KREMLIN REDEFINING POLICY IN “POST-SOVIET SPACE”
by Vladimir Socor
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Tuesday, February 8, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 27
In a marathon-length press conference on February 3, Kremlin political
consultant Gleb Pavlovsky laid certain Russian markers in Eurasia ahead of
the George W. Bush-Vladimir Putin summit and, by the same token, seized the
moment to announce a major redefinition of Russia’s policy in the
“post-Soviet space.”
Pavlovsky warned at the outset: “One should be aware that, at least until
the end of President Putin’s tenure and probably until the end of the
presidency of his immediate successors, Russia’s foreign policy priority
will be to turn Russia into a 21st century world power. This despite the
fact that we are presently a weak regional power with a weak commodity-based
economy.”
Linking Russia’s global ambitions for the future to the projection of its
influence in the “post-Soviet space” at present, Pavlovsky defined Russia’s
“near abroad” doctrine as inherently assuming Western cooperation with this
Russian design. He faulted Russia’s policy for this “primitive” expectation,
noting that Western non-acceptance “naturally weakens the CIS, which emerged
as part of that doctrine.” In that sense, “The concept of the ‘near abroad’
is dead.” Consequently, Pavlovsky announced, “Russia is currently revising
its policy in the post-Soviet space and the mechanisms of its
implementation.” As a general principle, “any country [that would] promote
the doctrine of Russia’s rollback will certainly create a conflict in the
relations with this country. This must be clearly understood.”
As part of that reassessment, Pavlovsky advanced three salient ideas:
1) Belarus represents an optimal model of integration with Russia, whereby
the regime’s ultimate political reliability will override other issues. “We
are totally satisfied with the level of our relations with Belarus. Russia
will clearly distinguish between certain characteristics of a political
regime in a neighboring country and its observance of allied commitments.
Belarus is a model ally.”
2) As a major departure from Russian policy since 1992, Moscow reserves the
right from now on to pursue its goals by establishing relations with
political forces, opposition as well as governing, in post-Soviet countries.
“Russia will certainly interact with the entire political spectrum in the
neighboring [sic] countries, both official and opposition, including
nongovernmental organizations, democratic organizations, and in-system
political groups,” other than the “extremist, radical, or underground
groups.” “The president of our partner country or ally country, while
preserving the role of our central interlocutor, will not be regarded by
Russia as the one and only representative of the society.” Moscow intends to
use its NGOs as well as its government agencies to link up with political
forces in post-Soviet countries.
Inspired by the defeat of the Moscow-supported presidential candidate in
Ukraine, this policy shift also means explicitly that Moscow reserves the
right to work with the opposition in that country during Viktor Yushchenko’s
presidency. “During the electoral campaign in Ukraine there was an
underestimation [by Russia] and low level of cooperation between Russian
society and Ukrainian NGOs. We will try to avoid such an underestimation in
the future. . . . Mr. Yushchenko will certainly not be regarded by us as a
person with exclusive rights to interpret the position of Ukrainian society,
political, and nongovernmental organizations.”
Indeed, until now, Moscow has almost always supported or worked with the
incumbent regimes in CIS countries, keeping the opposition at arm’s length.
Support for secessionist enclaves in Moldova and Georgia were the major
exceptions to that rule of Moscow’s conduct. Pavlovsky is now signaling that
Moscow will no longer feel inhibited to seek tactical alliances with
opposition groups against incumbents. Moreover, his remarks suggest that
Russian authorities intend to compete in the civil-society arena by using
their tame or government-created NGOs to offset the genuine ones, which are
usually Western-supported and promote representative democracy as distinct
from the “managed-democracy” model associated with Putin and Pavlovsky.
The Kremlin’s intervention in the Ukrainian electoral campaign may have been
the high-water mark as well as the last egregious case of massive uncritical
support to an incumbent regime. However, even as that effort was in
progress, the Kremlin’s policy in Moldova marked a first departure from its
general pro-incumbent policy. Responding to overtures from the centrist
opposition’s Democratic Moldova Bloc, the Kremlin decided by mid-2004 to
support the DMB against President Vladimir Voronin, who had reoriented his
policy toward the West. In Chisinau it is assumed that Pavlovsky and his
team played a major role in Moscow’s decision. Apparently sobered up by the
defeat in Ukraine, however, Pavlovsky implied during his press conference
that the Kremlin has now adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward Moldova’s
upcoming general elections.
Citing Kyrgyzstan as another case study, Pavlovsky signaled support to the
incumbent authorities in the upcoming parliamentary and presidential
elections, on the grounds that the opposition has not committed itself to
using non-violent methods. However, he left open the possibility of
political deals with the opposition: “Explain to us what goals you pursue,
what means you will use, and then we will decide on the level of our
interaction with this political force.”
3) Russia does not accept the proposition that Euro-Atlantic integration
provides a shelter against Russian influence in post-Soviet countries.
“Russia will become a world power again, and will have a global area of
interests. Now, however . . . there are certain countries where we have our
interests. Even the admission of some of these countries to the European
Union and NATO does not mean that they fall out of the area of our
interests. The Baltic states are certainly within this area of interests,
particularly on such issues as transit, or the status of the Russian
language and Russian community. We will certainly use their accession to the
new organizations in order to intensify monitoring of what concerns our
interests and to influence these countries.”
This stated goal transcends the Baltic states as such, reflecting more
far-reaching ambitions to corrode NATO’s and the EU’s political cohesion by
trying to extract concessions at the expense of Baltic states on the issues
that Pavlovsky named. The tactic at this stage consists of trying to
introduce those issues on the agenda of Russia’s discussions with the EU,
NATO, and some major West European capitals. Any success in doing so would
encourage Moscow to expand the range of internal EU and NATO issues on which
Moscow seeks to obtain a voice and a say.
(fednews.ru, RIA-Novosti, February 3).
Tuesday, February 8, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 27
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Moscow asserts right to work with opposition groups in CIS countries
*Speculation grows over Zhvania’s death, successor
*Armenian currency continues to soar against euro, dollar
*China denies financing Yuganskneftgaz acquisition