Armenian expert backs “normalization” of ties with Turkey
Mediamax news agency
11 Aug 05
YEREVAN
Consistent normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations meets the
interests of the Armenian people, the head of the analytical centre
for globalization and regional cooperation, Stepan Grigoryan, said in
Yerevan today.
Addressing a seminar in Yerevan, Grigoryan said that the establishment
of diplomatic relations between Armenia and Turkey without conditions
and the lifting of the border blockade by the Turkish authorities
would contribute to Armenia’s increased role in the region.
He said that the balance of forces in the South Caucasus would change
if the events were to develop this way and there would be no longer
need for the Russian military presence in Armenia.
Although the Turkish side has still been putting forward some
conditions, certain positive impulses towards the normalization of
relations with Armenia can be seen, Grigoryan said. The talks on
Turkey’s membership of the European Union due in early October could
play a decisive role in the process, he said.

ARMENTEL COMPANY RECEIVES NOTIFICATION FROM RA REGULATORY COMMISSION
YEREVAN, August 11. /ARKA/. The ArmenTel telecommunication company
received a notification from the RA Regulatory Commission, Executive
Director of the company Vasilios Fetsis told journalists. He said that
the company has the right to examine in details the accusations
brought against the ArmenTel, and it is more likely the lawyers of the
company will ask the Commission to give them time to examine the
case. He expressed hope that the Commission will agree with it. At the
same time, Fetsis pointed out that the company is ready to stand upon
its rights and to pay a penalty if ArmenTel’s guilt is proved. The RA
Regulatory Commission intends to hold a meeting to discuss the quality
of the mobile communication provided by ArmenTel on August 12,
2005. The Press-Secretary of the RA Regulatory Commission said to the
ARKA News Agency that the penalty is expected to be in the amount of
1% of the company’s last year turnover. A.A. -0–

CULTURAL DAYS OF GERMAN SAXONIA-ANHALT TERRITORY TO BE ORGANIZED IN
ARMENIA
YEREVAN, AUGUST 11, ARMENPRESS: Cultural Days of the German
Saxonia-Anhalt Territory will be organized in Armenia September 3-7
within the frameworks of which the Minister of Culture of the
Territory Yan Heinrich Olberz will arrive in Armenia with an official
delegation, the Armenian Culture and Youth Affairs Ministry press
service said.
The events will kick off in Yerevan Chamber Music House with the
concert of the German trio. Within the frameworks of the Cultural Days
German romance evenings and a week of German movies will be organized
in Yerevan Moscva cinema. Besides, Magdenburg puppet show will give
performance in puppet show after H. Tumanian.
The members of the German delegation will meet with the Armenian
Culture and Youth Affairs Minister Hovik Hoveyan and members of the
Armenian company of Armenian-German cultural ties. At the end of the
events the sides are expected to sign an agreement on cooperation in
cultural, scientific and education sphere.

Wednesday, August 10, 2005 — Volume 2, Issue 156
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Talks on Abkhaz railroad falter over refugee issue
*Georgian opposition to field single candidate in by-elections
*Astana sees border demarcation as security and ethnic problem
*Yushchenko backers shown to be younger, regionally concentrated
————————————————————————
ABKHAZ DERAIL RAILROAD TALKS
Abkhaz leaders have derailed the tripartite talks on rehabilitating
the railroad between Russia and Georgia in Abkhazia that were
scheduled to begin in Sukhumi on August 9. The group of nine Georgian
railroad experts had to return to Tbilisi after the Abkhaz authorities
unexpectedly refused entry to two members of the group, on the grounds
that they are internally displaced persons who fled Abkhazia during
the 1992-93 war (Interfax, Apsynpress, Imedi TV, August 9).
Sukhumi’s peculiar argument seems intended to break the linkage
between the restoration of the railroad and the safe return of
Georgian refugees to their homes, beginning with the Gali
district. That linkage has formed the basis of negotiations for
several years in several formats, including the tripartite “Sochi
process” conducted since 2003 among the Russian, Georgian, and Abkhaz
sides. Russia is keen to restore the railroad in order to obtain a
strategic link through Georgia with Armenia. The Abkhaz are just as
keen to be linked by rail with Russia, but are unwilling to accept a
mass return of refugees, and now apparently seek to de-couple the two
issues.
Although the railroad talks are formally tripartite, the Abkhaz
authorities hardly have experts of their own. They want the meeting to
proceed without Georgians if necessary and to start technical
inspection of the railroad with the Russian experts, who are in
Sukhumi already. The Sukhumi meeting and a detailed plan for
inspection had been approved at tripartite talks among expert groups
on July 19, and the intention was confirmed during a session of
Georgian and Abkhaz negotiators on August 4 at the UN Mission (UNOMIG)
office in Tbilisi, in the presence of ambassadors of the “Friends of
Georgia” group of countries.
The Tbilisi meeting was an unusually promising one, in that it was
free from polemics and the Abkhaz representatives matched the
Georgians’ civility. The Abkhaz side clearly appreciated Tbilisi’s
willingness to discuss an agreement on mutual assurances for
non-resumption of hostilities. Because this issue is now a part of the
agenda, the Abkhaz self-styled “deputy ministers” of defense and state
security obtained seats at the negotiating table opposite the Georgian
delegation, in the presence of great powers’ ambassadors.
The negotiators also discussed the restoration of the railroad, linked
to return of refugees; and they agreed in principle to conduct a
reliable count of Georgians refugees from Abkhazia, including those
who managed to return to the Gali district and those who wish to
return there. The Abkhaz delegation leader, “minister of foreign
affairs” Sergei Shamba, declared after the meeting, “There is hope and
we look into the future with optimism.” More emphatically, Georgia’s
State Minister for Conflict Settlement Giorgi Khaindrava remarked,
“The freeze is over, the climate is warming up ….We must
continue on the path of peace, understanding and mutual
forgiveness. It is us [Georgia] who must do this first.” He held out
the prospect of a bilateral meeting between Georgian President Mikheil
Saakashvili and Abkhaz leader Sergei Bagapsh, if the talks advance on
the interrelated issues discussed at that meeting (Rustavi-2 TV, Imedi
TV, Interfax, August 4, 5),
The improved atmospherics notwithstanding, a number of negative
signals followed. Shamba declared that any organized return of
refugees would exclude some categories of Georgians and is in any case
a distant prospect. While Georgia regards a reliable numerical count
as a step toward an early start of the organized return, Shamba’s
statements suggest an intent to use the count (and making up some
categories within that count) for stonewalling the refugees’
return. On the morrow of the Tbilisi meeting, Bagapsh challenged
Saakashvili to recognize Abkhazia’s secession from Georgia, as a
precondition to allowing Georgian refugees to return to Gali. This
position implicitly de-couples the issue of the refugees’ return from
that of reconstructing the railroad, which the Abkhaz now seem to want
to obtain without a quid-pro-quo (Interfax, Rustavi-2 TV, Imedi TV,
August 5).
