Journal of Turkish Weekly
Sept 14 2005
Georgia: An Important State for the Stability in the Caucasus
by Kamer KASIM
After the collapse of the Soviet Union , became an independent state,
however, since its independence faced severe internal crisis and
security problems, which were the great obstacle for the
implementation of reforms and the success of the state-building
process. Having border with , , and and access to the Black Sea make
important transit routes to the Europe and Central Asia . Internal
conflicts and lack of stability prevented to utilize its location in
the Caucasus and delayed the possible regional cooperation, which
would be beneficial for all the countries in the region. Given the
fact that has lack of natural resources and weak economic structure,
it is very difficult for to exploit its geographical location without
support from the regional powers and the . In fact, is the one of the
biggest beneficiary of the aid in the world. has received
approximately $ 800 million aid from the . , the , and the are also
important donors for . To analyze the roots of ‘s continuing problems
and its difficulty to solve them despite the financial and political
support from the outside world; we need to look at ‘s frozen
conflicts and Russian role in the region.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union , the has emerged with 60
percent of the population and 76 percent of the territory of the
former Soviet Union and followed the policy of domination in the
former Soviet territories. The Soviet Union was a multinational
empire and its foreign policy agenda was designed accordingly. The
foreign policy of the had to be different than the Soviet Union .
Internal discussing about the direction of the Russian foreign policy
produced the two main groups: Atlanticists and Eurasianists.
Atlanticists considered as a Western nation and according to them
cooperation with the Western states would help to absorb Western
values, including democracy and human rights. Atlanticists believed
that must avoid assuming a leading role in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS). ‘s active role in the CIS would slow down
‘s integration with Western economic institutions.[1] Until the end
of 1992 Atlanticist view was dominant in Russian foreign policy and
they aimed to liberate the from the burdens of the empire and to make
a part of community of democratic states. In that period, ‘s
administration was concerned with transforming of the Russian economy
into a genuine market and to integrate with the Western system. As a
result, showed a lack of interest in its relations with the new
Caucasian and Central Asian republics.[2] Eurasianists criticized
Atlanticist view and they emphasized ‘s distinctive identity from the
West. The Eurasianist approach affected ‘s foreign policy after 1992,
and produced the policy of `Near Abroad’ (blizhneezarubezhe)
promoting ‘s relations with the CIS. Eurasianists believed that the
security of and its `Near Abroad’ was inseparable and should not
ignore the Caucasus and Central Asia .[3] As an indication of the
change in Russian foreign policy, the `foreign policy concept’ was
introduced in 1993, which emphasized actual and potential conflicts
of interests with the West and envisaged a more active role for in
security and economic affairs in the `Near Abroad’.[4] After that
used every tool to restore its dominance in the Caucasus and small
states in the region were severely affected by that policy. was one
of the worst affected states with the Russian policy in the region.
was rejected became a part of the CIS and Russian military presence
in the country. showed its ability to use internal dispute in
regional states in order to exert its influence and to keep its
military presence in newly independent states. was an easy target for
the Russian foreign policy, since has diverse minority groups and
fragile political and economic structures. As a result faced internal
turmoil and conflict with Abkhazia and Ossetia . Abkhazia was an
autonomous republic within and the conflict, erupted between
Georgians and Abkhazians.
The Russian forces played a role in supplying arms, training and
assisting Abkhazian units in direct combat.[5] The main reason for
the Russian support of Abkhazia was to put pressure on to enter the
CIS and allow Russian troops to be deployed on the Turkish-Georgian
border. Abkhazia’s strategic position along the Black Sea coast was
probably another reason for the Russian support of Abkhazia.[6] In
fact, the conflict forced to enter the CIS.[7] got four military
bases in . The Russian bases were in the most sensitive areas. One
was in Abkhazia and was believed to be a support point for the
Abkhazian separatists. Another was in the southwestern region of
Adjara, which was also in rebel hands. A third one was at
Akhalkalaki; the heart of a region populated mainly by Armenians. The
fourth one was on the outskirts of Tbilisi where there is also an air
base.[8]
On April 4, 1994, the `Declaration on Measures for a Political
Settlement of the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict’ was signed, even
though the resumption of armed conflict remained a future
possibility. According to this document, Abkhazia would have its own
constitution, parliament and government and appropriate state
symbols, such as an anthem, emblem and flag, and would maintain its
own internal sovereignty.[9] Georgian officials complained about the
agreement and Deputy Prime Minister, Nadareishvili, said that
`agreements signed between and Abkhazia had no legal basis and were
harmful for ‘.[10]
also faced Ossetia problem just after the independence. Some south
Ossetians wanted to unite with North Ossetia and become part of .
