Tax Service Reports Increased Tax Collection

Armenpress

TAX SERVICE REPORTS INCREASED TAX COLLECTION

YEREVAN, APRIL 12, ARMENPRESS: The chief of Armenian taxation service,
Felix Tsolakian, reported today to president Kocharian that the service
collected 35 billion drams in tax revenues in the first quarter of the year,
1 billion more than projected. The figure is also by 6.4 billion higher than
was collected in the first quarter of 2004.
He also said 12.9 billion drams were collected in mandatory social
payments in the same time span. This figure is 3.4 billion drams more than
collected in the first quarter of 2004.
President Kocharian was quoted by his press office as saying that the
service should pay greater attention to collection of mandatory social
payments. Kocharian said the service should develop legislative changes to
further improve this practice, based on in-depth analyses of international
practice.

100s of Texas Armenians expected to gather at Texas State Capitol

Texas Joint Committee for the 90th Anniversary of the Armenian Genocide

PRESS RELEASE
Texas Armenian Committee
March 25, 2005
Contact: [email protected]

90TH ANNIVERSARY OF ARMENIAN GENOCIDE TO BE COMMEMORATED ON APRIL 23,
2005, 1 P.M. ON THE STEPS OF STATE CAPITOL, AUSTIN, TEXAS

Armenian-Americans of Texas from Dallas, Houston, College Station, San
Antonio, El Paso and Austin will gather on this day of remembrance to
bring their story to light in speeches, prayers, music and poetry, pay
homage to their dead, and declare their fellowship with genocide
survivors of all ethnicities and races. An exhibition will be on
display at South Gallery of Texas State Capitol (April 23 – 26). The
event will be part of a unified international effort on this weekend
led by the descendants of Armenians who were scattered across the
world (see ).

The Armenians are among the world’s oldest civilizations with at least
a 3000 year history. In 301 A.D., they became the first nation to
adopt Christianity as their state religion. With the Turkish invasion
in 1375, Armenians became an occupied people for almost six centuries.
The Turkish Ottoman Empire was based on twin myths – racial purity and
military superiority. In the late 19th century, as Armenians were
striving for reform and freedom from religious persecution, they were
targeted by the Ottoman government for extermination of their entire
race (A&E, Time Machine, The Hidden Holocaust, 5/28/93). Michael
Arlen in his Passage to Ararat referred to the Genocide as “the
beginning of a bloody river linking the great murderous events of our
century.” On April 24, 1915, in Constantinople (modern Istanbul,
Turkey), 250 Armenian cultural leaders were rounded up, late in the
night after their Easter celebration, sent to prison and summarily
executed.

Thus began the Armenian Genocide, a government-sponsored, premeditated
and orchestrated race murder that would annihilate over 1.5 million
Armenians by 1923. There were an estimated two million Armenians
living in the Ottoman Empire at that time. Hundreds of thousands were
butchered outright. Many others died of starvation, exhaustion, and
epidemics on death marches and in concentration camps. Also during
this time and in the years following, innumerable monuments and
cultural treasures were methodically destroyed and place names were
changed, so that no one might imagine Armenians had ever lived in
Eastern Anatolia, which had been the heartland of the Armenian nation
even before the Biblical times.

To this day, the Turkish government denies this Genocide ever took
place. Furthermore, it has been conducting a cover-up since 1915 with
an image-cleansing campaign to erase and obfuscate the facts. The
evidence, however, remains irrefutable. It includes official Ottoman
records, reports of foreign ambassadors at the time in Turkey, The Red
Cross, thousands of eyewitness accounts including American and German
missionaries, medical doctors, photographs of the concentration camps
and film footage of the death marches into the Syrian desert where
thousands of human skeletons still exist. On March 7, 2000, a petition
was signed by 126 of the world’s preeminent genocide scholars,
including Nobel Laureate for Peace Elie Wiesel, calling on the Turkish
government to recognize the incontestable fact of the Armenian
Genocide. Many countries around the world, including France, Canada,
Russia, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Argentina, Greece, Slovakia,
Lebanon, Belgium, and thirty-seven of the United States have
recognized these events as a Genocide by legislation or
proclamation. Texas recognition is still pending.