Abkhaz “prime minister” Alexander Ankvab spent the first week of
August in Moscow, holding talks with Russian government officials and
private firms on investment projects in Abkhazia. Upon returning,
Ankvab listed the projects as rebuilding the highway from the Russian
border on the Psou River to Sukhumi by two Russian construction
companies, building a timber-processing mill, and organizing wholesale
export of Abkhaz fruit to Russia. No reference is made to Georgia as
lawful sovereign and owner of some of the assets under discussion, or
to the Russia-Georgia legal border on the Psou (Interfax, Apsynpress,
August 9).
The railroad talks and inspection may well proceed after the August 9
postponement, but Tbilisi will have to make certain that this process
remains politically linked to the issue of return of refugees, and is
not turned by the Abkhaz side into a mere technical operation divorced
from the negotiating process of resolving the conflict. Meanwhile,
Tbilisi made the right choice in seeking to engage the Abkhaz
directly, outside the formally structured negotiations, through the
informal bilateral contacts in which the chief Georgian negotiator,
Irakli Alasania, has clearly earned the Abkhaz side’s respect.
–Vladimir Socor
ANTI-SAAKASHVILI OPPOSITION STRIKES ELECTION DEAL
The month-long negotiations among Georgia’s opposition parties about
fielding common candidates in the forthcoming parliamentary
by-elections on October 1 have produced an agreement. On August 5,
leaders of the Conservative, Labor, Tavisupleba (Freedom), and the New
Right parties signed a memorandum about holding preliminary primaries
to reveal the strongest single candidate. Each party will name a
candidate for each race and the winner will represent the united
opposition in the Batumi, Kobuleti, Shuakhevi (Ajaria), Tkibuli
(western Georgia) and Isani (Tbilisi district) single-mandate
constituencies. On August 8, the four-party coalition created a
special election commission to manage the primaries.
New Right will have three candidates in the primaries, while the
Conservatives will field four. Tavisupleba, chaired by Constantine
Gamsakhurdia (son of Georgia’s late president Zviad Gamsakhurdia),
will have two nominees. Gamsakhurdia junior did not attend the signing
ceremony, and he sent an authorized representative to sign the
memorandum in his absence. The Labor Party has not registered any
candidates, which is surprising because Labor claims to have the
biggest constituency among the opposition parties. “This is a very
important moment, as this is the first instance of political parties
holding primaries in Georgia,” Koba Davitashvili, the leader of the
Conservative Party, declared at the signing ceremony. The Conservative
Party had proposed the idea of holding primaries.
The memorandum signatories said the primaries would demonstrate
“civilized cooperation between opponents” in response to “brazen steps
taken by the authorities.” “Today we are opening a completely new
page in Georgian politics. We are setting the precedent of winners
being decided through civilized cooperation,” said New Right leader
David Gamkrelidze.
The four parties, however, emphasized that the memorandum does not
mean the creation of an electoral bloc, and they made clear the
conditions of their cooperation, including solidarity in support of a
fair and democratic electoral process and the freedom for each to
“express different views on various issues.”
Although the four stated that the coalition “will remain open to the
Georgian public and political forces, so that this format continues to
expand in the future,” the opposition National-Democratic Party has
been excluded from membership because of its low
popularity. Davitashvili later explained that the coalition is open to
the political forces that made a strong showing in the latest
elections. “Our goal is not to make a collection of parties, but the
creation of a truly strong political union able to win elections,” he
added. The NDP expressed its regret over the coalition’s stance and
said that allowing more opposition parties into the primaries would
have helped in selecting the best candidates. The NDP is likely to run
in the by-elections independently. Meanwhile, the opposition public
movement “People’s Forum,” which opposed the idea of primaries,
nevertheless announced it is open to “constructive cooperation” with
the four-party coalition during the by-elections.
The moderately opposition Republican Party, a participant in the
preliminary negotiations about the coalition, quit the coalition
because it favored selecting the common candidates through opinion
polls, instead of primaries. On August 5, Republican Party leader
Davit Usupashvili told a news conference that his party would not
participate in the by-elections because of artificial obstacles
created by the Central Electoral Commission (CEC), which has rejected
the party’s registration. CEC chair Gia Kavtaradze, however, said the
only reason for the rejection was that the Republican Party had not
indicated in its application the exact authority assigned to the
party’s representative in the CEC. He accused the Republican Party of
not wanting to participate in the by-elections and inventing absurd
reasons to justify its decision. The withdrawal of the Republican
Party, which was able to install strong candidates in Ajaria and
Tbilisi, has significantly weakened the opposition’s position.
The authorities responded to the new opposition front calmly and even
ironically. “I do not think that they will create problems for our
candidates,” said Mikheil Machavariani, deputy chair of parliament, in
commenting on the opposition’s memorandum. He dismissed the
allegations by the opposition parties about financing pro-governmental
candidates’ campaigns through state funds. He said that it is actually
the opposition who is using donations of “suspicious origin.”
Meanwhile, some Georgian television stations showed Deputy Interior
Minister Bidzina Bregadze, the ruling National Movement’s would-be
candidate in the Isani district, meeting with the district’s
prospective voters.
Despite proclaimed intentions to democratize the elections, what
probably united the opposition parties was a common lack of electoral
resources. The coalition of four must now withstand the government’s
possible efforts to destroy the alliance through various backstage
schemes.
Taking into account the powerful “administrative resources” behind
government-supported candidates, the opposition can justly claim
considerable success if its common candidates win by-elections in just
two of the five constituencies.
(TV Rustavi-2, Civil Georgia, Caucasus Press, GHN, Prime News, August
5; Caucasus Press, August 8; Resonance, Akhali Taoba, August 6)
–Zaal Anjaparidze
KAZAKH FOREIGN MINISTRY REFUTES ARGUMENTS ABOUT TERRITORIAL
CONCESSIONS
Kazakhstan’s border delimitation process has always been an issue
shrouded in mystery, even for residents of the border areas. The
authorities have previously accused journalists in South Kazakhstan of
issuing inaccurate reports that damage relations with
Uzbekistan. Therefore, journalists hungry for first-hand information
were excited by an unexpected Foreign Ministry press conference on
July 23.
But Foreign Ministry spokesman Murat Atanov prefaced his comments on
the current state of border delimitation with pointed attacks on “some
policymakers” who, in his words, make groundless insinuations that the
government is selling out Kazakhstan’s national interests by making
territorial concessions to neighboring states. Expressing the Foreign
Ministry’s official line, Atanov added that authors of such
“irresponsible” statements capitalize on the difficulties of the
border talks to score political points. “We cannot have what does not
belong to us,” Atanov declared, alluding to 420-square kilometer patch
of land ceded to China after difficult bargaining (Panorama, July 29).
