Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
March 8, 2005 Tuesday

SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE: EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN BLACK SEA AREA

TESTIMONY-BY: MR. BRUCE P. JACKSON, PRESIDENT

AFFILIATION: PROJECT ON TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES

Statement of Mr. Bruce P. Jackson President, Project on Transitional
Democracies

Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European
Affairs

March 8, 2005

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you on the state of democracy in the Black Sea
region and the possibilities which the vast democratic transformation
of this region presents for US policy. I would like to discuss three
major questions: (1) What is the Black Sea region and why should
developments there command the attention of this Committee and of US
policymakers? (2) Where are the states of the Black Sea region in the
development of democratic governance and what factors retard
development of a free and prosperous civil society in these states?

(3) Given the strategic importance of the region and the threats to
the freedom of peoples who profess to share our values, what should
be the policy of the United States towards the new democracies around
the Black Sea?

I Historically, the Black Sea has stood at the confluence of the
Russian, Ottoman and Persian Empires and has been a central theater
in the “Great Game” which was played out along its shores throughout
the nineteenth century1. The contours of the Black Sea region which
were established in the competitions between the great European
powers in the Crimean War and World War I are still evident today.
The geopolitics of the region remain heavily influenced by the
internal character and foreign policy aspirations of the larger
regional powers, Russia and Turkey. The middle powers, Ukraine,
Romania and Bulgaria, continue to seek security and stability in
regional cooperation and, particularly, in closer relations with
European institutions. The smaller littoral states, Moldova, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia, watch the great regional powers fearfully,
envy the more cosmopolitan and Europeanized middle powers, and are
bloodied by every tremor along the tectonic plate of the former
imperial powers. Today, the same factors, which rendered the Black
Sea region a “black hole” in European history, now argue that this
region is of central strategic interest to Europe and the United
States. There are six major points: 1 For a fuller discussion see
Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, “The Black Sea and the
Frontiers of Freedom” in Policy Review, June & July 2004

The Black Sea region has for centuries been the entry point to the
broader Middle East. The borders of the democracies of the region
touch Syria, Iraq, Iran and the shores of the Caspian Sea. As the
United States discovered to its dismay on March 1, 2003, without the
cooperation of Black Sea states, in this instance Turkey, we cannot
easily reach the northern approaches to the broader Middle East.
Every nineteenth century European power understood that the nation
which controlled the Black Sea could control the most important real
estate in the Middle East. If we are to be successful in our efforts
to support the democratization of the Middle East, we will have to
build a secure, prosperous, and democratic Black Sea region in the
process.

The Black Sea region was the beginning of the Silk Road of trade with
Asia. While silk and spices have lost much of their allure since the
times of Marco Polo, the energy reserves of Central Asia are becoming
increasingly important to our European allies and to the stability of
world oil prices. Today, the member states of the European Union
import approximately 50% of their energy needs; by 2020 imports will
rise to 70% of consumption. This increase will be delivered to Europe
across and around the Black Sea region, on routes such as the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.

3. The Black Sea region is rapidly becoming part of Europe. With the
exception of Croatia, all current candidates for EU membership are
from the Black Sea region. Romania and Bulgaria are expected to gain
EU membership in 2007 and Turkey sometime around 2014. The western
and southern shores of the Black Sea are also the borders of NATO and
soon the European Union. These facts so impressed the heads of state
of member states of NATO that at the Istanbul Summit in July 2004 the
NATO Joint Communiquerecognized that the Black Sea region was an
essential part of Euro-Atlantic security.

4. It is not, however, only US interests which tie us to the Black
Sea region, but also our political values. Both the Rose Revolution
in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine occurred in countries
along the northern and eastern shores of the sea. The possibilities
created by these democratic revolutions not only inspired President
Bush’s Second Inaugural Address and his recent speech in Bratislava,
but they changed the structure of politics in Minsk, Chisinau and as
far away as Almaty, Bishkek and Beirut. Without doubt, the largest
and most dramatic democratic changes are occurring in this part of
the Euro-Atlantic.

5. Sadly, it is not only our hopes that draw our attention to this
region, but also our fears. The most sharp and dangerous fragments of
the former Soviet Union lie scattered in an arc across the northern
shore of the Black Sea. A belt of ‘frozen conflicts” begins in
Transdnistria in eastern Moldova and runs through Abkhazia and South
Ossetia in Georgia to the mountain heights of Nagorno-Karabakh on the
border of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In each of these “frozen conflicts”
created in the civil wars of the dying Soviet empire, brutal warfare
and ethnic cleansing have occurred and could reoccur. In
Transdnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, transnational crime has
found a home and developed a base for trafficking in weapons, drugs,
women and children. These criminal enterprises destabilize the
governments of the region, threaten Europe with illicit traffic, and
ultimately pose a danger to the United States with their capability
and intent to sell weapons and technology to our enemies.

6. Finally, the most negative expression of Russian foreign policy
aspirations now occurs along the northern rim of the Black Sea
region. Since I have already been given an opportunity by the
Committee to testify on the subject of Russian neo-imperialism in
what the Kremlin regards as Russia’s “near abroad,” I will not repeat
the argument here2 . Suffice it to say, whether we are intent on
protecting new democracies from outside inference and coercion or are
simply concerned about the damage Russian policy is doing to its own
people, we are forced to focus on the region.

In short, the democracies of the Black Sea lie on the knife edge of
history which separates the politics of nineteenth century
imperialism from European modernity. Reactionary forces in the region
(separatism, historical Russian aspirations, and criminal interest)
would prefer a return to a balance of power system where the powerful
rule over spheres of interest and the powerless would serve either
autocrat or kleptocrat. On the other hand, those democratic reformers
who view themselves as the direct descendants of the leaders of
Solidarity and Charter 77 who freed Central and Eastern Europe in
1989, aspire to see their new democracies following the path of
Poland and the Czech Republic into a European system based on liberal
values and shared security.

Which of these forces ends up defining a modern Black Sea system is a
matter of great consequence for the United States and Europe. Not
only would a return to the politics of the past constrain our ability
to work for democratic change in the greater Middle East and damage
the energy security of Europe, but if the new democracies fail to
make the Black Sea a part of the Euro-Atlantic system, the lives of a
quarter of a billion Europeans will be nastier, more brutish, and
(inevitably) shorter. II Let me turn from the region as a whole to a
summary discussion of the state of democracy in its constituent
states, where it is somewhat easier to see the great possibilities
and the factors which retard reform and political integration.

Romania and Bulgaria are undoubtedly the success stories of Southeast
Europe and the Black Sea. Both were invited to join NATO in 2002
where they have performed well and contributed to missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq. As I mentioned earlier, both are expected to
join the European Union on January 1, 2007 leading their region into
the institutional core of Europe. The two factors that retard the
political and economic development of both Romania and Bulgaria are
deeply entrenched 2 Bruce Pitcairn Jackson, Testimony before the
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on “Democracy in Russia,” February
17, 2005. governmental corruption and a weak and often compromised
judiciary. But, even in this, there is a good news story to be told.
In the recent Romanian Presidential election for the first time, the
issue of corruption dominated the campaign and swept reformer Traian
Basescu into the Presidency. His Government has launched a large-
scale offensive against corruption in government and business.
Forthcoming elections in Bulgaria may offer a similar, albeit long
overdue, opportunity to accelerate reform. Clearly, Romania and
Bulgaria are two democracies whose long-term prospects look extremely
bright.

Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, President Basescu arrives in Washington
later today for a meeting tomorrow with President Bush and members of
the Senate. President Basescu is one of the most eloquent advocates
of a comprehensive strategy for the Black Sea, aimed at advancing
prosperity and democracy throughout the region. His goal is nothing
less than to make the Black Sea “a second Mediterranean” in terms of
shared security, commerce, and political cooperation.

Turkey achieved an historic milestone on December 17, 2004 when the
European Union finally agreed to open membership negotiations.
Despite this confirmation of Turkey’s European destiny, there are
strong indications that Turkey’s national and geopolitical identity
crisis is far from over and that Turkey may be entering a difficult
and problematic stage. In June 2004, in order to maintain some manner
of regional hegemony, Turkey played a key role in blocking the
extension of the NATO surveillance operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR to the
Black Sea. Internally, the ruling AK Party seems have taken a turn
for the worse, characterized by strident anti-Americanism, cultural
anti- Europeanism, and a resurgent xenophobia. (The television
footage of Turkish riot police savagely beating young women at a
peaceful protest for political rights that appeared on BBC yesterday
is but the most recent negative development.)

In foreign policy, during the term of Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey
has quietly broken off its strategic relationship with Israel,
refused to negotiate with Armenia on the opening of their common
border (thereby obstructing negotiations on Nagorno- Karabakh), and
demanded of the United States a draconian treatment of the Kurdish
population of Iraq. In diplomatic parlance, Turkey has become
“unhelpful.”

Perhaps, most worrying are reports of Turkish-Russian discussions of
a coordinated policy in the Black Sea region, which would inevitably
be conducted at the expense of smaller, pro-European democracies. The
motivation for Turkey’s negative regional behavior appears to be a
classic case of Great Power insecurity and a fear that Turkey will
lose its distinct identity in the economic and demographic
uncertainty of modern Europe. We can hope that the negative trend in
Turkish politics is related to the turmoil in the Middle East and the
problems and contradictions which a secular Islamic government
encounters in the course of European integration rather than a
response to the flowering of democracy around the Black Sea.
Nevertheless, Turkey has entered a dangerous period both for itself
and for US-Turkish relations which deserves serious attention.

Ukraine is possibly the best-known and most inspiring of the Black
Sea democracies. The triumph of Viktor Yushchenko and the Ukrainian
people is without question the most significant event in the advance
of democracy in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. That said,
President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko have a
Herculean task in front of them. First and foremost, they must unite
a nation even as they undertake the reforms which are necessary for
Ukraine to become a European democracy.

The most dangerous year for a new democracy is its first year, and
for Ukraine the critical period is from today through the
Parliamentary elections in March 2006. In this defining twelve- month
period, Viktor Yushchenko will have to address the criminal conduct
of the Kuchma period, define and negotiate the rules of the game for
the business community, and make significant progress both within the
Action Plan of the European Union’s Neighborhood Policy and in an
intensified dialogue with NATO. Any one of these tasks would be
formidable, but the new government must accomplish this and more, and
do so in such a way that convinces the people of Kiev, Lviv, and
Donetsk that they share a common future in a united pro-Western
Ukraine. The critical task will be to establish transparent business
practices and to eliminate the “grey economy” without resorting to
large-scale re-nationalization which would destroy the confidence of
foreign investors and dangerously inflame sectional resentments.

The further danger for Ukrainian democracy lies in the hostility of
Moscow towards pro-European democracies in the former Soviet space
and the fear that democratic reform inspires in the criminal clans,
which have dominated the “grey economy” of Ukraine up until now.
Sadly, but necessarily, the stability and security of EU and NATO
membership is some years off and over the immediate political
horizon. The United States and our European allies must bring their
entire diplomatic and economic power to bear to ensure that Russia,
or criminal groups emboldened by Russia, do not undermine the
Yushchenko Government. We must support the Ukrainian people in their
truly historic endeavor.

Georgia’s democratic revolution is only slightly less well-known than
Ukraine’s and is succeeding against even longer odds. Georgia, under
the leadership of President Misha Saakashvili, has finished an
extraordinary first year of reform, which saw the breakaway province
of Adjaria reunited with the constitutional government in Tbilisi. By
all indicators, such as its qualification for participation within
the Millennium Challenge Account, Georgia is delivering on its
commitments to economic reform and the democratic transformation of
its society and government. Like Ukraine, however, Georgia has
encountered serious and continuous obstruction from Russia. The
Russian Government has refused to comply with its international
treaty obligation to withdraw its troops from the Soviet-era bases on
Georgian soil and has consistently supported separatists in the
breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia. Late last year, Russia blocked
the OSCE from reinforcing a peacekeeping mission in South Ossetia in
order to protect its ability to ship prohibited weapons and
explosives through the Roki Tunnel to paramilitary gangs in South
Ossetia. And, at the December OSCE Summit in Sofia, Bulgaria, Russia
forced the OSCE to close the Border Monitoring Operation which
patrolled the northern border of Georgia with Ingushetia, Dagestan
and Chechnya. Russia’s actions could very well prove to be the death
knell for the OSCE; we must ensure that they are not for democratic
Georgia.

Despite Russian attempts to destabilize the Saakashvili Government,
Georgian democracy continues to mature and was strong enough to
withstand the recent tragic death of Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania,
who was a mainstay of the Rose Revolution. If democracies could be
compared to sports teams, Georgia would be the 1980’s US Olympic
Hockey team. Like the Lake Placid Olympic team, Georgia should not be
winning, except it does. It seems to me that Georgia has the
essential quality of scrappiness that animated successful democratic
movements in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic
States against the monolith of Soviet power; they care more and are
willing to work harder for democracy than the reactionary forces are
willing to work to restore autocratic rule and criminal enterprise.
In contrast, the other smaller states of the Black Sea regime,
Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia, retain more characteristics of
post-Soviet autocracies than of emerging European democracies. To
varying degrees, recent elections have not met European standards.
Opposition parties are harassed and opposition candidates are
occasionally threatened with criminal charges or simply imprisoned.
Both civil society and the free press are under duress in these
countries, as we can see from the recent assassination of the editor
of an opposition newspaper in Baku. For the most part, the major
factors retarding the democratic development of Moldova, Azerbaijan
and Armenia are the persistence of frozen conflicts on their
territories and the negative effect these conflicts have on their
economic development and domestic politics. The stand-off between
Moldovan government and the Smirnov clan in Transdnistria has
proliferated corruption and crime throughout Moldova and served as an
excuse for President Voronin to limit the political and press
freedoms of Moldovan citizens. Similarly, the impasse on
Nagorno-Karabakh has served to maintain extremists in both Azeri and
Armenian politics, and succeeded in isolating both countries from
constructive interaction with their Black Sea neighbors and with
Euro-Atlantic institutions.

This brief survey of the mature, nascent and inchoate democracies of
the Black Sea region reveals a special class of democracies which are
torn between the desire of their peoples for a European future (and
all the economic and political freedoms these peoples associate with
Europe) and the lingering grip of a brutal past. In short, this is a
region of Europe where the future of democracy is still at risk.

