Naxcivan, Karabakh attributed to Armenia by mistake – US envoy to
Azerbaijan
ANS TV, Baku
14 Sep 05
We regret that [the Azerbaijani exclave of] Naxcivan and the occupied
territories have been presented as Armenian land on the official
website of the US embassy in Yerevan, Tahir Tagizada, head of the
Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry’s press service, has said.
Tagizada said Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, who is
currently on a visit to the USA, will be informed about this after his
return and the issue will be discussed with the US side.
The US ambassador to Azerbaijan, Reno Harnish, has said that the
website’s description of Naxcivan and Nagornyy Karabakh as Armenian
land was just a mistake.
[Passage omitted: Harnish comments on exit polls to be held in Azerbaijan]

US embassy ascribes Azeri land to Armenia – TV
ANS TV, Baku
13 Sep 05
[Presenter] Not only the occupied Azerbaijani territories, but also
Naxcivan [Azerbaijan’s autonomous republic] is described as Armenian
territory in the official website of the US embassy in Yerevan. It is
surprising and also regretful that such information appears in a
webpage owned by the USA, a country which recognizes Azerbaijan’s
territorial integrity and always condemns aggression and separatism,
and that the US diplomatic corps turns a blind eye to this.
[Correspondent over video of the website] Not only the occupied
Azerbaijani territories, but also Naxcivan is described as Armenian
territory in the official website of the US embassy in Yerevan. A
webpage to which the US embassy website links says that Karabakh and
Naxcivan are historical Armenian territories. The webpage distorts
Naxcivan’s placenames, Armenizing village and town names. We perhaps
could ignore this as we often see Armenia talking such rubbish. But it
causes surprise that this information has been placed in the webpage
owned by the USA, a country which recognizes Azerbaijan’s territorial
integrity and always condemns aggression and separatism, and the US
diplomatic corps turns a blind eye to this.
The head of the press and information department of the Azerbaijani
Foreign Ministry, Tahir Tagizada, has told ANS this is
unacceptable. Tagizada said that this run counter to the United
States’ position as an OSCE Minsk Group co-chair. He said that the
ministry would look into the issue to resolve it with the American
side in a working atmosphere.
Azada Balayeva, ANS.

Foreign minister of the Nagornyy Karabakh Republic , International
Crisis Group discuss Karabakh settlement
Arminfo
14 Sep 05
YEREVAN
The foreign minister of the Nagornyy Karabakh republic [NKR], Arman
Melikyan, has met a delegation of the International Crisis Group (ICG)
led by Alain Deletroz in the NKR’s permanent representative office in
Armenia.
During the meeting, Alain Deletroz spoke about the work of his
organization and said that their goal is to help settle international
conflicts peacefully and prevent wars, the information and analytical
department of the NKR foreign ministry has said.
He said the ICG has prepared a report on the Nagornyy Karabakh
conflict called “Nagornyy Karabakh: view of the conflict from the
scene of events”.
Deletroz said the report is aimed at helping both the Armenian and
Azerbaijani sides, as well as the mediators find an acceptable
solution to the conflict at the negotiating table.
The NKR foreign minister stressed the importance of the international
community’s involvement in the process of establishing a lasting peace
in the region. He said the problem can be resolved only when all the
sides to the conflict display a thoughtful approach to it and realize
that the two main conflicting sides are the NKR and Azerbaijan. And
the attempts to present the conflict as a territorial dispute between
Armenia and Azerbaijan can be viewed as a distortion of reality, he
said.
At the end, Deletroz submitted the text of the report to the NKR
foreign minister and said it would be published on 14 September.
Melikyan thanked the ICG delegates and assured them that Stepanakert
would carefully read the report.

