabala,
Azerbaijan, may provide a useful pretext – and if such a penetrating
‘counter-terrorist preventive strike’ would also prevent oil from
flowing to the West by damaging some of the BTC infrastructure,
nobody in Moscow would be greatly upset.
Such a scenario might appear entirely hypothetical, and its
repercussions could be far more serious then a post-factum exchange
of stern diplomatic notes. Every balanced assessment of immediate
consequences and further implications would warn against reckless use
of military instruments in the Caucasus, but the Russian leadership has
been departing further and further away from its trademark pragmatism
and increasingly shows the predisposition to inadequate responses in
crisis situations.
CONCLUSIONS: The renewed enthusiasm around the decade-old ‘deal of
the century’ is fueled by record-high oil prices and pinned on the
forthcoming unveiling of the high-capacity pipeline. In unstable
areas like the Caucasus, however, huge profits tend to attract
big trouble. The recent cancellation of NATO Partnership for Peace
exercises in Azerbaijan was certainly not an isolated diplomatic
incident; the lack of real partnership is certainly an open secret
but the absence of real peace needs to be addressed urgently. The
list of things that might go wrong with delivering the Caspian oil
to the world markets is excessively long, from implosion of regimes
in the South Caucasus to Russia’s aggressive move in reasserting its
dominance. The deal would have deserved the pretentious name if it
was used for promoting stability in the region. It may not be too
late to give this emphasis to the oil policies, but the currently
prevalent benign neglect is not the way to proceed.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Dr. Pavel K. Baev is a Senior Researcher at the
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).
The CENTRAL ASIA – CAUCASUS ANALYST is a publicaton of the Central
Asia-Caucasus Institute at the Nitze School for Advanced International
Studies, at Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, DC.

The Gazette (Montreal)
October 9, 2004 Saturday
Final Edition
Turkey ready to fly
NORMAN WEBSTER, Freelance
Something important happened this week, and hardly anyone here seemed
to notice. While our media were covering the U.S. election, fire in a
submarine and the shutdown of NHL hockey, the European Union in
Brussels gave the go-ahead to Turkey’s application for membership.
Mind you, it was but a first step in a journey of many leagues. The
executive of the 25-country EU has recommended only that negotiations
begin with the Turks. That decision must be endorsed by the leaders
of all the states at a crucial meeting in December.
If that hurdle is crossed, the parties will sit down sometime next
year to begin discussions likely to last a decade or more before an
agreement on full membership is signed. If it ever is. The obstacles
to final accommodation with this giant (71 million people),
grindingly poor, overwhelmingly Muslim nation remain formidable.
The Turks are not universally beloved. Valery Giscard d’Estaing,
former president of France, once said Turkish membership would mean
the death of Europe. The current president, Jacques Chirac, has
indicated France might hold a referendum on the matter. Other
European politicians are trying to shunt the Turks aside by proposing
some sort of association short of full membership.
Behind these moves lie fears about waves of poor Turks invading
European economies, not to mention Midnight Express notions about a
brutal oriental culture that does not fit with Western civilization.
Such prejudices fade during a visit to bustling, fascinating,
crumbling Istanbul, one of the great European cities, but not
everyone makes that trip.
Then there is the small matter of religion. Given the rise of
fundamentalist Islam around the world, is there truly a place within
the EU for a Muslim nation?
Ironically, Turkey’s supporters turn this into an argument for
admission. At this critical moment, they say, Turkey is treading the
path of liberal democracy, showing the way to other Islamic
countries. Acceptance into the European club would send the best
possible message.
Conversely, “a no to Turkey could have catastrophic consequences,”
argued a recent editorial in The Economist. “It would be widely
interpreted in the Muslim world as a blow against all Islam.”
A significant element in the situation is the fact Turkey is the most
secular of Islamic countries, a legacy of Kemal Ataturk, founder of
the republic in 1923 after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Even
today, Turkey proscribes the head scarf for females in schools,
universities and the public service. A decade ago, it had a female
prime minister, Tansu Ciller.
The country’s current leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, is an embodiment
of Turkish contradictions. A devout Muslim, he leads an Islamist
party and his wife defiantly wears a headscarf.
When I last visited Istanbul, in the late 1990s, Erdogan was the
controversial mayor of the city, charged with inciting hatred by
reciting this daring poem: “The mosques are our barracks,/the domes
our helmets,/the minarets our bayonets,/and the believers our
soldiers.” In the end, he served five months in jail and a period of
banishment from office.
Yet today, two years after his party won national election, he is a
liberalizing leader whose package of reforms greatly influenced this
week’s EU decision in Brussels.
The Erdogan program has included easing up on the Kurdish minority
(the language of these former “mountain Turks” can now be used in
schools – imagine), abolishing the death penalty and loosening
restrictions on free speech (although Human Rights Watch notes an
individual who states an Armenian genocide took place during the
First World War can still be jailed for 10 years).
The military seems more comfortable in barracks, weaned from its
predilection for coups and dictatorship. Turkey’s traditional enemy,
Greece, has become a close ally. Torture is, if not abolished, at
least officially frowned upon.
There was a flap recently when the government proposed to criminalize
adultery. European officials cried shock-horror, EU negotiations
teetered in the balance, and the proposal was shelved.
Clearly, the time is ripe for another trip to Istanbul, where you can
escape the insane traffic by sipping dark Turkish coffee beside the
Bosphorus, as boats slip by between you and Asia. With the lira now
at more than a million to a Canadian dollar, capacious pockets will
be required.
It does make the head whirl when you slap down a few million and tell
the waiter to keep the change.
Norman Webster is a former editor of The Gazette.