`Far more people were murdered by governments in the 20th century than
died in all the century’s wars combined’ (`Murder By The State’, The
Atlantic Monthly, November 2003). On April 23rd, the public is invited
to unite with the Armenian-Americans of Texas against all governments
that have perpetrated genocide upon their own citizens including
Hitler’s Germany, Pol Pot’s Cambodia, Kosovo, Rwanda, Sudan and all
others.

For more information see:

http://www.genocideevents.com/
www.armenian-genocide.org
www.theforgotten.org
www.zoryan.org

Russian military spending in CIS not adequately recouped politically

Russian military spending in CIS not adequately recouped politically – paper

Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Moscow
11 Apr 05

Russia is attempting to consolidate its positions in Tajikistan in
earnest and for the long term, a Russian paper has said. The newspaper
recalled the Russian armed forces’ involvement in recent CIS military
training exercises in Tajikistan, saying Russia appeared “the most
imposing”. Russian Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov, who attended the
Rubezh-2005 exercises, said that R250 million would be allocated for
the development of the Russian military base in the republic in 2005,
and in the next two or three years the funding of activities in the
development of the military infrastructure in the republic will amount
to R1.124bn. However, it is unclear whether Russia’s “military
assertiveness” can secure a foreign policy in this republic, the paper
said. The following is the text of Vladimir Mukhin report entitled
“Collective Security Treaty Organization Arithmetic: Military Spending
Far Exceeds the Political Dividends” published by Russian newspaper
Nezavisimaya Gazeta on 11 April:

Last week Russia’s armed forces conducted a series of military
manoeuvres in a number of key regions of the CIS. A command-staff
training exercise of the Commonwealth’s Joint Air-Defence System,
which is formally composed of 10 states: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Ukraine, was held on
5 April. Turkmenistan and Georgia did not take part in the
command-staff training exercise. Two other countries – Ukraine and
Uzbekistan – operated at the manoeuvres with Russia on a bilateral
basis. The joint drill was thus only for the six countries
constituting the Collective Security Treaty Organization
(ODKB). Combat aircraft of the coalition made more than 60 flights
over the territory of the ODKB countries. The active phase of the
Rubezh-2005 international manoeuvres, which were attended in person by
RF Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov and ODKB General Secretary Nikolay
Bordyuzha and also other influential military commanders and
government officials from collective military-political arms of the
CIS, took place in Central Asia simultaneously.

The scale of the activities is noticeable. The concept of the
command-staff exercise and the Rubezh-2005 exercises was linked in
terms of time, purposes, and objectives here, evidently. The training
sorties of planes from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Russia were
connected with the operations of the Collective Rapid-Deployment
Forces, which were training at the Lyaur and Eshak-Maydon proving
grounds in Tajikistan. Approximately 1,000 servicemen and 300 pieces
of military equipment were engaged in the Rubezh-2005 exercises
altogether. Taking part in the exercises were an assault-landing
company and a flight of fighter-bomber aviation from Kazakhstan; a
group of a special subunit and two Mi-8 helicopters from Kyrgyzstan; a
special detachment, the 303d Separate Helicopter Squadron, the 670th
Aviation Group, the 999th Air Base, two Il-76 planes, and the 201st
Division from Russia; an assault-landing subunit with reinforcement
and support assets from Tajikistan.

One is struck immediately by the fact that Russia appeared the most
imposing at the exercises in Tajikistan. And this was no accident,
evidently. The role of Russia’s 201st Motorized-Rifle Division, which
will be transformed into the 4th Military Base, will grow in
connection with the transfer of protection of the border with
Afghanistan to the Tajikistanis. Moscow intends to substantially
consolidate its positions in this country in the very near future. RF
Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov, who attended the Rubezh-2005 exercises
in Tajikistan, said that R250m would be allocated for the development
of the 4th Russian Military Base in Tajikistan in 2005. And in the
next two or three years the funding of activities in the development
of the military infrastructure in the republic will amount to
R1.124bn. We would note that this is a very large amount of money,
comparable to the military budget of Tajikistan, which spends on
defence annually about R1.2bn, which constitutes 1.7 per cent of this
country’s GDP.