Sore Point: Baltic Pipeline Set to Mar Polish-German Relations Unless New
German Cabinet Undoes Damage

Polish News Bulletin; Sep 14, 2005
X-Sender: Asbed Bedrossian
X-Listprocessor-Version: 8.1 — ListProcessor(tm) by CREN
The following is a summary of an article by Radek Sikorski, former
deputy minister of defence, the PiS’s national security expert, and
Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, former European minister, European deputy
(PO). – Words and Deeds The text comes as Germany and Russia sign an
agreement for developing a Baltic gas pipeline that will directly link
the two countries while circumventing Poland and the Baltic states.
Many of us, write Sikorski and Saryusz-Wolski, were moved by the words
spoken by Horst Koehler, Germany’s president, during the celebrations
of the 25th anniversary of Solidarity in Gdansk. There was loud
applause when he pledged for Germany to never again deal above
Poland’s head. “Nothing about you without you,” pledged the German
president.
Reminiscing the spontaneity with which ordinary Germans were sending
aid packages to Poland during the grim martial-law era, Koehler even
said that proved “we can rely on each other.” Friendly relations with
Germany are, of course, in Poland’s interest and have been yielding
various benefits. Just as Germany would not have reunited itself
without the peaceful Solidarity revolution, so Poland would never have
joined the EU without the support of its western neighbour and ally.
Yet, write Sikorski and Saryusz-Wolski, there is an obvious contrast
between what the German president said in Gdansk, and what chancellor
Gerhard Schroeder is doing this week in Berlin: signing an agreement
with Vladimir Putin on developing a Baltic gas pipeline that will
circumvent Poland.
The North European Gas Pipeline will cost at least $6 billion more to
develop than the second line of the Yamal pipeline, whose development
is provided for in the 1993 Polish-Russian gas contract. Given
Poland’s support for the idea of developing a second line of the Yamal
through Poland, one suspects with near-surety that the only purpose of
the Russo-German project is to circumvent Central Europe with
strategic infrastructure. From the point of view of Russia’s
interests, the point is to create a situation where it will be
possible to cut off gas supplies to the former Soviet bloc countries
without jeopardising relations with the top European players, such as
Germany. As the press reported, there had been no consultations
between Berlin and Warsaw on the issue.
Poland has reasons to be afraid. It wants to have as good as possible
relations with Russia but it cannot be blind to plans for using energy
supplies for political ends. Russia used to be cutting off supplies to
the Baltic states when they were striving for independence. It has
continued to this day to use oil export to exert pressure on the
government of Latvia. The Kremlin political technologists used
millions of dollars from the budgets of Russian energy companies in
Ukraine to influence the outcome of the last presidential elections
there. In Armenia, Bulgaria, and Hungary, Russian acquisitions in the
energy sector have been followed by corruption and growing influence
of political forces that can hardly be described as pro-European or
pro-Atlantic.
In Poland, too, we remember all too well the ambiguities associated
with the high-capacity fibre-optic cable laid alongside the existing
stretch of the Yamal, last year’s unannounced interruptions in gas
supplies to Belarus and Poland, or the corrupt political games
accompanying Russian companies’ attempts to buy energy-sector assets
in Poland. After the phoney trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, no one
should be deluding himself that Russia’s energy sector functions
according to free-market principles. – Questions to Germany Germany’s
consent, write Sikorski and Saryusz-Wolski, to such Russian policies
is all the more surprising because the development of the Baltic
pipeline will be harmful for consumers in countries-importers of
Russian gas, as it will be the consumers who, this way or another,
will ultimately bear the project’s extra costs. The German government
is getting involved in a project that will cause its citizens to pay
more for gas than with the originally planned route, which will
benefit a couple of German companies and that part of the Russian
establishment that perceives the possibility of energy blackmail as a
way of exerting strategic influence on Russia’s neighbours. The German
society is being unconsciously pulled into a game that does not serve
its good.
The Schroeder administration’s consent to satisfying the country’s
valid energy needs at the cost of its own citizens and without paying
attention to Poland’s position raises several obvious questions. Does
the “nothing about you without you” principle apply to all issues or
only those where its application does not entail any costs for the
German party? How to understand a situation where the German
chancellor is speaking to the Russian leader above the heads of the
Central European EU member states? How to develop the EU’s common
foreign policy, on which such high hopes are being pinned and which is
to be a mechanism of defending the whole EU’s interests, if the
interests of some member states are being ignored in such a blatant
way?
We fear, write Sikorski and Saryusz-Wolski, that the issue of the
Baltic pipeline will spoil Polish-German relations. It concerns
something that Poland perceives as its vital interest in a first-rate
national security area. Poland could respond to the planned project by
passing an energy security bill banning the use of the Polish
territory, coastal belt, and air space for projects perceived as
unwelcome. It is also unlikely that the German companies participating
in the Baltic project will be treated favourably by the Polish state
in public-financed contracts. Poland will need to seek ways to make up
for the losses resulting from the breaching of the international
agreement on developing the second line of the Yamal.
Every reasonable person should be interested in the Poles and Germans
not only overcoming the historical stereotypes and prejudices but
actually reinforcing mutual confidence and trust. We would like to be