Russia transport minister to hold talks in Yerevan
By Tigran Liloyan
ITAR-TASS News Agency
October 11, 2004 Monday
YEREVAN, October 12 — Russian Transport and Communication Minister
Igor Levitin will discuss with the state leadership of Armenia the
entire complex of bilateral relations in the political and especially
in the economic sphere.
Levitin is arriving in the Armenian capital on Tuesday for the
first time in the capacity of the head of the Russian part of the
intergovernmental commission for economic cooperation.
Levitin will meet with Armenian President Robert Kocharyan and Prime
Minister Andranik Margaryan. The Russian minister will hold talks
with the head of the Armenian part of the commission, Defence Minister
Serzh Sarkisyan who is also Secretary of the National Security Council
under the Armenian president.
Sources in the Armenian government told Itar-Tass Levitin will address
the opening of the international Armenian economic forum held here
by the Union of Armenians of Russia and the World Armenian Congress
with well-known Russian entrepreneur and public leader Ara Abramyan
in the head.
The visit’s programme includes a visit to the Yerevan instrument
making plant Mars, which was handed over to Russia as settlement of
Armenia’s interstate debt.

Turkish ambassador to France says religion behind Turkey’s trouble joining EU
AP Worldstream
Oct 11, 2004
Turkey’s ambassador to France said in an interview published Monday
that his country’s would have “no problem” joining the European Union
if it were Christian and that its Muslim heritage is the real issue
behind the current debate.
“The real motive for this reticence, especially in France, is
religion,” Uluc Ozulker told the daily Le Parisien. “If Turkey were
Christian, there would be no problem. But, voila, we are a Muslim
country.”
The ambassador noted that Turkey is a secular state and has been for
more than eight decades since the nation’s founding father, Mustafa
Kemal Ataturk, instituted reforms.
Ozulker spoke as debate rose in France over Turkey’s eventual
membership in the European Union, which currently counts 25 members.
President Jacques Chirac reiterated on Sunday that “it is the French
people who will have the last word,” a reference to his plan for
France to hold a referendum on the subject. That could be a potentially
fatal blow to Turkey’s aspirations since EU members must unanimously
approve any nation’s application for membership.
Chirac supports Turkey’s membership but thinks it will take up to 15
years for it to join.
The French parliament is to debate the issue before the EU summit
Dec. 17 when leaders are to finalize an initial approval of membership
talks.
Ozulker said Europe “is not a Christian enclave” and Turkey’s joining
the EU “will not denature Europe” despite its some 70 million-strong
population.
“We share the same democratic values as the 25,” he said, adding that
Turkey is already part of the customs union.
Turkey has carried out some needed reforms such as abolishing the
death penalty and cutting back the power of the military in politics.
Asked if Turkey would recognize the Armenian genocide, the ambassador
said that it has yet to be proven.
“It’s up to international and impartial historians to meet and decide,”
he said. “We will accept the results of their work.”