PRO-WESTERN GOVERNING ALLIANCE POSSIBLE IN MOLDOVA
by Vladimir Socor

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Monday, March 14, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 50

On March 11, Moldova’s Central Electoral Commission released the final
results of the country’s March 6 parliamentary elections. The outcome,
verified by election observers in parallel vote-counting, shows the
Communist Party with 56 parliamentary seats (one more than initially
announced), the heterogeneous Bloc Moldova Democrata controlled by
pro-Moscow leaders with 34 seats (one fewer than initially announced),
and the right-wing Christian-Democrat People’s Party with 11 seats in
the 101-seat legislature. Thus the Communists, BMD, and CDPP garnered
46%, 28.5%, and 9%, respectively, of the votes cast. The other
parties and blocs failed to clear the parliamentary representation
thresholds. Among those who failed, three Russian left-nationalist
groups garnered almost 9 percent of the vote between them. (Moldpres,
March 11, 12).

Under Moldova’s constitution, the parliament elects the head of
state with a majority of at least three-fifths of its membership
and approves the president’s nomination of a prime minister and the
composition of the cabinet with a simple parliamentary majority.

The pro-Western team of Communist President Vladimir Voronin needs 61
votes to re-elect the president and 51 votes to approve a new cabinet
of ministers. Thus, it can form the cabinet single-handedly, and can
probably secure the president’s re-election by making tactical deals
with at least five, or preferably seven or eight, BMD members (unless
the Moscow operatives now active in Chisinau manage to lure some
Communist deputies away from Voronin quickly). One “centrist” faction
within BMD seems inclined toward such a tactical arrangement with
the president and perhaps further opportunistic deals down the road.

However, the presidential team and some groups of the traditional
pro-Western opposition are now considering the possibility of
joining together in a parliamentary and governing alliance. The
formation of such an alliance would signify a sea change to Moldova’s
politics, bringing together for the first time since 1991 some of
the anti-communist groups and the reformed section of the Communist
Party. A realignment along these lines is being referred to as
“national-interest alliance” or “pro-Europe alliance” in the internal
discussions now under way in Chisinau.

Three parallel processes have opened this prospect, which had seemed
beyond imagination only months ago, and which moved within a few
insiders’ grasp during the final phase of the electoral campaign.
Those processes are: First, the presidential team’s Western
reorientation (itself accelerated by Moscow’s heavy-handed pressures
on official Chisinau). Second, a realization by some pro-Western
opposition leaders that they must graduate at long last from the role
of protesters on the margins of the political system into the role
of national decision-makers and participants in governance. And, the
third and latest process, Moscow’s overt sponsorship of pro-Russian
“centrist” leaders in Chisinau, who dominate a confused and partly
corrupted BMD, and who must be prevented from creating a large
pro-Russian political bloc together with some diehard communists and
Russian left-nationalist groups.

A national-interest or pro-Europe alliance could: ensure the continuity
of Voronin’s European course; accelerate that course and broaden
its parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political basis; isolate
BMD’s pro-Moscow leaders; include the traditional pro-Western and
indeed anti-communist groups into the decision-making processes for
the first time in more than a decade; enable these groups to prepare
for better results in the 2009 parliamentary elections; and achieve
an overdue reconfiguration of Moldova’s political system, as the
Communist Party reforms itself into a European-type Socialist Party,
alongside Christian-Democrats and Liberals. Voronin and his aides
envisage such a reform of their party as one of the prerequisites to
the creation of a value-based coalition.

Preliminary discussions toward that end began even before the March
6 elections and accelerated afterward. The participants envisage
an alliance for the duration of the four-year mandate of this
parliament. Any programmatic document would have to stipulate:
scrupulous implementation of the European Union-Moldova Action
Plan, which was signed in Brussels on February 22; completion
of the internal reform agenda, itemizing specific goals — e.g.,
independence of the judiciary, administrative decentralization, turning
state-controlled television and radio into genuine public institutions,
cracking down on corruption, radically improving the legislative and
regulatory framework for Western investment — with time-tables for
implementation; intensifying efforts to rid the country of Russian
troops, and working toward a democratic solution to the Transnistria
problem with international support.

Participants in these discussions believe that they must
proceed cautiously and explain their steps properly to their
core electorates. At the same time, they realize that they need
to act expeditiously so as to preempt Moscow’s effort to assemble
a pro-Russian coalition under BMD’s top leaders — Chisinau mayor
Serafim Urecheanu, former prime minister Dumitru Braghis, and other
late-Soviet nomenklatura holdovers — alongside the Russian-leftist
Rodina movement and anti-Voronin defectors from the Communist
Party. The Christian-Democrats are keenly aware of this dangerous
possibility. Within the BMD, several social-liberal and liberal
deputies who never felt at home in that bloc (they joined it on
external advice and against their own better judgment) seem ready to
abandon the pro-Moscow leaders and to consider becoming one of the
parties to a value-based alliance.

Vladimir Socor

RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY, PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC
_________________________________________ ____________________
RFE/RL Iran Report
Vol. 8, No. 12, 23 March 2005

A Review of Developments in Iran Prepared by the Regional Specialists
of RFE/RL’s Newsline Team

************************************************************
HEADLINES:
* PRE-ELECTION POLL RESULTS DISPUTED
* POLICE CHIEF CONTEMPLATES PRESIDENTIAL RUN
* REFORMISTS CONSIDER PRESIDENTIAL OPTIONS
* ‘CONVERGENCE’ IMPORTANT IN IRANIAN POLITICS
* STUDENTS, TEACHERS, WORKERS STAGE PROTESTS
* SCHOLARS VIEW DEMOCRATIC EFFORTS IN IRAN
* RADIO FARDA ON IRAN AND TERRORISM
* IRAN-PAKISTAN-INDIA PIPELINE IMPERILED
* IRAN WANTS STABLE OIL-PRODUCTION QUOTAS
************************************************************

ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS CONSIDERS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION. Supreme Leader
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei told members of the Assembly of Experts on 17
March that public participation in the upcoming presidential election
will have a positive impact in the face of efforts by the “arrogant
powers” to “dominate the world,” the Iranian Students News Agency
(ISNA) reported. “The vigilance of the people in electing the
president, who must be pious and devoted to Islamic and revolutionary
values, and must possess stamina and versatility, can have an
important impact on the speed of the implementation of the [20-Year]
Outlook Plan,” he added.
The Assembly of Experts — a popularly elected body of almost
90 clerics that is tasked with selecting and supervising the supreme
leader — held its semiannual meeting on 15-16 March. On the first
day, Ayatollah Ali Meshkini was reelected chairman, ayatollahs
Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani and Ebrahim Amini, were elected vice
chairmen, and Qorban-Ali Dori-Najafabadi and Ahmad Khatami were
elected secretaries, IRNA reported. The assembly’s final
statement, issued on 16 March, addressed the upcoming presidential
election. “People should vote for an individual who will defend the
ideals of the Islamic revolution and who will give priority to
solving people’s economic problems,” it stated. (Bill Samii)

PREELECTION POLL PREDICTS TWO-ROUND ELECTION. Some 51.3 percent of
the 7,100 people polled by IRNA in East Azerbaijan, Fars, Hormozgan,
Isfahan, Kermanshah, Khorasan, Khuzestan, Mazandaran, Sistan va
Baluchistan, Tehran, and Yazd provinces said they will “definitely”
vote in the June 2005 presidential election, “Iran” newspaper
reported on 13 March. Of those polled, 38.2 percent said they favored
the reformists and 37.4 percent said the president’s political
tendency is irrelevant to them, while 56.6 percent said they did not
care if the president is a cleric. According to the same survey, IRNA
reported on 13 and 14 March, the favorite candidates are Ayatollah
Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, former parliamentary speaker
Hojatoleslam Mehdi Karrubi, and former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar
Velayati. None of the candidates would win an outright 50 percent or
more in the first round, however, which would necessitate a second
round in the election. (Bill Samii)

FORMER PRESIDENT STILL NONCOMMITTAL. Former President Ayatollah
Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani continues to hold off on making a firm
commitment to running in the June 2005 presidential election, saying
on 14 March, “I have complete readiness [to be a candidate] in the
elections, but I believe it is [too] early to make a decision,” IRNA
reported. He predicted that viable candidates will emerge and he will
not need to run for the post he held from 1989-1997. He said on 13
March, however, that “As we are getting closer to the election, I
feel my responsibility is getting heavier,” Mehr News Agency
reported. (Bill Samii)

POLICE CHIEF CONTEMPLATES PRESIDENTIAL RUN. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf,
the chief of Iran’s national police force, announced on 12 March
that he is considering running in the June 2005 presidential
election, IRNA reported. He identified three areas he would focus on
— the economy, foreign affairs, and “social capital.” Referring to
the economy, he said, “The people’s buying power has not seen
suitable growth; we have even seen stagnation in certain areas.”
Turning to foreign affairs, he said, “Given Iran’s outstanding
geopolitical weight and the role which the country can play at the
regional and global level, we have not properly tapped these
capacities.” And regarding the issue of “social capital,” he said,
“In the area of protecting our social capital, we face challenges
which make us lose our productive role in the fields of science,
politics, economy, and wealth as well as our social identity.”
Qalibaf said he would run if he could fulfill his objectives in these
areas. (Bill Samii)