sure that Poles and Germans can rely on each other. That is why, in
the face of the signing of a contract that can become a sore spot in
our relations for a long time to come, we hope that the new German
government will fundamentally alter Germany’s position on the issue. –
Adam Szejnfeld (PO) The Russo-German agreement proves the incompetence
of the four-year rule of the leftwing government in Poland. The SLD
has been unable to ensure Poland’s energy security, nor its strong
position on the international scene. If that position had been better,
perhaps Germany would not have decided to back the project, and the EU
would have been more sceptical about it. One of the priorities for the
new government in Warsaw will be defining Poland’s energy security
needs in real terms. However, we must not be taking offence at the
top European players, which is why it is important to improve
relations with Germany and France, and Russia. – Janusz Steinhoff
former economics minister (1997-2001) The new government in Warsaw
will need to draw up a new energy strategy and implement it
vigorously. The Russo-German agreement is a result of Poland’s passive
attitude. The EU has adopted three priorities with regards to gas
infrastructure: the pipeline through the Baltic, the second line of
the Yamal, and a development of transit infrastructure in
Ukraine. Signing a new gas agreement with Russia in February 2003,
Poland in fact ceded the decision on the second line of the Yamal to
Russia. Besides, in the last four years PGNiG [Poland’s state gas
importer] has only been talking about diversification plans, first
about a compressed-gas terminal, then about a Szczecin-Berlin
pipeline, and, more recently, about an LNG terminal. None of those
projects has gone beyond planning stage. – Jacek Piechota economics
minister Table. Largest companies in Central and Eastern Europe
(turnover in 2004, $ billion) Company country sector turnover Lukoil
Russia oil 33.8 Gazprom Russia gas 31.2 RAO JES Russia power 28 RZD
Russia railways 22.9 TNK BP Russia oil 14.3 PKN Orlen Poland oil 11.2
source: Rzeczpospolita Even before Poland joined the EU, the 15 states
had defined in 2002 a list of priority gas projects that put the
Baltic pipeline and the second line of the Yamal on an equal
footing. The European Commission is expected at its autumn session to
ultimately define the validity of those projects. Which if them is
carried out first will depend, of course, on the money, which should
be provided by the companies involved. PGNiG can hardly be expected to
finance a pipeline through Poland, especially if we compare its
financial muscle with that of companies like E.ON or BASF. It is sad
that both those companies had found themselves under political
pressure, and the agreement with Russia is part of chancellor
Schroeder’s re-election campaign. – Rzeczpospolita editorial comment
In president Putin and chancellor Schroeder’s presence, Russia and
Germany signed last week an agreement on developing a gas pipeline
through the Baltic.
It is a politically-motivated decision unfriendly towards Poland. In
business terms, a naval pipeline will cost far more than a land one,
such as the hypothetical second line of the Yamal pipeline that goes
through Poland. That latter project has for now been shelved and it is
unclear whether the Russians will ever return to it.
For Russia, circumventing Poland, Ukraine, and Belarus offers an extra
instrument of political pressure towards the countries between Russia
and Germany.
For Schroeder, the contract with Gazprom means big new orders for
German companies, ie economic success, something that the troubled
German economy needs more than anything today. As the German elections
are nearing, the gift from Putin offers not only economic but also
political advantage for Schroeder.
For Poland, the deal is a reminder of the consequences of a lack of
decisiveness in pursuing one’s own geopolitical interests. The issue
of gas supplies should be a fundamental element of Poland’s economic
policy. The rightwing cabinet of Jerzy Buzek made an attempt to
diversify Poland’s supply sources by signing a preliminary agreement
on the development of a pipeline from Norway.
One of the first decisions of the post-communist cabinet of Leszek
Miller was to cancel that deal under the pretext that it was too
costly. Since then, Poland has done virtually nothing to develop
alternative and secure natural gas supply routes.
Only now, when the cabinet’s term is drawing to an end, plans for
alternative pipelines through Ukraine or the Balkans have started
spring up one after another. It is good the possibilities exist.
The point, however, is not to waste them. That will be the job of the
new cabinet which should above all strive for those new gas projects
to receive strong backing from the EU as a whole. Its interests are
not completely identical with those of Germany and Schroeder, and
certainly not with those of Putin and Gazprom. Now the Brussels
administration needs to be convinced about that. – Gazeta Wyborcza
editorial comment Vladimir Putin’s explanations why Russia needs a
pipeline under the Baltic have been convoluted and falsely-sounding:
that Ukraine is threatened by “destabilisation” (not true, Ukraine has
become a safer place to invest following the orange revolution),
Poland has no money for developing a second line of the Yamal (where
did he hear that?), and the new pipeline will produce “cost savings”
(while in reality it will be two-three times more expensive than a
line through Poland). Putin’s conclusion is: “The whole project has
nothing to do with politics.” The truth is precisely the opposite. The
Kremlin wants the new pipeline precisely for political reasons.
The Baltic pipe will make the Central European countries, especially
Poland, even more dependent on Russia than before in terms of energy
supplies.
Russia has a long tradition of using the gas faucet in disputes with
other countries. Wee had a taste of that in the spring 2004 when
supplies to Belarus, and thus to Poland, were suddenly cut off for 24
hours. Earlier, Russia had used the same bugaboo to exert pressure on
Lithuania, Georgia, and Ukraine.
But using the “faucet argument” against Poland had been difficult due
to the fact that Germany is at the end of the same pipe. That is now