Aside from the development of the ground infrastructure, agreement has
been reached between Moscow and Dushanbe on the installation of an air
base in the Ayni locality (30 kilometres from Dushanbe). An instrument
transferring to the Russian side the Okno opto-electronic complex
located in Nurek was signed during Defence Minister Sergey Ivanov’s
visit to Tajikistan. It is obvious that Russia is attempting to
consolidate its positions in Tajikistan in earnest and for the long
term. But it is unclear as yet whether Russia’s military assertiveness
can secure a foreign policy in this republic that is just as assertive
and in keeping with the criteria of security.

“In order to reduce costs, Moscow is leaving the Tajik-Afghan border
and at the same time investing substantial funds in the development of
its military base in Tajikistan. This is somehow not all that
logical. The military can hardly form a secure barrier against drug
trafficking. And this is currently the principal threat to Russia and
the CIS,” military expert Vladimir Popov, member of the Academy of
Military Sciences, told Nezavisimaya Gazeta.

The expert believes that the military policy of the Russian Federation
in relation to the post-Soviet states that are ODKB allies is to a
certain extent understandable. Moscow is investing money in the
development of the military infrastructure not only in
Tajikistan. More than R100m are being allocated annually for the
functioning of the Russian base in Kant in Kyrgyzstan. Almost R1bn
were spent on the development of the military infrastructure of the
102d Military Base in Armenia. Sizable funds have been allocated for
joint defence in the union budget of Russia and Belarus. Of course,
Moscow understands that it may secure its interests on the post-Soviet
territory thanks to substantial material outlays. But are military
outlays always recovered in political dividends and do they carry
Russia’s plans into effect?

The collapse of the Akayev regime, the “colour revolutions” in Georgia
and Ukraine, and the Moldavian “brush-off” have considerably
undermined Russia’s capacity for influencing the situation in a number
of regions on the territory of the CIS. Kiev intends at this time to
reconsider certain results of the treaty on the lease of Sevastopol,
and a noise is being raised once again about the Russo-Ukrainian
border in the Azov-Kerch Strait. Moldavian President Vladimir Voronin
calls Russia’s peacekeepers occupiers, and the Georgian parliament is
demanding the immediate withdrawal of the RF military bases from the
country.

And the latest instance. In the course of the CIS Joint Air Defence
command-staff training exercise the plan of the exercises was adjusted
by Georgia, which did not let a Russian reconnaissance plane through
to the territory of Armenia. Although, according to the comments of
Vladimir Mikhaylov, RF Air Force commander in chief, this did not
prevent the accomplishment of all the assignments set the air-defence
forces and assets of Armenia and Russia in the Transcaucasus, it still
leaves an unpleasant aftertaste with the military, evidently.

Russia’s military assertiveness on the post-Soviet territory, which
has increased as of late, should be consonant with its foreign policy
aims. This is axiomatic for the state. It will sooner or later have to
be grasped by the country’s present leaders. Russia is gaining muscle,
seemingly, but for some reason or other some countries do not respect
it, all the same.

‘American Audacity’: At Levine School, Music to Walk By

‘American Audacity’: At Levine School, Music to Walk By

The Washington Post
Monday, April 11, 2005; Page C03

By Grace Jean

With faculty members as the performers, the Levine School of Music’s
aptly named “American Audacity” program Friday was an intriguing concert
featuring composers who use everything from recorded sounds to audience
members in their works.

Playing in tandem with computer-generated CDs posed no problems for
pianist Laurie Hudicek in Frances Thompson McKay’s haunting “Creek Bells
Frozen in Mourning.” She blended her crystalline tones with the recorded
watery sounds as fluidly as Leon Khoja-Eynatyan created myriad sounds on
vibraphone, timpani, gong and drums in William Kraft’s “Soliloquy.” The
percussionist startled listeners at times during the piece, but his
violent crescendos upon a snare drum in Pauline Oliveros’s “Single
Stroke Roll Meditation” were most provoking of all.

Audience members in Lang Recital Hall bravely produced a five-minute
performance of Oliveros’s “Tuning Meditation,” which required one to hum
while strolling around the room. Such an experience prompted more
listeners to accept composer John Supko’s invitation to walk around
during his “Without Stopping” for electric guitars, oboe, percussion,
keyboards and tape. Distinctive timbres emerged from the melee at times,
but only by standing near a performer could one prolong a particular
instrument’s prominence during the performance.