Having used Abkhazians and Ossetians, had the chance to meddle .
After Ossetians’ declaration of sovereignty, Georgian Parliament
abolished Ossetia ‘s autonomous status. 100,000 people became refugee
as a result of the fighting in Ossetia . In 1992 a
Russian-Georgian-Ossetian peacekeeping force was created in South
Ossetia .[11] Crisis gave a chance to intervene the internal affair
of . It might be argued that unification of south and north Ossetia
was not ‘s interest. Therefore benefited from the crisis, but it did
not also want Ossetians to reach their final objective.
Dispute between and continued about the Russian military bases in .
In 1995, the treaty was signed between and about permission to the
Russian military bases in . The Treaty was in effect for 25 years,
and automatically extent five years at a time if the parties did not
agree otherwise. However, the treaty was not ratified. In 1999,
Georgian Foreign Minister Menegarashvili stated that the reason for
the non-ratification of the 1995 treaty was that it was in fact
breaching the limits of the original Conventional Forces in Europe
(CFE) treaty. In March 2005 the Georgian parliament passed a
resolution ordering to withdraw from no later than 2006 and allowing
to exercise its right to take measures against the bases before May
2005.[12] According to the recent deal the withdrawal of the Russian
military bases from will be completed within 2008.
The developments after the 11th of September 2001 terrorist attacks
have a great impact in the Caucasus . The military presence in the
region increased the influence and in this aspect, together with ,
became an important state to fight against terrorism. The stability
in became more important for the . First, provides air link for the
troops to Central Asia and important check point in the Caucasus .
Second after 11 September and the War in in 2003 made crucial to the
realization of the East-West energy corridor and particularly the
transportation of Caspian oil to the world markets.
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline became partly operational on 25th of
May 2005. Therefore, the will not want any destabilization of , which
might prevent the flow of oil from the pipeline. Despite the fact
that was benefited from the international environment after the 11
September 2001, also used this environment for its benefit, which to
some extent put in a difficult situation. imposed more assertive
policy towards the Chechen conflict and blamed to provide shelter for
terrorists in Pankisi Valley . argued that Pankisi Valley became the
area as a training ground and arms smuggling route for the Chechen
rebels. The area also became home for approximately 7.000 Chechen
refugees and full control of the region is beyond the ‘s capacity.
aimed to established anti-terror centers in . However, considered
this suggestion as a Russian strategy to re-label its military bases
in as anti-Terror centers.
faced also tension in Javakheti province and its capital Ahalkelek,
where was home for Ahiska Turks and currently Armenian minority lives
there. The return of the Ahiska Turks to was discussed in the Council
of Europe within the framework of Georgian membership to the Council
of Europe. Ahiska Turks’ return to has not been realized yet. The
province is adjacent to and on the important transit route between
and . Separatist tendencies of the Armenian minority of the province
might destabilize and even the potential danger exists for the
creation of second `Karabakh’. During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict,
Armenians in Javakheti aided to the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians and
Nagorno-Karabakh problem is stimulated Armenian nationalism.[13]
After 11th September 2001 increased importance of in the region and
the military presence in reduced the risk of possible conflict in
Javakheti province.
After the completion of the Baku-Tbilisi-Cayhan pipeline Georgia
became a key state for Turkey, Azerbaijan and the US. Georgia’s
relations with Turkey improved on the political and economic front.