REFORMISTS CONSIDER PRESIDENTIAL OPTIONS. Islamic Iran Solidarity
Party Deputy Chairman Mohammad-Reza Khabbaz said on 13 March that his
organization has proposed creating a five-member committee to select
the reformist presidential candidate, Mehr News Agency reported.
Khabbaz said the selectors would be President Mohammad Khatami,
former Prime Minister Mir-Hussein Musavi, Militant Clerics
Association members Hojatoleslam Mohammad Asqar Musavi-Khoeniha and
Hojatoleslam Mohammad Musavi-Bojnurdi, and Qom seminarian Ayatollah
Hussein Musavi-Tabrizi.
A prospective reformist presidential candidate, Mardom Salari
Party Secretary-General Mustafa Kavakebian, said in a 10 March speech
in the northeastern city of Khalkhal, “I, as a little man among the
nation’s children, intend to propound the new discourse, meaning
that the elite have been kept outside the bounds of power for 26
years and feel compassion for the system [and] should find their
place within the ranks of those in power,” “Mardom Salari” reported
on 12 March. Kavakebian said 12,000 people in the country have
doctoral degrees, but ministers, ambassadors, and the country’s
senior leaders come from a group of only 2,700 people. He noted that
some officials have seven or eight different positions. Kavakebian
said the government is inefficient, because many of those in
positions of power get there through “nepotism, cliques, and
windfall-seeking.” He said Iran has not fully realized “all aspects
of religious government and Islamic values.” (Bill Samii)

‘CONVERGENCE’ IMPORTANT IN IRANIAN POLITICS. The term
“convergence” has gained currency recently in describing the modern
newsroom, where the most modern technologies, skills, and methods are
employed to relay information in a timely and useful fashion via a
variety of formats. But in Iran, “convergence” (hamgerai) is used as
part of the political discourse.
Conservative commentator Masud Dehnamaki said in an interview
in the 2 March “Farhang-i Ashti” that divisions in the conservative
Coordination Council of the Islamic Revolution Forces could yield new
presidential candidates, but it is important to strive for
“convergence.” Addressing the same issue, columnist Hussein
Safar-Harandi wrote in the 21 February “Kayhan” that the
conservatives’ failure to introduce one presidential candidate
shows that they face “serious obstacles to their convergence.”
Reformists also discuss convergence, with former legislator
Hussein Ansari-Rad saying that free elections, publicly defined
national interests, and citizens’ exercising their rights
represent the convergence of the people and officials, “Farhang-i
Ashti” reported on 1 March. He added, “All kinds of disruption in the
participation of the people in power and in the administration of the
country would jeopardize this convergence.”
“Convergence” is also used in a foreign-policy context, with
Defense Minister Ali Shamkhani saying on 30 January: “Iran believes
one of the effective ways in confronting expansionist ambitions of
the world arrogance and the Zionist regime is to strengthen
convergence and unity among regional countries,” IRNA reported. (Bill
Samii)

STUDENTS, TEACHERS, WORKERS STAGE PROTESTS. The Islamic Association
of Amir-Kabir University announced that its recent sit-in was only an
initial step, “Iran News” reported on 16 March. The association
explained that, by it’s actions, it is protesting “the
antistudent establishments at this university.”
An unspecified number of students participated in the sit-in
at Amir-Kabir University on 12 and 13 March. They were protesting
against the imposition of a “security climate” on universities and
the presence there of “rogue elements,” or militiamen affiliated with
the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC), Radio Farda reported on
13 March, citing student Mehdi Hariri. “We are in the second
day…[and] not planning to stop…yet,” Hariri told Radio Farda. He
said the Basij militia active on campuses is intended “to oppose the
real demands” of students. The militias are financed by “outside
powers,” parliament, and “certain other bodies inside universities,”
he told Radio Farda.
The Office for Strengthening Unity, an umbrella student
group, has issued a statement backing the students, and members
recently met with Higher Education Minister Jafar Tofiqi to convey
student grievances, including the increasing difficulty of holding
gatherings inside universities, Radio Farda reported.
Separately, a group of part-time teachers gathered outside
parliament on 13 March to protest their work conditions, iribnews.ir
reported.
In another job action, 200 employees of a refrigerator
factory in Luristan Province demonstrated in front of the governorate
in Khoramabad on 14 March, Radio Farda reported. The workers
complained that since the factory was privatized in 2003 they have
not received their wages or benefits on a regular basis and that five
months have passed since they were last paid. The workers said that
the factory does not get raw materials, so it cannot manufacture
refrigerators. One of the workers, Morad Davudi, urged the government
to pay attention to their demands.
There have been several incidents of labor and student unrest
in Iran in recent weeks (see “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 14 March 2005).
(Vahid Sepehri, Bill Samii)

SCHOLARS VIEW DEMOCRATIC EFFORTS IN IRAN. President George W. Bush
expressed his support for Iranians’ democratic aspirations during
a 16 March news conference in Washington, RFE/RL reported. He said,
“I believe that the Iranian people ought to be allowed to freely
discuss opinions, read a free press, have free votes, and be able to
choose amongst political parties. I believe Iran should adopt
democracy.” Bush has touched on this theme several times since his
inauguration (see “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 6 and 14 February, 1 and 14
March 2005.
A few days earlier, on 10 March, Bush extended the “national
emergency with respect to Iran” because of Iran’s support for
terrorism, its active opposition to the Middle East peace process,
and its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, according to the
State Department website () (see “RFE/RL Iran
Report,” 15 March 2004). The national emergency regarding Iran was
declared in Executive Order 12957 of 15 March 1995. It is distinct
from the national emergency declared by President Jimmy Carter on 14
November 1979 by Executive Order 12170, “to deal with the unusual and
extraordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and
economy of the United States constituted by the situation in Iran”
(see “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 15 November 2004). Extension of EO 12957
continues the ban on U.S. investment in Iran’s energy sector.
Hoover Institution Research Fellow Abbas Milani asserted at a
15 March symposium in Washington that Iran’s “Democratic
Movement” is very much alive. Milani explained that he was not
talking about the reformist political organizations associated with
President Khatami’s 1997 election, suggesting that they are a
spent force. The real democratic movement, he said, includes women,
who have been forceful defenders of their rights since the 1979
revolution. He noted that women are active in all spheres and in the
early 1980s they rejected the government’s generous offer of
early retirement. The prevalence of NGOs, Milani said, is another
sign of a democratic movement. Milani said the Iranian diaspora can
make a contribution to democratic efforts, and he saw cleavages
within the regime as a hopeful sign.
Another scholar was less sanguine. Speaking at the same
symposium, Hoover Institution fellow Michael McFaul said that Iran
has some things in common with Georgia and Ukraine, which recently
underwent relatively peaceful revolutions. However, McFaul noted that
a number of important factors that existed in these post-Soviet
states are absent in Iran. He said there is no economic crisis in
Iran, and that the Iranian regime is more ruthless than the deposed
governments in Georgia and Ukraine proved to be. He dismissed the
political cleavages as disputes between, for example, hard-liners and
semi-hard-liners, terming them political disputes that do not touch
on fundamental issues about the state or the system. McFaul noted
that Iran does not have an independent media or independent election
monitors to report on episodes of malfeasance. In Georgia and
Ukraine, according to McFaul, there was anger over violations of the
constitution and the public and the media wanted their leaders to
adhere to the constitution. In Iran, the constitution itself is the
problem. McFaul also said Iran does not have a united or mobilized
opposition.
Milani and McFaul, as well as co-panelists Ellen Laipson of
the Henry L. Stimson Center and Larry Diamond of the Hoover
Institution, all said that as much as Iranians dislike their
government, they are very likely to have a sharply nationalistic
reaction if a foreign power attacks Iran.
Tehran, it seems, remains very concerned about the
possibility of U.S. military action. In an article published in a
prestigious U.S. journal (“Middle East Policy,” v. XII, n. 1, Spring
2005; provided courtesy of Blackwell Publishing), Foreign Minister
Kamal Kharrazi warned the United States against interference in
Iranian domestic affairs. Kharrazi writes that “foreign armies cannot
bring democracy,” adding that “the illusion that reform and democracy
can be dictated from outside must be abandoned.” According to
Kharrazi, “foreign interventions…tend to spawn resistance and
undesirable outcomes.” Kharrazi claims that foreign involvement could
undermine a country’s reform process, and adds that such a
process and democratization must be “homegrown and country specific,
rather than imposed from outside.”
In other parts of the article, Kharrazi denies that Iran is
interfering in Iraqi affairs, claims that Iran is a stabilizing force
in the region, and calls for a multilateral regional security
framework. Kharrazi defends Iran’s nuclear ambitions and claims
that Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued a religious
decree against developing weapons of mass destruction.
The Iranian legislature, in its 9 March session, approved a
special budget for discovering and countering U.S. plots and attempts
to interfere in the country’s domestic affairs, IRNA reported.
The size of the budget was not disclosed. The legislation permits the
cabinet to dispense up to 9 billion rials (approximately $1.14
million) to any foreign country or organization that acts in
accordance with the objectives of the law. The budget can also be
used for informing the public about the American “cultural
onslaught,” filing complaints against the U.S. in international
courts, and filing complaints on behalf of victims of chemical
weapons during the Iran-Iraq War.
“The Los Angeles Times” reported on 4 March that the White
House is trying to determine how to use a $3 million budget to foster
opposition activities in Iran. (Bill Samii)

KHATAMI CONCLUDES THREE-STATE TOUR. President Khatami returned to
Tehran on 13 March — one day after he left Venezuela, the last stop
in a three-country trip, IRNA reported on 13 March (see “RFE/RL Iran
Report,” 14 March 2005). In Venezuela, Iranian and Venezuelan
representatives signed 25 cooperation accords in industry, housing
construction, sea transport, farming, and oil, EFE and
Venezuela’s univision.com reported on 12 March. Khatami
inaugurated a joint-venture tractor construction plant on 12 March in
Ciudad Bolivar, south of Caracas, which should make 5,000 tractors a
year, EFE reported. The two states agreed to build the plant in
December 2003, when President Hugo Chavez went to Tehran, AFP
reported. The two countries are also to build a cement plant, set to
produce one million tons of cement a year from 2006, EFE added. A
statement signed by the presidents backed Iran’s peaceful nuclear
program and bid to enter the WTO, and praised the visit as boosting
the “strategic alliance” of the two states, EFE reported. (Vahid
Sepehri)