III If I am correct in arguing that the Black Sea region is a area of
enormous democratic potential, but where democracy remains at risk,
then the policy of the United States has to be to support new
democracies, to dissuade or deter foreign powers from intervening in
their development, and to ensure that the Euro-Atlantic institutions
they seek remain open to them. I have six recommendations for this
Committee to consider and for US policy generally: 1. Accelerate the
leading democracies of the region. The prospects for democracy in the
Black Sea region will be substantially enhanced by the formal
integration of Romania and Bulgaria in the European Union. Their
accession must remain on track for January 1, 2007 in order to convey
to the other states of the region that the possibility of near-term
European integration exists and that painful reforms have their
reward in security and prosperity. The United States can assist
Romania and Bulgaria in achieving their goal by pushing hard for
judicial reform and strict standards of official conduct. The
Department of Defense should make its long-delayed decision on the
repositioning of US European bases to the sites offered by the
Romanian Government in the vicinity of Constanza on the Black Sea.
Nothing could make more clear that the United States shares the view
of the European Union that security and stability in the Black Sea
region is essential to Euro-Atlantic security. 2. Reform and adapt
our institutions to perform in the Black Sea region. Existing
institutions, such as NATO and the OSCE, must be made to perform in
service of democracy in the Black Sea littorals. We must revisit the
decision to block Active Endeavor from being extended to the Black
Sea and overturn the archaic Montreux Convention, which is sometimes
invoked as the justification for barring NATO surveillance from
transiting the Bosphorus. Similarly, we must demand that the OSCE
fulfill its peacekeeping and monitoring responsibilities throughout
the region. Even if we are successful with both NATO and the OSCE,
the Black Sea region remains “institution-poor.” Regional
initiatives, such as the confused GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) or the moribund Black Sea
Economic Cooperation forum have not filled the gap. As a consequence,
we should engage with regional leaders, such as Romanian President
Basescu, Georgian President Saakashvili, and Ukrainian President
Yushchenko, on the formation of new structures for a Black Sea
strategy. 3. Confront both Russia and Turkey: Whatever we hope to
accomplish in the Black Sea region will be impossible without the
willingness to confront Russia where its conduct goes beyond the
acceptable. But we must also communicate frankly to Turkey that we
expect our friends and allies to support other democratic states and
to work for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in their region.
Just because Russian officials become peevish when we point out that
the poison used on Yushchenko and the explosives used in the car
bombing in Gori, Georgia came from Russia, does not mean we should
ignore this conduct. Just because Turkish officials become indignant
at the mention of a genocidal campaign conducted by Ottoman
authorities against Armenian civilians in the early years of the last
century does not mean that coming to terms with history should not be
discussed between democratic allies. If we are to succeed where
democracy is at risk, we must be clear in what we say and do. 4.
Prioritize the frozen conflicts: Beginning with the conflict in
Transdnistria, our negotiators need to redouble their efforts to find
creative solutions. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine has opened up
the possibility of ending the criminal enterprise in Transdnistria
and its secessionist conflict with the constitutional government in
Chisinau. For negotiations to succeed, however, we should expand the
so-called Pentagonal-format to include both the European Union and
Romania, as essential and constructive partners. In Nagorno-Karabakh,
we must press Azerbaijan and Armenia back to serious negotiations and
insist that negotiations begin from the point reached at 2001 meeting
in Key West. Finally, we must show far greater resolve and enthusiasm
when parties take a meaningful step towards peace. President Misha
Saakashvili’s enlightened peace plan for South Ossetia has been
greeted by a resounding silence in Brussels and Washington, which is
dumbfounding. It is also callous and derelict. 5. Harmonize the
democracy support programs of the United States and the European
Union: Both the Millennium Challenge Account and European Union’s
Neighborhood Policy were designed to assist emerging democracies in
their efforts to accelerate economic development and strengthen the
capacity of democratic institutions. Both the United States and the
European Union are active in the Black Sea region, but formal
coordination does not yet exist. The four freedoms of market access,
labor mobility, investment and travel offered in Europe’s
Neighborhood Policy are the obvious complement to what the United
States can offer in terms of security support and developmental aid.
Closer coordination is essential. We must also challenge our
Congressional-funded NGO’s, such as the National Endowment of
Democracy, IRI and NDI, to address a wider spectrum of democracy-
support activities. Elections are not the only things that matter in
the Black Sea region. Strengthening civil society, the press and
parliamentary oppositions are also key. 6. Focus on Ukraine: For
better or for worse, the extent and character of democracy in the
Black Sea region will be defined to a great extent by the successes
and failures of democratic change in Ukraine. Without a democratic
Ukraine, peace in Moldova will remain elusive and the democracies of
the South Caucasus will be isolated from Europe. The ultimate
disposition of Ukraine may well finally answer the question that has
nagged at us since 1989: “What is the size of Europe?” If the Orange
Revolution succeeds and European institutions maintain an “Open Door’
policy towards Ukraine’s candidacy for membership in NATO and the
European Union, then we can assume that all the democracies on the
Black Sea have a place in Europe, including, some day, Russia.

Mr. Chairman, I believe that what is occurring around the Black Sea
may be the beginning of the final phase of the completion of a Europe
whole and free. Over the five years remaining in this decade, I think
that the rapid democratic transformation of Central, Eastern, and now
Southeastern Europe will come to a conclusion, and a new (and far
larger) community of Euro-Atlantic democracies will result. While
democratic change is ultimately the responsibility of the Black Sea
states themselves, the United States has a significant role to play
both in supporting and protecting these young democracies. How well
we play this role will affect the lives of tens of millions of people
and, quite literally, shape the future of the West. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.

Congressional Quarterly, Inc.
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
March 8, 2005 Tuesday

CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS

SUBCOMMITTEE: EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN BLACK SEA AREA

TESTIMONY-BY: VLADIMIR SOCOR, SENIOR FELLOW

AFFILIATION: JAMESTOWN FOUNDATION

Statement of Vladimir Socor Senior Fellow, Jamestown Foundation

Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European
Affairs

March 8, 2005

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee: I am grateful for the
opportunity to appear and testify in this important hearing on a
region that has surged to salience in debates on U.S. foreign and
security policy and strategy: the broader Black Sea region, new
frontier in the advance of Euro-Atlantic security and democracy. My
presentation will succinctly identify the interests of the U.S. and
its friends in the region, threats to those interests, and steps the
U.S. can take to promote its security and democratic goals together
with its friends in the region. Interests The Black Sea region forms
the hub of an evolving geostrategic and geo-economic system that
extends from NATO Europe to Central Asia and Afghanistan, and as such
is crucial to U.S.-led antiterrorism efforts. It provides direct
strategic access for American and allied forces to bases and theaters
of operation in Central Asia and the Middle East. It also provides
westbound transit routes for Caspian energy supplies which are key to
our European allies’ energy balance in the years ahead. Countries in
the Black Sea region rarely if ever experienced security, democracy,
or prosperity. Their chance came with the end of Soviet dominance and
the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic community of interests and
values. At present, however, Russian President Vladimir Putin leads a
campaign to halt and turn back that process at the former Soviet
borders, so as restore a sphere of Russian political, economic, and
military dominance in a large part of the Black Sea region. Threats
of force against Georgia, refusal to withdraw Russian troops from
that country and from Moldova, overt support for secessionist
enclaves in those two countries, fanning of civil confrontation
during the presidential campaign in Ukraine, the poison attack on
Viktor Yushchenko, are among the recent brutal hallmarks of Mr.
Putin’s policy in this region.