The project to construct railway link between Turkish city Kars to
Georgian city Ahalkelek would be important for improve the
transportation in the region. However, Armenia objected the
Kars-Ahalkelek railway link. Armenia argued that proposed railway
line would contribute the isolation of Armenia. The construction of
the Kars-Ahalkelek railway line and the rehabilitation of the
existing Tbilisi-Ahalkelek line need approximately $ 400 million.
Georgia’s significance will grow in the region and the US and
Turkey’s assistance will continue in the future. Political stability
in the Caucasus will be very difficult to achieve in the near future.
The increase of political and economic stability in Caucasus
countries will contribute the regional stability. After the `velvet
revolution’, the positive atmosphere emerged for the stability of
Georgia and stability will create the suitable atmosphere for the
solution of Georgia’s `Frozen Disputes’.
——————————————————————————–
[1] Robert H. Donaldson and Joseph L. Nogee, The Foreign Policy Of
Russia Changing Systems and Enduring Interests, (London and New York:
M.E. Sharpe, 1998), pp. 112-113.
[2] For example, Foreign Minister Kozyrev first visited Central Asia
in April 1992, by which time US Secretary of State James Baker had
already been there three times on official visits. See, Graham E.
Fuller, `Russia and Central Asia…’ pp. 125-127.
[3] Roy Allison, Millitary Forces in the Soviet Successor States,
Adelphi Paper, 280, (London: The International Institute for
Strategic Studies, 1993), p. 46. See also A. Kortunov, `Russia, the
`Near Abroad’, and the West’, G. Lapidus (ed.), The New Russia:
Troubled Transformation, (Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 157-160
[4] Neil Malcolm, `The New Russian…’, p. 31. See also Oleg Kovalev,
Foreign Policy Belief Systems of Post Soviet Russian Elites,
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University Of Delaware, Summer 1996, pp.
158-222.
[5]Although, generally, Russia rejected the involvement of the
Russian troops in the conflict, Russian warplanes bombed Georgian
positions at the Gumsta front. It was argued by Russia that they were
provoked by the Georgian artillery shelling of the Russian military
laboratory in Eshera. Ibid, p. 74 Elizabeth Fuller, RFE/RL, 1 October
1993
[6] Ali Fuat Borovali, `The Caucasus within a Historical-Strategic
Matrix: Russia, Iran And Turkey’, Dis Politika (Foreign Policy), Vol.
18, 1994, p. 33.
[7] Viacheslav A. Chirikba, `Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict and its
Aftermath’, Mehmet Tutuncu (ed.), Caucasus: War and Peace, (The
Netherlands: SOTA Haarlem, 1998), p. 75.
[8] Stephen Kinzer, `Defiant Satellite Nation Finds Russia’s Orbit
Inescapable’, Sunday, 3 May 1998.
[9] Chirikba, `Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict…’, p. 79
[10] Interfax, 16 September 1996. After the series of talks, both
sides reached another agreement at the end of October 1998. Abkhazian
Newsletter, 5 December 1998.
[11] Suzanne Goldenberg, Pride of Small Nations, (London and New
Jersey: Zed books, 1994), pp. 105-107.
[12] See Johanna Popjanevski, `Russian Trop Withdrawal In Light of
International Law’, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and
International Studies
[13] Hasan Kanbolat ve Nazmi Gül, `The Geopolitics and Quest for
Autonomy of the Armenians of Javakheti (Georgia) and Krasnodar
(Russia) in the Caucasus’, Armenian Studies (Ermeni Araþtýrmalarý),
Issue 2, June-July-August 2001, ss. 186-210. For the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, See Kamer Kasým, `The Nagorno-Karabakh
Conflict, Caspian Oil and Regional Powers’, Bülent Gökay (ed.), The
Politics of Caspian Oil, London: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 185-198. Kamer
Kasým, `The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict From Its Inception To The Peace
Process’, Armenian Studies, Issue 2, June-July-August, 2001, pp.
170-185. Kamer Kasým, `The Transportation of Caspian Oil and Regional
Stability’, Journal of Southern Europe and The Balkans, Volume: 4,
Number 1, May 2002, pp. 36-45.
Assoc. Prof. Dr. Kamer KASIM: Abant Izzet Baysal University,
Department of International Relations and Member of ISRO Science
Committee.