TEHRAN CONSIDERS WOLFOWITZ WORLD BANK NOMINATION. An Iranian state
radio analyst using the name “Mr. Fathi” discussed on 17 March the
White House’s nomination of Deputy Defense Secretary Paul
Wolfowitz to head the World Bank. Fathi argued that the nomination
has upset many governments because Wolfowitz is a “neoconservative
who is the planner of America’s attack on Iraq.” Fathi suggested
that Wolfowitz does not have the expertise to head the global
development bank. Fathi acknowledged that Wolfowitz’s time as
ambassador to Indonesia, when that country received loans from the
World Bank, contributed to poverty eradication. The Iranian state
radio analyst cited personnel moves involving Undersecretary of
Defense for Policy Douglas Feith and Undersecretary of State for Arms
Control John Bolton, as well as Condoleezza Rice’s move from
national security adviser to secretary of state, as evidence that
President Bush is increasingly sensitive to the international
community. “By sending the neoconservatives to political and economic
institutions, he wants to make them familiar with international
realities and show them that there is extensive opposition to
American policies in the international scene,” Fathi said. The
Wolfowitz appointment, Fathi said, marks the decline of
neoconservative influence in U.S. defense institutions. (Bill Samii)

RADIO FARDA ON IRAN AND TERRORISM: DIFFICULT U.S., IRAN RELATIONS
MARKED BY MUTUAL DISTRUST (PART 1). Iran has made great strides in
recent years in rebuilding bridges to Europe and Asia after the
tumultuous early years of the Islamic Revolution. Those years saw the
new Islamic regime seeking to export its revolutionary values abroad
and assassinating opponents. The early excesses led many countries to
regard the Islamic Republic as a rogue state and to try to isolate it
politically and economically.
Today, Iran claims its right to again be a full member of the
world community. But doubts linger about how much Iran has moved away
from its use of terrorism as a political tool. Washington, for
example, still considers Iran to be a state sponsor of terrorism and
cites as evidence what it says is Tehran’s continued support of
Middle Eastern terrorist groups, the killings of dissidents in Iran,
and interference in Iraq. Why does Washington view Tehran as part of
an “axis of evil” and as an enemy in the global war on terrorism?
In an effort to find the answers, Radio Farda issued a
four-part series on Iran and terrorism. Part 1 looks at the difficult
historical relationship between the United States and the Islamic
Republic — a relationship both sides say has been marked by
terrorist actions by the other. This series is based on material
prepared by Radio Farda’s Mehdi Khalaji and Ardavan Niknam, with
additional reporting by Parichehr Farzam. This article is also
available on the RFE/RL website:

BF30124D108.html
In Washington’s eyes, 4 November 1979 marked the
beginning of the Islamic Republic’s state sponsorship of
terrorism. That’s when a crowd of militants unopposed by police
stormed the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. The well-organized attackers took
52 American members of the staff hostage and held them for 444 days.
By the time the incident ended, in January 1981, the United States
had severed diplomatic ties with Tehran and had attempted —
unsuccessfully — to liberate the hostages in a commando operation.
U.S. President Jimmy Carter announced the failure of the
American commando operation this way: “I share the disappointment of
the American people that this operation was not successful.” The
rescue operation had to be unexpectedly aborted after a helicopter
developed engine trouble in a staging area in the Iranian desert. The
mission ended in the deaths of eight Americans, as two U.S. transport
planes collided.
Gary Sick was the principal White House aide for Iran during
the Islamic Revolution and the hostage crisis. He says those events
continue to shape the tense relationship Tehran and Washington have
today: “A lot of this also goes back to the early days of the
revolution, which was seen not only as a revolution against the Shah
but a revolution against the United States. The concept of ‘Death
to America,’ the ‘Great Satan’ and other such slogans and
words have become very much part of the revolution, particularly
after the mass demonstrations associated with the takeover of the
U.S. embassy. So it is very much part of Iran’s domestic
politics. At the same time, the United States suffered greatly
because of the takeover. And Iran became the U.S.’s
‘Satan.’ They are now part of the axis of evil. Many
politicians have identified them as the sort of permanent bad guys in
the Middle East and that, of course, is increased by the fact that
Israel regards Iran as its number-one enemy. So, between Israel and
the U.S., the rhetoric on the American side is in some cases no less
as dramatic as on the Iranian side. And this has become part of
American domestic politics, too, which immensely complicates any kind
of discussion or any hope for developing better relations.”
For Tehran, the hostage taking also remains a powerful
symbol. But it portrays the event as a just reaction against what it
calls decades of U.S. exploitation of Iran.
As an example, Tehran charges the United States with helping
orchestrate the 1953 coup that toppled the government of Prime
Minister Muhammad Mossadeq after he nationalized Iran’s then
foreign-dominated oil industry. Some U.S. involvement was
subsequently acknowledged by U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright in 2000.
Tehran also saw the United States as propping up the
government of Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, which was overthrown in the
Islamic Revolution in January 1979. Revolutionary leaders regarded
the Shah’s government as corrupt and ruthless in its use of its
state security organization, SAVAK, to target opponents.
The leader of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, made anti-Americanism a principle of the Islamic
Republic’s foreign policy, lashing out at Washington in many of
his speeches: “We are here to prevent America committing evil acts,
to defend ourselves. We do not expect America to do any good to us.
We trample upon America in these matters. We will not let it
interfere with our affairs. Nor will we let any other party interfere
[with] us. And if they want to invade, we will not let their planes
land. We will kill their paratroopers in midair.”
Today, relations between the United States and Iran continue
to be characterized by hostile statements on each side. Occasional
attempts at starting talks to ease tensions have always run aground
due to preconditions set by both sides.
Iran says there can be no talks until the United States first
ends it efforts to isolate Iran through unilateral sanctions.
The United States says there can be no talks until Iran ends
what it charges is its state sponsorship of terrorism and its
rejection of the Arab-Israeli peace process. Washington also wants
Tehran to renounce any efforts to acquire nuclear weapons and
long-range missiles.
U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney put Washington’s position
toward Iran this way in a recent statement: “[Iran] has been a major
source of state-sponsored terrorism, if you will, and [is] devoted to
the effort to destroy the peace process. We find that clearly
something that we can’t accept, and we’ve made clear our
opposition to that, as well as to their efforts to acquire weapons of
mass destruction.”
Iran denies it supports terrorist groups or is seeking to
acquire nuclear weapons.

U.S. ACCUSES IRAN OF EXTENDING ITS SUPPORT FOR MIDEAST TERRORIST
GROUPS (PART 2) To back up its charges that Iran is a state sponsor
of terrorism, the United States cites evidence it says proves that
Tehran provides financial and possibly some weaponry to militant
groups in the Mideast opposed to Israel. These militant groups —
including Lebanon’s Hizballah and radical Palestinian Islamic
groups like Hamas — have previously carried out or continue to carry
out attacks that kill civilians as part of their conflict with the
Jewish state.
Iran does not hide its close relations with Hezbollah, which
include meetings in Damascus or Tehran with leaders of the group. But
it calls the Shi’a Hizballah — which helped force Israeli troops
from southern Lebanon in 2000 — a liberation movement, not a
terrorist group. The Islamic Republic extends the same terminology to
Sunni Palestinian groups like Hamas because they also are fighting to
evict Israel from what Tehran says is Muslim land. Tehran does not
recognize Israel as a state.
Part 2 of RFE/RL and Radio Farda’s four-part series on
Iran and terrorism looks at the evidence cited to substantiate
accusations that Iran supports militant groups in the Middle East.
This also examines more recent U.S. charges that Iran is extending
this same pattern of support to radical groups opposing the U.S.
intervention in Iraq. Both sets of accusations are a central cause of
the tensions that continue to prevent Washington and Tehran from
re-establishing relations 26 years after Iran’s Islamic
Revolution. This series is based on material prepared by Radio
Farda’s Mehdi Khalaji and Ardavan Niknam, with additional
reporting by Parichehr Farzam. This article is also available on the
RFE/RL website:

24CE9C37CDA.html
Immediately after taking power in Iran, the Islamic
Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, called for
exporting the Islamic Revolution to other countries. In one of his
messages, Khomeini said “we will not rest until the slogan,
‘There is but one God and Muhammad is his Prophet,’ echoes
through the whole world.”
He considered Israel — which had good ties with the deposed
Shah and is a close ally of Washington — an enemy in his global
struggle, second only to the United States. The reason was what he
considered Israel’s illegitimate occupation of Muslim land.
The feelings about Israel were expressed in propaganda
campaigns aimed at both domestic and foreign audiences. In Iran, the
last Friday of the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan was proclaimed as
Qods Day. Qods is the Arabic name for Jerusalem. Qods Day was to
remember that the city — Islam’s third holiest after Mecca and
Medina — is under the control of a non-Muslim power.
Ayatollah Khomeini described Qods Day as marking a Muslim
struggle not only against Israel but all “arrogant” powers: “Qods Day
is a day to warn all superpowers that Islam is no more under their
domination through their evil mercenaries.”
When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, the conflict with the
Palestinians spread to include a country with a sizable Shi’a
community. Shi’a Iran responded by supporting the Lebanese
Shi’a Hezbollah as a guerrilla force battling Israel’s
establishment of an occupied “buffer zone” across much of southern
Lebanon.
Hajir Teymourian, a Middle East expert in London, describes
Tehran’s activity this way: “The most important terrorist
organization that Iran helped form was Hizballah, which was set up in
1982 by Iran’s ambassador in Lebanon, Ali Akbar Mohtashami-Pur.
According to journalists, it still receives tens of millions of
dollars of economic and military aid from Iran annually. For 12
years, Hizballah was the major kidnapper of Western citizens in
Lebanon, and caused Iran’s government to be internationally
isolated as a terrorist state — an isolation that still continues —
and inflicted billions of dollars of damages on Iran’s economy. I
think no one doubts that [the militant Islamic groups] Hamas and the
Islamic Jihad are also supported by Iran.”
On the world stage, Tehran always denied that it gave
military support to Hizballah, a group that not only became notorious
for kidnapping Westerners in Lebanon in the 1980s but also for
killing more than 240 U.S. soldiers in a 1983 suicide bombing of
their Beirut barracks. It also hijacked a U.S. commercial airliner in
1985.
But inside Iran, figures such as Hassan Abbasi, a
high-ranking commander of the Revolutionary Guards and head of the
Islamic Republic’s Center for Doctrinal Studies, openly spoke of
the country’s close ties with Hezbollah. He described the
group’s activities as “sacred:” “If something can be done to
terrorize and scare the camp of infidelity and the enemies of God and
the people, such terror is sacred. This terrorism is sacred.
Lebanon’s Hizballah was trained by these very hands. Pay
attention! Do you see these hands? Hizballah, Hamas, and Islamic
Jihad were trained by these very hands.”
Gary Sick was the principle White House aide for Iran during
the Islamic Revolution and is a prominent U.S. expert on the Islamic
Republic. He says factional struggles within the Iranian
establishment have made it hard to know whether the support of
Hizballah comes directly from Iran’s elected government or,
instead, from hard-line organizations like the Revolutionary Guard,
which enjoy considerable independence.
“Obviously, Iran claims absolutely that it does not support
terrorism. But it does, however, make no apologies that it supports
Hizballah, which from the Iranian point of view and from
Hizballah’s point of view is fighting a war of liberation against
Israel. They consider that a legitimate activity. They deny that
they, in fact, train and support terrorist activities. Iran has a
particular problem, and that is that Iran is comprised of two or
three different governments, different groups of people, different
factions, each of which has a certain amount of control over things
that happen. It is possibly very true that people such as President
[Mohammad] Khatami may not, in fact, even know what people in some
parts of the Revolutionary Guards, for instance, are doing with
Hizballah. But, in any case, the government is held responsible. So
Iran has created a problem for itself to some degree by its rhetoric,
very strong rhetoric, which some people say is more
‘Palestinian’ than the [rhetoric of the] Palestinians
themselves.”
Tallal Salman is editor of Lebanon’s “Al-Safir” daily. He
believes Iran not only supports Hizballah but also tries to extend
support to Palestinian militant groups — though it is logistically
more difficult to do so: “Any resistance [movement] has its own
conditions. Lebanon is geographically tied to Syria, and in terms of
military support and training, Iran does have the means to help
Hizballah. But it is much more difficult in Palestine. Iran obviously
gives political support to Palestinian groups, and also other forms
of support that we may not be able to detect. But I believe that even
today, there is an organic connection between Iran, Hizballah, and
Palestinian groups.”
In one sign of support for Palestinian militant groups, Iran
hosted former Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as one of its first
foreign visitors immediately after the Islamic Revolution. At the
time, many Iranians reportedly named their newborn sons Yasser in
enthusiasm for the Palestinian cause. More recently, in January 2002,
Israel stopped a ship loaded with arms which Arafat eventually
acknowledged was destined for the Palestinian Authority. Both Israel
and the United States said the arms originated in Iran, which Tehran
denied.
But as Arafat pursued on-and-off peace talks with Israel,
Iran’s relations with him cooled. Tehran saw his attempts to
negotiate as falling short of its own policy of fully opposing the
Jewish state.
In recent months, Washington’s concerns over Iran as a
sponsor of terrorism in the Middle East have shifted from the
Arab-Israeli conflict, further east to Iraq.
Kenneth Katzman is a regional expert with the Congressional
Research Service in Washington, D.C. He says the concern for many in
Washington is that Iran is supporting groups in southern Iraq who
might want to form a nondemocratic, strict Islamic government modeled
after Iran.
Iraqi and U.S. officials have accused Iran — as well as
Syria — of interfering in Iraq by permitting groups in their
countries to supply Iraqi insurgents with money and other resources.
U.S. President Bush repeated the charges against both
countries recently. He said: “We will continue to make it clear, to
both Syria and Iran, that — as will other nations in our coalition,
including our friends the Italians — that meddling in the internal
affairs of Iraq is not in their interest.”
Iran and Syria reject charges of interfering in Iraq. Last
month (16 February) the two countries declared that they had formed a
mutual self-defense pact to confront “threats” — an apparent
reference to the United States.
Outside of the Middle East, Iran also appears to have sought
to use its aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Muslims during the
conflict there to secretly train fundamentalist groups.
Analyst Nima Rashedan says much of the evidence of such
activities comes from documents seized by NATO forces in
Bosnia-Herzegovina: “This is a case that happened in a place in
Bosnia. Before the Dayton Accords and the presence of the United
States and NATO in Bosnia, the Islamic Republic had sent groups to
Bosnia, including the Revolutionary Guards’ Qods Force, led by
Mohammad Reza Shams Naqdi, and his deputy, Hussein Allahkaram, based
near Sarajevo — another group from the Intelligence Ministry — who
had set up a camp, training fundamentalists close to [Alija]
Izetbegovic’s Democratic Action Party, to establish the
intelligence apparatus of Bosnia. Later, NATO attacked the camp and
arrested a number of people, including Iranian intelligence
officials. The most interesting point was the discovery of documents
that were part of the curriculum for the training of Bosnian
intelligence recruits by Iranians. Among the instructions in the
texts were methods for killing opposition figures and silencing
journalists. That is, the Intelligence Ministry instructed a foreign
organization’s members how to intimidate, hunt, kidnap,
eliminate, and threaten the families and the financial sources of
journalists.”
(Part 3 of Radio Farda and RFE/RL’s series on Iran and
terrorism, which will be in next week’s “RFE/RL Iran Report,”
looks at charges that hard-line elements of the Iranian regime have
used terrorism to silence dissidents at home. Part 4 examines the
continuing impact of the Salman Rushdie affair on Iranian foreign
relations.)

IRAN-PAKISTAN-INDIA PIPELINE IMPERILED. As the owner of the
world’s second-largest proven natural gas reserves, Iran is keen
to exploit this resource as a source of revenue. It is therefore
pursuing gas export deals with a number of countries.
One of the biggest potential customers so far is India, and
negotiations for a pipeline stretching across Pakistan have been
going on since the mid-1990s. A recent flurry of diplomatic visits
suggested that the deal was about to be concluded, but U.S. security
concerns and Indian anger over Iranian business practices are putting
this in doubt.
Iran and India signed an agreement for an overland natural
gas pipeline in 1993, and in 2002 Iran and Pakistan signed an
agreement on a feasibility study for such a pipeline. India-Pakistan
tensions over Kashmir and related security concerns have delayed the
project. In late-February and early-March, diplomats from all three
countries said a deal would be signed soon. Iranian Foreign Minister
Kamal Kharrazi said the pipeline would be 2,700 kilometers long, and
India would buy 7.5 million tons of LNG [liquefied natural gas] a
year for 25 years (see “RFE/RL Iran Report,” 7 March 2005).
On 16 March, however, Indian Petroleum Minister Mani Shankar
Aiyar announced that his country might withdraw from the gas deal.
“We will not buy gas from Iran if we cannot sell it in India,” Press
Trust of India reported him as saying. Aiyar explained that Iran
wants to charge as much for natural gas as it does for LNG [about $4
per million British thermal unit (MBTU)], whereas the main Indian
consumers — the fertilizer and power sectors — are unwilling to pay
more than $3 per MBTU. With the addition of transportation and
transit charges to the Iranian price, Aiyar said, the gas would end
up costing $4.50 per MBTU. Aiyar added that India and Pakistan will
need approximately 200 million standard cubic meters of gas daily,
and Iran should offer a special price for such a large order.
Tehran, furthermore, is insisting on a “take-or-pay”
agreement, in which India must pay for the agreed amount of gas even
if it does not take delivery of it, Press Trust of India reported on
9 March. India reportedly prefers a “supply-or-pay” contract, in
which Iran must deliver gas to the Indian border or pay for the
contracted quantity. Tehran also rejected India’s request for
natural gas that is rich in petrochemicals, preferring instead to
deliver “lean” gas that does not contain butane, ethane, or propane.
It could be a coincidence, but Aiyar’s suggestion that
the deal could fall through comes at the same time that U.S.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is visiting India and Pakistan.
In fact, she referred to the proposed pipeline during a 16 March
press conference in New Delhi, RFE/RL reported. According to Rice,
“We have communicated to the Indian government our concerns about gas
pipeline cooperation between Iran and India. I think our ambassador
has made statements in that regard and so those concerns are well
known to the Indian government.”
The timing of the Indian petroleum minister’s comments
suggest that New Delhi is pressuring Tehran for a better deal, and it
could be taking advantage of Rice’s visit to leverage its
position.

INDIA’S OTHER SUPPLIERS… India is a huge and growing
natural-gas market. According to the U.S. Energy Information
Administration (EIA;
), natural gas
use in Iran was nearly 25 billion cubic meters in 2002 and is
projected to reach 34 billion cubic meters in 2010 and 45.3 billion
cubic meters in 2015. India produces gas and has worked with outside
partners — including Bechtel, Gaz de France, General Electric,
Total, and Unocal — to increase production, but it is looking to
other countries to fulfill its requirements.
One idea is to connect Bangladesh’s natural gas reserves
with the Indian gas grid. Burma could be a source of natural gas,
too. Two Indian companies — Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC)
and Erstwhile Gas Authority of India, Ltd (GAIL) — own equity in
Burmese natural gas reserves, and Burmese officials have indicated an
interest in running a pipeline to West Bengal in India.
Qatar — with the world’s third-largest natural-gas
reserves (14.4 trillion cubic meters) — is another competitor for
the Indian market. India’s Petronet and Qatar’s Ras Laffan
LNG Company (Rasgas) signed an agreement for the provision of 10.3
billion cubic meters per year of LNG, and deliveries began in January
2004, according to the EIA.
Indian Petroleum Minister Aiyar visited Moscow and Kazakhstan
in late February to discuss energy issues. He reportedly said that
India is willing to pay $2 billion for a 15 percent stake in
Yuganskneftegaz, “The Financial Express” reported on 12 March. He
also said India could invest $25 billion in the entire Russian energy
sector. India’s cabinet recently authorized discussion of the
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan Natural-Gas Pipeline Project (see
“RFE/RL Afghanistan Report,” 25 February 2005). Iran does not, as a
result, have a stranglehold on the Indian market.

