Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Thursday, March 23, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 57
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Russian troops sweep Dagestan, resulting in widespread anger
*Kyiv now tilts toward Russia on Transnistria issue
*Tbilisi to receive gas deliveries from Azerbaijan
DESECRATION OF KORAN COULD PROVOKE ATTACK IN DAGESTAN
On March 3 Russian security officials swept through several villages in
the Khasavyurt district of Dagestan, North Caucasus.
According to RIA-Dagestan, “Officers of the Ministry of Interior Affairs
[MVD] and the Federal Security Service [FSB] are combing the Khasavyurt
area adjacent to Chechnya with the support of the 102nd Motorized Rifle
Division, helicopters, and armored vehicles.” The Ministry also reported
that a Kalashnikov assault rifle, two hand grenades, and 2,000
ammunition cartridges had been found in the village of Novosasitli in a
house owned by a relative of Rasul Maksharipov, a Dagestani insurgent
leader who was killed last summer (RIA-Dagestan, March 3).
Mopping-up operations, house searches, and arrests of suspected rebel
sympathizers happen daily in Dagestan, but this time Russian military
forces, not local police, took the lead, a tactical decision that
immediately caused trouble.
On March 10, Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie, a website linked to the Muslims of
Russia organization, posted an open letter from residents of
Novosasitli. The letter revealed the details of the sweep and contained
information not mentioned in the official report. Before they started
the mopping-up operation, residents claimed, Russian soldiers forced all
of the residents to leave their homes. The locals complained that the
servicemen were drunk, stole money and jewels during the sweep, and
broke furniture in many houses. One officer threatened to have his
soldiers rape a female village, adding that the attack would be even
worse than “what the Americans do with Muslims in Guantanamo or Abu
Gharib” (Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie, March 10). In addition, people in
Novosasitli insist that all of the weapons found in the village had been
planted by the military to justify their violent raid.
Yet all of these alleged crimes pale in comparison to one specific
incident that might have serious negative consequences not only for
Dagestan, but also for Russia’s reputation before the whole Muslim
world. At the home of Makhach Khabibov, Makhsharipov’s relative, Russian
officers deliberately desecrated a Koran. According to the letter by the
villagers, a Russian officer pulled the holy book from a shelf and
methodically began to rip out its pages. Then he threw it on the floor
and walked over it. Chernovik, a Dagestani newspaper, confirmed this
information. A correspondent from the newspaper saw the desecrated Koran
himself when he visited the village (newsru.com, March 16).
This provocation was so extreme that even some official Muslim leaders
of Russia, who usually look the other way when officials violate the
rights of ordinary Muslims in the country, protested.
At the end of last week, Mufti Mukkadas Bibarsov, head of the Muslim
Spiritual Directorate of the Volga Region, said that this act of
desecration must receive exactly the same strong condemnation from the
government and Russian society as did the recent Danish cartoons
lampooning the Prophet Mohammad (Islam.ru, March 16).
Mufti Nafigulla Ashirov, head of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate for
the Asian part of Russia, echoed these words, arguing that anyone,
Muslim or non-Muslim, should be angry at such actions and the dangers
they pose to the unity and stability of the Russian Federation
(Islam.ru, March 17).
Leaders of the MVD forces hurried to disavow their involvement in the
incident. A source in the Command called the desecration of the Koran
“a serious case” and said that an investigation into the incident was
underway (Ekho Moskvy, March 16).
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the desecration of the Koran was done
on impulse. The witnesses say that the entire sweep was well organized
and that Russians in civilian clothes (probably FSB officers)
coordinated the actions of the Interior forces. Given the high level of
advance planning, the provocative behavior of the servicemen, as well as
the desecration of the Koran, could have been premeditated. The
residents of Novosasitli said that, before the sweep began, the MVD
troops fired guns in the air and helicopters flew over the village,
which made the locals feel especially nervous and terrified. The
Dagestani police and even the republic’s deputy minister of interior
affairs were forcibly kept away from the settlement during the sweep
(Islamskoe Vozrozhdenie, March 10).
The rough manner of the mopping-up operation resembles the massive
sweeps that took place in Chechnya from 2000 through 2003. The aim of
those “zachistkas” was to terrorize the Chechen population in order to
make them stop supporting the insurgency. The result was exactly the
opposite, however, since this brutal strategy only fueled resistance.
The same reaction could happen in Dagestan, where the local insurgency
had already gained significant public support.
“The desecration of the Koran has inspired serious public discontent in
Dagestan,” says Abdurashid Saidov, a respected Dagestani journalist. “No
doubt such blasphemy will stimulate the youth to join the rebels. And it
should be clearly understood that actions such as the desecration of
sacred Muslim items and tormenting unarmed civilians, including women,
will not help security officials to frighten the Dagestanis, but, on the
contrary, this can only lead to a second Nalchik in the largest republic
of the North Caucasus. I do not think the Kremlin will gain anything for
itself if what happened in Nalchik is repeated in Dagestan.” On October
13, 2005, insurgents swept into Nalchik, the capital of
Kabardino-Balkaria, capturing key facilities and fighting local security
forces. The authorities attempted to seal off the town, but the rebels
managed to escape.
The Russian military does not listen to people like Saidov, operating
under a different logic. “Religious fanatics understand only the
language of force,” says General Yuri Nikolaev, a former army commander
in the North Caucasus (see EDM, June 23, 2005).
Time will tell whose arguments are closer to reality.
–Andrei Smirnov
UKRAINE BREAKING RANKS WITH EUROPE AND MOLDOVA ON TRANSNISTRIA
Ukraine’s March 3 decision to cooperate with the European Union and
Moldova on Transnistria is proving short-lived. On that day, at the EU’s
insistence, Ukraine began enforcing a new border and customs regime
agreed with Moldova on the Transnistrian sector of the Ukraine-Moldova
border, thus closing Europe’s largest “black hole” of contraband and
illicit trafficking. However, the March 15 meeting in Moscow of
Ukraine’s National Security and Defense Council Secretary (NSDC),
Anatoly Kinakh, with his Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov, marked
another turning point in Ukraine’s policy (if decisions reversible every
few weeks amount to a policy).
That meeting’s officially reported agenda included only two items:
preparing the first session of the presidential Putin-Yushchenko
commission (which has never met since its creation on paper more than a
year ago) and Transnistria (Interfax, March 15). The seemingly peculiar
linkage of these two items reflects the Ukrainian presidency’s and
NSDC’s long-standing attempts to elicit positive pre-electoral signals
from Moscow in return for Kyiv’s alignment with Moscow on Transnistria.
Indeed, on the eve of the Ivanov-Kinakh meeting, Russian Minister of
Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov publicly asked Ukraine to return to the
spirit of the December 15 Putin-Yushchenko declaration on Transnistria
(whereby the Ukrainian president had fallen into line with Putin, hoping
to induce him to visit Yushchenko in Ukraine ahead of the March 26
parliamentary elections). Lavrov further recalled the February
joint “inspection” visit to Transnistria by Igor Ivanov’s and Kinakh’s
deputies, who demonstratively exonerated Transnistria of suspicions
regarding arms production and contraband (Interfax, March 14).
That Lavrov-invoked spirit seems to be back after Kinakh’s Moscow visit.
Moscow’s consent to open the prospect of a Putin-Yushchenko meeting in
the joint communiqué is a modest but real “positive signal” just ahead
of Ukraine’s March 26 vote.
On March 17 and 20, Ukraine’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs forwarded two
notes to Moldova’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in which it complained
of economic damage and political complications that Ukraine is
experiencing as a result of the new border and customs regime on the
Transnistria sector. Between the lines, the notes expressed discontent
with Chisinau’s failure to explain the nature of the measures introduced
on March 3 to the public in Ukraine and Transnistria and hinted that
Ukraine cannot be expected to adhere to these measures much longer.
Indeed the Ukrainian Ministry proposes in one of the notes that the new
border and customs regime be “temporarily suspended” after Ukraine’s
March 26 elections. It further proposes that Ukrainian customs clear
Transnistria cargos in situations where the March 3 regime stipulates
Moldovan clearance of those cargos.
Meanwhile, Kyiv is already punching some holes in that regime
politically and physically. Politically, Kyiv is undermining the basic
tenet of the European Union’s initiative to introduce international
legal norms and standards on this border. That tenet holds that all
deliberations and decisions regarding this border are strictly a
bilateral matter between Moldova and Ukraine. The EU’s Border Assistance
Mission (EUBAM) is present on the border and actively engaged in
consultation, advisory work, and monitoring, but in no way substitutes
for Ukraine and Moldova, the sovereign states qualified to make policy
decisions on that border under international law. Thus, the EU opposes
any transfer of deliberations and decisions from the Ukraine-Moldova
bilateral framework into a format that would include Transnistria and
Russia as well. By contrast, Moscow and Tiraspol call for a format of
all
“interested parties,” including themselves on an equal footing with
Ukraine and Moldova, to settle the issue.
Kyiv is now inching toward accepting that Russian view. On March 16,
Yushchenko authorized an invitation to Transnistria’s self-styled
“foreign affairs minister,” Valery Litskay, for consultations in Odessa;
and Yushchenko personally invited Transnistria’s leader Igor Smirnov on
March 17 for a meeting in Kyiv. Litskay declined, saying that he would
only attend together with the Russian side. Smirnov accepted in
principle, but only if the agenda and outcome of a meeting with
Yushchenko are well prepared in advance (translation: if Kyiv agrees to
suspend the border and customs regime that were introduced on March 3).
Following this humiliating episode, Kyiv continued consulting with
Moscow.
Beginning with the night of March 16-17, Ukrainian border and customs
authorities, on instructions from Kyiv, are from time to time allowing
road transport to enter Transnistria directly from Ukrainian territory,
bypassing Moldovan customs. Such passage violates the regime introduced
on March 3, which requires such transport to be detoured from Ukrainian
territory to Moldovan customs checkpoints, there to undergo registration
and clearance before proceeding to their destinations in Transnistria.
Some of those cargos are food products, some of which are intended to be
smuggled back into Ukraine or redirected to Moldova; others are scrap
iron for the Rabnita steel plant, Transnistria’s most lucrative official
enterprise; and many of the cargos are imports of the Sheriff
conglomerate, the hub of Transnistria’s shadow economy.
Official statements from Kyiv portray the passage of such transport as a
welcome sign that Transnistria’s authorities are lifting the blockade
they had installed after March 3 on the border with Ukraine. In reality,
Tiraspol relaxed its blockade on the condition that Ukrainian
authorities collude in bypassing Moldovan customs. Tiraspol had stopped
all transport from Ukraine to retaliate economically against Kyiv,
generate political pressure from Ukrainian interest groups on the
government to lift or dilute the new border regime, foster a siege
atmosphere in Transnistria, and furnish a basis for Russian actions to
lift the purported “blockade.” Tiraspol’s move appears to be partly
successful against wavering Ukrainian authorities.
(Interfax-Ukraine, Moldpres, Olvia-Press, March 13-21)
–Vladimir Socor
GEORGIA EXTRICATING FROM GAZPROM’S BEAR HUG
The winter now ending was almost certainly the last one during which
Georgia had to face Gazprom’s commercial blackmail and supply cutoffs.
Within the coming months, Georgia will begin receiving Azerbaijani gas
through the Shah Deniz-Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (Turkey) transit pipeline
and will also have an opportunity to receive small volumes of Iranian
gas. This new situation should finally end Georgia’s dependence on
Gazprom and constant risk of losing the country’s gas transport and
distribution systems to the Russian state monopoly.
Deliveries from Azerbaijan’s offshore Shah Deniz gas field are scheduled
to begin in September 2006, reaching 20 billion cubic meters annually to
several consumer countries by the end of the decade. That figure, almost
double the initial projection, rests on revised estimates of the field’s
recoverable reserves, which turned out to be far richer than initially
estimated. The consortium for extraction and transport consists of:
British Petroleum as technical operator and Norway’s Statoil as
commercial operator, with stakes of 25.5% each; Azerbaijan’s State Oil
Company, Total of France, and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC),
with 10% each; a partnership of Russia’s Lukoil and Italy’s Agip with
10% between them, and Turkish Petroleum with 9%.
Georgia is to receive 300 million cubic meters of gas annually in
compensation for the transit service and to purchase another 500 million
cubic meters annually for a deeply discounted price fixed at per one
thousand cubic meters. The aggregate volume of 800 million cubic meters
represents 60% of Georgia’s current annual requirement of gas.
Significantly and properly, the arrangement whereby the consortium pays
Georgia with gas, in lieu of cash, for the transit service is deemed
entirely compatible with market economics. Gazprom and the Kremlin
denounced a similar arrangement, whereby Ukraine was receiving under
priced Russian gas in lieu of cash for the transit service until January
1, as “anti-market” and provided an excuse for their predatory move
against Ukraine.
The Georgian government now seeks to increase Georgia’s guaranteed
annual intake of Shah Deniz gas, so as to cover at least part of the
remaining 40% of the country’s current requirement. The requirement will
increase as Georgia’s economic growth accelerates. With Gazprom a risky
option for meeting that requirement, Georgia is looking at the
possibility of importing small volumes of gas from Iran. Georgia began
such imports in late January, following the never-explained bomb blasts
in Russia’s North Caucasus that sabotaged two Russian gas pipelines,
interrupting the supply to Georgia and Armenia. The national gas
companies of Georgia and Iran signed an agreement at that point whereby
Georgia would receive 2 million cubic meters of gas per day from Iran,
priced at 0 per one thousand cubic meters. That gas reached Georgia via
Azerbaijan, through the reconstructed small-capacity pipeline
Astara-Gazi Mahomed-Gazakh. That emergency arrangement opened the way to
exploratory discussions with Iran toward a more stable agreement to help
meet Georgia’s annual requirements. Meanwhile, 10% of the Shah Deniz gas
to reach Georgia will count as “Iranian” (NIOC’s share in that project).
On March 20, Georgia’s Ambassador to Armenia, Revaz Gachechiladze,
declared Georgia’s interest in receiving Iranian gas via Armenia. Both
Armenia and Georgia could benefit by enlarging the diameter of the
Iran-Armenia pipeline currently under construction, Gachechiladze
remarked (Armenian Radio, March 20). The pipeline’s diameter of 700
millimeters barely meets Armenia’s own needs. It was initially projected
at 1,420 millimeters with an eye to markets beyond Armenia, primarily
Georgia; but Moscow prevailed on Yerevan to reduce the scope of the
project so as to maintain Gazprom’s dominance. Under a 2005 bilateral
agreement, Iran will supply Armenia with 36 billion cubic meters of gas
over a 20-year period, with an option to extend the contract period to
25 years and the volume of supplies to 47 billion cubic meters.
Any gas reaching Armenia and Georgia from Iran is almost certainly not
“Iranian,” but rather originating in Turkmenistan and re-exported via
northern Iran. Turkmenistan is supplying northern Iran’s market as well.
Under an agreement signed last month, Iran will import 14 billion cubic
meters of Turkmen gas in 2006, up from 9 billion cubic meters in 2005.
The deliveries in 2006 will for the first time fill the Korpeje-Kurt Kui
pipeline — the sole non-Russian line out of Turkmenistan — to full
capacity. Part of the additional volume is almost certainly intended for
re-export by Iran to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and possibly Georgia. This
year, Turkmen gas costs per one thousand cubic meters at Iran’s border,
up from previously.
Gazprom may well retain some market share in Georgia beyond 2007, but
without the leverage to force Georgia to hand over its worn out trunk
pipeline or distribution systems. At the moment, Gazprom persists with
the offer to supply Georgia with gas at a still “favorable” rate of 0
per one thousand cubic meters (up from ), if Georgia locks itself into
permanent dependence by selling the trunk pipeline to Gazprom for a
deceptively tempting 0 million and throws the main gas distribution
systems into the deal. Some Georgian government officials seriously
considered such a possibility, but three factors have recently doomed
it: Gazprom’s unreliability as demonstrated by the January-February
supply crisis, Georgia’s receipt of U.S. Millennium Challenge Account
funds (partly earmarked for the trunk pipeline’s rehabilitation), and
the Shah Deniz-Erzurum pipeline about to come on stream.
Gazprom was also unsuccessful in targeting Georgia’s largest gas
distribution company, Tbilgazi, for takeover. Insolvent and heavily
indebted, the municipally owned Tbilgazi is being restructured under the
just-appointed General Director Bidzina Chkonia, hitherto the Millennium
Challenge Account’s Georgia coordinator for energy. Tbilisi is
negotiating with Kazakhstan’s gas transport company, KazTransGaz, to
privatize and overhaul Tbilgazi.
(Rustavi-2 Television, March 16, 20; Kavkas-Press, March 15; Interfax,
March 14 – 17, 20; Imedi TV, March 6; see EDM, January 23, 25)
–Vladimir Socor
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PRESS RELEASE April 10, 2006
Embassy of the Republic of Armenia
2225 R Street, NW, Washington, DC, 20008
Tel: 202-319-1976, x. 348; Fax: 202-319-2982
Email: [email protected] ;Web:
Vahram Nercissiantz Addresses Carnegie Endowment on Armenian Economy
On April 6, 2006, Mr. Vahram Nercissiantz, Chief Economic Adviser to the
President of Armenia, presented the current state and future prospects of
the Armenian economy at the Carnegie Endowment in Washington, D.C. In his
address, entitled `Armenian Economic Reforms: Results and Challenges,’ Mr.
Nercissiantz explained the nature of economic reforms implemented in Armenia
since independence and presented its main achievements, such as economic
growth and liberalization. He noted that Armenia was ahead of neighboring
Georgia and Azerbaijan in terms of economic indicators even though Armenia’s
economic growth occurred without the benefit of oil resources or transit
opportunities, and in the presence of economic blockade.
Mr. Nercissiantz also noted that Armenia’s economic progress is acknowledged
by the international financial institutions, as well as in the annual Index
of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation and the Wall Street Journal.
The latter ranked Armenia considerably higher than that of any CIS country
or any of its neighbors. In the Q&A following his remarks, Mr. Nercissiantz
also addressed issues of energy security, foreign trade, and cooperation
with the Millennium Challenge Corporation.
The presentation was attended by economic experts from Washington-based
think tanks, representatives from the World Bank, IMF, State Department,
Department of Commerce, MCC, as well as the diplomatic corps.