going to change. As the Deutsche Welle radio commented: “A
German-Russian border has been created.”
For the incumbent German cabinet, the political considerations, though
not the only ones that matter, are also crucial. Gerhard Schroeder
has for years preferred the Berlin-Paris-Moscow triangle to the
relations with the “lesser mortals.” One consolation is that his
defeat in the upcoming elections may ?
though does not have to ? put an end to that policy.
What should Poland do?
It should ultimately abandon the illusion that, though we are
dependent on Russia in energy supplies, a common faucet with Germany
means we can feel safe. Now that the Germans will have their own
faucet, it becomes clear how short-sighted such thinking, professed
chiefly by the SLD, was. And it was it that caused the post-communist
cabinet of Leszek Miller to cancel the plans for developing a pipeline
from Norway through Denmark.
Today, those, or other, plans for diversifying Poland’s supply sources
need to be reconsidered.
The second thing are serious talks with the incoming Christian
Democrats in Germany. Angela Merkel, who will probably become the new
chancellor, said recently in Warsaw that “eastern policy cannot be
carried out over Poland’s head.”
We are keeping her by her word. – Gas Myths About Poland Will Poland
lose revenue from the gas transit fees? It didn’t have the money to
co-finance the second line of the Yamal? Did it want to blackmail
Russia?
Many myths have emerged in the debate on the Baltic pipe. Gazeta
Wyborcza attempts to find out the truth.
Myth 1: Poland opposes the Baltic pipeline because it will lose
revenue from existing transit fees, Russian, French, and German
experts have been saying.
Not true. Poland charges no fees for the transit of gas from Russia to
western Europe. Transit fees are charged by the Polish-Russian company
EuRoPol Gaz. However, it was decided as early as in 1994 that EuRoPol
Gaz would operate on a non-profit basis, paying no dividend to its
shareholders, including the Polish state-owned gas importer PGNiG. The
2003 Polish-Russian gas contract includes a schedule of gradual
reductions in the transit fees charged by EuRoPol Gaz through
2019. The transit fees are even exempt from the VAT. Poland not only
does not receive any fees or dividend for the transit of Russian gas,
but has actually granted EuRoPol Gaz sizeable public aid in the form
of tax and customs duty breaks.
Myth 2: The pipeline had to be build under the Baltic because Poland
had no money for one through its own territory. That is what Vladimir
Putin told Die Welt. Poland’s economics minister Jacek Piechota
offered a similar remark: “You can hardly expect PGNiG to finance the
development of a pipeline through Poland.” Yet neither the 1993
Polish-Russian agreement on the development of the Yamal pipeline, nor
a 1997 financing agreement provide for the funds to be put up by
Poland or PGNiG. In the whole world such projects are financed with
bank loans taken against the future transit fee revenues, and so was
the new pipe through Poland to be financed.
Myth 3: Poland wanted a pipe through its territory to be able to exert
pressure on Russia. “I’ve heard one of the reasons the Poles would
like a pipe through their territory is to be able to cut off supplies
to negotiate more successfully with Russia,” said Giles Chichester,
head of the European Parliament’s energy committee. There have been
cases of Gazprom cutting off supplies to Poland, but it has never
happened with the Polish-Russian EuRoPol Gaz. The Polish-Russian gas
contracts also precisely define the hefty penalties Poland would pay
if transit were interrupted by its fault. – Pipe Makes Business Sense
Why did Russia decide to develop a pipe under the Baltic instead of
developing, as planned, a second line of the existing Yamal pipeline?
“Because it decided that it made business sense. Russia’s role as a
global gas exporter will be growing in the coming years. So why would
it need troublemaking middlemen? They circumvent them by laying down a
pipe under the Baltic. In my view, 75 percent of the decision was
motivated economically, and the remainder politically,” says Jakub
Siemek, head of the natural gas faculty at the Mining and
Metallurgical Academy in Krakow, in Gazeta Wyborcza..
What problems was Poland making? The fees for transit through Poland
are very low, and Poland has never fallen behind with its gas
payments.
“It is not about theft or similar problems that have occurred at times
in the other countries. The Russians decided to punish us for our
eastern policy, our lack of consent for the ?connector pipe’ that was
to connect the Belarussian and Slovakian gas systems while
circumventing Ukraine, and for the plans for developing a pipeline
from Norway.”
The “connector pipe” would make Kiev even more exposed to Russian
blackmail than it is today. Poland had to protest.
“Sure, but do we always have to be the first to protest? What have we
achieved? Now the Russians have circumvented not only Ukraine but also
us.”
Perhaps it wouldn’t have happened if the Norwegian project had gone
forward.
“That’s not so certain at all. There are no technical reasons for two
pipelines not to cross on the sea bottom. And the legal issues are
complicated.”
“Perhaps it was our plans for developing a pipe from Norway that were
the drop that overfilled the chalice for the Russians. They were
reacting with utmost irritation to any reports suggesting that the
Norwegian pipe would prevent them from developing a direct link
between Russia and Germany through the Baltic. They perceived such
suggestions almost as an attack against them. When the Norwegian
project was dumped, they decided to get even.”
The Baltic pipe will expose Poland to Russian blackmail.
“I wouldn’t see things in such bleak colours. Most of the gas
transported by the existing Yamal pipe will continue to be received by
other European countries. The Russians are pragmatic. They want to
keep selling gas to us.”
What can Poland do about the new pipe?
“Little. Perhaps there is a possibility of forking it somewhere in
Germany, from where gas could be transported to, for instance, the
Police chemical plan near the German border. But that’s all we can
do. We have no real influence over anything else.”
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