Kenneth Stilwell gave Antal Dorati’s Five Pieces for Oboe a charming
read, and set a meditative tone in his own composition “At the Altar of
the Stars,” with pianist Hudicek.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A42726-2005Apr10.html

Turkish Volunteers in Chechnya

Turkish Volunteers in Chechnya

In-Depth Analysis of the War on Terror

TERRORISM MONITOR
The Jamestown Foundation
7 April 2005
Volume III, Issue 7

By Brian Glyn Williams, with Feyza Altindag

For several years Kremlin spokespersons have identified Turkey as the
primary source of foreign jihadi volunteers (always referred to as
naemniky, “mercenaries” in official proclamations) fighting alongside
their Chechen adversaries. One spokesman claimed “We keep killing armed
Turkish citizens on Chechen territory” and another described Turkey as
“a record breaker for producing foreign mercenaries killed in Chechnya.”
[1] While skeptics might be tempted to dismiss such claims as mere
bluster in light of Turkey’s well known secular tendencies, the evidence
is mounting that Turkish volunteer fighters make up a sizeable component
of the foreign element fighting alongside the indigenous Chechen
insurgents in Russia.

While it is widely recognized that the 100-200 foreign jihadis fighting
alongside the approximately 1,200 Chechen insurgents are led by Arab
emirs (commanders) such as the slain Amir Khattab (a Saudi whose mother
was Turkish according to jihadist websites), Abu Walid (Saudi killed
April 2004), and Abu Hafs al Urdani (aka “Amjet” a Jordanian), the
Russian government has consistently maintained that Turks play a
prominent role among the foreign “terrorists” in Chechnya. [2]

To support their claims, Russian security services have produced Turkish
passports found on the bodies of several slain fighters and have given
the names and personal details of Turkish jihadis killed in Chechnya.
Among others, Russian spokespersons referenced one Ziya Pece, a Turk who
was found dead with a grenade launcher following a fire fight with
Federal forces. Russian officials have also provided detailed
information on 24 Turkish fighters killed between 1999 and 2004, and
Russian soldiers in Chechnya have spoken of engaging a unit of 40
skilled Turkish fighters. [3] If this were not compelling enough
evidence, Russian security forces have also produced a living Turkish
jihadi named Ali Yaman who was captured in the Chechen village of Gekhi-Chu.

A Turkish Platoon in Chechnya

Surprisingly, this evidence is not refuted by Chechen or Turkish jihadi
sources and on the contrary has been corroborated on such forums as the
kavkaz.org website produced by Arab and Chechen extremists linked to the
field commander Shamil Basayev. The following excerpt from a kavkaz
interview with a Turkish jihadi commander in Chechnya is illuminating
and suggests the existence of a Turkish jamaat known as the “Ottoman
platoon” in the Arab-dominated International Islamic Brigade (it also
corroborates the above Russian claim that Federal forces have killed 24
Turks in Chechnya):

“Interview with the Chief of the Turkish Jamaat ‘Osmanly’ (Ottoman)
fighting in Chechnya against the troops of Russian invaders, Amir
(Commander) Muhtar, by the Kavkaz Center news agency:

(Interviewer) Are there many Turks in Chechnya today? Some mass media
were reporting that there are about 20 of you guys.

(Amir Muhtar) Out of the first Jamaat that was fighting in 1995-1996
seven mujahideen have remained. Back then there were 13 of us. They are
actually the core of the Turkish jamaat in Chechnya today. Twenty-four
Turks have already died in this war. Among them was Zachariah,
Muhammed-Fatih, Halil…Three mujahideen became shaheeds (martyrs)
during the battle with commandos from Pskov in the vicinity of
Ulus-Kert. Some died before that in the battles in Jokhar (Grozny). Five
were wounded.” [4]

In February 2004 a Turkish jihadi website devoted to Chechnya also
announced the martyrdom (shehid olmak) of three Turkish mujahideen in
just two weeks. [5] Another site that has been removed left the
following account of the combat that led to the martyrdom of three
Turkish jihadi fighters:

“Last night we had news from verifiable sources that a group of Turkish
mujahideen came across Russian soldiers north of Vedeno in a small
village. After stumbling on them a fire fight ensued and one Algerian
and three Turkish brothers died. The Algerian’s name is Hassam and the
Turkish brothers’ names are Ebu Derda, Huzeyfe and Zennun. These
brothers fought in Commander Ramazan’s unit in the Dagestan conflict.” [6]