…AND IRAN’S OTHER MARKETS. Iran natural-gas reserves are
estimated at 26.6 trillion cubic meters, according to the Energy
Information Administration, but the country only produced about 76.5
billion cubic meters of natural gas in 2002. Most of that gas was
used domestically, although Iran did export some gas to Armenia and
Turkey.
Iran is eager to reach other markets. Iranian Petroleum
Minister Bijan Namdar-Zanganeh and Omani Oil and Gas Minister
Muhammad bin Hamad bin Sayf al-Rumhi on 15 March signed an agreement
on the export to Oman of 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas
annually, beginning in 2006, IRNA reported.
The same day, Zanganeh and Kuwaiti Energy and Oil Minister
Ahmad Fahd al-Ahmad al-Sabah signed a deal for the export to Kuwait
of 10 million cubic meters of natural gas a day, beginning in late
2007, IRNA reported. Zanganeh said the deal with Kuwait is worth more
than $7 billion over 25 years. He went on to say that the legal
documents relating to the deal will be drawn up in a few months.
Earlier in March, the possibility of Ukraine purchasing 15
billion cubic meters of natural gas from Iran every year was
discussed at an Iran-Ukraine energy commission meeting in Kyiv. Two
pipeline routes are being considered —
Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Russia-Ukraine or Iran-Armenia-Georgia-Black
Sea-Ukraine. Other countries that have signed gas-related memoranda,
or at least discussed the topic, with Iran include Austria, Bulgaria,
China, Greece, Italy, and Turkey.
Iran likes to present every meeting as a major accomplishment
by staging the signing of a memorandum of understanding, but these
are not binding contracts. Conclusion of the deal with India is
potentially very important for Iran, because it will curtail some of
its political isolation and will earn it a place in the international
gas market. But Tehran’s pricing policies and Washington’s
opposition may scuttle Iran’s effort to achieve a natural gas
breakout. (Bill Samii)

IRAN WANTS STABLE OIL-PRODUCTION QUOTAS. OPEC announced on 16 March
that it has raised its oil production quota from 27 million barrels
per day to 27.5 million bpd, Reuters reported. If necessary, it will
increase this by another 500,000 bpd. Saudi Oil Minister Ali al-Naimi
explained that his country wants to keep the price in the $40-$50
range.
The Iranian government did not want the production ceiling to
change. Petroleum Minister Namdar-Zanganeh explained on 15 March that
there is an excess supply, prices are relatively high, and “we should
not make a decision that gives the wrong signal to the oil market and
further overheats the market and harms OPEC in the long run,” state
television reported. Namdar-Zanganeh explained that those who want to
increase production believe that real production is 600,000-700,000
barrels per day more than the official figure, state radio reported.
He went on to say nobody is talking about reducing production.
According to the “Financial Times” on 8 March, Iran is
already pumping at full capacity and cannot produce more oil. Only
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have the capacity to produce more oil,
Reuters reported on 16 March.
Iran’s economy depends on oil-export revenues (around 80
percent of total export earnings, 40-50 percent of the government
budget, and 10-20 percent of gross domestic product, according to the
Energy Information Administration), and every $1 increase in the
price of oil increases Iranian revenues by approximately $900 million
per year. The current price for a barrel of oil is above $50, but the
Iranian budget for 2005-06 is based on a $28 price and the price for
2004-05 was around $19.90.
The proposed budget calls for increased oil and gas
production over the next five years, Mahshahr parliamentary
representative Kamal Daneshyari, who heads the legislature’s
Energy Committee, said in the 6 February “Mardom-Salari.” (Bill
Samii)

*********************************************************
Copyright (c) 2005. RFE/RL, Inc. All rights reserved.

The “RFE/RL Iran Report” is a weekly prepared by A. William Samii on
the basis of materials from RFE/RL broadcast services, RFE/RL
Newsline, and other news services.

Direct comments to A. William Samii at [email protected].
For information on reprints, see:

Back issues are online at

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

SIX POSSIBLE TRAPS IN GEORGIA-RUSSIA TROOP WITHDRAWAL AGREEMENTS
by Vladimir Socor

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Tuesday, March 15, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 51

The Georgian Parliament passed a resolution on March 10 that requires
Russia unconditionally to withdraw its forces from Georgia no later
than January 1, 2006 — unless Moscow reaches agreement with Tbilisi
before May 15, 2005, on a “reasonable timeframe” for the troop
withdrawal (see EDM, March 14).

Georgia will be safer if the troop withdrawal timeframe remains as
defined by the parliamentary resolution, without political conditions
or linkages to other issues. Georgia would, however, run serious
risks if it tries negotiating a complex political agreement with
Russia on troop withdrawal and allow it to become linked to other
issues. In that case, Moscow would again drag out the negotiations
while trying to pressure or lure Tbilisi into signing an agreement
filled with traps and conditionalities.

Based on 14 years of experience in the Baltic states, Moldova, and
Georgia itself, at least six traps can be expected to be laid by Moscow
into the text of a political agreement with Georgia on troop withdrawal
and related agreements. Those traps would be designed to negate the
goal of military withdrawal, ensuring a military presence instead.

1. Legalization

Whatever “reasonable timeframe” is ultimately agreed for troop
withdrawal — 3 years as Tbilisi hopes, 7 years as Moscow demands,
or a compromise — Russia wants the presence of its troops to be
legalized for the duration. If this is done, Moscow will have a
tempting incentive to pressure Georgia to accept prolongation of
the term upon expiry. The Baltic states were aware of this risk
when they refused to legalize the presence of Russian troops on
their territories for any “temporary” or “transitional” period. Such
legalization by Georgia would: a) undermine the irreplaceable argument
of national sovereignty for the ridding the country of Russian troops;
b) enable Russia, under the CFE Treaty and in other contexts, to cite
“host-country consent” by Georgia; c) weaken international sympathy
and support for Georgia’s ultimate goal of terminating Russia’s
now-unlawful military presence; d) retain, instead of removing, a
potential time-bomb of a political-military nature inside the country;
and e) interfere with Georgia’s national goal of integration with
NATO. Like the Baltic states, Georgia must never legalize Russia’s
military presence for any length of time.

2. Re-labeling

Russia hopes to retain the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases and its
Tbilisi general headquarters by re-labeling them “anti-terrorist
centers.” Georgians originally came up with this idea in 2004 in order
to re-start the Russian-blocked negotiations and to provide Moscow
with a face-saving way to withdraw the troops. Tbilisi had envisaged
the formation of one joint Georgian-Russian analytical anti-terrorist
center, under Georgian sovereign control and not located at any
existing military base, to be created in the wake of the garrisons’
departure, and to include several score of Russian officers, without
troops or armaments. Moscow, however, seized Tbilisi’s goodwill gesture
and turned it against Georgia. Last month, Moscow proposed to rename
the existing bases as “anti-terrorist centers” and even to augment
their garrisons; and when Tbilisi refused, Moscow publicly blamed
Tbilisi for blocking the negotiations. Georgia may have outsmarted
itself with that offer in the first place. With anti-terrorism an
international concern for many years to come — and, sometimes, a cover
for any use of coercion — it is easy to envisage Russia demanding
to retain “anti-terrorist centers” in Georgia into the future,
while propagandizing (as it already does) that Georgia tolerates
“international terrorism.” Moscow has grossly abused Georgia’s
face-saving offer. This is not its first use of re-labeling for
cheating. Three years ago, Russia re-labeled its Gudauta military
base as “peacekeeping” and retains it to this day, in breach of its
1999 commitment to have closed down that base by 2001. The lesson
from all this to Tbilisi is that it must require the withdrawal of
Russian troops unambiguously, without the risky and time-wasting
complications of tinkering with their labels. The Baltic states were
successful because their position was never less than straightforward.

3. Ratification

Russia will try to require parliamentary or some other type of
ratification of a troop-withdrawal agreement with Georgia. The
experience of Moldova is instructive on this point. In 1994,
then-prime ministers Viktor Chernomyrdin and Andrei Sangheli signed an
intergovernmental agreement on the withdrawal of Russian troops from
Moldova within three years (by October 1997). A Russian-added codicil
stipulated, however, that implementation would be “subject to the
states’ internal procedures,” not further specified. The Kremlin then
interpreted this as requiring parliamentary ratification. Moldova’s
parliament quickly ratified the agreement; but Russia’s Duma never
did. Instead, the Russian government for years thereafter presented
additional conditions just for submitting the agreement to the Duma for
debate, and the Duma piled up additional conditions for examining the
document, with still more conditions for ratifying the agreement, which
it never did. Ultimately, the main condition was Moldova’s acceptance
of Transnistria’s separation with Russian troops in place. As Moldova
could not accept such terms, Russia has since 1997 simply ignored
that agreement. With this experience in mind, Tbilisi must insist on
an executive agreement with Russia on troop withdrawal, fully binding
from the inception, and providing for effective international oversight
(other than by the OSCE) of its implementation.