VIVA CELL HAS 217,OOO SUBSCRIBERS
YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 14. ARMINFO. Viva Cell obtained 217,000 subscribers
during its 2 and a half month of activity in the mobile communication
market of Armenia, Armenian Minister for Transport and Communication
said at the Parliament, Wednesday.
He said 85,000 of the subscribers are SIM Cards owners. To note, Viva
Cell launched activity in the country on July 1 2005. As of the first
half of 2005, the only rival ArmenTel had 257.7 thousand subscribers
of mobile communication.

Security pact chief praises Russian-Armenian military teamwork after
joint drill
RTR Russia TV, Moscow
14 Sep 05

[Presenter] A joint Russian-Armenian military exercise to rehearse
defensive combat skills as part of a combined force has passed in
Armenia [it reportedly began on 10 September and ended on the
13th]. The country’s president, Robert Kocharyan, and the
secretary-general of the Collective Security Treaty Organization,
Nikolay Bordyuzha, watched the exercise. This is how Bordyuzha
commented on the results of the drill.
[Bordyuzha] I reckon that this exercise went off successfully. What
matters is not the effect of explosions and gunfire that we see in the
field, but the rehearsal of coordination between units of the Armenian
and Russian armed forces.
[Presenter] The 10th joint drill involved over 1,000 service personnel
and about 300 items of military materiel, including four fighter jets
and six helicopters.