For several years now Turkish jihadi websites have actually been posting
the martyrdom epitaphs of Turkish fighters who died in the Chechen
cihad. Much of the jihadist rhetoric found on these Islamist sites will
be familiar to those who follow the martyrdom obituaries of foreign
jihadis who have died fighting in Kashmir, Iraq, Afghanistan and other
conflict zones. The following account, for example, describes the fate
of a Turkish fighter who followed the well worn path of roaming Turkish
jihadis in the Balkans before being killed:

“Shaheed Bilal Al-Qaiseri (Uthman Karkush). 23 years old from Qaiseri,
Turkey. Martyred during the Withdrawal from Grozny, February 2000:

Bilal fought for six months in Bosnia during 1995 from where he
unsuccessfully attempted to travel to Chechnya. He went to fight for the
Jihad in Kosova but returned after a month when the fighting ceased. He
came to Chechnya in August 1999 where he participated in the Dagestan
Operations in Botlikh. After the Mujahideen withdrew, he was planning to
return to Turkey when Russia invaded Chechnya. He participated in the
fighting in Argun and, subsequently, Grozny. Before and throughout
Ramadan he cooked for the Mujahideen in his group. During the fighting
he was distinguished for his bravery. After seeing a dream in which he
was married, he decided to marry a Chechen, but Shahaadah (martyrdom)
was destined for him instead. He was severely injured during the
withdrawal from Grozny in the village of Katyr Yurt where his room
received a direct hit from Russian Grad Artillery. He was later martyred
from his injuries in the village of Shami Yurt.”

Ethnicity and Turkish jihad in Chechnya

The following epitah, which describes a Turkish martyr “with some
Chechen ancestry” speaks of a deeper and less obvious current in the
Turkish jihadi movement that delineates Turkish volunteer fighters from
the majority of trans-national Arab jihadis fighting in Chechnya:

“Shamil (Afooq Qainar). 25 years old from Istanbul, Turkey.

Martyred in Grozny, November 1999:

With some Chechen ancestory, he deeply loved Chechnya and was more often
alongside Chechens than Turks. He had also participated in the Chechen
Jihad of 1996-99. With his good manners, polite demeanor and modesty, he
got along well with everyone. He also took part in the Dagestan Jihad in
the Novalak Region where, notably, his group fought their way out of a
Russian siege at a cost of 25 Shaheed (martyrs). He was martyred in the
second month of this War (November 1999) in Grozny.” [7]

While it might be overlooked, the fact that the slain Shamil is, like
many of his compatriots, of Chechen extraction, is of tremendous
importance. It would seem that many Turks who volunteer to fight on the
behalf of the Chechens do so because they have ethnic origins in the
Caucasus region or identify with the Chechens as irkdashlar (kin).

In the 19th century, Tsarist Russia instigated a brutal policy of ethnic
cleansing that saw tens of thousands of indigenous Caucasian highlanders
expelled to Anatolia. While public expressions of Laz, Circassian,
Kosovar, Bosniak, Tatar and Chechen ethnic identity were subsequently
discouraged in officially homogenous Republican Turkey, folk traditions
such as the famous Caucasian highlander sword dances, Albanian borek
(pastry), Crimean Tatar destans (legends), and ritualized commemoration
of past victimization at the hands of Russians, Serbs, Bulgarians and
others continued.

It was only with the liberalization of Turkey under President Turgut
Ozal in the early 1990s that these historical sub-ethnic grievances
could be expressed in the public sphere. As this unprecedented
celebration of ethnicity and commemoration of past repression took place
in a liberalizing Turkey, Turks were confronted with horrifying images
from the Balkans and Caucasus. Stories of rape camps in Bosnia, mass
graves in Kosovo, and televised images of columns of pitiful Chechen
refugees in Russia struck many Turks as a replay of the apocalyptic
destruction of millions of Balkan-Caucasian-Ukrainian Muslims by
Orthodox Christians in the 19th century.