PRESS OFFICE
Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern)
630 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10016
Contact: Jake Goshert, Coordinator of Information Services
Tel: (212) 686-0710 Ext. 60; Fax: (212) 779-3558
E-mail: [email protected]
Website:
April 10, 2006
___________________
ARMENIAN SCHOOL PROGRAM MARKS ANNIVERSARY OF ALPHABET
They took the stage with pride on Saturday, March 18, 2006, celebrating not
just an historic anniversary, but also an entire culture.
Dedicated to the 1,600th anniversary of the creation of the Armenian
alphabet, students from New York’s Khrimian Lyceum program of the Diocese of
the Armenian Church of America (Eastern) performed in “Dagh oo Daghant”, a
showcase of Armenian language, culture, performance, and fine arts.
The Khrimian Lyceum is a monthly educational program for graduates of local
parish Armenian schools. In addition to the program in New York City, the
Diocese offers Khrimian Lyceum sessions in Boston and Chicago. Along with
teaching Armenian language and history, the program also focuses on
expanding the students’ cultural and artistic expression, as well as other
public-speaking and leadership skills.
“These are the young leaders who will be tomorrow’s Armenian community
leaders and professionals, painters and singers, dancers and musicians,”
said Gilda Buchakjian-Kupelian, the Diocese’s coordinator of Armenian
studies who oversees the program. “To see their confidence grow as they go
before a crowd, speaking and singing in Armenian, is wonderful. It shows
their true dedication to the Armenian culture.”
More than 150 friends, family, and community members attended the evening of
poetry, song, dance, music, and theater. Also on display were student
drawings and paintings inspired by the work of Toros Roslin and Ayvazovsky,
thanks to art teacher Susan Kirby.
Two young students, Lori Khrimian and Laurie Dabaghian, were mistresses of
ceremonies for the evening. The program featured a choir of young singers,
conducted by Maro Partamian, and accompanied by Florence Avakian on the
piano, with soloists Anita Apanossian and Markrete Krikorian. Rosine
Ghichlian and Nayad Manukian read poems in Armenian about their living
native tongue. Deanna Gulmezian played “Vagharshabadi bar” on the piano.
The students performed two traditional Armenian dances, under the guidance
of dance instructor Nayra Lazarian and with thanks to the Shushi Dance
Ensemble of St. Vartan Cathedral, which provided costumes.
There was also a theatrical presentation based on Goriun’s “Vark Mashdots,”
directed by Vartan Garniki and featuring performances by Nayad Marukian,
Lori Khrimian, Sareen Jebejian, and Christine Shahian. The story traced the
invention of the alphabet from Mesrob Mashdots to the spread of Christianity
throughout Armenia.
Khrimian Lyceum teachers also performed, with Shakeh Kadehjian reciting
readings in Armenian and Maro Partamian singing songs by Gomidas.
— 4/10/06
E-mail photos available on request. Photos also viewable in the News and
Events section of the Eastern Diocese’s website,
PHOTO CAPTION (1): Students from the Diocesan Khrimian Lyceum in New York
City recite in Armenian during Dagh oo Daghant, the talent show held at the
Diocesan Center on March 18, 2006.
PHOTO CAPTION (2): Maro Partamian, one of the instructors of the Khrimian
Lyceum, leads a chorus of young singers during Dagh oo Daghant.
PHOTO CAPTION (3): The instructors of the Khrimian Lyceum, the Diocesan
educational program for graduates of local Armenian schools.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Wednesday, March 15, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 51
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Kyiv revisits RosUkrEnergo’s role in Gazprom deal
*Will Russian become a second state language in Ukraine?
*Ethnic conflict flares in Samtskhe-Javakheti region of Georgia
ROSUKRENERGO SNEAKING BACK INTO UKRAINE
Pending the March 26 parliamentary elections, official Kyiv has shelved
the deeply damaging gas deals it signed on January 4 and February 2 with
Gazprom and its offshoot RosUkrEnergo. President Viktor Yushchenko and
those close associates who confused him into advocating for these deals
seemed prepared to ignore the widespread criticism, until unpublicized
U.S. intercessions finally caused the presidency to delay any decision
until a new government is formed and to exclude the shadowy RosUkrEnergo
from whatever agreements are eventually reached with the Russian side.
Yushchenko has dropped the subject altogether since mid-February.
However, indirect attempts seem to be under way to keep those deals
alive and set the stage for reactivating them after the elections. On
March 13, Gazprom’s deputy chairman Alexander Medvedev declared that it
will be RosUkrEnergo [not Ukraine] that will pay Gazprom for the gas
consumed by Ukraine in January above the volume stipulated for that
month; and that the price of that gas will be 0 per one thousand cubic
meters — i.e., under the terms of the January 4 agreement. In what
looks like a parallel move, Naftohaz Ukrainy chairman Oleksiy Ivchenko
declared that Kyiv would pay RosUkrEnergo [not Gazprom] for that same
volume of gas, at the price of per one thousand cubic meters — again,
under the January 4 agreement (Inter TV, March 13).
Taken together, these moves seem designed to keep the January 4
agreement alive, implement at least some of its provisions, and cement
RosUkrEnergo’s role as intermediary. If this were done, Kyiv would
severely weaken its case for dropping out of that agreement after the
election.
One week earlier, Ukraine’s National Energy Regulatory Commission
awarded a five-year license to the UkrGazEnergo closed joint-stock
company to deliver gas on Ukraine’s internal market. UkrGazEnergo is a
joint venture of RosUkrEnergo and Naftohaz Ukrainy and was created by
the secret February 4 agreement that triggered a storm of criticism when
it was leaked. Thus, Gazprom — acting via RosUkrEnergo/UkrGazEnergo —
is capturing a share of Ukraine’s market and access to the internal
infrastructure. The Regulatory Commission’s move also seems designed to
make certain that RosUkrEnergo via UkrGazEnergo enters Ukraine to stay
(Interfax-Ukraine, March 9).
The Regulatory Commission’s chairman happens to be a candidate for
parliament for the Party of Regions. However, support for RosUkrEnergo
and UkrGazEnergo by a handful of strategically placed officials clearly
cuts across partisan lines, given the fact that Ivchenko is Yushchenko’s
choice for Naftohaz chief and his political ally in the Our Ukraine
bloc.
Kyiv now apparently seeks to regain the chance to buy Turkmen gas
directly, without corrupt intermediaries, possibly in the second half of
2006 or at least in 2007. Ashgabat demands repayment of Ukrainian
arrears as a pre-condition to resuming negotiations on a supply
agreement. Ivchenko and Fuel and Energy Minister Ivan Plachkov lost that
opportunity in the final months of 2005 — the negotiations went down to
the wire until December 28 — by stonewalling on a debt-settlement
agreement or even denying the existence of the debt. Kyiv now seems to
change that negotiating approach and certainly the negotiator.
On March 10-12, a delegation led by Naftohaz Ukrainy commercial director
Anatoly Popadyuk held what appear to be conclusive debt-settlement
negotiations in Ashgabat. The delegation acknowledged that Ukraine owed
9 million, most of it for Turkmen gas delivered in 2005, as Ashgabat had
all along claimed. At the end of Popadyuk’s visit, the Ukrainian side
apparently disbursed .5 million in cash, pledged to pay another million
also in cash, and made a commitment to supply million worth of
Ukrainian goods, including million worth of steel pipes for
Turkmenistan’s oil and gas industry (Turkmen Foreign Ministry press
release, Turkmenistan.ru, March 12).
This result constitutes major progress toward removing an issue that has
poisoned Ukrainian-Turkmen relations, restricting Kyiv’s margin of
maneuver vis-à-vis Gazprom. As recently as February 17-18, Plachkov
and Ivchenko were stonewalling on the debt issue in their talks with
Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov in Ashgabat. Their stance may have
reflected their role as the main authors on the Ukrainian side of the
January 4 and February 2 agreements with Russia. Back in Kyiv from
Ashgabat, Ivchenko told mass media that the debt “does not exist” and
accused Turkmenistan and its president of “displaying Eastern perfidy,”
“humiliating Ukraine and damaging its image.” Ivchenko urged Ukraine to
“renounce Turkmen gas altogether” and stop holding talks with
Turkmenistan, and he threatened to sue Turkmenistan in the Stockholm
Arbitration Court for breach of contract. He assured the public that
Ukraine would in any case receive gas for per one thousand cubic meters
(RosUkrEnergo’s price), but did not explain the reasons for such
confidence (One Plus One Television [Kyiv], February 20).
Just as Ivchenko’s statements seemed to contradict Yushchenko’s February
14 announcement on shelving the deals with RosUkrEnergo, so the March 13
convergent statements by Medvedev and Ivchenko and the Energy Regulatory
Commission’s licensing of UkrGazEnergo raise questions about who is in
charge of Ukraine’s energy policy and about the authority of the
president’s word with some of his officials (see EDM, February 16, 17,
23).
–Vladimir Socor
UKRAINIAN OPPOSITION PARTIES CAMPAIGN FOR RUSSIAN LANGUAGE
The Russian language issue has been employed in the run-up to the March
26 Ukrainian parliamentary election probably more actively than in any
past poll. Unlike in previous elections, where marginal groups and
low-key candidates played the Russian-language card, now such
heavyweights as the frontrunner Party of Regions (PRU) has made
elevating the status of Russian a key promise.
“This issue has a significant conflict potential, that is why it is very
tempting to use it in elections,” Andriy Bychenko of the Razumkov Center
think tank said, presenting the results of a December 2005 nationwide
opinion poll on the attitudes toward the Russian language. The poll
showed that more than 60% of Ukrainians are in favor of raising the
status of Russian, including 37% who believe that Ukrainian and Russian
should have equal status. The 1996 Constitution, however, does not
provide for any status for Russian whatsoever, but stipulates that
Ukrainian is the sole state language. Hence the high conflict potential
and temptation to abuse the issue.
Feelings about the Russian language are especially strong in eastern and
southern Ukraine, including Crimea. In those areas, according to an
April 2005 poll by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and the
Kyiv-based Sociology Institute, support for the idea of making Russian
either a second state language or an official regional language hovers
around 90%. More than half of western Ukrainians are against this,
according to the same poll.
The parties that regard the Russophone eastern and southern areas as
their strongholds have been capitalizing on what they describe as the
authorities’ failure to address the Russian-language issue. In the
current campaign, all those parties represent the opposition, while the
national-minded west and center of Ukraine have stayed loyal to the
parties that used to form the Orange Revolution coalition. Playing the
Russian-language card is nothing new for the radical leftists — the
Communist Party (CPU) and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSPU) of
Natalya Vitrenko. Elevating the status of Russian to a second state
language has always been among their main slogans. In the current
campaign, however, they have at least two very strong rivals playing in
the same field: the United Social Democratic Party (SDPUO) of Viktor
Medvedchuk, who was a key aide to former president Leonid Kuchma, and
the Party of Regions (PRU) of former presidential candidate Viktor
Yanukovych.
One of the main slogans of the SDPUO’s campaign reads: “Against NATO,
for the Single Economic Space with Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, and
for the Russian language.” The text reads more like a communist leaflet.
The appearance of strong rivals playing in the same field is arguably
the main reason behind dwindling popular support for the CPU and the
PSPU. One telling example is the Russophone Donetsk Region, which was
the main electoral base of the CPU a decade ago, but now is the
stronghold of the PRU.
PRU leader Viktor Yanukovych, who routinely spoke Ukrainian when he was
prime minister in 2002-2004, ostensibly speaks Russian on his campaign
trips. The PRU’s campaign brochure “50 questions and answers” promises a
nationwide referendum in order to give Russian “the state status, on par
with Ukrainian,” as “56% of Ukrainian citizens routinely use the Russian
language in everyday life.”
The PRU collected 300,000 signatures for a local referendum on the
status of the Russian language earlier this year in Crimea, which is,
ironically, the only region where Russian actually enjoys a special
status, according to the local constitution. Based on this, on February
22 the Crimean parliament voted to hold a local non-binding referendum
on the status of Russian on March 26, to coincide with the general
elections. The Ukrainian Justice Ministry, however, warned that the
referendum would be illegal.
For the moment, it is not clear whether the referendum will be held at
all. It is clear, however, that it will have no legal consequences,
which its organizers readily admit, saying that their goal is just to
raise public awareness of the problem. The Crimean Tatars, who back the
government in Kyiv, will ignore the Russian language referendum, their
leader, Mustafa Dzhemilev, told Glavred web site.
On March 6, the city council of Kharkiv in northeastern Ukraine voted to
grant Russian the status of a regional language. President Yushchenko’s
legal adviser, Mykola Poludyony, said the council’s decision was
illegal, as the council had acted outside its remit. Kyiv’s official
position is that there is no Russian language problem. “This is
speculation by certain politicians ahead of the election,” Yushchenko
said on a trip to western Ivano-Frankivsk last month. On March 11, in
his regular weekly radio address to the nation, Yushchenko warned
against “provoking conflicts around the language issue in the heat of
the election campaign.”
(LIGABiznesInform, May 5, 2005; proUA.com, February 22;
Interfax-Ukraine, February 24; Glavred.info, March 3; Itar-Tass, UT1,
March 6; UNIAN, February 7, March 7; Ukrainian radio, March 11)