4. Istanbul formula

Moscow wants to retain the OSCE Istanbul 1999 formula, because it does
not require the closure of the Batumi and Akhalkalaki bases. It merely
stipulated, “during the year 2000 the sides will complete negotiations
regarding the duration and modalities of the functioning of the Russian
military bases at Batumi and Akhalkalaki and the Russian military
facilities within Georgia.” This formula must finally be cast aside
because Moscow has breached it — along with many other points of the
OSCE Istanbul 1999 agreements — constantly and massively throughout
these years. The Istanbul formula was patently inadequate in the
first place because it failed to stipulate the goals of base closure
and troop withdrawal regarding Batumi, Akhalkalaki, and other Russian
military installations. Any new agreement with Russia must precisely
stipulate the binding obligation to close the bases and installations
and withdraw the troops by a date certain.

5. Georgian obligations

Russia will try to saddle Georgia with obligations to create proper
conditions for the reduction and withdrawal of Russian troops,
facilitate the functioning of bases and movement of personnel, vouch
for a secure environment in the base areas, and so on. Moscow will
formulate some conditions very broadly in order to abuse them later,
but will also advance some very specific conditions that Georgia
might be unable to fulfill in time or at all. Thus, Russia refused to
hand over Gudauta to Georgia — and has since blocked any meaningful
international inspection — on the excuse that Georgia is unable
to provide security in the area, which happens to be controlled by
Russia’s Abkhaz proteges. In Akhalkalaki, Moscow can well orchestrate
demonstrations by local Armenians in favor of retaining the Russian
base, then claim that it could not and would not act against the
will of the local population. Russia has already played this game
for years in Transnistria as an excuse for keeping its troops in
place. With this in mind, Georgia must not accept any obligations
of a kind that Russia or some local clients might prevent Tbilisi
from fulfilling. Tbilisi must also decline to vouchsafe (if only
“temporarily”) for the operation of Russian bases. Such an obligation
would deprive Georgia of leverage later on, in the likely event that
Moscow tries yet again to renege on its troop-withdrawal commitments.

6. Linkages

The Kremlin has managed to tie up the military negotiations
with the negotiations on a new interstate political treaty. As a
precondition to a troop-withdrawal agreement, Moscow now demands
that the political treaty rule out the hosting of third-party troops
and military installations on Georgia’s territory, and generally
constrict Georgia’s independent military cooperation with other
countries. As a further precondition to withdrawal of its troops
(other than the “peacekeepers”), Moscow wants the political treaty
to enshrine a special role for Russia in settling the Abkhazia and
South Ossetia conflicts and protecting the [newly-minted] “Russian
citizens” there. Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that
such clauses are necessary in order to persuade the Duma to ratify
an interstate treaty with Georgia, if one is signed. This claim is
implausible in view of the Kremlin’s control of a comfortable majority
in the Duma. For its part, Tbilisi must reject any linkages between
a troop-withdrawal agreement and extraneous political issues. It can
simply offer a commitment that Georgian territory would not be used
by a third party against Russia. However, Georgia’s international
security arrangements and internal constitutional setup do not belong
in a bilateral treaty with Russia. Nor should Georgia legitimize those
“peacekeeping” operations as part of an agreement with Russia.

At this point, Tbilisi must initiate consultations with the three
Baltic states regarding their experience with practical arrangements
for the withdrawal of Russian forces.

Vladimir Socor

ARMENIA, RUSSIAN PRESIDENTS EXCHANGE MESSAGES

ArmenPress
March 21 2005

MOSCOW, MARCH 21, ARMENPRESS: Vladimir Putin and Robert Kocharian
have exchanged today messages in connection with the opening of the
Year of the Russian Federation in Armenia, RIA Novosti reported,
citing the Kremlin press service.
“Russia attaches great importance to the consistent strengthening
of friendly relations with Armenia, its reliable ally and strategic
partner. I am convinced that the holding of the Year of Russia will
contribute to the further rapprochement of the two countries, and to
the development of friendship and direct dialogue between our
peoples,” Putin wrote in part.
“Events on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Great
Victory will occupy a special place in this significant festival.
This is a tribute of respect to the exploit and courage of all those
who were side by side fighting against fascism,” he wrote.
Armenian President Robert Kocharian’s message expressed similar
respect. “The decision to announce 2005 as the Year of the Russian
Federation in the Republic of Armenia opens broad possibilities for
the further expansion of Armenian-Russian contacts. This initiative
will undoubtedly contribute to the full implementation of the
political, economic and cultural potential of cooperation between our
fraternal peoples.
I would like to express confidence that the holding of the Year of
Russia in Armenia will make it possible to add new ideas and projects
to the agenda of Armenian-Russian cooperation,” Kocharian wrote.
“The Armenians love Russian art and are waiting impatiently for
meetings with representatives of Russian culture. Contacts between
representatives of science, education and business communities of our
countries, as well as contacts at the regional level could also be of
great practical importance.
“It is symbolic that the Year of Russia in Armenia has coincided
with the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the Victory over
fascism. This heroic page of our common history has tied the fates of
our peoples and brought them closer together,” Kocharian wrote.

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

ArmenPress
March 21 2005

TURKISH NEWSPAPER DOUBTS BENEFITS OF CLOSED BORDER WITH ARMENIA

YEREVAN, MARCH 21, ARMENPRESS: At the initiative of a Turkish
Rotary district governor, Turkish, Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian
Rotary clubs met in Ankara on March 19 for an unprecedented joint
program titled “Caucasus Friendship Days.”
Two Armenian, one Azerbaijani, one Georgian and several Turkish
Rotary clubs were meeting at Ankara’s Bilkent Hotel within the scope
of the program. Members of the Armenian clubs reportedly traveled by
bus after spending a night in Kars.
The meeting was covered by Turkish newspaper. The English-language
Turkish Daily News, particularly, said: “Is not it time to find out
what are our benefits from the closed border with Armenia? If we open
the border would it make Armenians more unyielding in what is related
to their problems with Azerbaijan or their drive to have the 1915
genocide recognized internationally.? Open border may however, make
Armenians realize the importance of Turkey as a neighbor nation and
the importance of living in peace. It may also make them soften their
tough position.”

From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

TATUL MARGARIAN APPOINTED NEW ARMENIAN AMBASSADOR TO USA

ArmenPress
March 21 2005

YEREVAN, MARCH 19, ARMENPRESS: Armenian president Robert Kocharian
appointed deputy foreign minister Tatul Margarian Armenia’s new
ambassador to the United States of America. He is replacing Arman
Kirakosian.
Tatul Margarian was born in 1964 in Armenia’s southern town of
Kapan. He graduated from a Yerevan Economic Institute in 1985 and
then he continued his post-graduate education at the same institute.
He later studied at the International Studies Department of John
Hopkins University in the USA and studies now at London Political
Sciences and Economics University for a doctoral degree.
In 1990-1991 he worked as an aide to the deputy chairman of
Armenian parliament. In 1994-1998 he served as an advisor at the
Armenian embassy in USA and was head of staff. In 1999 he was
appointed aide to foreign minister and in 2000 deputy foreign
minister. In 2002-2003 he was president Kocharian’s special envoy in
the talks over Nagorno Karabagh problem.
He is fluent in Russian and English, married and has one son.

ArmenPress
March 21 2005

THE QUILTS OF GEE’S BEND PRESENTED IN ARMENIA

YEREVAN, MARCH 19, ARMENPRESS: The U.S. Embassy in Armenia
presented last Friday “The Quilts of Gee’s Bend” exhibition of twelve
quilts created by a community of African-American women in Gee’s
Bend, Alabama. This exhibition has been shown with international
acclaim at major art museums across the United States, and is
appearing overseas for the first time. Ambassador John Evans
officially opened the exhibition at the Academia Gallery in Yerevan.
Gee’s Bend is a small rural community located in southwest Alabama
on a sliver of land five miles long and eight miles wide, an island
surrounded by a bend in the Alabama River. Gee’s Bend was the site of
cotton plantations, owned by the families of Joseph Gee and Mark
Pettway, and were worked by slave labor. Most of the approximately
750 people who live in Gee’s Bend today are descendants of slaves.
After the Civil War, when slavery was abolished, the freed slaves
rented the land from the Pettways, took their family name, and
founded an all-black community that was very isolated from the
surrounding world.
Throughout American history, quilting has provided generations of
women with an outlet to express their creativity and skill. A quilt
is a layered blanket, with a front and a back, and stuffing in the
middle for extra warmth. Though traditions of quilting span many
centuries, civilizations and cultures, “pieced” quilts, which have
tops decorated with strips of cloth in a range of colors and fabrics,
originated in colonial America.
In 2002, the first exhibition of these quilt masterpieces was
organized at the Museum of Fine Arts, Atlanta. The “Quilts of Gee’s
Bend” also traveled to the Whitney Museum of American Art in New
York, as well as other museums in a twelve-city U.S. tour. The
exhibition achieved tremendous international acclaim. Hundreds of
print and broadcast media organizations that have celebrated the
quilts and the history of Gee’s Bend. Art critics worldwide have
compared the quilts to the works Henri Matisse and Paul Klee.
In 2003, with assistance from Tinwood organizations, all the
living quilters of Gee’s Bend – more than fifty women – founded the
Gee’s Bend Quilters Collective to exhibit, market and sell the quilts
being produced by the women of the Bend. In 2005 the Quilts of Gee’s
Bend will travel overseas for the first time, to be exhibited in
Armenia, Georgia, and Kazakhstan.

PanArmenian News
March 21 2005

FBI AGENT: INVESTIGATION ON ILLEGAL ARMS TRAFFIC CONDUCTED JOINTLY
WITH APPROPRIATE ARMENIAN BODIES

21.03.2005 08:35

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ The investigation on the illegal trade in arms in
the US was initiated over a year ago and was conducted jointly with
the appropriated Armenian bodies, Bryan Parmar, FBI special agent,
US’s juridical attaché in the Caucasus stated at today’s press
conference in Yerevan. When commenting on the role of Georgia and
possibly Azerbaijan, he noted that Georgian specialists also take
part in the investigation, while Azerbaijan has nothing to do with
it. As for the participation of the Armenian military or the Russian
military bases, the FBI agent stated that he possesses no information
in this regard but did not rule such a possibility. Agreeing with the
statement that no single weapon was taken out from Armenia, the FBI
representative stated that there was efficient ground for the arrest
of the gang. When answering the question whether Solomonyan’s words
were mere bluff, intended for a possibility to earn some money. Mr.
Parmar noted that the bargain was not carried through and the arms
could fall into wrong hands. “If everything did not go beyond photos
we would not pay serious attention to it”, he noted. Mr. Parmar
also confirmed that Artur Solomonian mentioned of enriched uranium
but did not revert to the topic afterwards. According to the FBI
representative, several sources of weapons are located in the Caucasus.