As a result, informants interviewed by the author in Turkey in the
summer of 2004 claimed that many young men from villages in Eastern
Turkey inhabited by people of Caucasian origin were told by their family
patriarchs to go and fight for their honor, faith, and ancestral
homeland in Chechnya. Moreover, with the advent of the internet in
Turkey, gruesome images of horribly mutilated Chechen women and
children, mass burials and vandalized mosques appeared on Islamist and
secular-nationalist websites alike and enraged many traditionalists in
the country. In this climate, both nationalists and religious extremists
exploited many Turks’ sense of ethnic or religious solidarity with their
Chechen “brothers and sisters” and invoked strong feelings of namus (a
traditional sense of machismo, pride and honor among Turks that comes
from the defense of faith, family, motherland, and honor of one’s women).

Like the Turks who continue to fight and die in Chechnya, the websites
that glorify the defense of the Chechens run the gamut from the
anti-American/Zionist rhetoric of the Islamists to the nationalist
irredentism of the Pan-Turkists. But the latter predominate. [8] The
pro-Chechen websites with an ethnic dimension tend to feature images of
Turks wearing traditional Caucasian folk costumes and 19th century
anti-Russian heroes. Others with a slightly more nationalist bent (such
as ) blend images of Ataturk and Alparslan
Turkes (the founder of the Turkish Boz Kurt-Grey Wolves extreme
nationalist party) with images from Chechnya. As these sites make clear,
many Turks who fight in Chechnya are engaging in the same sort of
volunteerism that led Albanian Americans to go fight in Kosovo in 1999
under the auspices of Homeland Calling and other widely recognized
diasporic organizations.

This ethnic diaspora narrative might also explain some of the Arab
jihadi participation in Chechnya. Many Chechen refugees settled in
Ottoman Jordan following their expulsion from Russia in the 19th
century. Jordanian Arabs of Chechen extraction, such as the influential
Sheikh Muhammad Fatih, have played an important role in the Chechen
jihad as warriors, preachers, and fund raisers.

Notwithstanding the involvement of Turks in the Chechen conflict, it
would be erroneous to interpret this as proof that secular Turkey faces
a serious Islamist problem. Turkish jihadis who have fought in Chechnya
have found the Wahhabi Puritanism of their Arab jihadi comrades-in-arms
unsettling, and many secular Turks partake in “jihad tours” simply to
gain prestige at home in their tight knit families or neighborhoods. In
addition, the vast majority of Turks interviewed tended to view Chechens
as “terrorists” who reminded them of the hated Kurdish PKK/Kadek militants.

Finally, the involvement of two Turkish extremists (Azad Ekinci and
Habib Akdas) who had a history of jihadi activity in Chechnya in the
bloody al-Qaeda bombings in Istanbul in November 2003 further undermined
the Chechen cause in the country. [9] Indeed for all the romantic
notions, some Turks have of volunteering to fight on behalf of the
Chechens, the carnage wreaked on innocent Turks by El Kaide Turka
(Turkish al-Qaeda) clearly demonstrates that jihadism has a potentially
unpredictable effect on those who are attracted to it.

Dr. Brian Glyn Williams is assistant professor of Islamic History at the
University of Massachusetts-Dartmouth.

Notes:

1. “Turkish fighter killed in Chechnya.” Aljazeera.net
;

“Most Foreign Mercenaries Killed in Chechnya are Turks.” RIA Novosti.
January 13, 2005.

2. ” FSB Raskryla Set’ Virtaual’nikh Arabskikh Terroristov.” Novosti.
Lenta.ru. Feb. 02, 2005.

3. Pravda.Ru 11/05/2004.

4. Hasan Israilov, exclusively for Kavkaz-Center 2003.

5. The Turkish Jihad in Chechnya website which posts the photographs of
‘martyrs’ in Chechnya:

6. This site also described the death of a Turkish emir (commander) who
was killed by a land mine and the death of several Turks and a Jordanian
in a shoot out with Russian soldiers.