–Oleg Varfolomeyev
KARABAKH CONFLICT HANGS OVER GEORGIA’S ARMENIAN-POPULATED REGIONS
Tensions are running high in Tsalka and Akhalkalaki, two regions of
Georgia that are predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians.
The latest problem began in Tsalka on March 9, when a trivial brawl at a
restaurant between local Armenians and Georgians resulted in the death
of Gevork Gevorkian, a 24-year-old Armenian, and injuries to four other
Armenians. However, Maria Mikoyan of the Armenian Union in Georgia (Nor
Serund) claimed that the fight began because the Georgian young men were
irritated by the Armenian music playing in the restaurant.
Although police have arrested five Georgian suspects, about 500 Armenian
protesters gathered outside the Tsalka administrative building on March
10, calling for prosecution of the suspects. On March 11, the upheaval
spread to Akhalkalaki, a town in the predominately Armenian populated
Samtskhe-Javakheti region in southern Georgia.
About 300 participants in the Akhalkalaki rally were Tsalka Armenians.
They later took their appeal to the Georgian government and demanded
that Tbilisi “stop the policy of pressure by fueling interethnic
tensions” and “stop the settlement of other nationalities in
Armenian-populated regions.” Later, the protesters voiced demands
related to the right to conduct court proceedings and government
business in the Armenian language. Specifically, they want the central
government to make the Armenian language a state language equal to
Georgian in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region. Reiterating the alleged
threat to the rights of Armenians in Georgia, the appeal also demanded
political autonomy for the region.
The rally soon turned violent. The protesters, mostly youth, left the
government building and raided a local court chamber, ousting a Georgian
judge. They also attacked a building on Tbilisi State University’s
Akhalkalaki campus and a local Georgian Orthodox Church. Later on
Khachatur Stepanian, a representative of the council of Armenian civic
groups in Samtskhe-Javakheti, which organized the rally, attempted to
soften the anxiety and called the incident a “provocation” staged by
“someone else.”
On March 11, leaders of the public movement Multiethnic Georgia and the
Armenian Union in Georgia complained that police had brutally dispersed
the rally in Tsalka where “ethnic confrontation is increasingly becoming
a reason behind crimes.” They said that if tension in Tsalka and
Samtskhe-Javakheti continues, then Tbilisi would be forced to establish
direct presidential rule there.
Although Georgian Public Defender Sozar Subari investigated the Tsalka
incident and ruled it to be a “communal crime,” the majority of the
Armenian communities in these regions consider the incident to be a
demonstration of ethnic hatred towards Armenians, which they believe is
the result of the Georgian government’s misguided policies towards
ethnic minorities. They further alleged that Georgian law-enforcement
agents were working in tandem with those who committed the crime.
United Javakh, a radical Armenian organization in Samtskhe-Javakheti,
issued a statement accusing Tbilisi of “discriminatory policies” against
“the Armenian population of Javakh,” the Armenian nomenclature for the
region. They described the recent dismissal of the region’s ethnic
Armenian judges for ignorance of the Georgian language as “cynically
trampling on the rights of the Armenian-populated region.” Georgian
authorities insist the judges were dismissed for misconduct.
The United Javakh statement warned about “destructive trends in the
Georgian government’s policy” aimed at artificially creating a “climate
of ethnic intolerance” and “crushing the will of Javakh’s Armenian
population to protect its right to live in its motherland.” Finally the
statement demands that Tbilisi show “political prudence” and put an end
to the “infringement” of the Armenian community’s rights.
The content and tone of this and previous statements by United Javakh
and other radical Armenian organizations reportedly have strong backing
from political forces in Armenia. In fact, the statements recall the
language used by the Armenian community in Karabakh in its relations
with the Azerbaijani government before war erupted. Vardan Akopian,
chair of the Javakh Youth organization, argued, “The current situation
in Javakheti is a cross between situations in Nakhichevan and Karabakh.”
Several protestors explicitly cited the Karabakh precedent.
Symptomatically, on October 8, 2005, Garnik Isagulyan, the Armenian
president’s national security advisor, bluntly warned Tbilisi to be
“extremely cautious” with regard to Samtskhe-Javakheti “because any
minor provocation can turn into a large-scale clash” (EDM, October 12,
2005). Various Armenian political parties, officials, and media have
actively discussed the problems of the Armenian community in
Samtskhe-Javakheti. Some Armenian members of the Georgian parliament
linked this activity with the approaching parliamentary elections in
Armenia.
Recently Armenian Defense Minister Serge Sarkisian released a paper on
security issues in which he expressed concern over the situation in
Samtskhe-Javakheti. The excessively critical tone of the Armenian
minister towards Tbilisi’s policy in Samtskhe-Javakheti reportedly
alarmed Georgian politicians and analysts, but they preferred to stay
tight-lipped, perhaps to avoid upsetting the already-complex
Georgian-Armenian relationship (EDM, August 3, June 7, May 24, March 23,
2005). Russia has tried to capitalize on the problem by fueling tensions
in Akhalkalaki, location of a Russian military base slated for closure.
Although the Georgian government is continuously downplaying the ethnic
aspects of the disturbances in Armenian-populated regions, this factor
appears to lurk beneath the surface. Georgia remains Armenia’s sole
transport route to Russia and Europe due to the ongoing blockade by
Turkey and Azerbaijan. Thus an unstable Samtskhe-Javakheti would hardly
be a gain for Yerevan. However, the “Karabakh syndrome” should not be
removed from the agenda.
(Resonance, March 9, 11; Akhali Taoba, Civil Georgia, Rustavi-2, Regnum,
vesti.ru, March 11; Imedi-TV, March 10, 11)
–Zaal Anjaparidze
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
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Armenian Assembly of America
1140 19th Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: 202-393-3434
Fax: 202-638-4904
Email: [email protected]
Web:
PRESS RELEASE
April 10, 2006
CONTACT: Christine Kojoian
E-mail: [email protected]
U.S. AMBASSADOR TO ARMENIA JOHN EVANS HAILS MCC SIGNING DURING
ASSEMBLY’S PAN-ARMENIAN CONFERENCE
Washington, DC – U.S. Ambassador to Armenia John Evans hailed the
signing of a five-year $235 million Compact between Armenia and the
Millennium Challenge Corporation during the Armenian Assembly’s
National Banquet on March 27 in Washington, DC.
The Ambassador cautioned however that a country that is found eligible
for MCC funding must continue to remain eligible. Evans noted that
one of the criteria is meeting the MCC standard for ruling justly. In
his prepared remarks, the Ambassador urged Conference participants to
join in helping “Armenia achieve democratic elections in 2007 and
2008.”
The National Banquet was part of a major three-day pan-Armenian
Conference hosted by the Assembly, together with the Armenian General
Benevolent Union (AGBU) and the Eastern and Western Dioceses of the
Armenian Church.
Below is the full text of Ambassador Evans’ prepared speech:
This evening I want to explain what the United States is doing in the
Republic of Armenia with regard to the development of genuine
democracy and democratic elections. Under the FREEDOM Support Act,
the U.S. Government has contributed approximately $1.5 billion in
support of democratic and economic transition in Armenia.
Let me begin by reminding you that the United States is pursuing three
overarching goals in the South Caucasus. First, we hope to strengthen
security and stability in the entire region. This includes, most
notably, our efforts to help Armenia and Azerbaijan resolve the
Karabakh dispute, but it also includes assistance to the countries in
strengthening their border regimes so as to prevent the unauthorized
transit of dangerous materials. Second, we are attempting to
strengthen the economies of the countries in the area, all of which
are suffering from under- or maldevelopment. Third, we are attempting
to strengthen the political systems of the three countries by
encouraging the growth of genuine democratic cultures and
institutions. Now to Armenia specifically.
All the basic preconditions for Armenia to be a leading democracy in
the region are present. A mix of cultural, historical, educational
and social factors, including extensive ties with the great Western
democracies, particularly the United States and France, give Armenia
a theoretical advantage; however, some other factors — the legacy of
Soviet misrule, the unsolved Karabakh issue, and too intimate a
relationship between economic and political power — have delayed the
appearance of a vibrant democracy in Armenia. The badly flawed
constitutional referendum in late November was a stark reminder that
important work still has to be done if Armenia is to reach its
potential as a democratic state. Ultimately it will take a
combination of administrative improvements, increased capacity on the
part of elections officials, political parties and civil society, and
political will on the part of the Armenian authorities for elections
that meet international democratic standards to become a reality.
But the lessons of the last few years should be clear: any government
that falsifies elections is taking an enormous risk. We do not think
Armenia can afford another set of bad elections next time. In
addition, the Millennium Challenge Compact that was signed today is
contingent on Armenia’s remaining qualified for that assistance. This
requires that its pattern of actions not be contrary to the
independent, objective criteria used to select it for eligibility.
One of those criteria is meeting standards for “ruling justly.”
Even before the November referendum, those of us working on this issue
at the U.S. Mission in Yerevan had decided there was no time to waste.
Last summer we devised a program of assistance specifically aimed at
helping Armenia achieve democratic elections in 2007 (legislative) and
2008 (presidential). We announced the program in late October, at an
estimated cost of between $6 and $7 million, and it is now underway.
Our program has nine basic elements: 1) cleaning up the voters’ lists;
2) helping build capacity for administering elections properly; 3)
supporting voter education; 4) training judges to adjudicate electoral
disputes; 5) increasing public interest in elections and promoting a
democratic political culture; 6) developing unbiased and professional
polling capacity; 7) working with political parties, especially with
young people and women; 8) supporting domestic monitoring of elections
and the media; and 9) training and technical assistance for
journalists and media professionals covering elections. And let me
stress: our assistance aims to support the democratic process, not
parties or individuals.
In pursuing this program, we are not alone. Many Armenians both in
and out of the government want to see free and fair elections in 2007
and 2008. And we are joined by the European Union, the OSCE and the
Council of Europe in pressing for necessary improvements. Earlier
this month, the ambassadors of most of the OSCE participating states
met in Yerevan and issued a public call for free and fair elections.
Although resistance to change is formidable in some quarters, there
are other parts of the society that desperately want change. The
United States is not a newcomer to the challenge of building
democratic institutions in Armenia. We have been involved in this
process for ten years already. We were actively involved in
encouraging reforms during previous elections…but we believe that a
major push is necessary at this time. We need to build capacity, and
we need also to stiffen the political will of some leading figures.
But this is where you come in. You have made many contributions,
often simply by example. We know that many of you continue to
contribute to building a democratic culture in Armenia in many
different ways. But what I ask of you tonight is that you join with
us over the next fifteen months with a major push to help Armenia
achieve democratic elections in 2007 and 2008, following up on your
efforts in 2003. Many of you interact with Armenians both in and out
of the Government. We hope you will stress to them how important it
is for Armenia to hold elections that meet international
standards. Armenia’s government needs to know that the broad
international community — not only the U.S. Ambassador – is watching
and expects a better process. We invite you to become more deeply
acquainted with our program: a wealth of relevant information is
available on our Embassy website through our new Democracy link. As
appropriate, feel free to direct your Armenian contacts to these
resources, or have them talk to us.
Ladies and Gentlemen,
Without hydrocarbons, without great natural resources, and fated to
live in a difficult neighborhood, Armenia has to live by its wits, and
by its ability to build a just and free society based on the rule of
law. The Millennium Challenge Compact that was signed earlier today,
as it is implemented over the next five years, will help. And with
your help, we believe Armenia’s future is bright.
The Armenian Assembly is the largest Washington-based nationwide
organization promoting public understanding and awareness of Armenian
issue. The Armenian General Benevolent Union is the world’s largest
philanthropic organization devoted to education, cultural and
humanitarian efforts. Both are 501(c)(3) tax-exempt membership
organizations.
The Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern) is the
spiritual and administrative head of the Armenian Apostolic Church in
the Eastern United States. The Eastern Diocese and its counterpart,
the Western Diocese of the Armenian Church of America, exist under the
authority of the ancient Mother See of the Armenian Church in Holy
Etchmiadzin.
####
NR#2006-032
Photograph available on the Assembly Web site at the following link:
/2006-032-1.jpg
Caption: U.S. Ambassador to Armenia John Evans at the Armenian
Assembly’s National Banquet on March 27.