Armenia to quit talks if Baku raises Karabakh issue with UN – official
Mediamax news agency
14 Sep 05

YEREVAN
“Our position has remained unchanged – if Azerbaijan raises any issue
with the UN, Armenia will walk out of the Karabakh talks and Baku will
have to continue the talks directly with Stepanakert,” the press
secretary of the Armenian Foreign Ministry, Gamlet Gasparyan, said
today while commenting on the inclusion of “the situation in
Azerbaijan’s occupied territories” on the agenda of the 60th session
of the UN General Assembly.
The press secretary said that according to UN rules, this and other
issues that were not discussed during the 59th session were
automatically included on the agenda of the 60th session.
“However, Azerbaijan cannot take any steps and insist on the
discussion of the issue as this will be against the agreement reached
by the sides in the past,” Gasparyan said.

International Crisis Group’s proposals “unacceptable” – foreign minister
of the Nagornyy Karabakh Republic [NKR], Arman Melikyan said
Arminfo
14 Sep 05
YEREVAN
The proposals of the International Crisis Group (ICG) contain some
elements that are unacceptable to the Karabakh side, the foreign
minister of the Nagornyy Karabakh republic [NKR], Arman Melikyan, told
the NKR parliament today.
Melikyan said this while commenting on the ICG’s proposals at the
request of Gegam Bagdasaryan, MP from the bloc of the Armenian
Revolutionary Federation – Dashnaktsutyun and Movement 88. The ICG
suggested that the Armenian side should pull out of the [Azerbaijani]
territories under its control, allow the internally displaced people
to return home, resolve Nagornyy Karabakh’s status in 10-15 years,
etc.
Specifically, the ICG describes the Karabakh conflict as a
confrontation between Armenia and Azerbaijan. However, the minister
said the report contains some positive points as well. Specifically,
the ICG shows understanding of the sovereignty of the NKR and of the
international recognition of its independence, Melikyan said. He added
that the NKR foreign ministry will express its view on the report
soon.

THERE IS NO FORGIVING TO THOSE WHO COMMITTED ARMENIAN GENOCIDE:
GOVERNOR OF ST.PETERSBURG
YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 14. ARMINFO. An official delegation of
St.Petersburg led by the governor of the city Valentina Matvienko
visited today the memorial and museum of the victims of the Armenian
Genocide in Ottoman Turkey.
“We are shocked with the outrageous crime against humanity – the
Armenian Genocide. There is no forgiving to those who committed this
atrocity. The whole world should condemn this,” Matvienko wrote in the
visitors’ book. She also planted a fir-tree in the memorial
park. “This is a great honor to me,” she said.

COOPERATION AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED BETWEEN YEREVAN AND ST.PETERSBURG
YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 14. ARMINFO. A three-year cooperation agreement
will be signed between Yerevan and St.Petersburg, says Governor of
Leningrad region Valentina Matvienko who is presently visiting
Yerevan.
A special working group for cooperation programs development will be
set up in 2-3 months. “We are going to enlarge our cooperation with
Yerevan in various spheres – culture, science, IT and telecoms. For
this we have not only a historical base but also an economic
potential,” says Matvienko.
She says that Yerevan and St.Petersburg are interested in enlarging
their trade-economic ties. Today their trade turnover is only $9 mln
but this index has grown by 15% in the last year and is tending to
grow further.
Matvienko says that she has agreed with Mayor of Yerevan Yervand
Zakharyan on the construction of the House of St.Petersburg in
Yerevan and vice versa.
They have also agreed to organize a meeting of Armenian and Russian
businessmen for them to draft joint projects and consider investing
possibilities.
Matvienko is convinced that the Armenian community of St.Petersburg
will make a big contribution to the enlargement of
Yerevan-St.Petersburg cooperation. She says that the Year of Russia
in Armenia and the Days of St.Petersburg in Yerevan will be a good
stimulus for intensifying bilateral relations and implementing joint
projects.