The Foreign Ministry spokesman had good reason to be irritated by
persistent allegations of concessions made to Russia, China, and
Uzbekistan at the border talks. The Azat Party of National Patriots
and other political forces have become fixated on this issue. Even
Serikbolsyn Abdildin, the leader of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan
and an advocate of integration with Russia, lamented the loss of the
Imashev gas fields in western Kazakhstan to Russia. In northern
Kostanay region, the border village of Ogneupornoye was handed over to
Russia in exchange for 520 hectares of arable land, based on the
rationale that nearly 80% of the residents held Russian passports. The
deal sparked protests from Kazakh nationalists, inflamed by
unconfirmed rumors of scuffles between Kazakhs repatriated from
Uzbekistan and local Russians in Kostanay region (Sayasat.kz, August
4).
The Foreign Ministry’s denial of territorial concessions to neighbor
countries amid a host of contradicting facts seems to be aimed at
domestic as well as international audiences. Astana hopes to ease the
interethnic tension between Slavs and the indigenous population,
particularly in the predominantly Russian-populated northern regions,
triggered by media reports of unequal bargaining. The northern border
regions are increasingly becoming the main area for resettling the
growing number of ethnic Kazakhs emigrating from Uzbekistan.
Furthermore, the elimination of border disputes will help strengthen
Kazakhstan’s ties to its partners in the CIS Collective Security
Treatment Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO). Bigaly Turarbekov, an advisor to the Kazkah
foreign minister, stressed the international significance of the
border settlement, which, as he put it, would “contribute to
confidence-building among SCO member states” (Panorama, July 29).
The pro-presidential political parties and nationalist movements
remain divided over the border issue. The leader of the Civic Party,
Azat Peruashev, thinks that the concessions of a few square kilometers
of land are not a great loss if Kazakhstan is to gain international
recognition of its borders (Novoye Pokolenie, July 29).
Despite this high-flown rhetoric, there are many hurdles and
uncertainties to overcome before the border settlement is
finalized. The demarcation of Kazakh-Uzbek border, according to
Atanov, is expected to take at least two years. The delimitation of
the border with Kyrgyzstan is vaguely postponed to the “nearest
future.” Slightly more than 650 frontier markers, (of a planned 1,500
stakes) have been erected along the border with Uzbekistan. But the
most difficult part of the work will undoubtedly be the evacuation of
some 370 Kazakh families left on Uzbek territory after border
delimitation. The government has allocated 1.5 billion tenge to
resettle them in Kazakhstan. The border demarcation occurs at a time
of heightening tension and mutual animosity between Astana and
Tashkent, but the Kazakh Foreign Ministry sees no political
ramifications from the frequent shootings on Kazakh-Uzbek border
(Ekspress-K, July 23).
Kazakhstan also has uneasy relations with Russian border
authorities. Russia takes measures to stem the flow of illegal
migrants and drug traffickers from Afghanistan and Central Asia, but
these efforts clash with its stated desire to leave the border with
Kazakhstan open in line with its policy of “integration” and in
defiance of internationally accepted norms of border control. Russia
has been pleased by the words of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, who
on many occasions has assured the Russian population of his country
that there would be no frontier poles along the Russian-Kazakh border
and that a simple delimitation procedure would be sufficient. “We have
nothing to quarrel over, that is an example of good-neighborly
relations,” according to Sergei Kopeiko of the Russian Embassy in
Astana (Liter, February 5). But everybody in Astana and Moscow
understands very well that a poorly guarded border will cause serious
security problems for both sides, and that maintaining security in
this situation is nothing more than an illusion of mutual trust.
Another potential point of contention between Kazakhstan and Russia is
the delimitation of the territorial waters of the Caspian Sea. Recent
efforts by Russian President Vladimir Putin to mobilize all littoral
Caspian states against terrorism may create an impression of military
and political integration, but in no way will it help settle the
looming territorial disputes in the Caspian region.
–Marat Yermukanov
NEW DATA CREATES DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF ORANGE REVOLUTIONARIES, VOTERS
Democratic Initiatives, a well-established, Kyiv-based sociological
think tank, has just published a new study, Politchnyi portret
(no. 32, 2005). Democratic Initiatives was one of four Ukrainian
sociological organizations involved in organizing exit polls during
the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election.
Politychnyi portret reveals that 18.4% of Ukraine’s population (about
5.5 million people) participated in the Orange Revolution. Of winner
Viktor Yushchenko’s voters, 34% participated, while only 9% of Viktor
Yanukovych voters took part in protest rallies. Yanukovych, even
though he had the backing of the more populous eastern Ukraine, failed
to organize a counter-Orange Revolution. As Politychnyi portret
(p. 59) concluded, Yushchenko voters were far “more energized.”
During the 2004 election, polls revealed that 33% of Yushchenko voters
and only 13% of Yanukovych voters were ready to participate in
sanctioned rallies. This Yushchenko edge was also evident in voter
participation in boycotts, strikes, and hunger strikes. Only 17% of
Yushchenko voters refused to participate in protests, but the
equivalent for Yanukovych voters was 41%.
Most Orange Revolutionaries traveled to Kyiv voluntarily, although a
small number of hard-core activists were paid travel expenses. This
was not the case for Yanukovych voters, who were dispatched to Kyiv in
an organized operation. One indicator of the manufactured Yanukovych
faction was the dried military meals that the Ministry of Defense
illegally “sold” at a cost of 300,000 hryvni (,000) to the Yanukovych
voters who journeyed to Kyiv (Ukrayinska pravda, May 13). “While
‘orange’ supporters came on their own, the “‘blue-whites’ are
brought in,” one commentator pointed out (Zerkalo Nedeli/Tyzhnia,
November 27, 2004).
Two factors explain this difference between Orange Yushchenko and
Blue-White Yanukovych voters.
First, civil society is far weaker and far more “managed” in eastern
Ukraine, which voted largely for Yanukovych, than in western and
central Ukraine, which voted for Yushchenko. Only 10% of Yanukovych
voters, compared to 30% of Yushchenko voters, believe citizens should
take action to protect their rights (International Foundation for
Electoral Systems, April 2005).
Based on their own views of how civil society is “managed” in their
hometowns, Donetsk residents and eastern Ukrainians refused to believe
that the Orange Revolution protestors were in Kyiv voluntarily. They
cynically believed that if Donetsk residents were paid to attend
“popular” rallies, why should Yushchenko rallies be organized any
differently?
Following this logic, if the protestors were not paid, then the Orange
Revolution must be a U.S.-backed conspiracy (Zerkalo Nedeli/Tyzhnia,
December 4-10, 2004).
When asked why the Orange Revolution took place, Yushchenko voters
pointed to election fraud (59%), the need to uphold democratic values
(36%), opposition to the authorities (30%), and the need to support
Yushchenko’s candidacy (30%). Yanukovych voters had very different
views. A striking 45% believed the crowds attended rallies because
they were paid, only 25% thought people actually turned out to support
Yushchenko’s candidacy (Politychnyi portret, p. 62).