PRESS OFFICE
Diocese of the Armenian Church of America (Eastern)
630 Second Avenue, New York, NY 10016
Contact: Jake Goshert, Coordinator of Information Services
Tel: (212) 686-0710 Ext. 60; Fax: (212) 779-3558
E-mail: [email protected]
Website:
April 10, 2006
___________________
DIOCESE-LED RETREAT FOCUSES ON CONVERSATIONS WITH GOD
How do we know God? How did our faith form into a church? How do we best
treat each other?
These were just a few of the issues raised during a day-long retreat led by
staff from the Eastern Diocese and held at the Holy Ascension Church in
Trumbull, CT, on Saturday, March 25, 2006.
“We must continue to give our people more opportunities to focus on prayer
and learning what it is to be an Armenian Christian,” said participant
Dottie Bengoian.
The lecture was titled, “Where Two or Three are Gathered: The Power of
Praying Together.” It included discussions on the Lord’s Prayer; on the
foundations and feelings created from the Armenian Divine Liturgy; and on
the differences between praying alone and in groups.
“This was a thought-provoking day, which allowed me to personally examine my
beliefs and faith in a quiet setting and also in a group,” said participant
Linda McGann. “I learned a great deal, not only about myself and my fellow
parishioners, but about my Armenian Church.”
Thirty-six people, including parishioners from Trumbull and the nearby St.
Gregory the Enlightener Church of White Plains, NY, attended the session,
led by two members of the Diocese’s Department of Youth and Education: Elise
Antreassian, coordinator of Christian education, and Nancy Basmajian,
executive secretary for the Armenian Church Youth Organization of America
(ACYOA).
Along with parishioners, the attendees included parish council leaders and
Sunday School educators. Also at the session were Fr. Untzag Nalbandian,
pastor of the church in Trumbull; Fr. Karekin Kasparian, pastor of the
church in White Plains; and the visiting Fr. Daniel Karadjian, pastor of the
St. Sarkis Church of Charlotte, NC.
“This retreat created a lot of discussion and provided a deep understanding
of our Christian life,” said participant Hermon Telyan.
The session was part of series of events marking the 75th anniversary of the
Trumbull parish.
“This retreat was one of the most spiritually uplifting events we’ve had as
we continue our celebration,” said Fr. Nalbandian.
Organizers of the event say it was definitely a success because the
participants were obviously moved.
“At one point, after reading the Lord’s Prayer and reflecting on its
meaning, we joined together in a group prayer which was created by the
immediate thoughts of the participants,” Antreassian said. “And in that one
moment, the group connected. Our thoughts blended. As each person spoke
individually to God, our prayers became one call for His guidance and mercy
and love.”
For information on organizing these types of retreats in your parish,
contact Elise Antreassian, coordinator of Christian education, by e-mailing
[email protected].
— 4/10/06
E-mail photos available on request. Photos also viewable in the News and
Events section of the Eastern Diocese’s website,
PHOTO CAPTION (1): Parishioners from two parishes gather at the Church of
the Holy Ascension in Trumbull, CT, for a one-day retreat focused on prayer
on March 25, 2006.
PHOTO CAPTION (2): On March 25, 2006, 36 parishioners and priests gathered
to discuss prayer during a one-day session led by members of the Diocesan
staff.
PHOTO CAPTION (3): Elise Antreassian, coordinator of Christian education
for the Eastern Diocese, along with ACYOA Executive Secretary Nancy
Basmajian, led the workshop on prayer at the Church of the Holy Ascension in
Trumbull, CT, on Saturday, March 25, 2006.