7. Martyrdom obituary found at:

8. For the nationalist perspective on Chechnya see: cecenonline.com/ana.

9. Mehmet Farac. El Kaide Turka. Ikiz Kuleler’den Galata’ya. Istanbul,
Gunizi Yayincilik. 2004.

http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/571DBFAB-CF71-4F5E-8498-C975A0FA8810.htm
http://www.kavkazcenter.com/eng/article.php?id=906.
http://www.cecenya.net.tr.tc/.
http://www.cihad.net/cecenistan/.
http://www.islamicaweb.com/archive/showthread/t-16293.
www.kafka.4t.com/photos.html

Le genocide armenien; Notre avis

L’HumanitĂ©, France
13 avril 2005

Le génocide arménien; Notre avis

Arte, 20 h 40.
Le 24 avril sera la date de commémoration du quatre-vingt-dixième
anniversaire du gĂ©nocide armĂ©nien. Avec l’accusation de « crimes
contre l’humanitĂ© » toujours pas reconnue par l’État- turc, est en
dĂ©bat l’entrĂ©e de la Turquie dans l’Europe. C’est le 24 avril 1915,
dans la nuit, que des rafles de personnalités arméniennes à Cons-
tantinople ont marquĂ© le coup d’envoi d’un massacre qui aura fait
entre un million et un million et demi de morts. Dans son
documentaire, Laurence Jourdan remonte Ă  la source du conflit qui a
engendrĂ© l’extermination massive d’ArmĂ©niens. Elle analyse
le contexte géopolitique et montre comment les nationalistes
Jeunes-Turcs du pouvoir ottoman ont, peu à peu, monté en puissance
jusqu’Ă  la dĂ©portation et la mort des ArmĂ©niens pendant la Seconde
Guerre mondiale. Des survivants racontent. Avec des lettres, de
rapports de diplomates occidentaux en poste dans l’empire, des
témoignages, Laurence Jourdan signe un film indispensable pour
comprendre ce génocide.

Fernand Nouvet

Profanation a Marseille d’une style commemorative du genocide arm.

Agence France Presse
11 avril 2005 lundi 9:49 PM GMT

Profanation Ă  Marseille d’une stèle commĂ©morative du gĂ©nocide armĂ©nien

MARSEILLE 11 avr 2005

Une stèle à la mémoire des victimes du génocide arménien a été
profanée à Marseille, a-t-on appris lundi soir auprès des
représentants de la communauté arménienne et de la police.

L’inscription “PD”, taguĂ©e en noir, a Ă©tĂ© dĂ©couverte lundi après-midi
sur cette stèle de pierre blanche installée sur la voie publique dans
un quartier est de la ville.

Cette “khatchkar” (pierre tombale en armĂ©nien) est fleurie chaque
année au 15 avril, en réference au 24 avril 1915 qui marque
symboliquement le début du génocide arménien.

“A quelques jours de la commĂ©moration du 90e anniversaire du
gĂ©nocide, cet acte est très symbolique et ne peut passer inaperçu”, a
dĂ©clarĂ© Ă  l’AFP Vartan Arzoumanian, prĂ©sident du ComitĂ© de dĂ©fense de
la cause arménienne Marseille Provence (CDCA). Le président de cette
organisation qui milite notamment pour la reconnaissance du génocide
armĂ©nien par la Turquie s’est dit “indignĂ©”.

La communauté arménienne de la région marseillaise est la seconde de
France, après Paris, avec environ 80.000 personnes.

Les massacres et les dĂ©portations d’ArmĂ©niens, de 1915 Ă  1917, ont
fait entre 1,2 et 1,3 million de morts selon les Arméniens.

Turquie: Des intellectuels s’inquietent d’une monte du nationalisme

Agence France Presse
11 avril 2005 lundi 8:36 AM GMT

Turquie: Des intellectuels s’inquiètent d’une montĂ© du nationalisme

ANKARA

Quelque 200 personnalités turques, dans une lettre ouverte rendue
publique lundi, s’inquiĂ©tent d’une montĂ©e du nationalisme en Turquie
qui, selon elles, pourrait engendrer une recrudescence des tensions
entre turcs et kurdes.

“Nous constatons que l’on tente d’entraver par de rĂ©cents Ă©vĂ©nements
le processus de paix et de démocratisation dans notre pays. Nous
craignons un retour Ă  la violence et Ă  une atmosphère de combat”, ont
affirmé les signataires du texte.

Celui-ci signé par des ONG, académiciens, écrivains, journalistes,
artistes et musiciens, fait référence à une tentative de lynchage la
semaine dernière par une foule survoltée de 2.000 personnes à Trabzon
(nord-est) de cinq militants qui distribuaient des tracts dans un
marché en faveur des droits des détenus.