The picture was very different among Yanukovych voters. Of those who
took part in rallies, 38% believed that being paid was the reason. Of
Yanukovych voters who did not take part in rallies, nearly half (48%)
were convinced that participants were being paid to participate
(Politychnyi portret, p. 63).
Second, fewer Yanukovych voters traveled to Kyiv than did Yushchenko
voters because of demographic differences. Yushchenko voters tend to
be younger and better educated, precisely the groups who are more
mobile and active in civil society. Younger people would also be more
able to withstand the winter cold in Kyiv. Yanukovych voters in
contrast, tend to be between 50-70 old and with lower levels of
education, thus representing two less-mobile social groups.
The 2004 election also revealed the fallacy of two very common Western
beliefs about Ukraine.
First is the view that most documented violence was committed by
Yanukovych voters against Yushchenko supporters. But when thousands of
Yanukovych voters were paid to travel to Kyiv, there was not a single
recorded incidence of violence. Instead, backers of both candidates
freely mingled and discussed the election results.
Back in Donetsk, anybody wearing Orange symbols was beaten and had
their symbols ripped off. Violence against Yushchenko supporters was
organized, systematic, and brutal, while the victims refrained from
responding in kind, upholding principles of non-violent action
(razom.org.ua and yuschenko.com.ua, December 12, 2004; UNIAN, December
15, 2004).
Second is the view that western Ukrainians are aggressively
nationalistic. After decades of Soviet propaganda and the
anti-Yushchenko campaign of 2004, eastern Ukrainians remain convinced
that any violence in the election must have been organized by
Yushchenko “nationalists.” They refused to believe that in reality,
Yanukovych voters were behind all of the violence.
The Orange Revolution succeeded because western Ukraine provided
participants while eastern Ukrainians remained passive. Some 45% of
the Orange Revolution protestors were from western Ukraine, especially
from the three Galician oblasts: Ivano-Frankivsk (69%), Lviv (46%),
and Ternopil oblast (35%).
A striking 35% of western Ukrainians took part in the Orange
Revolution, and 23% of west-central Ukrainians. Besides western
Ukrainians, more than one-third of the residents of Kyiv participated,
a figure close to that of Galicia. These figures were far lower in
eastern (15%), east-central (9%), and southern Ukraine (8%)
respectively.
These studies by Democratic Initiatives and IFES point to a close
interconnection between national identity and civil society in
Ukraine, with eastern Ukraine dominated by passivity and a “managed”
civil society. The 2004 election also showed that violence came from
eastern, not western, Ukrainians.
–Taras Kuzio
————————————————————————
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation,
is edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those
of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of
the Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the
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Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
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Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.

USA urges government condemnation of attacks on Azeri opposition party
Assa-Irada
11 Aug 05
BAKU
The USA expects a fair investigation into the case of Ruslan Basirli,
chairman of the Yeni Fikir (New Thought) youth movement [believed to
be close to the People’s Front of Azerbaijan Party], charged with
cooperating with Armenian secret service agencies.
“In accord with the rule of law, we expect that the government of
Azerbaijan will conduct a fair and impartial investigation into the
recent allegations raised by the Prosecutor-General’s Office against
the head of the Yeni Fikir organization. Serious allegations should be
addressed in the courts, and not in the media,” the US embassy in Baku
has said.
It also indicated that it expects a fair parliamentary election this
autumn. “We expect that the government of Azerbaijan will pursue fair
and transparent elections in November, according to the principles
laid out in the Azerbaijani election laws and in the presidential
decree of 11 May. This includes condemning unwarranted attacks on
individual parties or political figures and allowing all political
parties to pursue their election campaigns without harassment or
unsubstantiated allegations.”

No evidence against Annan on Iraq food contract
Irish Times; Aug 11, 2005
Evelyn Leopold at the United Nations

THE UN: A key investigator of the UN oil- for-food programme in Iraq
has said there was “absolutely” no evidence UN secretary general Kofi
Annan had interfered in the awarding of a contract to a firm that
employed his son.
However, South African judge Richard Goldstone, said on Tuesday the
inquiry was still investigating “vigorously” whether Mr Annan had
advance knowledge of the bid by Swiss firm Cotecna Inspection SA,
which was awarded a lucrative contract in the humanitarian programme
for Iraq.
“We found absolutely no evidence implicating the secretary general, Mr
Annan, in the award of the Cotecna contract,” Mr Goldstone told the
BBC.
“That was handled by the appropriate organs within the United Nations
and there is absolutely not a tittle of evidence suggesting he tried
to influence that decision.”
Mr Goldstone is one of three commissioners leading the UN- established
independent inquiry committee, along with Paul Volcker, former head of
the US Federal Reserve, and Mark Pieth, a Swiss money-laundering
expert.
Mr Annan’s role will be analysed further in a report due in September,
shortly before he hosts a summit on UN reforms with more than 170
world leaders.
Meanwhile, a senior Cypriot government official has said that it is
unlikely to extradite the former head of the UN oil-for-food programme
to face allegations of receiving bribes.
Benon Sevan, a Cypriot of Armenian descent, was accused by UN
investigators of receiving almost $150,000 in kickbacks for oil
allocations under the programme he headed from 1997 to 2003.
He has denied any wrongdoing.
Asked how authorities would respond to any extradition request, an
official said: “There is a constitutional prohibition on extraditing
one of our nationals to another jurisdiction.” If a formal extradition
request was filed, a court could cite the constitution to block it.