AGBU Press Office
55 East 59th Street
New York, NY 10022-1112
Phone: 212.319.6383, x128
Fax: 212.319.6507
Email: [email protected]
Website:
Monday, April 10, 2006
AGEMIAN ORGANIZATION ESTABLISHES YEARLY DONATION OF $10,000 CAD TO AGBU TORONTO

The Agemian Organization recently established a $1 million CAD
philanthropic fund to be administered by the Agemian and Moussakhanian
families in Toronto, Canada, in order to support various national and
international non-profit endeavors, one of which is the AGBU Toronto
Chapter.
Initiated by Souren & Lili Agemian, and administered by their
children, Souren Jr. & Rosemary Agemian, and Eddie & Carol
Moussakhanian, the fund reaches out to a myriad of worthy causes
within Ontario and beyond. Carol Moussakhanian, Executive Director of
the fund, stated, “[I am] pleased to submit our first check to AGBU,
which I am sure you will put to good use.” The three families plan to
send a similar amount every year.
An annual donation of $10,000 from the fund to AGBU Toronto will help
support the numerous activities and programs organized by the Chapter
that keep the community energized. The senior Agemians, who are AGBU
Honor Members, are no strangers to the local Armenian circle. For more
than two decades, they have been very active within both the local
AGBU community and many other worthy Armenian associations abroad.