Les jeunes gens, pris par les commerçants et les passants pour des
activistes kurdes après des rumeurs selon lesquelles ils auraient
brûlé un drapeau turc, ont été sauvés in extremis par une
intervention de la police et Ă©crouĂ©s pour atteinte Ă  l’ordre public.

Un outrage par des adolescents kurdes Ă  l’emblème national lors des
célébrations du nouvel an kurde le 21 mars à Mersin (sud) a provoqué
une fièvre nationaliste à travers la Turquie.

“Les rĂ©actions Ă  cet incident perpĂ©trĂ© par un groupe d’enfants ont
dĂ©rapĂ©, avec le soutien des Ă©tablissements de l’Etat, vers le racisme
et le nationalisme”, regrettent les intellectuels, qui Ă©voquent une
“hystĂ©rie de masse engendrĂ©e par le nationalisme kurde et turc”.

Les intellectuels demandent par ailleurs le limogeage immĂ©diat d’un
sous-préfet qui avait ordonné la saisie dans sa localité de Sutculer
(sud-ouest) des romans de l’Ă©crivan turc Orhan Pamuk, dĂ©frayant la
chronique dans un pays qui aspire Ă  intĂ©grer l’Union europĂ©enne.

“Cette procĂ©dure rappelle la pĂ©riode nazie”, prĂ©cise le texte.

Dans un excès de zèle, le responsable, contrarié par des déclarations
de l’Ă©crivain en faveur des ArmĂ©niens, avait publiĂ© une circulaire
avant que celle-ci soit annulée par son supérieur.

Pour respecter les normes européennes de démocratie, la Turquie a
octroyé des droits culturels à la communauté kurde, estimé à quelque
10 millions de personnes.

Le respect des droits de l’Homme en Turquie est un enjeu majeur alors
que l’Union europĂ©enne a dĂ©cidĂ© le 17 dĂ©cembre d’ouvrir dès octobre
2005 des nĂ©gociations d’adhĂ©sion avec Ankara.

The Case Was Heard

A1plus

| 21:35:46 | 11-04-2005 | Social |

THE CASE WAS HEARD

Today in the RA Economical Court the case about the National Academy of
Science against `Meltex’ Co. Ltd was heard. The Academy demands to fire
`Meltex’ Co. Ltd TV Company `A1+’ who by the way has the building according
to a contract and meets all the commitments anticipated by the contract.

The case lasted for a few seconds only. Judge Matevosyan refused to accept
the objections of the `Meltex’ Co. Ltd advocate. The Judge immediately
announce the verdict – to fire `A1+’ from the area. `Meltex’ Co. Ltd intends
to appeal the decision of the court in the Court of Appeal.

Galoust Sahakyan Sees No Necessity To Change The Constitution

A1plus

| 21:11:00 | 11-04-2005 | Politics |

GALOUST SAHAKYAN SEES NO NECESSITY TO CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION

Today Arthur Baghdasaryan announced that no political agreement has been
reached to discuss the Constitutional amendments, that’s why the issue will
not be discussed in this 4-day session. Another question is what will be
discussed if the discussion of the Constitutional amendments and the
Electoral Code is postponed.

A different question is how they will manage to carry out Constitutional
discussions, even formally, and when they will manage to reach political
agreement.

By the way, as for dates, it is clear that the commitments taken upon before
EU will not be met. Let us remind you that according to them to
Constitutional Amendments referendum was to be organized before June 2005.
Orinats Yerkir deputy head Hovhannes Margaryan does not doubt that they will
manage to meet the commitments. And according to Galoust Sahakyan, `it is
even positive that the discussion of the matter is postponed, as all the
political powers will treat the problem more responsibility’.

Let us note that Galoust Sahakyan does not consider the meeting of the
commitments obligatory, `We must not inspire people that commitment taken
upon is like a stigma. If we want to carry out structural changes, the
society must accept them. Otherwise, I think our Constitution can remain as
it is. The years have shown that we have a good Constitution’.

And still, Mr. Sahakyan considers that if we have chosen the path of
democracy, we must accept the offered changes. And although national
traditions of constitutional amendments have not been formed, according to
Sahakyan, he does not worry about dates.