Lraper Church Bulletin 11/08/2005
Contact: Deacon Vagharshag Seropyan
Armenian Patriarchate
TR-34130 Kumkapi, Istanbul
T: +90 (212) 517-0970, 517-0971
F: +90 (212) 516-4833, 458-1365
[email protected]

ARMENIAN PATRIARCH TO ATTEND 20TH WORLD YOUTH DAY IN GERMANY
<; (Click the "ENG" button on the left hand side corner of the page) The Chancellery of the Armenian Patriarchate announced that His Beatitude Mesrob II, Armenian Patriarch of Istanbul and All Turkey, will be leaving for Cologne, Germany, on Tuesday, 16 August, and will be returning to his See on Monday, 22 August. The Patriarch has been invited to Germany by Their Eminences Cardinal Karl Lehmann, Bishop of Mainz & President of the German Catholic Bishops' Conference, and Cardinal Joachim Meisner, Archbishop of Cologne, in order to participate in the 20th World Youth Day. On Tuesday, 16 August, Patriarch Mesrob will be joining the youths from the Catholic Students' Parish of Muenster. On Wednesday, 17 August, the Patriarch will be taking part in a stage programme titled "Study for Love and Justice" - a talk focusing on Christian-Muslim dialogue and reconciliation with Martin Buchholz of the West German Broadcasting Corporation. On Thursday, 18 August, the Patriarch will be taking part in another public talk, this time with His Excellency Bishop Heinrich Mussinghoff of Aachen, aboard the "Friend-Ship" of the Catholic Students' Parish of Muenster. The theme of the talk will be: "We are all children of Abraham: Christians and Muslims - can we live together in peace? Inspired by the Gospel, reconciliation can be found." On Friday, 19 August, His Beatitude the Patriarch will be participating in the International Conference of Delegations for Pastoral work at Universities, along with His Eminence Cardinal Zenon Grocholewski, Prefect of Catholic Education, Vatican, and His Excellency Bishop Mussinghoff. On Saturday, 20 August, in the late afternoon, the Patriarch will attend the Vigil with the youth and with His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI. On Sunday, 21 August, in the morning, His Beatitude will attend the Holy Mass celebrated by His Holiness Pope Benedict XVI. On Monday, 22 August, in the afternoon, His Beatitude the Patriarch will be returning to Istanbul. In Cologne, Patriarch Mesrob will be assisted by the Revd. Fr. Drtad Uzunyan, His Beatitude's staff-bearer; Ms. Jaisy Manthuruthil and Mr. Michael Bruening, both young guides have been assigned to accompany him. He will also have a chance to meet His Grace Archbishop Karekin Bekciyan, Primate of the Armenian Diocese of Germany - a graduate of the Holy Cross Patriarchal Seminary (Surp Hac Tbrevank) in Istanbul.

CENN – August 11, Daily Digest
Table of Contents:
1.. “Union of Tourist Operators of Armenia ” Makes Decision to Boycott
Yerevan Hotel “Europe”
2.. Pipeline will Pass Through the Bottom of Caspian Sea
3.. Discussion of “Millennium Challenges ” Program Pass successfully
4.. National Citizens’ Initiative Examines Likelihood of Revolution in
Armenia
1. “UNION OF TOURIST OPERATORS OF ARMENIA” MAKES DECISION TO
BOYCOTT YEREVAN HOTEL “EUROPE”
Source: ARMINFO, August 1, 2005
The “Union of Tourist Operators of Armenia” at a general assembly of
tourist organizations included in it made a decision to boycott Yerevan
Hotel “Europe.”
The union informs ARMINFO that Hotel “Europe” uses the unstable
situation with the AMD/USD exchange rate and speculates on it, waging a
wrong price policy proceeding from the exchange rate of 500 AMD per 1
USD, which does not correspond to the rate established by the Armenian
Central Bank. Factually, it means artificial rise in prices during the
tourist season by some 10-15%, which is groundless and inadmissible. In
the course of the meetings of the Union representatives and the hotel’s
leadership, several attempts were made to explain that the approach is
groundless and inadmissible in the tourist business. However, the
leadership of the Hotel “Europe” (Director N.Tataryan) expressed
unwillingness to listen to the opinion of experts. Hence, the Union made
a decision to unilaterally stop the relations with the above hotel up to
resumption of new negotiations and proposals by the Hotel’s owners.
It should be noted that the “Union of Tourist Operators of Armenia” was
registered in December 2002 and unites 12 tourist companies, which have
distinguished themselves as serious organizations in the native tourist
market: “Intur,” “Armenia Travel + M,” “Armen tour Travel,” “Sputnik,”
“Tatyans Travel,””Avarayr,” “Menua Tour,” “Levon Travel,” and others.
2. Pipeline will Pass Through the Bottom of Caspian Sea
Source: “Rezonans”, August 4, 2005
On September 2005 the contract between the governments of Azerbaijan and
Kazakhstan will be signed on transportation of Kazakh petroleum through
Bako-Tbilisi-Ceyhan main exportation pipeline. After that the
construction of pipeline that will pass through the bottom of Caspian
Sea and will connect Kazakhstan with Azerbaijan will be included in
agenda.
“British Petroleum” declares that four foreigner companies working in
Kazakhstan on “Kashagan” petroleum deposit at the same time are the
auctioneers of Bako-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline (their quota is 15%);
therefore they can transport petroleum by the main exportation pipeline.
As for the other companies working in Kazakhstan, declares bp, for the
transportation of petroleum extracted by them through
Bako-Tbilisi-Ceyhan transportation tariff should be agreed with
auctioneers.
3. DISCUSSIONS OF “MILLENNIUM CHALLENGES” PROGRAM PASS
SUCCESSFULLY
Source: ARMENPRESS, August 4, 2004
This year the qualification round of the “Millennium Challenges” program
will end and afterwards the negotiations over preparation of the
agreement will launch, Tigran Khachatrian, deputy finance minister, told
at a press conference.
He said within the frameworks of the program a group of experts from US
arrived in Armenia to assess the separate points of the program from
qualification viewpoint. At present the effectiveness of the points is
being discussed i.e. whether they will secure economic growth and
promote the poverty reduction.
T. Khachatrian said the discussion of the program is going on
successfully and added that they have reached positive response over two
major points which are connected with the construction of community
roads and ensuring water supply. The two issues have been assessed as
important factors for securing economic growth and promoting poverty
reduction in Armenia. The deputy minister also noted that the first real
investments in the program will be made in 2007.
4. National Citizens’ Initiative Examines Likelihood of
Revolution in Armenia
Source: ACNIS Info, August 10, 2005
The National Citizens’ Initiative (NCI) today convened a roundtable on
“The Probability of Revolution in Armenia: Preconditions and
Consequences.” The meeting brought together public figures, policy
makers, media representatives, analysts and experts.
NCI coordinator Hovsep Khurshudian welcomed the audience with opening
remarks and wished the participants fruitful work. “The final hopes that
Armenia’s rulers would find strength and decency in themselves to change
the destructive course which is taking the country toward the Middle
Ages, and that they would initiate the first steps to the public demand
for fundamental transformation seem to be thwarted. Consequently, headed
by the progressive political powers, the society itself must engage in
fundamental value metamorphosis, and in the outcome, Armenia would find
its rightful place in the family of free, dignified and prosperous
societies,” Khurshudian said.
During her policy intervention, National Press Club chairperson Narine
Mkrtchian put an emphasis on the implementation of socio-political
changes, and the historical necessity for the establishment of a new
political system. She talked in detail about the existing preconditions
in the country, which, in her view, would cause a revolution. And these
are: the absence of authoritative legitimacy; the political elite’s
inaptitude to form a progressive social order; corruption; clan-based
rule; dilapidation of ethics at all levels; and other abuses, to which
economic, inner-authoritative and parliamentary crises have also
accumulated, resulting in one general systemic exigency. “Whereas, in
countries like Armenia, the resolving of systemic crises is possible
only by means of revolution,” Mkrtchian mentioned.