“It is quite exciting to see that the second generation of Armenian
immigrants realize the importance of organizations like AGBU and the
necessary work being performed to preserve our Armenian heritage,”
said Eugene Karadjian, Secretary-Treasurer & Director of AGBU Toronto.
The AGBU Toronto Chapter is committed to preserving and promoting the
Armenian identity and heritage through educational, cultural and
humanitarian programs. For more information on AGBU Toronto, please
email [email protected].
For more information on AGBU and its worldwide chapters, please visit

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Thursday, March 30, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 62
IN THIS ISSUE:
*New president fails to halt violence in Dagestan
*Turkey’s role to increase under Azerbaijan’s latest Caspian gas proposal
*World Azerbaijani Congress spoils Iranian-Azerbaijani relations

DAGESTAN CONTINUES TO SINK INTO CHAOS DESPITE APPOINTMENT OF NEW LEADER
More than a month has passed since the Kremlin appointed a new leader
for Dagestan, the largest republic in the North Caucasus. On February
20, Russian President Vladimir Putin put 65-year-old Mukhu Aliev at
the helm of the North Caucasus republic and Dagestan’s legislature
readily confirmed the choice for president.
Many observers in Russia favored the appointment. Some even called the
decision to appoint Aliev “a rare example of the right decision of the
Kremlin in its North Caucasian policy.” The observers expressed hopes
that Aliev, a long-time Communist party boss and an experienced
administrator, would improve the Dagestani economy, fight corruption,
and repel the growing local insurgency. In particular, Moscow regards
Aliev as a figure who can oppose the mighty clan of Magomedali
Magomedov, Aliev’s predecessor, who had ruled Dagestan for 14 years
(see EDM, February 23).
However, after one month in office, doubts began to appear regarding
his ability to change the deteriorating situation. Apparently the
insurgency ignored the leadership change and kept to their plans to
launch a spring campaign. On February 24 a police patrol was attacked
in the town of Khasavyurt. Then on March 10, Magomed Magomedov,
deputy head of the republican Criminal Investigation Department, was
killed in Makhachkala, the republican capital, by a bomb planted
underneath his car. Two days later, March 12, a senior officer from
the Organized Crime Department was shot dead in Makhachkala, and
another was killed on March 21 in the town of Buinaksk. On March 29,
two policemen were wounded in a shoot-out with rebels in the capital.
As reported earlier, on March 2 during a security sweep of several
villages in Khasavyurt district, Russian troops desecrated a Koran,
the holy book of all Muslims. This incident only added fuel to the
fire (see EDM, March 23).
In addition to the standoff between militancy and security officials,
Dagestan was also hit by waves of criminal violence and unrest this
March. On March 20, the family of a businessman was killed in the
capital. There were three brazen robberies in Dagestan during the last
two months, including two attacks on pension delivery vehicles in
Khasavyurt and Makhachkala, and one robbery of a pension payment
office in the village of Baba-Urt (Kavkazky Uzel, March 22).
On March 20, residents from the village of Korkmaskala, in
Kyimtorkalin district, tried to storm a local office building to
protest what they considered to be an unfair land distribution
scheme. The police special-task unit guarding the building opened
fire, and 20 people were injured. Shamil Zainalov, the new prime
minister of Dagestan, had to go to the area to personally resolve the
conflict (Interfax, March 20).
There were also two attacks on district administration heads. On March
10, there was an assassination attempt on the head of the
administration of Magarmakent district (regions.ru, March 10). On
March 22, gunmen shot dead Ruslan Aliev, head of the mountainous
Botlikh district, who was returning home after a meeting with
President Aliev and other Dagestani district chiefs. Ruslan Aliyev’s
vehicle was struck by gunfire in the center of Makhachkala, on the
city’s most guarded street (Kavkazky Uzel, March 22).
Despite the rapidly increasing rebel attacks, unrest, and criminal
violence, there were still some hopes that the new leader of Dagestan
could at least partly succeed with economic and political
reforms. Aliev’s first changes within the republican government
generated a belief that he might indeed be able to shake up the
political structure of Dagestan, which has been completely based on
clan connections and bribery. The most odious figures in the
government, like Umalat Nasrutdinov, the minister of agriculture, and
Marat Ilyasov, the minister of economy, both of whom became ministers
thanks to family ties, were replaced (Kavkazky Uzel, March 10).
Nevertheless, the most powerful clans in Dagestan, that of former
president Magomedali Magomedov and Makhachkala mayor Said Amirov, have
not relinquished their positions yet. On the same day that Aliev was
appointed, Magomed-Salam Magomedov, son of Magomedali, became chairman
of the republican parliament. With the help of his farther,
Magomed-Salam had become one of the richest and most powerful tycoons
in Dagestan. A member of the Board of Elbin-Bank and a member of the
Working Group for Offshore Oil Resources of the Dagestani Sector of
the Caspian Sea, Magomed-Salam is also the unofficial owner of many
local businesses and real estate. The position of parliamentarian
leader will help Magomedov’s family to legalize their control over the
republican economy. There are rumors circulating in Dagestan that next
year Magomedov Jr. might claim the post of prime minister of Dagestan.
Said Amirov, an old rival of Magomedov and the deeply entrenched mayor
of Makhachkala, also remains a strong and independent political figure
in the region. On March 13, Amirov was elected mayor for the third
time in elections that independent observers described as fraudulent
(Kavkazky Uzel, March 13).
So far the new leadership in Dagestan has not successfully implemented
any of the tasks that the Russian authorities had entrusted to it. The
clans remain strong while the chaos and violence in the region
continues.
–Andrei Smirnov and Mikhail Roshchin
AZERBAIJAN SPEARHEADING INITIATIVE ON TRANS-CASPIAN GAS PIPELINE
Addressing an international energy conference in progress in Baku,
Azerbaijan’s Industry and Energy Minister Natig Aliyev outlined the
advantages of a trans-Caspian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan and
Kazakhstan via the South Caucasus to European markets. Natig Aliyev
underscored the project’s value for diversifying supplies and
restraining prices as well as the favorable international context for
this project, as Western interest rebounds in the wake of this
winter’s disruption in supplies. Urging Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to
become part of the project without waiting for approval from other
Caspian countries — an allusion to Russia and Tehran — Aliyev noted
that any impediments to a seabed pipeline are political, not technical
ones.
A trans-Caspian seabed pipeline “would ensure Europe’s energy security
and protect it from Russian monopolism,” Aliyev remarked. “Europe has
understood that it is naive to place all its hopes on Russian gas. The
events of recent months, when Russia has in effect demonstrated its
status as a monopolist, indicate that prices will rise further.” Thus,
the timing is now ripe for starting the negotiations (AP, Turan,
Trend, Ekho [Baku], March 29).
The preceding week, Russia opposed the trans-Caspian pipeline proposal
during a routine meeting of the five riparian countries on defining
the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Russia, which happens to be the
leading industrial polluter of that sea, cited environmental risks in
opposing a trans-Caspian pipeline and claimed that any such project
requires approval from all five countries. Azerbaijan took the lead in
refuting Russia’s position (RIA-Novosti, March 22). Azerbaijan,
seconded by Kazakhstan, upholds the right of Caspian countries to make
sovereign decisions about laying pipelines on their respective seabed
sectors.
Baku estimates the construction costs at billion for a pipeline with
an annual capacity of 30 billion cubic meters that would run from the
eastern Caspian shore, across the seabed to Azerbaijan, and further
via Georgia into Turkey. With Turkey as a transit corridor, the gas
could be piped to European Union member countries in southern and
central Europe. The concept largely follows that promoted by the
United States in 1996-2001, primarily in Europe’s interest, though
amid European indifference at that stage. Azerbaijan and Georgia were
firmly on board the U.S.-led project, Turkmenistan prevaricated, and
Turkey mismanaged the negotiations.
The updated concept, now under exploratory discussion by the same
countries with European participation for the first time, includes
major novel elements, such as:

a) The opportunity for Kazakhstan to joint the project;

b) Turkey’s role as transit corridor to Europe, rather than consumer
country as had earlier been envisaged;

c) Massive input from Azerbaijan’s Shah-Deniz gas field into the
proposed pipeline via Turkey to Europe (the offshore field’s
anticipated yield is 20 billion cubic meters annually, almost twice
the earlier projection, and most of it available for delivery to
Europe); and