The answer must be a redoubling of democratic institution building
within these countries, and anchoring them to Euro- Atlantic
institutions. The U.S. is uniquely equipped to lead this effort
within the Euro-Atlantic community and in the region itself. With
Romania and Bulgaria now in NATO and set to join the European Union,
and with old NATO ally Turkey aiming for EU entry, now is the time to
start planning for the Euro-Atlantic integration of countries that
have declared that aspiration in the broader Black Sea region:
Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Azerbaijan. Friends and Partners American
and overall Western interests in this region require stable,
reform-capable states, in control of their own borders, safe from
external military or economic pressures or externally-inspired
secessions, secure in their function as energy transit routes, and
capable of supporting U.S.-led or NATO coalition operations. Those
interests can only be sustained if the region’s countries develop
good governance, with functioning democratic institutions and
political processes resistant to corruption or hostile manipulation,
and if they are protected by international law and Western-led
security arrangements.

Thus, effective state- and democracy-building and strategic interests
are twin sides of a common set of U.S. and Euro- Atlantic interests
in the Black Sea region. By the same token, security threats to
countries in this region and actions that undermine their sovereignty
run counter to those interests. Within this region, Romania and
Bulgaria became providers of security and contributors to coalition
operations even before accession to NATO. Their role is set to grow
further as the two countries become hosts to U.S. military
installations on the Black Sea littoral. NATO aspirants Ukraine,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan have acted as de facto allies in providing
political backing, guaranteeing air and land passage rights, and
fielding peace-support troops for NATO and U.S.-led operations.
Georgia and Azerbaijan, active members of the anti-terrorist
coalition, have thus graduated from the role of pure consumers of
security to that of net consumers and incipient providers of security
to the region and beyond.

Tbilisi and Baku regard their participation in the anti-terrorism
coalition as synonymous with their national interests. Already before
9/11 they had experienced terrorist threats and attacks in the form
of externally inspired coup- and assassination attempts against their
leaders and ethnic cleansing. Thus they are vitally interested in
combating terrorism in all its forms. For both Georgia and
Azerbaijan, participation in the anti-terrorism coalition is also a
means to maintain close relations with the U.S., advance the
modernization of their security sectors, and earn their credentials
as NATO aspirant countries. Moreover, Georgia and Azerbaijan are on
the alert to prevent a spillover of the Russian-Chechen war into
their territories and to interdict the passage of any foreign gunmen,
their suspected accomplices, or radical Islamist missionaries. With
U.S. assistance, Georgia cleaned up the Pankisi Valley in 2002-2003
and holds it under control since then. For its part, Azerbaijan gave
radical Islamist organizations no chance to make inroads into the
country. Successful development of Azerbaijan as a Muslim secular
state is also a shared interest of that country and the West. This
goal has good prospects of fulfillment in Azerbaijan’s society
characterized by religious tolerance and receptiveness to Western
models. The success of pro-democracy movements, known as Rose and
Orange Revolutions, in Georgia and Ukraine recently, is seen by many
as potentially repeatable in Armenia, but unlikely to be duplicated
in Azerbaijan or Moldova. In these two countries, democratization
will likely follow an evolutionary path. Last week, Presidents
Mikheil Saakashvili of Georgia and Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine,
meeting with Moldova’s president Vladimir Voronin, announced their
readiness to work with him toward completing Eastern Europe’s third
wave of democratization — that in the broader Black Sea region. Mr.
Voronin and his team, communists in name only, have reoriented
Moldova westward and are resisting what they describe as “Russia’s
attempts at re- colonization.” These presidents along with Ilham
Aliev of Azerbaijan are scheduled to meet again next month in Moldova
with a view to revitalizing the GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan,
Moldova) group of countries. Security Threats: Old, New, Newest The
region’s Western-oriented countries are facing a wide spectrum of
threats to their security, mainly from Russia and its local proteges.
The overarching goal is to thwart these countries’ Euro-Atlantic
integration and force them back into a Russian sphere of dominance.
The scope, intensity, and systematic application of threats has
markedly increased over the last year, as part of President Putin’s
contribution to the shaping of Russia’s conduct. These may be
described as old-, new-, and newest-type threats to security. The
“old-type” threats stem from troops and bases stationed unlawfully in
other countries, seizures of territories, border changes de facto,
ethnic cleansing, and creation of heavily armed proxy statelets.
Georgia, Moldova, and Azerbaijan are the targets of such blackmail.
“New-type” threats are those associated with illegal arms and drugs
trafficking, rampant contraband, and organized transnational
criminality, all of which use the Russian-protected secessionist
enclaves as safe havens and staging areas. Such activities are
usually associated with non-state actors, often of a terrorist
nature. In the Black Sea region, however, state actors within Russia
are often behind these activities, severely undermining the target
countries’ economies and state institutions. The “newest-type” threat
to security can be seen in Russia’s assault on electoral processes,
some months ago in Ukraine’s presidential election and in recent
weeks in Moldova’s parliamentary elections (and meanwhile even in
loyalist Abkhazia). Using massive financial, mass-media, and covert
action means, Russia has sought to influence the outcome of elections
or hijack them outright in order to install its favorites in power.
Closely related to this is the export of the Russian model of
governance, characterized by a symbiosis of neo-KGB structures,
organized crime, state bureaucracy, and government-connected big
business.

In all of the situations described above, security and democracy are
equally at risk. “Frozen” Conflicts The Black Sea region is the most
conflict-plagued region along the new Euro-Atlantic perimeter. This
situation limits the ability of the U.S. to capitalize on the
region’s high strategic value. Thirteen years after the USSR’s
dissolution, Moscow continues heavily to dominate conflict-management
in this region. Russia, largely responsible for sparking or fanning
these conficts, has a vested interested in keeping them smoldering,
so as to pressure Georgia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Moldova and
thwart their Euro-Atlantic integration. Russias policy consists of
freezing not the conflicts as such, but the rather the negotiating
processes, which Russia itself dominates. The U.N. and OSCE, left
largely to their own devices, have merely conserved these conflicts.
There are those who suggest that the U.S. should defer to Moscow on
this issue, lest Russia’s cooperation with the U.S. in anti-
terrorism and anti-WMD-proliferation efforts be jeopardized. This
thesis seems to underestimate Russia’s own declared interest in
cooperating in such efforts; to overestimate the practical value of
Moscow’s contributions; and to ignore Russia’s outright obstruction
of U.S. efforts in a number of cases. Moreover, that thesis would
seem to confirm the Kremlin in its dangerous expectation that
strategic partnership with the U.S. should entail acceptance of
Russian paramountcy on “peacekeeping” and conflict-resolution in the
“post-Soviet space.” This is an ingredient to sphere-of-influence
rebuilding. It is crucial to avoid the perception (let alone the
fact) of a Russia-U.S. or Russia-West division of peacekeeping and
conflict-management spheres, or an informal partition of countries’
territories.

Strategic partnerships can not long be sustained with rump countries
vulnerable to armed secessionist pressures across uncontrolled
external borders. It is high time to move this issue to the front
burner of U.S. security policy. Preferably in synergy with NATO and
EU countries, the U.S. is best placed for promoting
conflict-settlement solutions that would consolidate the region’s
states in strategic partnership with the the U.S. Turning the broader
Black Sea region into a policy priority need not compete with the
priorities assigned to other areas.

On the contrary, stabilization of this region would entail
incomparably lower risks and incomparably smaller resources compared
to the risks and resource commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, or
emergent initiatives in the broader Middle East. The fact is that a
secure and stable Black Sea region is necessary for sustaining those
U.S.-led operations and initiatives.