ACNIS analyst Hovhannes Vardanian made a breakdown of the domestic and
external preconditions for a rebellion. According to his observations,
the revolts that have taken place in the post-Soviet region are
primarily a consequence of the public’s extreme social polarization,
poverty, widespread corruption, an atmosphere of arbitrariness and
rights for the privileged, and other adverse phenomena. In the words of
Vardanian, revolutionary developments in Armenia are being nourished by
the factor that the incumbent administration is not capable, in any way,
of carrying out true systemic reforms. “The current situation, which can
be characterized by the inactiveness and ineffectiveness of state
authorities, unbridled arbitrariness by high degree bureaucracy,
advanced level of bribery and corruption, and the explicit violation of
law and order, is leading the country toward anarchy and chaos, and the
rule of the jungle, when the big and strong eats up the small and weak,
and this makes the chance of a revolution in Armenia simply inevitable,”
Vardanian said. Among external stimuli, he set aside the “snowball
effect.” In his opinion, from this vantage point, the parliamentary
elections to be held in Azerbaijan this fall might turn into a serious
test for Armenia.
Susanna Barseghian, another ACNIS analyst, deemed the printed media’s
role important in the formation of public opinion, and by means of a
content analysis, she made a distinction of the ideas the media could
form when portraying the likelihood or unlikelihood of a revolution in
Armenia. “When reflecting on the probability of a revolt in Armenia, on
one hand, the oppositional and pro-governmental press keeps talking
about choosing the ‘right time’ for a democratic revolution, and on the
other hand, it refreshes the inevitability of a ‘state coup,'”
Barseghian maintained, pointing out the important findings of her
analysis. According to it, in May alone, 13 Armenian periodicals have
printed 153 articles, or one report per one and a half issue, on the
likelihood of a revolution, and that constitutes 2.8% of the total
publications printed in the researched newspapers.
The remainder of the session was devoted to exchanges of views and
policy recommendations among the public figures and policy specialists
in attendance. Noteworthy were interventions by former minister of state
and board member of the Heritage Party Hrach Hakobian; Edward Antinian
of the Liberal Progressive Party; Noyan Tapan news agency political
analyst Davit Petrosian; Moushegh Lalayan of the Republican Party; ACNIS
analyst Alvard Barkhudarian; Ruzan Khachatrian of the People’s Party;
“Areg” Youth Association chairman Gerasim Barseghian; Alexander Butaev
of the National Democratic Union; and many others.
The National Citizens’ Initiative is a public non-profit association
founded in December 2001 by Raffi K. Hovannisian, his colleagues, and
fellow citizens with the purpose of realizing the rule of law and
overall improvements in the state of the state, society, and public
institutions. The National Citizens’ Initiative is guided by a
Coordinating Council, which includes individual citizens and
representatives of various public, scientific, and educational
establishments. Five commissions on Law and State Administration,
Socioeconomic Issues, Foreign Policy, Spiritual and Cultural Challenges,
and the Youth constitute the vehicles for the Initiative’s work and
outreach.
For further information, please call
Tel: (37410) 27-16-00 or27-00-03
Fax (37410) 52-48-46;
e-mail [email protected]
or visit
CENN INFO
Caucasus Environmental NGO Network (CENN)
Tel: ++995 32 75 19 03/04
Fax: ++995 32 75 19 05
E-mail: [email protected]
URL:

PRESS RELEASE
The National Citizens’ Initiative
75 Yerznkian Street
Yerevan 375033, Armenia
Tel.: (+374 – 10) 27.16.00, 27.00.03
Fax: (+374 – 10) 52.48.46
E-mail: [email protected]
Website:
August 10, 2005
National Citizens’ Initiative Examines Likelihood of Revolution in Armenia
Yerevan–The National Citizens’ Initiative (NCI) today convened a roundtable
on “The Probability of Revolution in Armenia: Preconditions and
Consequences.” The meeting brought together public figures, policy makers,
media representatives, analysts and experts.
NCI coordinator Hovsep Khurshudian welcomed the audience with opening
remarks and wished the participants fruitful work. “The final hopes that
Armenia’s rulers would find strength and decency in themselves to change the
destructive course which is taking the country toward the Middle Ages, and
that they would initiate the first steps to the public demand for
fundamental transformation seem to be thwarted. Consequently, headed by the
progressive political powers, the society itself must engage in fundamental
value metamorphosis, and in the outcome, Armenia would find its rightful
place in the family of free, dignified and prosperous societies,”
Khurshudian said.
During her policy intervention, National Press Club chairperson Narine
Mkrtchian put an emphasis on the implementation of socio-political changes,
and the historical necessity for the establishment of a new political
system. She talked in detail about the existing preconditions in the
country, which, in her view, would cause a revolution. And these are: the
absence of authoritative legitimacy; the political elite’s ineptitude to
form a progressive social order; corruption; clan-based rule; dilapidation
of ethics at all levels; and other abuses upon which economic,
intra-governmental and parliamentary crises have also accumulated; resulting
in one general systemic emergency. “In countries like Armenia, the resolving
of systemic crises is possible only by means of revolution,” Mkrtchian
mentioned.
ACNIS analyst Hovhannes Vardanian made a breakdown of the domestic and
external preconditions for a rebellion. According to his observations, the
revolts that have taken place in the post-Soviet region are primarily a
consequence of the public’s extreme social polarization, poverty, widespread
corruption, an atmosphere of arbitrariness and rights for the privileged,
and other adverse phenomena. In the words of Vardanian, revolutionary
developments in Armenia are being nourished by the factor that the incumbent
administration is not capable, in any way, of carrying out true systemic
reforms. “The current situation, which can be characterized by the
inactiveness and ineffectiveness of state authorities, unbridled
arbitrariness by high-level bureaucracy, advanced level of bribery and
corruption, and the explicit violation of law and order, is leading the
country toward anarchy and chaos, and the rule of the jungle, when the big
and strong eats up the small and weak, and this makes the chance of a
revolution in Armenia simply inevitable,” Vardanian said. Among external
stimuli, he set forth the “snowball effect.” In his opinion, from this
vantage point, the parliamentary elections to be held in Azerbaijan this
fall might turn into a serious test for Armenia.
Susanna Barseghian, another ACNIS analyst, deemed the printed media’s role
important in the formation of public opinion, and by means of a
content-analysis made a distinction among the ideas the media could form
when portraying the likelihood or unlikelihood of a revolution in Armenia.
“When reflecting on the probability of a revolt in Armenia, on the one hand,
the oppositional and pro-governmental press keeps talking about choosing the
‘right time’ for a democratic revolution, and on the other hand, it
refreshed the topic of inevitability of a ‘state coup,'” Barseghian
maintained, pointing out the important findings of her analysis. According
to it, in May alone, 13 Armenian periodicals have printed 153 articles, or
one report per one and a half issue, on the likelihood of a revolution, and
that constitutes 2.8% of total publication space printed in the researched
newspapers.