d) Possibly integrating the Caspian gas pipeline with the Nabucco
project (Turkey-Bulgaria-Romania-Hungary-Austria) by connecting the
two planned lines near Erzurum in eastern Turkey.
Turkmen President Saparmurat Niyazov has signaled an intention to
rejoin negotiations on the trans-Caspian pipelines. Receiving a
Turkish delegation (unrelated to the energy sector) in Ashgabat,
Niyazov offered on live television, “We can provide you with cheap gas
… I had already made such an offer to you in the past, but your
leadership was slow to act and failed to get the Turkmen gas in
time. At present, you are purchasing expensive gas and it does not
even match your demand” (Turkmen Television Channel One, March
19). Niyazov was alluding to Turkish government officials who made it
possible for Gazprom’s pipeline across the Black Sea to defeat the
U.S.-proposed trans-Caspian pipeline in the race for Turkey’s gas
market in 2001. Those Turkish officials have since been investigated
and indicted for having secretly agreed on onerous terms of purchase
for Russian gas.
Turkey has recently been paying 3 per one thousand cubic meters of
Russian gas, and Gazprom recently demanded a hike to 3, which Turkey
finds unacceptable (Zaman, February 2). Meanwhile, the pipeline across
the Black Sea is being underutilized while Turkey’s gas market is
oversubscribed. The initial trans-Caspian project had targeted the
Turkish market as main downstream destination. In the new
circumstances, Turkey’s role can change from that of a potential
consumer of Caspian gas to that of a transit country for Caspian gas
to Europe.
–Vladimir Socor
NEW TENSIONS COMPLICATE RELATIONS BETWEEN BAKU AND TEHRAN
More than 600 representatives of Azerbaijani diaspora organizations in
49 countries assembled in Baku on March 16 for the second World
Azerbaijani Congress. The event was organized by the State Committee
on the Affairs of Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, which was established in
2003 by a decree from then-President Heydar Aliyev to help unite all
Azerbaijanis abroad.
The event was grandiose both in scale and impact. The goal of showing
the unity of millions of Azerbaijanis around the world for the sake of
an independent, strong, and prosperous Azerbaijan was achieved. The
Congress discussed issues regarding coordination among the Azerbaijani
diaspora organizations, strengthening relations with other nations’
diaspora organizations, promoting information about Azerbaijan around
the world, and building relations with foreign governments.
As a result of the Congress’ work, a new strategy was developed
regarding the activities of the Azerbaijani diaspora in other
countries and the joint activities of the Azerbaijani and Turkish
diaspora organizations. Moreover, Congress participants adopted a
resolution addressed to Azerbaijanis around the world, foreign
governments, and international organizations regarding Armenian
aggression toward Azerbaijan.
Yet, the Congress made news not so much for its work, but for a row
that erupted between Azerbaijan and Iran after the Congress. The
Iranian ambassador to Azerbaijan, Afshar Suleymani, reacted very
angrily and emotionally to the speeches given at the World Azerbaijani
Congress by some representatives of Azerbaijani diaspora organizations
in Europe. These delegates called for the unification of North
Azerbaijan (the independent Republic of Azerbaijan) and South
Azerbaijan (in northern Iran, populated by Azerbaijanis and considered
by Azerbaijanis as part of a once-unified Azerbaijani state). The
speech by Javad Derekhti, an Azerbaijani from the Iranian Azerbaijan,
was particularly provocative, because he talked about human rights
violations suffered by ethnic Azerbaijanis in Iran (Trend News Agency,
March 16).
The Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828, which ended the three-decade
Russian-Iranian War eventually divided Azerbaijan into two parts along
the banks of the Araz River. It is estimated that more than 25 million
ethnic Azerbaijanis currently live in Iran, but they have no rights to
be educated in their native language and any attempts to organize
movements for cultural autonomy are strongly repressed by the
authorities in Tehran. Iran is extremely touchy about this issue and
has kept its distance from official Baku for most of the 1990s exactly
because of the issue of Azerbaijani separatism in Iran.
Suleymani tore into these speeches in a press release from the Iranian
embassy on March 17. “Iran is deeply upset about the participation of
some anti-Iranian elements in the Congress and their provocative
statements on the issues of Iran’s domestic affairs,” it read. “The
Embassy considers these steps to contradict the friendly relations
between the brotherly nations and those commitments taken by the
Azerbaijani government in the treaty of 2002, sighed in Tehran. The
Embassy is very surprised about the references at the Congress to the
Turkmanchai Treaty of 1828 and mentioning Azerbaijan as a divided
country.”
The Iranian Foreign Ministry also sent a protest note to the
Azerbaijani ambassador in Iran. The row intensified after remarks by
the Iranian ambassador regarding Azerbaijani poets Nizami and
Shahriyar, whom he called “Iranian poets.” This caused an immediate
protest from the Azerbaijani Writers Union, saying, “The Union deeply
regrets and is surprised that the ambassador made such remarks and
demands an immediate end to such uneducated discoveries” (APA News
Agency, March 24).
The Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign Affairs reacted to the Iranian
ambassador’s complaints by asking him to calm his emotions. Speaking
at a press conference the next day, Tahir Tagi-zadeh, the head of the
informational department of the Azerbaijani Ministry of Foreign
Affairs said, “The speeches made at the World Azerbaijani Congress by
representative of the public organizations are their personal
opinions. The emotional speeches of the ambassadors might spoil the
cooperation based on the principles of friendship and good
neighborliness” (day.az, March 17).
Nazim Ibrahimov, head of the State Committee on the Affairs of
Azerbaijanis Living Abroad, also downplayed the significance of
speeches, saying they were private opinions of Congress
participants. “The State Committee has functioned for three years
already, and we have never interfered in the internal issues of Iran”
he explained (AzTV, March 20).
The issue continues to be a hot topic of discussion in the local
press, with a majority of Azerbaijani politicians and intelligentsia
condemning the actions of the Iranian ambassador and calling for a
renewed discussion of the human rights situation of Azerbaijanis in
Iran. Yet some diplomats and experts in the country believe that the
Iranian ambassador’s remarks were intentionally aggressive, meant to
scare off the United States from using the ethnic card to weaken the
regime in Tehran.
–Fariz Ismailzade

The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation,
is edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those
of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of
the Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the
content of EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in
error, please respond to [email protected].
Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.

The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)

Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.

PRESS RELEASE
Strassler Family Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies
Tel: 508-793-8897
Web:
April 10, 2006
Clark’s Payaslian to speak about Politics and the Armenian Genocide on
April 20
LECTURE
“Power, Politics, and the Armenian Genocide”
Thursday, April 20, 2006
Tilton Hall, Clark University
7:30 p.m.
Simon Payaslian, Kaloosdian/Mugar Chair of Armenian Genocide Studies at
Clark University, will discuss the advent of the United States as a
global power and its correlation with the internalization of the
Armenian question in the late nineteenth century. Payaslian will
discuss how the Wilson administration (1913-1921) promoted American
missionary and economic interests while still maintaining friendly
relations with the Ottoman government during the Armenian Genocide.
This lecture is free and open to the public and is sponsored by the
Strassler Family Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies. For more
information, call 508-793-8897.