CFE Treaty, Istanbul Commitments Russia has openly repudiated its
obligations under the 1999-adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in
Europe and Istanbul Commitments (twin parts of a single package)
regarding withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia and Moldova. The
OSCE, custodian of those documents, has cooperated with Russia in
eviscerating them. Troop withdrawal deadlines were postponed and then
removed altogether; preconditions to withdrawal were attached where
the troop withdrawal was to have been unconditional; excuses were
found for retaining some Russian troops in place where the withdrawal
was to have been complete; wide verification loopholes were tacitly
accepted; heavy weaponry — coyly designated as “unaccounted-for
treaty-limited equipment” by a complacent OSCE — was transferred
from Russia’s arsenals into those of the separatist enclaves; the
creation of Russian-staffed separatist forces was tolerated; and the
requirement of host-country consent (to the stationing of foreign
troops) is being flouted. Since 2002, Moscow has rejected the very
notion that it had made “commitments” in Istanbul to withdraw its
troops from Georgia and Moldova.

The OSCE itself all along termed those Russian commitments only
“politically binding,” as distinct from legally binding; i.e., not
binding in practice. All these concessions notwithstanding, the OSCE
is no longer able since 2003 even to cite its own 1999 decisions,
because Russia has easily vetoed such references in the
organization’s routine year-end resolutions. Realistically speaking,
the Istanbul Commitments are dead. Since 2004, moreover, Moscow
threatens to destroy the OSCE by blocking the adoption of the
organization’s budget and terminating certain OSCE activities. Russia
does not want to kill the OSCE, but rather to harness and use the
weakened organization. Under these circumstances, no one can possibly
expect the OSCE to resurrect the Istanbul Commitments, let alone
ensure compliance with them. Meanwhile, the U.S. and NATO governments
collectively take the position that they would not ratify the adapted
CFE Treaty (which Moscow wants ratified) until Russia has complied
with the Istanbul Commitments. This form of leverage has, manifestly,
proven too weak to induce Russia to withdraw its troops from Georgia
and Moldova.

Russian officials scoff at calls for troop withdrawal based on the
Istanbul documents. It is high time for Georgia and Moldova to go
beyond the OSCE to international organizations, and argue the case
for Russian troop withdrawal on the basis of national sovereignty and
international law. The U.S., along with the Euro- Atlantic community,
should place these issues prominent on the agenda of U.S.-Russia,
NATO-Russia, and EU-Russia agendas, and not just at summit time (as
has been done occasionally and feebly thus far) but also on a regular
basis until this legitimate goal is achieved.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Gevor outpoints Chirkov in Cuxhaven
By Fabian Weber @ Ringside

Boxing Centra;
12/03/05

In the co-main event of the prelude 2005 for promoter Spotlight Boxing, a
boxing show at Kugelbake-Halle in Cuxhaven, a quiet seaport resort in the
North of Germany, Universum’s middleweight contender Koren Gevor beat
Russian national champion Alexey Chirkov by unanimous decision over eight
rounds by scores of 79:76, 80:73 and 79:74. It was an explosive and
meaningful battle between the Hamburg based Armenian and Chirkov who had
come into this fight being undefeated in 16 contests.

But the short and athletic shouthpaw Gevor, best described as a Russian
version of Vinny Pazienza, showed no respect whatsoever and kept his
opponent under fire for the entire fight. Gevor suffered a cut on his right
eye after a clash of heads in round six but kept up the high pace while
blood was streaming down on his face and he inflicted a high amount of
damage to his opponent in return.

The 25-year-old Gevor, who is sharing weight class and promoter with the
more popular Felix Sturm, improved to 20-2 with 11 knockouts. It was Gevor
ninth straight win since two unlucky technical losses caused by injuries in
2002. For several months the German based Armenian eyes a shot at European
middleweight champion Howard Eastman.

Snowfall causes further road closures

The Messenger
Friday, March 11, 2005, #044 (0818)

News in brief:

According to Prime News, the road to Khevsureti is closed because
of heavy snowfall and the resulting danger of avalanches. The road
to the Armenian border is also closed in the Ninotsminda zone, as is
the Zugdidi-Svaneti road.

Also affected are the Batumi-Akhaltsikhe and the Georgian military
highway north of Gudauri

PRESS RELEASE
Diocese of the Armenian Church of Australia & New Zealand
10 Macquarie Street
Chatswood NSW 2067
AUSTRALIA
Contact: Laura Artinian
Tel: (02) 9419-8056
Fax: (02) 9904-8446
Email: [email protected]

12 March 2005

PRIMATE RETURNS TO AUSTRALIA TO A HIGH-PACED SCHEDULE

Primate of the Diocese of Australia & New Zealand, His Eminence Archbishop
Aghan Baliozian no sooner returned from Geneva, Switzerland after having
participated in the World Council of Churches Central Committee meetings as
representative of the Armenian Apostolic Church of the Holy See of
Etchmiadzin that he launched into a busy schedule of meetings and pastoral
visits in Australia.

>>From 3-4 March, the Archbishop partook in the meeting of the Executive
Committee of the National Council of Churches in Australia (NCCA) that was
held in the nation’s capital, Canberra. At the meeting, his Eminence was
elected as a member of the Standing Committee that will act between
Executive Committee meetings as necessary. The meeting also resolved that
the NCCA will propose to member churches to mark April 24 as a day of
remembrance and commemoration of the 90th anniversary of the Armenian
Genocide

On 3 March, the Archbishop made an official visit to the Syrian Embassy in
Canberra and congratulated the newly appointed Ambassador to Australia, His
Excellency Mr Tamman Suliman who until recently held the post of Charge d’
Affaires. On 4 March, His Eminence visited the Embassy of Lebanon in
Australia and expressed his condolences on behalf of the Armenian Community
of Australia at the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister, Mr
Rafik Harire. On both occasions, His Eminence was a dinner guest of the
respective Ambassadors.

>>From 5-8 March, the small parish community of Perth in Western Australia
welcomed Archbishop Aghan on a 3-day pastoral visit. His Eminence
celebrated mass with the congregation on Sunday, 6 March and performed a
marriage sacrament and two baptisms. During his short visit, the Archbishop
made the most of every opportunity to meet with community members more
closely. He returned to his residence in Sydney on 8 March.

Perth is located on the far south-western coast of Australia surrounded by
the waters of the Indian Ocean and is about a 5-hour flight from Sydney.
The Armenian Community of Perth has reduced considerably over the years and
according to current estimates numbers around 100.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Channel News Asia, Singapore

Sports News »

Kim Clijsters

Time is GMT + 8 hours

Posted: 12 March 2005 0852 hrs

Tennis: Clijsters reaches third round at Indian Wells

INDIAN WELLS, California : Kim Clijsters advanced to the third round of the
Indian Wells WTA and ATP Masters Series tournament on Friday, hammering 22
winners and three aces to beat Shinobu Asagoe 6-3, 6-3.

The 21-year-old Belgian and former world number one needed just 71 minutes
to dispatch Japan’s Asagoe and raise her 2005 record to 5-1.

“It is a nice start for me,” Clijsters said. “I had to make sure I kept the
pressure on and stayed aggressive.”

This is Clijsters’s sixth consecutive appearance here, where she has fond
memories after winning the singles title in 2003.