The remainder of the session was devoted to exchanges of views and policy
recommendations among the public figures and policy specialists in
attendance. Noteworthy were interventions by former minister of state and
board member of the Heritage Party Hrach Hakobian; Edward Antinian of the
Liberal Progressive Party; Noyan Tapan news agency political analyst Davit
Petrosian; Moushegh Lalayan of the Republican Party; ACNIS analyst Alvard
Barkhudarian; Artak Zeinalian of the Republic Party, Ruzan Khachatrian of
the People’s Party; “Areg” Youth Association chairman Gerasim Barseghian;
Alexander Butaev of the National Democratic Union; and many others.
The National Citizens’ Initiative is a public non-profit association founded
in December 2001 by Raffi K. Hovannisian, his colleagues, and fellow
citizens with the purpose of realizing the rule of law and overall
improvements in the state of the state, society, and public institutions.
The National Citizens’ Initiative is guided by a Coordinating Council, which
includes individual citizens and representatives of various public,
scientific, and educational establishments. Five commissions on Law and
State Administration, Socioeconomic Issues, Foreign Policy, Spiritual and
Cultural Challenges, and the Youth constitute the vehicles for the
Initiative’s work and outreach.
For further information, please call (37410) 27-16-00 or 27-00-03; fax
(37410) 52-48-46; e-mail [email protected]; or visit

8 August 2005, Volume 8, Number 26
U.S.-AZERBAIJANI RELATIONS AT A TURNING POINT? The working visit to
Washington last week by Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov
came at a very significant time for both countries and could represent
something of a turning point in bilateral relations. Following a
sweeping reevaluation of U.S. policy, those relations have been
subject to a dynamic, yet subtle shift in recent months, driven by a
set of external developments ranging from the impact of the so-called
colored revolutions in several former Soviet states to a new emphasis
on democratization as the strategic priority of the second Bush
administration.
The shift in U.S.-Azerbaijani relations has also been dictated by
internal considerations, further exacerbated by Azerbaijan’s looming
parliamentary elections set for 6 November. Set against the wave of
democratic change in Georgia, Ukraine, and most recently, in
Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan faces new pressure to ensure a free and fair
election. And it is this need to meet heightened democratic standards
that is the new determinant in the U.S. approach to Azerbaijan.
The necessity for improved electoral credentials in Azerbaijan has
been repeatedly stressed in recent months by the Council of Europe,
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and
was reiterated during last month’s visits to Baku by former
U.S. Secretary of State Madeline Albright and current Deputy Secretary
of State Paula Dobriansky. But Washington’s insistence on
democratization in Azerbaijan is not merely an end in itself, but
stems from a broader American recognition of democratization as
essential to domestic stability and regional security. It also
reflects a new tool in the global war on terror, although it remains
to be seen if this “muscular Wilsonian” approach will yield better
results.
For Azerbaijan, this priority for democratic elections has sharply
raised the threshold for the regime of President Ilham Aliyev. But
preparations for the election have fallen far short of the shared
expectations of the international community and the Azerbaijani
opposition. Specifically, Azerbaijan’s electoral reforms remain
incomplete, with shortfalls in both the composition of electoral
commissions and the planned monitoring of the ballot. American
disappointment with election preparations to date was also a central
message in Mammadyarov’s talks with his American hosts.
This is also a lesson for others, however. For neighboring Armenia,
which will be facing its own elections within the next two years, and
even for Georgia, whose Rose Revolution was rewarded by an American
presidential visit and by U.S. help in pressuring Russia to withdraw
its troops from the country, but which has since created a Central
Election Commission wholly dominated by supporters of the ruling
party, there are significantly higher standards and greater
expectations.
In addition, Mammadyarov’s visit was largely overshadowed by
speculation about an imminent agreement for a new U.S. military base
in the country. This speculation has been largely fueled by the recent
demand by Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov to close the U.S. and
coalition air base at Karshi-Khanabad within six months. The loss of
the use of the base in Uzbekistan is viewed by some experts as an
immediate setback to the U.S. military’s operational capabilities in
nearby Afghanistan and, as the thinking holds, necessitates the
opening of a new air base in Azerbaijan. While this view is correct in
recognizing the importance of the South Caucasus air corridor as a
“lifeline” between coalition forces in Afghanistan and bases in
Europe, it is flawed by a superficial understanding of the nature of
the U.S. military mission and presence in Azerbaijan, as well as by
the practical limitation of aircraft needing to refuel en route from
Azerbaijan to Afghanistan.
Despite reports predicting a “new” U.S. military engagement in
Azerbaijan, in reality there has been a significant American military
mission there for at least three years, comprised of two
components. The first component was the creation of the “Caspian
Guard,” an initiative involving both Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan
focusing on maritime and border security in the Caspian Sea. The
Caspian Guard initiative incorporates defensive mission areas,
including the surveillance of Caspian airspace, borders, and
shipping. It encourages greater coordination and cooperation in
counter-proliferation efforts by Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. This
effort was further bolstered by a $20 million program launched in July
2004 and implemented by the U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency to
train the Azerbaijan Maritime Border Guard. Additional training and
combined exercises were also provided by U.S. Navy SEALS to
Azerbaijan’s 41st Special Warfare Naval Unit in June 2004.
The second component was the establishment of several “Cooperative
Security Locations,” tactical facilities with pre-positioned stock
that provide contingency access but, unlike a traditional base, have
little or no permanent U.S. military presence. These locations are
designed to increase the mobility of U.S. military forces and, most
importantly, facilitate counter-proliferation missions along
Azerbaijan’s southern border with Iran and northern borders with
Georgia and Daghestan.
In line with the U.S. military need to project military power rapidly,
the U.S. presence in Azerbaijan may be further expanded from the
existing Cooperative Security Locations to Forward Operating Sites,
host-country “warm sites” endowed with a limited military presence and
capable of hosting rotational forces. These forward operating sites
can also serve as centers for bilateral and regional training.
Thus, while the utility of a permanent, traditional military base in
Azerbaijan is seriously limited, the expansion of the forward
stationing of forces is likely. (Azerbaijani presidential aide Novruz
Mamedov’s recent statement to Interfax that Azerbaijan will not host
“U.S. military bases” may draw a fine semantic line between “bases” in
the traditional sense and forward operating sites.) Yet even the
military relationship is in the final analysis contingent on
Azerbaijan’s ability to meet the new, more stringent U.S. standards of
democracy and free elections. The steadfast refusal by the Azerbaijani
authorities to amend the composition of election commissions and their
reluctance to permit the marking of voters to preclude multiple voting
cast doubt on President Aliyev’s repeated assertions that the ballot
will indeed be free, fair, and transparent. (Richard Giragosian)
DOES WAHHABISM POSE A THREAT TO AZERBAIJAN? Addressing a 3 August
conference in Baku on “Religion and National Security,” Rafik Aliyev,
chairman of the Azerbaijani government’s Committee for Work with
Religious Formations, warned that the increased activity of
“Wahhabis,” meaning members of radical and/or unregistered Islamic
groups, poses a threat to political stability in Azerbaijan in the
run-up to the 6 November parliamentary elections. Reports of at least
one, and possibly two, National Security Ministry operations against
Wahhabis in recent weeks would seem to substantiate Aliyev’s
apprehension.