Eurasia Daily Monitor — The Jamestown Foundation
Monday, March 13, 2006 — Volume 3, Issue 49
IN THIS ISSUE:
*Kremlin defends its place among the G-8
*Putin makes “historic” visit to Algeria
*Aliyev tours Japan, seeking investors
MOSCOW COUNTS THE PROS AND CONS OF “SELECTIVE COOPERATION”
Until very recently the Kremlin dismissed the possibility that
Washington might seriously reevaluate the format and style of its
relations with Russia. At his extended press conference on January 31,
Russian President Vladimir Putin ridiculed the “adversaries” who
expressed doubt about Russia’s place in the G-8 because, “They are stuck
in the previous century.” His confidence was based on a unique insight:
“I know the mood of the G-8 leaders.” Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,
returning from an official visit to Washington last week, has to break
some very unpleasant news to his boss: The prospects now look rather
different from the picture so aptly described by Putin as: “The dog
barks, the caravan rolls on.”
During Lavrov’s visit, the Council on Foreign Relations Task Force
chaired by John Edwards and Jack Kemp released its report, “Russia’s
Wrong Direction: What the U.S. Can and Should Do.” The report received
extensive comment in the Russian media (Kommersant, March 9; Ekho
Moskvy, March 12). Some newspapers added critical opinions of other
experts (Izvestiya, March 9) and some noted that the Council on Foreign
Relations was not exactly the think tank closest to the White House and
that Ambassador Stephen Sestanovich, who directed the work, was a key
figure in the Clinton administration (Vremya novostei, March 7), but
some reports emphasized the clear link between the conclusions about
Moscow advancing in the wrong direction and the criticism of Russia in
the U.S. State Department’s report on human rights (Nezavisimaya gazeta,
March 10; Gazeta.ru, March 9). Meaningful parallels were drawn
with Winston Churchill’s famous Fulton speech that marked the onset of
the Cold War exactly 60 years ago (Ezhednevny zhurnal, March 9).
It might appear ironic, but the main thesis of the Task Force report —
that the progressive curtailing of democracy in Russia leaves space only
for limited and selective cooperation with the United States — is
entirely compatible with the recent course of Russian foreign policy.
Indeed, if Moscow wholeheartedly embraces Uzbekistan as a strategic ally
after the Karimov regime brutally suppressed a popular uprising in
Andijan and expelled the U.S. Karshi-Khanabad airbase, it follows that
the Russia-U.S. “strategic partnership” is somewhat limited. The
divergence between the Kremlin and the White House is now most apparent
in the Middle East. Lavrov managed to provide U.S. Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice with sufficient explanations about the motives for
inviting the Palestinian Hamas delegation to Moscow and the content of
the rather unproductive talks, but then he rushed to join
Putin in Algeria where a .5 billion deal on selling Russian arms was
finalized (Kommersant, March 11). The Edwards-Kemp Report singled out
Iran as the most promising area for in-depth cooperation, but the start
of discussions in the UN Security Council on its nuclear program has
shown that Russia is resolutely against any sanctions, so this promise
quite probably will also prove a disappointment (Newsru.com, March 10).
Emphasizing the readiness to challenge the opinions of Western partners,
the Russian Foreign Ministry resolutely rejected the “double standards”
in the latest State Department report on human rights (Lenta.ru, March
10). Lavrov even sought to pre-empt the attack from Washington with an
article that outlined the fundamental differences in foreign policy
philosophy, focusing on projects for advancing democracy and freedom in
the world that were unacceptable for Moscow (Moskovskie novosti, March
3). These differences became even sharper in the programmatic speech of
Vladislav Surkov, deputy head of the presidential administration and the
chief “ideologist” in the Kremlin, who stressed the crucial importance
of Russia’s “sovereignty,” understood as its ability to manage its own
affairs and thus “politically synonymous with competitiveness”
(Vedomosti, March 6).
Two things spoil the prospects for “selective cooperation” for Moscow.
The first one is the fact that the privilege to chair the G-8 in 2006
was granted to Russia as a confirmation of its role of “strategic
partner,” so the devaluation of this role logically leads to shrinking
of this privilege. Moscow attaches enormous importance to organizing a
perfect summit in St. Petersburg so even jokes by some British
columnists about European guests demonstratively leaving the banquet
table before the dessert is served can hit a raw nerve (Financial Times,
March 10). The CFR Task Force, however, proposes something more serious:
The revival of the G-7 format, which might be complemented by a wider
group where Brazil, China, and India together with Russia could be full
members (Gazeta.ru, March 9). Such a prospect would signify a
devastating blow to Putin’s ambitions, particularly if U.S. President
George W. Bush would indeed find a good reason to stay home in July, as
an increasing number of experts advise.
The second problem with stepping back from partnership to cooperation is
that the Russian political elite that appears so tightly united around
Putin is in fact pursuing a variety of strategies of personal
integration with the West (Kommersant, February 17). Surkov argued that
the “off-shore aristocracy” could be transformed into a real nationally
oriented elite, but his audience had plenty of reasons to worry for the
safety of their private connections with Europe, as Russia retreats into
a progressively more “selective” cooperation that increasingly resembles
self-isolation (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 7).
One soothing message for the “patriotic” but intimately Westernized
bureaucrats was Anatol Lieven’s article entitled “Do not condemn Putin
out of hand” (Financial Times, February 28) reprinted in the pro-Kremlin
tabloid Komsomolskaya pravda (March 2). His insistence on giving the
benefit of the doubt to Putin’s courtiers who “will move freely between
the state and market sectors, and in the process will be handsomely
rewarded” earned scornful condemnation from liberal Russian commentators
(Grani.ru, March 6). What makes this kind of argument more convincing is
that it is always so much easier not to take demanding steps that would
require consistent follow-up, presuming that the ability of the West to
influence Moscow is quite limited. It is in fact far greater than even
the authors of the Task Force report admit, and Russia’s dependency upon
the EU energy market provides more
instruments for a pro-active policy. It is not too late for President
Bush to take a new look in Putin’s eyes and re-evaluate the Russian
leader’s intentions.
–Pavel K. Baev
RUSSIA POISED FOR BOLD INROADS INTO WEST’S ENERGY SUPPLY SYSTEMS
On March 10-11, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid what he
characterized as an “historic” visit to Algeria. The trip was the first
by a Kremlin leader since the Soviet heads of state and government,
Nikolai Podgorny and Alexei Kosygin, visited in 1969 and 1971,
respectively, during the heyday of the Moscow-Algiers strategic
partnership. Putin portrayed his visit as a resumption of that
partnership.
This time around, the Kremlin puts energy at the center of the
partnership as it seeks to undercut Western interests in that country.
Algeria is one of the main non-Russian suppliers of oil and gas to
Western Europe, and — thanks to liquified gas — a potential supplier
to North America as well. West European policymakers often cite Algeria
as one of several supply sources that could to some extent offset
Western dependence on Russia.
Putin, accompanied by Gazprom chairman Alexei Miller and other top
energy sector executives, offered Russian participation in oil and gas
projects in Algeria and on Algeria’s export markets. Russian and
Algerian officials discussed a draft framework agreement whereby Russian
companies would participate in international tenders for field
exploration and development, modernization of Algeria’s oil and gas
transport systems, and construction of additional transport capacities.
Further under these proposals, Algerian and Russian companies would
coordinate their positions on international gas markets, including
possible joint marketing. Algeria’s main export markets for gas and oil
are France, Spain, Italy, and Turkey.
Russia’s Gazprom and Rosneft state companies, Lukoil, and Stroytransgaz
(a state company for gas pipeline construction) are the main entities
slated to participate in such projects from the Russian side. Algeria’s
state company Sonatrak plans to sign a framework agreement in April in
Moscow on cooperation with Russian companies.
Russia lags behind Algeria and France with regard to liquid gas.
Consequently, Moscow is keen to cooperate in this field with a view to
entering international LNG (liquified natural gas) markets. According to
Russian officials during this visit, Gazprom’s first-ever delivery of
LNG to the United States in September 2005 was based on a swap deal with
Gaz de France and Sonatrak. Algeria is ranked fourth worldwide for gas
exports and seventh worldwide for gas reserves (although this ranking
should not be taken literally as long as gas reserves in Turkmenistan,
other Central Asian countries, and around the Persian Gulf are only
incompletely estimated).
In a parallel set of proposals, Putin’s delegation proposed that Russia
participate in the modernization of Algeria’s armed forces. The Russian
side offered air defense systems, combat planes, infantry weapons and
field ordnance, and naval craft to Algeria. These proposals are
reminiscent of the Soviet arms offers to Arab countries including
Algeria (as referenced by Putin) in that they seek to create
multidimensional dependency by the recipient country on Russia, with the
difference this time around that any arms deal with Algeria would likely
be on a commercial basis (Interfax, March 10-11)
On March 10, Germany’s E.ON Ruhrgas announced that it is holding talks
with Gazprom on identifying assets of the Germany company that would be
turned over to Gazprom in accordance with agreements signed last year.
E.ON Ruhrgas and BASF’s subsidiary Wintershall are the two German major
gas import and distribution companies that signed agreements in April
and September 2005 with Gazprom on German participation in gas field
development in Siberia, construction of the Baltic seabed pipeline from
Russia to Germany, and takeover of assets in Germany’s internal gas
distribution networks by Gazprom. Such takeovers by Gazprom are slated
to extend deeper into European Union territory, as those German
companies own stakes in the gas transport and distribution companies of
several other EU countries.
At present, Gazprom holds a 50% stake plus one share, and Wintershall
50% minus one share in Siberia’s Yuzhno-Russkoye gas field, the source
of the pipeline planned to run toward the Baltic Sea and further on the
seabed to Germany. For its part, Wintershall has ceded some of its
internal German gas distribution systems to Gazprom via the joint
company Wingas, consisting of 50% plus one share for Wintershall and 50%
minus one share for Gazprom. The Russian monopoly has given E.ON Ruhrgas
the option to acquire half of Wintershall’s stake in Yuzhno-Russkoye, in
which case the two German companies would each provide 25% of the total
capital investment. For its part, E.ON Ruhrgas must turn over to Gazprom
some internal German gas distribution systems via a parity joint company
along the same lines as the Wintershall-Gazprom company (Interfax, March
10).
–Vladimir Socor
AZERBAIJAN SIGNALS EASTWARD TILT WITH PRESIDENTIAL VISIT TO JAPAN
President Ilham Aliyev’s official visit to Japan on March 8 marks
another milestone in Azerbaijan’s slow re-orientation toward Asia.
During the visit, he met with Japanese Emperor Akihito, Prime Minister
Junichiro Koizumi, Foreign Minister Taro Aso, and the head of the
Japanese International Development Agency (ANS TV, March 8). Aliyev and
Koizumi signed several agreements to expand bilateral cooperation.
Aliyev delivered a keynote speech at the Japanese Institute for
International Relations and attended a business forum that hosted more
than 150 businessmen from both countries (Echo, March 8). Hosting
business forums in conjunction with President Aliyev’s visits abroad has
become a regular event, which shows his strong commitment to developing
economic ties with foreign countries and attracting new investment to
Azerbaijan.
The business agenda for Aliyev’s visit is particularly noteworthy. It
included presidential meetings with the heads of several large Japanese
companies, including Itochu and Inpex, as well as with members of the
Japanese-Azerbaijani Parliamentary Friendship Society.
The growing Japanese demand for energy makes Tokyo a reliable and eager
partner of Azerbaijan, which is increasing its oil production
year-by-year. At the same time, the development of infrastructure in
Azerbaijan requires technical assistance from abroad. During the visit,
Azerbaijan and Japan signed an agreement on the provision of technical
assistance to Azerbaijan by the Japanese government (Trend, March 7).
One of the key goals of President Aliyev’s visit was to draw more
Japanese investments into the Azerbaijani economy, particularly sectors
other than oil. Speaking at the Business Forum in Tokyo, Aliyev said,
“We have a very good investment climate. Azerbaijan highly values direct
foreign investments. We have received a great deal of assistance from
Japan in the past. But now, the time for real, active cooperation has
come” (Xalq Qazeti, March 12). During his meeting with President Aliyev,
Prime Minister Koizumi also noted the friendly nature of bilateral
relations and stressed that Japan was looking for reliable a partner in
the region (Sherg, March 11).
Japanese businesses have already invested more than 4 million in
Azerbaijan, primarily in the oil sector. Mitsui and Mitsubishi provided
Azerbaijan with loans up to 4 million for construction of the
“Severnaya” power generation plant in the vicinity of Azerbaijan’s
capital, Baku. The plant came online in early 2003. Altogether, Japan’s
overall assistance to Azerbaijan through various organizations has
reached 4 million, including million in grants (Turan, March 6).
Japan has been particularly keen on funding the construction and repair
of new public schools in Azerbaijan and providing educational
opportunities for the country’s youth. For his efforts to promote
education in Azerbaijan, former Japanese ambassador to Azerbaijan
Toshiyuki Fujiwara was awarded with the highest state prize ever given
to a foreign ambassador, the Order of Honor, and ANS Media Group named
him “Man of the Year.” Azerbaijan has opened a department of Japanese
language at Baku State University, where more than 40 students currently
study. Aliyev also hopes to draw the Japanese government’s attention to
the plight of internally displaced persons in Azerbaijan, a population
that receives less and less humanitarian assistance each year. Japan is
traditionally one of the largest humanitarian donors around the world.
With Western countries and organizations pressing Aliyev regarding
democratization, the Azerbaijani president feels much more comfortable
with the less-demanding Eastern partners. Thus, the development of
relations with the Middle Eastern countries as well as with China,
Japan, and Pakistan are seen as priorities. Although Azerbaijani foreign
policy officials continue to claim that the country is pursuing a
balanced foreign policy, a strong bias toward Asia is evident.
Azerbaijan also hopes that Japan will support its case regarding the
ongoing Karabakh conflict with Armenia. Baku is prepared to support
Japan’s nomination to the UN Security Council in exchange for help with
Karabakh. Lider TV reported on March 8 that President Aliyev had devoted
much of his speech at the Japanese Institute for International Relations
to the Karabakh conflict. Koizumi confirmed Japan’s recognition of
Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity during his private talks with Aliyev
(Sherg, March 11).
Ties between Japan and Azerbaijan are increasing markedly. First
established in 1992, bilateral relations skyrocketed following former
president Heydar Aliyev’s visit to Japan in 1998. Baku subsequently
negotiated with Japanese companies to secure their involvement in the
Ateshgeh, Mugandeniz, and Yanan Tava Caspian oil fields (Zerkalo, March
8). Azerbaijan recently opened a new embassy in Tokyo.
At the moment, Azerbaijani-Japanese trade is nearly .6 million, yet much
of it (.3 million) comes from imports of Japanese products into
Azerbaijan, such as steel pipes, electric appliances, transmissions,
spare parts, and telecommunication materials. Azerbaijan exports
alcohol, carpets, plastic, and textiles.
The visit should open new opportunities for bilateral cooperation.
Novruz Mammadov, head of the International Relations Department within
Aliyev’s office, told Trend News Agency on March 7, “The visit carries a
very important nature, both from the side of inter-governmental and also
inter-parliamentary relations. The purpose of the visit is to deepen
these relations in all spheres.”
–Fariz Ismailzade
The Eurasia Daily Monitor, a publication of the Jamestown Foundation, is
edited by Ann E. Robertson. The opinions expressed in it are those of
the individual authors and do not necessarily represent those of the
Jamestown Foundation. If you have any questions regarding the content of
EDM, or if you think that you have received this email in error, please
respond to [email protected].
Unauthorized reproduction or redistribution of EDM is strictly
prohibited by law.
The Jamestown Foundation
4516 43rd Street, NW
Washington, DC 20016
202-483-8888 (phone)
202-483-8337 (fax)
Copyright (c) 1983-2005 The Jamestown Foundation.