–Boundary_(ID_xuRMGAPLFCbPTwG08Of1bg)–

ARA ABRAHAMIAN: WE NEED CLEAR PERCEPTION OF ARMENIAN-RUSSIAN
STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

Azg/arm
22 March 05

– What do you expect from President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Armenian?

– Important decisions are, as a rule, being prepared before high-level
meetings. Many institutions are usually engaged in such kind of
preparations and the mass media is informed as well. As far as there
is no such sprightliness in political and media sphere then we can
scarcely expect any major solution.

– Why does the breakthrough in Armenia-Russian economic relations
keep us waiting?

– To achieve that breakthrough we need a united team of politicians,
businessmen, experts and journalists of both countries in order
not only to outline the spheres of cooperation but also control
confirmation of agreements in the parliaments, preparation and
realization of governmental decisions as well as working out an order
of financing projects and election of business structures supporting
the projects.

– What’s the activity of the Intergovernmental Commission on Economic
Cooperation co-chaired by Sargsian and Levitin?

– There is indeed such a commission, and it is rather active. I
deeply appreciate what Serge Sargsian is doing there. The co-chairs
are in good business relations. There are already some results. But,
as I mentioned, economic relations should not be limited by what is
done on parliamentary or presidential level. We need all other levels
of cooperation I mentioned after bilateral agreements are signed in
order to bring the issue out from political to practical sphere.

– Is that the reason why the enterprises handed over to Russia for
Armenia’s debt lie idle?

– That’s right. I already had the chance to say that the agreements of
transition do not contain concrete obligations for Russian authorities
to modernize those enterprises and do not set deadlines for their
exploitation The Russian side has not set a company that would be able
to attract investors and to rebuild those enterprises. Armenia should
be more persistent in this issue as it’s not crucial for Russia to get
those enterprises working. They are more of political importance for
Russia, as it will show that Armenia is primary for Russia’s foreign
policy as a whole.

By the way, there is such a problem in the sphere of providing
the Armenian diamond polishing factories with diamonds. There are
agreements with presidents’ signatures but Alrosa is very unsteady
in provision. I think the presidents could agree that Alrosa signed
an agreement with the Armenian company on diamond provision including
provision measure, terms and sanctions of international courts in case
one of the sides neglects obligations. I am sure that Alrosa would
not dare overlook items in the agreement under threat of sanctions.

– What are the issues that will likely top Putin’s visit agenda?

– Besides the concrete economic issues I mentioned, I think that
would be expedient to discuss Armenia’s role in Russia’s regional
strategy especially given Russian-Turkish (goods turnover being
$9 billion) and Russian-Azeri (goods turnover being $1 billion)
economic and military cooperation. I view of growing influence of
Turkey and America in Azerbaijan and Georgia, the Armenian side has
to be concerned with the threat of being politically isolated. The
Armenian side has to give its own clear definition to Armenian-Russian
strategic partnership. Apparently, Russia has to clearly display
its interest towards Armenia by strong economic presence as well as
highlighting Armenia’s privileged role in bilateral relations with
the region’s states.

Russia has to definitely make understand that it does not apply the
same yardstick to the countries of the South Caucasus and Turkey, and
that Armenia’s privileged position in economic and military relations
should be clearly worked out and make known either to the region
or to the whole world. The two countries need a clear regulation of
transportation in order to prevent Armenian citizens and goods from
being maltreated and discriminated as it happened last year when the
Armenian vehicles were blocked on the Russian border.

I think that Armenia should join the talk process over Russian military
base’s withdrawal from largely Armenian-populated Akhalkalaki and over
keeping balance of force in the region in general. It is directly
linked with Armenia’s security given latter’s relations with Turkey
and Azerbaijan.

– It’s rumored that you make efforts to release the Armenian pilots
from jail in Equatorial Guinea. Is that true?

– Indeed I had a conversation with the foreign minister Vartan
Oskanian to coordinate our steps. As a UNESCO Goodwill Ambassador, I
am mobilizing all my international contacts to find the most optimal
variant for releasing our compatriots and send them back home. The
issue is somewhat neglected though. I went into this being late but
hopefully we can reach a positive result by the united efforts of
the Armenian diplomacy and my personal international contacts.

– What concrete steps have you taken in this direction?

– I flew in Rome and sought after the Pope’s signature on a letter
to the president of Equatorial Guinea with an appeal to release the
Armenian pilots. After that, I met the Director-General of UNESCO,
Mr. Matsuura, in Paris. He also signed a letter on his and on behalf
of UNESCO to the Guinean president asking to release the Armenian
pilots. Proper UN representatives are also into this; a similar letter
with Kofi Annan’s appeal is being prepared. I met the high-ranking
representatives of Equatorial Guinea in Paris, and we discussed
conditions of releasing the Armenian pilots.

Considering poor health of some detainees, I stressed on the soonest
release of the sick pilots.

I hope that we will have positive results.

– As we round off, I cannot help asking about your relations with the
Armenian authorities, particularly with President Robert Kocharian,
with Armenian political parties and their leaders and about your plans
concerning the presidential elections in Armenia. The question is
that there are various rumors over all these issues in the Armenian
mass media and political circles.

– Let me answer step by step. I am in normal relations with the
Armenian authorities. I would call it partnership. During my last
meeting with the President I informed him about our plans to carry out
a series of arrangements onoccasion of the 90th anniversary of the
Armenian Genocide. The President agreed that many vital for Armenia
issues will hardly find solution without tightening ties with the
Diaspora. I hope our cooperation will become more fruitful in future.

Concerning my relations with politics and political parties in
Armenia, I should say that I am in good relations with either
centrist or oppositional parties and their spearheads. The aim of
the World Armenian Congress and the Russia’s Union of Armenians is
to see Armenia stable, and we use our contacts to foster political
stability in the republic. We carry out different arrangements with
different parties. We cooperate in equipping Armenian schools with
computers with some parties and perform benevolent programs with
the others. With the Armenian Revolutionary Party we discussed the
possibility of opening offices for lobbying activities in a number
of European capitals in regard to Turkey-EU talks and its EU bid.

I declare that we never meddled in the elections in Armenia by
financing this or that party, and statements in the political circles
and in the mass media are groundless.

As to my plans over presidential elections in Armenia, I should say,
as I mentioned in a press conference during my last visit, that I will
be actively involved in this elections siding the candidate that will
put forward a clear program of the country’s economic growth. Not a
bunch of good wishes but concrete measures, the financial source and
a team that will accomplish all these. Besides, the candidate should
have a comprehensive foreign policy program on Nagorno Karabakh issue,
on coming to terms with Turkey and Azerbaijan. If there is such a
person among the candidates, I will do all possible to support him.

We always spurred consolidation of all political forces for the sake
of nationwide issues’ solution. We think also that elections of every
level should be held within the terms set by the constitution and
legislative acts. Prescheduled elections are the result of either
unstable inner political situation or emergency. I would not like
to see Armenia in either of these situations. Moreover, I think that
all kinds of colorful revolutions are not designed for us.

– Do you see any such politician today?

– I think it’s early to speak of that. This issue will come to the
practical level in a year, then we’ll go into details.

Middle East Media Research Institute, DC
Inquiry and Analysis Series – No. 213
March 21 2005

The Plight of Iraqi Christians

By Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli*

Introduction
The kidnapping of Archbishop Basil Georges Casmoussa on January 17,
2005 in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, and his subsequent release
the following day, highlighted the plight of Iraqi Christians, like
other Iraqi communities, facing threats from Islamist terrorists bent
on plunging Iraq into ethnic conflict.

Deep Roots and Current Violence
The Iraqi daily Al-Mada recently carried a report about the ruins of
what is believed to be the oldest Eastern Christian church,
discovered in 1976 by an archeological team in the desert west of the
holy Shi’ite city of Karbala. The church, known as Al-Qusair Church,
was built in the 5th century, 120 years before the appearance of
Islam and almost two centuries before the spread of Islam in what is
known today as Iraq.

The church (53×13 feet) had fifteen arched doors. Inside
archeologists found remnants of an altar and gammadion crosses. There
were two small cemeteries, one within the church walls intended for
the priests and one outside the walls for other church members.

During the Saddam regime, the eastern side of the church was
converted into a training target for an artillery unit of the Iraqi
army. A number of unexploded shells have been found within the
church’s perimeter. After the fall of Saddam, the tombs were
desecrated by looters, who hoped to find gold buried with the dead.
The Iraqi Department of Antiquities has recognized the historical
significance of the church, and restoration and preservation are
being considered. [1]

The Iraqi Christians
Iraqi Christians represent three percent of the Iraqi population
(which is estimated at 26 million). [2] The overwhelming majority of
Iraqi Christians belong to the Chaldean Catholic Church – the Iraqi
branch of Roman Catholicism. Chaldean Catholics are also known as
“Assyrians.” The patriarch of the Chaldean Catholic Church has
clarified that “Assyrian” is an ethnic identity and “Chaldean” is a
religious one. [3] There are other churches in Iraq, including the
Roman Catholic, Protestant, Baptist, Nestorian and Armenian. However,
the distinction between these churches is not really understood by
most Iraqi Muslims, who look upon all Christians as “People of the
Book,” as they are referred to in the Koran.