But Clijsters is unseeded this year because she missed most of 2004 with a
wrist injury. She pulled out of Indian Wells last year with the same injury
and had surgery three months later.

Clijsters still managed to win tournaments last year in Antwerp and Paris.

“This is my first tournament overseas in about a year. I thought it was
going to be tougher to win matches here, especially because I had to get
used to playing outdoors again,” Clijsters said.

“In Belgium I have mostly been working out indoors, but I am feeling well
and so I think it was a good decision to come here a week early.”

This is just her second tournament of 2005 and although she is into the
third round she is still struggling at times with her serve.

Against Asagoe, she had four double faults and connected on 44 percent of
her first serves.

But she delivered more winners (22-7) and won more total points (71-49) than
her Japanese opponent.

“I need to work on that first serve. It has to get better because it isn’t
going to take me far against the better players,” Clijsters said.

In other women’s second round matches on Friday, young Russian Maria
Kirilenko posted the first upset of the tournament, beating eighth-seeded
compatriot Elena Bovina 6-3, 6-1.

Second seed Amelie Mauresmo of France cruised past Tathiana Garbin 6-2, 6-1,
reigning US Open champ Svetlana Kuznetsova dominated Czech Eva Birnerova
6-3, 6-2 and Russian fourth seed Elena Dementieva defeated American Abigail
Spears 6-2, 7-6 (7/5).

The 96-player men’s event got underway with France’s Gael Monfils making his
US debut a successful one, defeating American Jeff Morrison 7-5, 6-4.

Juan Carlos Ferrero set up a second round match with another former Spanish
number one by beating Russia’s Igor Andreev 6-3, 6-3.

Ferrero next faces Carlos Moya. The Spanish duo were teammates on Spain’s
winning Davis Cup team in 2004. Moya became number one in the world when he
reached the finals here five years ago.

Sweden’s Thomas Enqvist beat Karol Beck 6-0, 7-5 and Armenian Sargis
Sargsian stopped Bobby Reynolds of the United States 6-3, 6-2. – AFP

–Boundary_(ID_2EQW9R5AN8Y13G5VXje4qA)–

WATERTOWNTAB

Volunteer opportunities
Friday, March 11, 2005

Project SAVE interviewers

Project SAVE Armenian Photograph Archives, recipient of funding from
the Watertown/Harvard Community Enrichment and Watertown/O’Neill Properties
Charitable Funds, is beginning to interview elder Armenians for the purpose
of collecting and documenting their photographs. Project SAVE’s grant
project includes an effort to involve community historians of all ages and
ethnicities in learning the techniques of interviewing people and
documenting their photographs.

This training is essential for all types of community preservation
efforts. If you love history, especially people/social history, and love
photographs for what they can tell us about the past and teach us about
ourselves, think about becoming a volunteer. You will have first-hand
experience visiting with people, learning documenting procedures, using the
tape recorder, preparing paperwork for accessioning and archiving
photographs, and making discoveries of long forgotten people and places.

If you are intrigued by this work, and have four to eight hours a month
to devote to it, whether you are a high school student (with parents’
permission), a senior citizen or somewhere in between, please contact Ruth
Thomasian, executive director, at Project SAVE Archives, 617-923-4542, or
[email protected].

ARKA News Agency
March 9, 2005

Honorary Doctor of Slavinic University conferred on RF Ambassador to
Armenia

RA Minister of Foreign Affairs: Karabakh conflict should be settled
in the framework of OSCE Minsk Group

Memorandum on mutual understanding signed by Armenian, Latvian
parliaments

*********************************************************************

HONORARY DOCTOR OF SLAVINIC UNIVERSITY CONFERRED ON RF AMBASSADOR TO
ARMENIA

YEREVAN, March 9. /ARKA/. RF Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary to Armenia Anatoly Dyukov has been awarded RAU Order
of Honor and the title of Honorary Doctor of the Armenian-Russian
Slavonic University for his contribution to Russian-Armenian
cooperation. RAU Rector Armen Darbinyan emphasized the Ambassador~Rs
decisive role in the foundation and further development of RAU. He
also stressed the trend toward educational integration and the
importance of exchanging experience between the two countries~R
educational system.
Anatoly Dryukov has been RF Ambassador Extraordinary and
Plenipotentiary to Armenian since 1998. The Ambassador~Rs mission in
Armenia is nearing completion, and in April-May 2005 he is expected
to be replaced by the career diplomat Nikolay Pavlov. Dryukov has
worked in the Foreign Ministry system since 1960. He has held
different diplomatic posts at the central office of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and abroad. In 1987-1990, he was USSR Ambassador to
Singapore, in 1991-1996 USSR and RF Ambassador to India.
The RAU was founded under the Russian-Armenian Intergovernmental
Agreement on the foundation and activities of a Russian-Armenian
University in Yerevan. The Agreement was signed on August 29, 1997 in
Moscow. On November 28, 1997, the RA Government made a resolution on
the foundation of a Russian-Armenian University in Armenia.
The RAU is a higher professional school under joint jurisdiction of
the RF and RA and has the status of state-run higher schools in both
countries. The RAU was licensed on June 27, 2000 by the RF Ministry
of Education and implements higher and post-graduate educational
programs. P.T. ~V0–

*********************************************************************

RA MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS: KARABAKH CONFLICT SHOULD BE SETTLED
IN THE FRAMEWORK OF OSCE MINSK GROUP

YEREVAN, March 9. /ARKA/. Karabakh conflict should be settled in the
framework of one structure, that is OSCE Minsk Group, as stated RA
Minister of Foreign Affairs Vartan Oskanian. According to him, all
international structures are anxious about the Karabakh conflict
settlement, especially those where Armenia and Azerbaijan are
involved, that is EU, Council of Europe, however settlement of the
issue may be achieved only in the format of OSCE Minsk Group. ~SAll
other international structures should concentrate on the process in
this format, being ready to contribute to peace process or improving
post-conflict satiations~T, he said. At that he noted that he
positively evaluated the striving of various European instances to
participate in settlement of the conflict, however, ~Ssees no
competition with OSCE Minsk Group~T. A.H. –0–

*********************************************************************

MEMORANDUM ON MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING SIGNED BY ARMENIAN, LATVIAN
PARLIAMENTS

YEREVAN, March 9. /ARKA/. A memorandum on mutual understanding on
issues related to integration in the EU was sign Wednesday between
Armenian and Latvian parliaments. The memorandum was signed by
Armenian Parliament Vice-Speaker Tigran Torosyan and the Head of
Latvian Parliament~Rs Commission for European Affairs Oskars Kastens,
as a source of Armenian National Assembly Department for Public
Relations says.
Cordial relations established between Armenian and Latvia, progress
in political dialog between the two countries, the EU decision to
include Armenia in Widen Europe. New Neighbors program are welcomed
in the memorandum as well as Armenia~Rs aspiration to join European
fold and its success in that direction. Latvian Parliament
willingness to share its experience obtained on its way to the EU
membership with Armenian colleagues was also welcomed in the
document. It was stressed in the memorandum that the parliaments play
major part in the process of their countries integration in the EU.
The countries arranged to support Armenian National Assembly in
fulfilling the agreement on partnership between Armenia and European
Commonwealth and its member countries. M.V.–0–

*********************************************************************

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ARKA News Agency
March 10, 2005

Event dedicated to 90th anniversary of Armenian Genocide to be held
on April 20 in Washington