The first such crackdown took place on the night of 12-13 July, when
National Security Ministry personnel raided the village of Novkhany
near Baku, killing two “armed Wahhabis” and arresting six others. Some
30 more suspected Wahhabi sympathizers were apprehended in the
district in the following days, day.az reported on 4 August, quoting
the father of Emil Novruzov, one of the young men in question.
Also on 4 July, the National Security Ministry refuted media reports
that its operatives arrested 11 Wahhabis during a raid on a Baku
mosque the previous day and were monitoring attendance at several
other mosques.
In the wake of the July arrests, Azerbaijani Deputy Interior Minister
Vilayat Eyubov was quoted by day.az as saying that he does not believe
the situation in Azerbaijan is conducive to the spread of
Wahhabism. “I do not believe that they will be able to put down roots
in Azerbaijan and attain their desired [objective],” he was quoted as
saying. At the same time, Eyubov admitted that there is a constant
flow of information about suspected Wahhabi sympathizers, and that
information is systematically evaluated.
In contrast, popular Imam Ilgar Ibrahimoglu believes that Wahhabism
does indeed pose a danger for Azerbaijan. Ibrahimoglu told zerkalo.az
that “it is no secret to anyone that radical Wahhabi groups have been
active in Azerbaijan for several years,” and that there is no
indication of a weakening of that trend. Ibrahimoglu attributed the
appeal of Wahhabism to the lack of democracy, frequent human rights
violations, and the authorities’ clumsy repression of less radical but
unregistered religious communities. (Ibrahimoglu’s own Djuma Mosque in
Baku has been subjected to repeated pressure and harassment over the
past two years.)
Parliament deputy Ramiz Akhmedov blamed the growing popularity of
radical Islam on the “primitive, 19th-century” approach of the
officially registered Muslim clergy that, he claimed, alienates
believers and impels them to seek “pure Islam,” zerkalo.az reported on
18 January. Some, Akhmedov continued, opt for Shi’a Islam, some for
Sunni Islam, and others for a third alternative that he did not
name. Adherents of radical Islam then seek to take advantage of young
believers’ interest in studying the fundamentals of their faith. And
supplying such knowledge has apparently become a major industry:
Akhmedov pointed out that religious literature is freely available
both in Baku and elsewhere, written in contemporary Azerbaijani and
printed in both the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets.
According to zerkalo.az on 4 August, Wahhabism has taken root above
all in the northern and central districts of Azerbaijan, and in
Baku. That geographical pattern suggest that Wahhabism first
penetrated from Daghestan, which borders on Azerbaijan to the
north. So-called Wahhabis in several remote villages challenged the
Daghestani authorities in 1999, and the Russian media consistently
blame Islamic fundamentalists for the almost daily terrorist bombings
and killings in that republic.
The online daily echo-az.com similarly registered a strong Wahhabi
presence in northern Azerbaijan, but in an article on 18 January
entitled “The ‘Wahhabization’ of Azerbaijan is continuing,” it claimed
that there is also a Wahhabi presence in the south of the country. The
same article listed other ways in which young Azerbaijani believers
are exposed to radical Islam: when studying theology abroad, and while
on pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia.
Former Deputy National Security Minister Sulhaddin Akper enumerated
various ways in which the Azerbaijani authorities could counter
Wahhabi propaganda: by raising the level of religious education,
screening more stringently applications from persons wishing to
perform the hajj, and lodging a formal protest with the government of
Saudi Arabia, which is perceived as an exporter of radical
Islam. Akper said it is up to both the Foreign Ministry and
Azerbaijan’s official religious bodies to take appropriate action.
But according to the government’s Committee for Work with Religious
Formations Chairman Aliyev, the Board of Muslims of the Caucasus
(UMK), instead of acting to avert the subversion of Islam in
Azerbaijan by radical tendencies, is actively encouraging them. Aliyev
claimed in mid-July that on two occasions within the previous three
months, state customs officials have intercepted and confiscated
consignments of radical Islamic literature addressed to the
UMK. Aliyev said the first consignment of books weighed 14 tons and
the second 10 tons.
But UMK officials claimed that the literature in question was in
Arabic, Uzbek, and Kazakh, and was intended for shipment to
Uzbekistan. They said the consignments were sent to Baku “by mistake.”
On 4 August, Caucasus Press quoted Aliyev as saying customs officials
intercepted a further consignment of radical literature two days
earlier, and that such shipments are sent to Azerbaijan via Turkey and
Georgia.
Speaking at the 3 August conference on “Religion and National
Security,” Aliyev said that he thinks the recent arrests of “Wahhabis”
were justified, according to zerkalo.az on 4 August. He called for
“serious” work to explain government policy to the leaders of
religious communities in the run-up to the 6 November election. (Liz
Fuller)
ARMENIA ‘IMMUNE TO TERRORIST ATTACKS.’ Armenia is immune to the kind
of deadly terrorist attacks that have rocked major Western cities in
recent years, military intelligence service chief Basentsi Azoyan
claimed on 3 August. “I am confident that no terrorist acts and
especially international terrorist acts will take place in Armenia,”
he told RFE/RL in a rare interview. “There are no grounds for that.”
Azoyan argued that bombings and other terrorist acts are usually
carried out by Islamist extremists and separatist groups fighting a
central government. No such elements operate in Armenia, he said. But
Azoyan warned at the same time that radical Islamic organizations “may
pose a threat to Armenia” in the event of a renewed war with Muslim
Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. “We must therefore help to expose
those groups all over the world,” he said.
Two other countries that border on Armenia, Iran and Turkey, also have
predominantly Muslim populations. But with the Turkish-Armenian border
closed and Armenian-Iranian relations warm, the risk of terrorist
infiltrations from those countries appears minimal.
The counterintelligence service is one of the most secretive divisions
of the Armenian military and is formally part of its General
Staff. According to Azoyan, the main focus of its unpublicized
activities is to stave off “periodical” attempts by Azerbaijan to send
sabotage and reconnaissance groups into Armenia.
“There have been numerous attempts by sabotage or intelligence groups
to enter Armenia,” he said. “There have even been cases where some
agents reached Yerevan. But they were all exposed and rendered
harmless.” Azoyan claimed that the most recent such incident took
place last year, but he refused to give any details. (Ruzanna
Stepanian)
QUOTATION OF THE WEEK. “We need a market economy, not an oriental
bazaar.” — Mardan Efendiev, a leading member of Asim Molla-zade’s
Party of Democratic Reforms, in a 5 August interview with day.az
Compiled by Liz Fuller