Under the secular Ba’th regime, the Christians in Iraq, who presented
no threat to Saddam, enjoyed considerable religious freedom. In an
interview with the Arabic-language London daily Al-Hayat, the Latin
Patriarch in Iraq, Jan Suleiman, said that whenever Saddam Hussein
was approached regarding a problem affecting the Christian education
system in Iraq, he would intervene to resolve it. [4]

Violence Against Individuals
The high level of violence in Iraq has affected every sector of the
Iraqi population, and Christians are no exception. Christians,
however, have been specifically targeted by Islamists, who either
accuse them of collaborating with the “invading crusading army” or
label them infidels. As Islamist pressures mounted in Iraq, following
its occupation, Christian businesses were destroyed, Christian
university students were harassed and Christian women were forced to
wear the veil. [5]

Suspected of Collaboration
Most Christian children attend Christian schools, where the teaching
of a foreign language, primarily English, is a high priority in the
curriculum. It is therefore understandable that the multinational
forces have tapped the Christian community for office and translation
work. However, the Christians are concerned that a prolonged
occupation of Iraq by the multinational forces under the command of
the United States will only heighten the accusations that they are
collaborating with an occupation “originating from a Christian
country.” [6]

Recently, the unidentified “Brigades for the Liquidation of Christian
Agents and Spies” has threatened to liquidate those working with the
multinational forces and to “pursue them in their homes and
churches.” In placards posted in Christian areas, the Brigades wrote:

“The Christian minority enjoys peace and security in the land of the
Muslim and in our country in particular. Its members have held senior
positions in the State. But their malevolence toward Muslims became
evident when the occupier entered our country. He found great support
among them in the form of translators and agents who acted as
informers against Muslims. Their churches receive evangelist groups.
They spread moral corruption and pornography in our streets. Muslims
have been arrested, women raped and houses destroyed as a result of
Christians being agents of the occupiers.” [7]

Violence Against Churches
In August 2004, five churches, one in Baghdad and four in Mosul, were
hit in one day, in a coordinated attack that killed 12 people. In
October, five churches in Baghdad were hit on the first day of the
Muslim month of Ramadan. In November, eight people were killed in two
church bombings. [8] The August attack on churches was followed on
September 10 by mortar attacks against the Assyrian town in Bakhdeda
(also referred to as Qarqosh ) in the Ninevah Governorate in northern
Iraq. [9]

The Destruction of Businesses
With the public sector and the military all but closed to them,
Christians have focused on the services sector of the economy and
retail business. Because of Islamic restrictions on alcohol
consumption, Iraqi governments have limited the liquor retail
business to Christians, who, in turn, have been meeting an obviously
high demand for alcoholic beverages among a large segment of the
Iraqi Muslim population. In fact, a considerable amount of money
under the “Oil for Food Program” was used by the Saddam regime for
the import of the most expensive brands of alcoholic beverages for
Saddam Hussein, his sons, and the high echelons of the secular Ba’th
ruling party. At one time, the Coalition Provisional Authority was
contemplating a public auction of high quality vintage wine and
champagne found in the cellars of the palaces of Saddam, his sons,
and their cronies.

Shortly after the fall of Saddam, Islamists, who took control of the
streets of many Iraqi cities, began to target Christian owners of
liquor stores. They first ordered the owners to close their
businesses; if the owners failed to comply, the Islamists gutted the
stores and often killed the owners. An example is liquor merchant
Bashir Toma Alias, who was shot in the head in the center of a bazaar
in Basra while on his way home to celebrate Christmas. [10]

Writing about the “deplorable attack against Chaldean Christians in
Iraq,” the Chaldean New Agency wrote on October 7, 2004:

“Not only did those heinous crimes result in the loss of innocent
lives, but worse, they have created tremendous hardships for those
Chaldean families whose very livelihood were attacked. With a lack of
alternative jobs, many of them are currently living off the
charitable contributions of the local Chaldean churches.” [11]

The report goes on to warn that unless these “Islamic terrorists” are
brought to justice, “Iraqi Chaldeans will continue to be an easy
target for such criminals who are bent on imposing their distorted
version of Islam by force.” [12] It was reported that in the southern
city of Basra, the second largest city in Iraq, armed Shi’ite groups
with names such as “The Revenge of Allah,” “Hizbullah,” and “The
Organization of Islamic Doctrines,” roam the streets to mete out
“Islamic punishment” on traders and users of alcohol, as well as on
prostitutes. Four hundred Christian stores were closed. According to
Faysal Abdullah, the head of the Organization of Islamic Doctrines,
Islam “rewards those who seek martyrdom and who were designated by
Allah to uproot vice.” [13]

Often the police stand idly by in the face of crimes committed in
their presence because they are afraid of the armed Islamists or
because they sympathize with their aims.

The Christians complain that after they were driven out of the liquor
business by Islamist groups, Muslims have taken over the business and
continue to sell liquor publicly. [14]

The Islamists have also targeted barber shops run by Christians
because the Islamists object to haircuts and to shaving. [15]

Harassment of Students
Christian students at Iraqi universities are also subjected to
harassment and often to violence. At the University of Mosul, the
second largest university in Iraq, 1,500 Christian students recently
decided to suspend their studies because of threats to their lives by
Islamists who have taken control of the university. [16] Because many
of these students traveled to campus in buses from outside the city,
they were afraid that their transportation would be bombed if they
persisted in attending the university. [17]

A survey among Christian students carried out by the Iraqi daily
Al-Mada has found similar sentiments among Christian students
attending other institutions of higher learning in Iraq. They do not
understand why they are being victimized. Anna Mirfit Boutrus, a
22-year-old student at the Technological University of Baghdad,
expressed her distress:

“Why do the terrorists want to prevent us from performing our
religious rites? Why do they bomb our churches? Why do they want to
kill us~E What have we done to them? We are citizens of this land.
This is our country. We will not give it up and we will not replace
it with another.” [18]

For female Christian students, there is incessant pressure to wear
the veil or put their lives in jeopardy. [19]

Christmas Celebrations
Christians celebrated Christmas in their homes, for fear of attacks.
Most churches avoided the traditional midnight Mass or large
gatherings of church goers. [20] Indeed, the churches called upon
their parishioners to avoid coming to churches on Christmas out of
concern for their safety. [21] Asked to comment on the situation on
the eve of Christmas, Patriarch Emanuel III, the Patriarch of
Babylon, responded:

“As leaders of the Christian communities in Iraq, we are pained by
what has happened to our country. There is destruction of our people,
resources, buildings and churches. We grieve the tragic death of many
of our children and the injuries and psychological shocks suffered by
others. Many of our citizens were subject to humiliating kidnapping,
thefts, and expulsion.” [22]

Sister Warda of the Daughters of Mary Convent commented that the
cancellation of Christmas celebrations must be viewed in perspective.
She said: “We cannot celebrate in isolation of what our relatives and
brothers are subjected to in our wounded country.” [23]

Conversion to Islam
Chaldeans also complain about pressures to convert to Islam. When a
parent converts to Islam all minors in the family are forcefully
converted regardless of the wishes of the other parent. [24]

Leaving the Country
The plight of Iraqi Christians is part of a rapidly deteriorating
situation that is forcing Christians throughout the Middle East to
seek refuge in the West. A recent article by Majid Aziza in the Iraqi
daily Al-Zaman, a newspaper with a long-standing liberal pedigree,
highlights the plight of Christians in the Arab and Muslim world:

“Christian natives of Arab countries are escaping their countries of
origin. Statistics show that a large number of them have emigrated to
countries which offer them and their children greater security, such
as the United States, Canada, Australia and some European countries.
The reason is the harassment to which they are subjected in countries
they have inhabited for thousands of years. Sometimes the harassment
originates from the regime; at other times it comes from extremist
groups.”

Saddam and the Iraqi Christians
On the one hand, Saddam Hussein supported Christian education; on the
other, he forced Christians out of their villages in the north as
part of the Arabization of Kirkuk and its environs. Many other
Christians opted to leave their villages in the north because of the
unsettled conflict between the Kurds and Saddam’s regime. Now
harassment by Islamists is forcing these transplants to return to the
villages of their ancestors in the north. In the words of one person
who plans to relocate: “Some of the Muslims consider us infidels. We
are being targeted. They will eat us alive.” [25] For Christians who
have left Iraq, Syria remains the preferred country for temporary
residence for two reasons: first, no visa is required and second, it
provides security at a low cost of living. [26] Jordan is another
country populated by a large number of Iraqi Christians.

Voting in the Elections
In a meeting with a Christian delegation, Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani denounced the attacks on the churches and called upon
Christians to participate in the elections to ensure maximum
participation. [27] Al-Sistani has also been quoted as saying that he
would have no objection for a Christian to be elected president of
Iraq if he met the appropriate qualifications. [28]

There were no fewer than eight Christian parties that competed in the
January 30 elections. The Christians were determined to vote because
they believed an elected government would provide them with a measure
of security they now lacked. They also counted on massive
participation of Iraqi Christians in the Diaspora to vote for their
parties. [29] The low rate of participation in the elections of
Iraqis in exile must have been disappointing to the Christians.

In the elections, one Christian party, the National Rafidain,
received approximately 37,000 votes, entitling it to one seat in the
275-seat assembly.

The low turnout of the Christian voters was involuntary. Many of the
Christians live in Sunni provinces, particularly in Ninevah and
Salahudin in the so-called Sunni triangle. Tens of thousands of
Christians who intended to vote discovered on election day that the
Independent Elections Committee did not provide ballot boxes in these
two provinces because of security concerns. Christians complained
that tens of thousands of their community were in essence
disenfranchised, particularly in the city of Mosul, for no fault of
their own. Many others may have sought the security of their homes
rather than risk violence while going out to vote. [30]

*Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli is Senior Analyst of MEMRI’s Middle East
Economic Studies Program.