State Fire Inspection of Armenia is included into the structure of
Emergency Situations Department as a separate subdivision

Azerbaijani divisions make an attempt by using fire arms to bring
closer their posts to the front line of NKR defense army

The newly appointed Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
Georgia to Armenia hands in his credentials to RA President

American Policy on Iran round-table discussion to be held on March 14
in Caucasus Media Institute in Yerevan

*********************************************************************

EVENT DEDICATED TO 90TH ANNIVERSARY OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE TO BE HELD
ON APRIL 20 IN WASHINGTON
YEREVAN, March 10. /ARKA/. An event dedicated to 90th anniversary of
Armenian Genocide is to be held on Apr 20 in Washington, as Armenian
Assembly of America told ARKA today. According to press-release, all
Armenian organizations functioning in the United States will take
part in the event organized under auspices of Group for Armenian
Issues of the U.S. Congress and Armenian Embassy in the U.S.A. Major
part played by the United States in struggle against barbarity and in
provision of assistance to those survived the Genocide will be
stressed in the course of the event. M.V. -0–

*********************************************************************

STATE FIRE INSPECTION OF ARMENIA IS INCLUDED INTO THE STRUCTURE OF
EMERGENCY SITUATIONS DEPARTMENT AS A SEPARATE SUBDIVISION

YEREVAN, March 10. /ARKA/. By the decree of the RA Government the
State Fire Inspection of the republic is included into the structure
of the Emergency Situations Department adjunct to RA Government as a
separate subdivision. According to the Government~Rs Press Service, in
this regard the State Fire Inspection of the Emergency Situations
Department is restructured into anti-fire service and State fire
Inspection. By the government~Rs decree, the by-laws and structure of
State Fire Inspection is determined. A.H.~W0–

*********************************************************************

AZERBAIJANI DIVISIONS MAKE AN ATTEMPT BY USING FIRE ARMS TO BRING
CLOSER THEIR POSTS TO THE FRONT LINE OF NKR DEFENSE ARMY

STEPANAKERT, March 10. /ARKA/. The day before, on the North ~VEastern
bordering line of NKR and Azerbaijani armed forces, near Seisulan
settlement of Mardakert region of NKR, Azerbaijani divisions made an
attempt by using fire arms to bring closer their posts to the front
line of NKR Defense Army, according to NKR Ministry of Defense Press
Service Department. ~SServicemen of NKR Defense Army opened fire in
return. As a result of fire exchange there are losses from both
sides~T, according to the message. The Press Service reminds that
~Snotwithstanding many appeals of the Karabakh side to Azerbaijan, the
military administration of the country doesn~Rt stop its provoking
activity that may seriously jeopardize the situation both on the
border line and in the whole region~T.
According to the message, ~SNKR authority informed the corresponding
international organizations about restructuring activity of
Azerbaijan and of the development of the situation on the demarking
line~T. A.H. ~V0–

*********************************************************************

THE NEWLY APPOINTED AMBASSADOR EXTRAORDINARY AND PLENIPOTENTIARY OF
GEORGIA TO ARMENIA HANDS IN HIS CREDENTIALS TO RA PRESIDENT

YEREVAN, March 10. /ARKA/. The newly appointed Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Georgia to Armenia Revaz
Gachechiladze handed his credentials to RA President Robert
Kocharyan. According to the President~Rs Press Service, Kocharyan
congratulated the Ambassador on the occasion of his appointment and
noted the recently Armenian-Georgian relations had activated.
~SArmenia is the best neighbor of Georgia ~T, the ambassador cited the
Georgian President. He also introduced to Kocharyan the latest events
in Georgia, in particular in the area of economy.
In the course of the meeting cooperation in the area of energy and
transport was discussed.
On Dec 29, 2004, Georgian Parliament approved the candidacy of
Gachechiladze for the post of an Ambassador to Armenia. Gachechiladze
used to be an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Israel.

Gachechiladze was born in 1943 in Tbilisi. In 1965, he graduated from
Oriental Studies Department of Tbilisi State University (TSU). From
1968 to 1992 he worked in the department of economic geography of
TSU, first as an assistant, and then as a senior lecturer. From 1987
to 1991 he worked in Georgian Academy of Sciences as a Head of the
Center of Social Studies. In 1997-1998 he worked in Georgian MFA, as
a Director of the Department for international organizations. In
1998-2004 was am Ambassador to Israel. He is a Doctor of Geography,
Professor. He speaks Russian, Turkish, English, German, French and
Polish. A.H. –0–

*********************************************************************

AMERICAN POLICY ON IRAN ROUND-TABLE DISCUSSION TO BE HELD ON MARCH 14
IN CAUCASUS MEDIA INSTITUTE IN YEREVAN

YEREVAN, March 10. /ARKA/. American Policy on Iran round-table
discussion will be held on March 14 in Caucasus Media Institute in
Yerevan. The Head of the program on Islam Study of the Center for
Strategic and International Studies in Washington, a specialist on
Iran, Islam, the Middle East, Central Asia and Caucasus Shirin
Hunter, will present a report at the discussion. M.V. -0–

*********************************************************************

ARKA News Agency
March 11, 2005

Official Tbilisi discusses the possibility of transit transportation
of gas by the route of Iran-Armenia ~VGeorgia- Ukraine

On March 14-15, RA Minister of Foreign Affairs to participate in the
61st session of the UN Committee on Human Rights

USDA-MAP Armenia office to work as CARD

Regular sitting of the Armenian-Georgian intergovernmental commission
on economic cooperation to l be held in the first half a year of 2005
in Yerevan

AAO Demands facts substantiating charges of anti-Semitism from US
Department of State

Visit of the Head of the Federal Foreign Department of Switzerland is
expected to the South Caucasus states in Autumn 2005

Monitoring group of GRECO international organization to arrive in
Armenia in May

Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli arrives Friday in Yerevan for
a two-day working visit

*********************************************************************

OFFICIAL TBILISI DISCUSSES THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSIT TRANSPORTATION
OF GAS BY THE ROUTE OF IRAN-ARMENIA ~VGEORGIA- UKRAINE

YEREVAN, March 11. /ARKA/. Georgian Prime Minister Zourab Nogaideli
stated today in Yerevan that Georgia is interested in the
construction of the Iran ~VArmenian gas pipeline. According to RA
Government~Rs Press Service, Nogaideli stated that official Tbilisi
discussed the possibility of transit transportation of gas by the
following route: Iran-Armenia ~VGeorgia- Ukraine.
Construction of the Iran ~VArmenian gas pipeline should be completed
till January 1, 2007. After that, joint work of gas systems of the
two countries will begin. In accordance with the agreement, at the
initial stage the volume of gas import to Armenia will make 1,1 bln.
cubic meters annually, and since 2019 – 2,3 bln. cubic meters. A.H.
–0–

*********************************************************************

ON MARCH 14-15, RA MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO PARTICIPATE IN THE
61ST SESSION OF THE UN COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS

YEREVAN, March 11. /ARKA/. On March 14-15, RA Minister of Foreign
Affairs Vartan Oskanian will leave for Geneva for a working visit, to
participate in the 61st session of the UN Committee on Human Rights.
According to the RA MFA~Rs Press Service, it~Rs planned that Oskanian
will speak at the session. In the framework of the visit he will meet
the General Secretary of the Committee and will hold bilateral
meetings with official representatives of various countries. A.H.
~V0–

*********************************************************************

USDA-MAP ARMENIA OFFICE TO WORK AS CARD

YEREVAN, March 11. /ARKA/. From April 5, 2005, the Armenian office if
the United State Department of Agriculture~Rs Marketing Assistance
Project (USDA-MAP) is to start working as the Center for Agribusiness
and Rural Development (CARD) Foundation. Sos Avetisyan, Public
Relations and Information Executive, USDA-MAP, reported that the
USDA-MAP will be closing its doors on March 31, 2005. He reported
that the newly established Foundation is an independent local
organization which has a Board of Trustees and Executive Director.
Jeffrey E. Engels, the out-going USDA-MAP Director, will continue as
CARD Executive Director, and Gagik Sardaeryan, former marketing
manager USDA-MAP, has been appointed CARD~Rs Deputy Director.
The Foundation is mainly to be funded by the US Department of
Agriculture~Rs farming services.
Executive Director. In speaking of this transition, Mr. Engels said,
~SThe transition from MAP to CARD is a unique one: for the first time
an international USDA agricultural development project will
transition its best activities to a private sector, locally
registered legacy organization. CARD carries on the successful
history begun under MAP, directly responding to the needs of farmers
and agribusinesses with market-driven, economical, and
technologically-appropriate solutions to Armenian agriculture. This
is an exciting opportunity.~T
Since 1996, USDA-MAP has helped to over 60 Armenian enterprises and
25 production and sale cooperatives, 50 credit clubs and thousands of
farms in all Armenian regions by rendering technical, financial and
marketing assistance to them. In 2004, the RA Ministry of Agriculture
awarded USDA-MAP a gold medal ~SFor agricultural achievements.~T P.T.
~V0–

*********************************************************************

REGULAR SITTING OF THE ARMENIAN-GEORGIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMISSION
ON ECONOMIC COOPERATION TO L BE HELD IN THE FIRST HALF A YEAR OF 2005
IN YEREVAN

YEREVAN, March 11. /ARKA/. The regular sitting of the
Armenian-Georgian intergovernmental commission on economic
cooperation will be held in the first half a year of 2005 in Yerevan,
as stated RA Prime Minister Andranik Margaryan in the course of the
meeting with his Georgian colleague Zourab Nogaiteli, according to RA
Government~Rs Press Service. Margaryan discussed the issue of
construction of Sadakhlo check-point, establishment of a gas
measuring nearby the Armenian border for the part of the territory
through which gas is supplied to Armenia through Georgia, issues of
legal registering the process of passing Ashotsk-Ninotsminda electric
power line to the Georgian side. The Prime Ministers emphasized the
necessity of urgent development of a project to solve the problems
and to be discussed at the ext sitting. In this regard, it~Rs also
planned that till the end of March 2005, meeting of Ministers of
Finance and Economy of the two countries will be held for the
discussion of current financial problems and getting prepared to the
sitting.
In the course of the meeting the Armenian side raised the issue
disrespectful attitude to Armenian churches in Georgia and the
necessity of taking adequate measures to prevent such things. In this
regard, the Ministers of Culture of the two countries were ordered to
jointly consider the issue and report on it at the next sitting of
the commission. A.H. –0~W

*********************************************************************

AAO DEMANDS FACTS SUBSTANTIATING CHARGES OF ANTI-SEMITISM FROM US
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

YEREVAN, March 11. /ARKA/. The Armenian-Aryan Order (AAO) demands
facts substantiating the charges of anti-Semitism from the US
Department of State. An open letter of the AAO Supreme Council
addressed to the US Department of State says that the Department~Rs
recent report on global anti-Semitism mentions among other forces the
~Sultranationalist Armenian-Aryan Order~T, which makes antri-Semite
appeals and demands that the country [Armenia] be cleared of Jews and
Yezids. ~SWe still do not understand what statement made by the Jewish
community of Armenia and unknown to us served as a basis for this
decision,~T says the letter. Moreover, the AAO Supreme Council does
not understand the paragraph concerning Yezids, considering the fact
that they repeatedly refuted the fact included in the report. ~SWe
demand the presentation of substantiated facts related to the report.
Otherwise, we will consider the report of the US Department of State
as interference in Armenia~Rs domestic affairs,~T the letter says.
Also, the AAO leaders do not understand deliberate identification of
anti-Semitism with anti-Judaism.
Referring to the information of the Jewish community of Armenia, the
US Department of State~Rs report on global anti-Semitism indicates a
number of cases of insult of Jews in Armenia. Specifically, the
document says that the Director of the ALM TV channel made frequent
anti-Semite remarks, and the Union of Armenian Aryans, which is a
small ultra-national group, made an appeal for clearing the country
of Jews and Yezids. P.T. ~V0–

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VISIT OF THE HEAD OF THE FEDERAL FOREIGN DEPARTMENT OF SWITZERLAND IS
EXPECTED TO THE SOUTH CAUCASUS STATES IN AUTUMN 2005

YEREVAN, March 11. /ARKA/. In autumn 2005, visit of Mishlin
Calmy-Ray, the Head of the Federal Foreign Department of Switzerland
is expected to the South Caucasus states, as stated the Ambassador
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Switzerland to Armenia Stephan
Shpek. According to him, like other European countries, neutral
Switzerland is interested in the stability in the South Caucasus,
since instability in three states of the region that are the members
of the Council of Europe is quite dangerous for the whole Europe and
for Switzerland in particular. He emphasized that Switzerland has a
regional approach to the South Caucasus. However, according to him,
South Caucasus may be called a region only from geographic
standpoint. In the meantime, he characterized the Armenian- Swiss
relations as ~Svery good but not intensive~T, meaning insufficient
relations among the top officials of the two countries. A.H.~W0~W

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MONITORING GROUP OF GRECO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION TO ARRIVE IN
ARMENIA IN MAY

YEREVAN, March 11. /ARKA/. Monitoring group of GRECO (groups of
countries against corruption) international organization is expected
to arrive in Armenia on May 30, as Bagrat Yesayan, the Head of
Monitoring Commission for Implementation of Anticorruption Strategy,
stated. In his words, the organization has clear mechanism to conduct
monitoring, in the frames of which Armenia has already presented
report on steps taken. According to Yesayan, the Group will present
the report at its session to be held late this year. After that,
bails will be made to Armenia. He said a scheme of their
implementation would be worked out. Yesayan also said legislation
reformation concrete directions would be presented to Armenia after
the first stage completion. In his words, Armeian legislatyion should
conform to European criteria of struggle against corruption.
In 2004, Armenia became the 37th member of GRECO. M.V. -0–

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GEORGIAN PRIME MINISTER ZURAB NOGAIDELI ARRIVES FRIDAY IN YEREVAN FOR
A TWO-DAY WORKING VISIT

YEREVAN, March 11. /ARKA/. Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli
arrives Friday in Yerevan for a two-day visit at the invitation of
his Armenian counterpart Andranik Margaryan. The Georgian PM will
meet with Armenian President Robert Kocharyan, Armenian PM Andranik
Margaryan and Armenian Apostolic Church Leader Garegin II. The
Geogian high-ranking official will also lay flowers at
Tsitsernakaberd, a memorial of Armenian Genocide victims in Yerevan.
The delegation includes Georgian Foreign, Finance, Defense, Energy
and Economic Development Ministers as well as the PM Adviser,
Director of Regional Cooperation Department of Georgian Foreign
Ministry and other officials. M.V. -0–

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